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ABSTRACT 
This thesis finds that the term ‘terrorist financing’ is a misnomer in that much of the activity 
encompassed by that term involves neither terrorism nor money.  Instead, terrorist financing 
more accurately refers either to the flow of economic and material value to ‘terrorist’ actors 
or specific material expressions of support to ‘terrorism,’ however that contested term is 
defined.  This finding not only directly challenges the dominant ways terrorist finance is now 
conceptualized, but also provides the first unified coherent conceptual framework capable of 
supporting systematic analysis of the topic.  This thesis arrives at this conclusion by first 
critically examining the various – and often contradictory or incoherent – normative, legal, 
and political contexts that dominate ‘orthodox’ thinking on terrorism and terrorist finance, 
and then relocating the financing of terrorism squarely in context of the everyday realities of 
how terrorism and terrorist actors interact with global and local political economies.   This 
thesis goes beyond existing critical works on terrorist financing, and constructs the necessary 
conceptual foundation for a vastly more coherent, systematic, and ultimately useful 
understanding of the financial and economic dimensions of terrorism.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2001, a body of ideas has evolved about the threat of ‘terrorist finance’ that has driven 
and justified various coordinated exercises of state and private sector power aimed at 
‘fighting’ terrorism by ‘attacking’ its financial underpinnings. Almost in parallel, however, a 
literature deeply critical of many of these ideas has emerged from within and outside 
academia, arguing that such ‘orthodox’ understandings of terrorist finance are severely 
dysfunctional, and at worst malignantly so.  In particular, these critiques demonstrate that 
such ‘orthodox’ approaches to conceptualizing terrorist finance are in many ways incoherent, 
incomplete, and inconsistent with both thorough theoretical investigation and empirical 
observation.  At the same time, however, this ‘critical literature’ on terrorist finance offers no 
coherent solutions to address the problems they identify.  This dissertation therefore seeks to 
take the first significant step beyond these critiques to construct an improved conceptual 
framework that can serve as a foundation for further – and better – research on terrorist 
finance within international security discourse.   
 
As such, the research question of this thesis is,  
How can the conceptualization of terrorist finance be improved; given the failings of 
current approaches to researching and analyzing terrorist financing that have been 
cited in the critical literature as well as the policy failures associated with these 
intellectual failings? 
To answer this question, the thesis employs primarily poststructuralist methods, but with the 
explicit aim of creating a framework for analysis of terrorist finance that is applicable to both 
positivist research as well as analysis that incorporates more critical and constructivist 
perspectives.  In particular, this dissertation first explores how orthodox understandings of 
terrorist finance generally ‘ask the wrong questions’ about terrorist financing; then presents 
an analysis of what, epistemically, the ‘right questions’ are; and ultimately proposes a new 
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typology of terrorist financing activity centered around the contextualized dynamics of 
individual-level political-economic interaction.  In particular, this thesis finds that the term 
‘terrorist financing’ is a misnomer in that much of the activity encompassed by the term 
involves neither terrorism nor money.  Instead, terrorist financing more accurately refers 
either to the exchanges of economic and material value that empower ‘terrorist’ actors, or 
specific material expressions of support to either ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorism’-related socio-
political movements – however this contested term is defined.  This typology and the 
improved conceptualization presented in the thesis, it is argued, constitute a framework for 
representing terrorism-related financial activity within which knowledge of the political 
economic dimensions of terrorist actors can be produced; knowledge that ultimately will be 
both more accurate and more useful than that currently available in existing discourse.   
 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and the consequent declaration of a 
‘Financial War’ on terrorism, ideas regarding the financial activities and interactions of 
terrorist actors coalesced into what de Goede calls  a “qualitative assemblage”1 of ideas about 
terrorism-related economic activity that over time achieved enough “resonance”2 among 
disparate discourses to ultimately form what this thesis refers to as an ‘orthodox’ approach to 
representing and conceptualizing terrorist finance.  This ‘orthodox’ ideational framework – 
despite being often incorrect, incoherent and internally contradictory – came to govern how 
governments, the private sector, and academia comprehended, researched, and responded to 
these activities and interactions.  In general terms, the orthodox approach, as elucidated ad 
hoc in various scholarly, journalistic, quasi-academic, and governmental literature, states that 
‘terrorist financing’ is a significant, discrete, and politically unproblematic (albeit empirically 
complex), international security threat that must be uncovered, confronted, and as much as 
                                                           
1 Marieke de Goede, "Money, Media, and the Anti-Politics of Terrorist Finance," European Journal of Cultural 
Studies 11, no. 3 (2008), 293. 
2 de Goede (2008), 293. 
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possible stopped, and therefore analysis of it should focus on uncovering the dark mysteries 
of who finances terrorism and how they do it.  Although the exact ways in which this 
‘orthodox’ approach has been conceptualized and articulated has evolved over time (in 
particular from simplistic and linear views, to more of a focus on complex networks and 
systems), the core of this framework – that ‘terrorist financing’ is a finite, bounded 
phenomenon that is, incontestably, in itself a threat that should and can be confronted – has 
remained intact.  This is significant to International Relations because this ‘orthodox’ view 
has provided potent justification of and explanation for various coordinated exercises of state 
and private sector power that affect not only those that are – or at least are perceived to – 
involved in ‘financing terrorism,’ but also local, national, and global societies at large. 
 
As this ‘orthodox’ view of terrorist financing has gained wide currency in spheres of 
academia and practice, a growing ‘critical’ literature has challenged both the accuracy and 
the utility of this ideational framework.  A diverse set of critiques argues that orthodox 
perspectives that hold terrorism-related financial activity is necessarily a threat in itself are 
not necessarily true, given that neither ‘terrorism’ nor ‘finance’ can be viewed in such 
unproblematic and universalizing terms, and therefore that how one perceives terrorists and 
those involved with them financially is necessarily subjective and politicized and driven by 
certain securitized perspectives about financial activity perceived to be ‘linked’ to terrorism 
or terrorists.  This means in turn, these critiques argue, that it is simply not accurate to in 
some universal way conceptualize ‘terrorist financing’ as a threat, because it demonstrably 
depends on one’s perspective of these contested topics, and, furthermore, that by doing so, 
conceptions of terrorist finance have in some cases become simply a convenient tool to 
advance certain political or normative interests over others.  In other words, the critical 
literature implies that because the orthodox perspective on terrorist financing is at core a 
  
 
11 
universalizing project structured to serve certain narrow political and institutional interests it 
is simply incapable of systematically producing accurate knowledge about the financial 
realities of terrorist actors, because it necessarily alters, obscures, or even summarily 
excludes certain interpretations for reasons other than their analytic worth.  In the second 
instance, the critical literature argues that, largely because of this incapacity to systematically 
produce accurate knowledge about the reality of terrorist financing, ‘orthodox’ approaches to 
terrorist financing are not even especially useful to the political and institutional objectives – 
e.g. counterterrorism, safeguarding of the neoliberal financial system, protection of liberal 
democracy from threats, etc – whose interests the ‘orthodox’ approaches were ostensibly 
meant to serve in the first place.    
 
A major gap in the critical literature, however, is that no coherent alterative to the orthodox 
approach exists.  This thesis seeks to fill this gap, and takes the first significant step towards 
doing so by constructing the ontological and epistemological foundation for an improved 
conceptualization of terrorist financing that would be capable of systematically producing 
knowledge about the realities of terrorist finance that is both more accurate and more useful 
than that using either simply the orthodox or critical perspectives. To accomplish this, this 
thesis first examines problems with how knowledge of terrorist financing is produced, and 
then attempts to advance this knowledge by developing a epistemic view of terrorist 
financing that revolves around the concept of value chains and is based upon a superior 
conceptual and methodological approach.  In this way, the thesis in effect applies 
poststructural methods and approaches of investigation to the objective of creating a 
foundation for better empirical/positivist research, as well as critically minded theoretical 
investigation.   
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This dissertation is divided into five chapters and a conclusion, each of which aims to 
progressively improve how terrorist financing is represented and thus how it is 
conceptualized.  As such, it should be explicitly noted, the thesis therefore is about reframing 
debates about and research into the financing of terrorism in ways that could be used to 
produce more accurate and useful theories and frameworks of analysis about terrorist 
financing. Given that such future research could take many forms and sit within a variety of 
different discourse – from Terrorism Studies to Security Studies to Criminology to 
International Political Economy, this thesis therefore is ambitious in what it could ultimately 
lead to, but nevertheless focused in its research objective.  
 
Chapter One begins this project by first explaining the baseline assumption upon which this 
dissertation rests: that terrorist financing is currently poorly conceptualized.  This is done by 
introducing both orthodox and critical approaches to analyzing terrorist financing and 
discussing how neither literature presents a coherent conceptual approach to analyzing 
terrorist finance that can systematically produce knowledge about the topic that is both 
accurate and useful.  While Chapter One does not thoroughly examine these literatures 
(leaving this to Chapter Three), it establishes both that terrorist financing is currently poorly 
conceptualized and in general terms what problems must be addressed to build an improved 
framework for understanding and analyzing the issue.  In particular, the chapter discusses not 
only how orthodox approaches have actually produced inaccurate knowledge about terrorist 
finance, undermined efforts of the so-called ‘Financial War’ against terrorism, led to a variety 
of anti-liberal social consequences, and justified an unexamined expansion of state power, 
but also how more critical approaches to the issue, despite their value as critiques, have not 
presented much in the way of viable alternatives to such orthodoxies.  Chapter One also 
discusses the methodology by which this dissertation will go beyond these critical 
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perspectives by formulating an improved conceptualization of terrorist financing; one that is 
intended to produce knowledge about terrorist finance that is both more accurate and more 
useful.  It discusses how this dissertation in effect aims to build a conceptualization of 
terrorist finance that is capable of systematically producing ‘practical wisdom’ about the 
financial activities of terrorist actors and the various intellectual and practical meanings and 
conclusions one can draw from analysis of these activities. In particular, this is achieved 
through a combination of research methods meant to first illustrate the empirical realities of 
terrorist finance, second to problematize ‘orthodox’ representations of terrorist finance, third 
to conceptually reframe the issue, and fourth and finally to present a new alternative 
framework within which a more coherent, nuanced, and ultimately useful representation of 
terrorist financing can be produced.   
 
Chapter Two illustrates and discusses the empirical realities of terrorist finance, via a case 
study of terrorist financing along the Georgian-Chechen border, and some preliminary 
impressions about the conceptual implications raised by them.  As a whole, this chapter 
creates a baseline for understanding the critiques introduced in Chapter 1 and discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3, in order to move beyond them in the rest of the dissertation.   The 
Chechen case is particularly significant because it encompasses virtually the full range of 
activities evident throughout the literature of which terrorist financing is comprised, 
providing views of terrorist finance from global and national levels to its everyday realities at 
level of the individual.  The chapter finds that terrorist financing activity is empirically 
complex, inherently politicized and contested, and conceptually intersubjective, and 
ultimately challenges many assumptions about the role of the state, power, and agency within 
International Relations.  
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Chapter Three directly engages with both the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘critical’ literatures on 
terrorist financing in order to problematize existing conceptualizations and representations of 
terrorism-related financial activity.  The chapter begins by summarizing the main features of 
the ‘orthodox’ conceptualization of terrorist finance, and then traces the evolution of this 
approach through three rough ‘generations’ of literature from both within and outwith 
academic discourse.  The chapter then analyzes the major deficiencies in this literature via an 
examination of the critical literatures.  This literature – more accurately a disparate collection 
of works that question the power/knowledge dynamics of current understandings of terrorist 
financing – provides a compelling picture of problems in existing conceptions of terrorist 
financing.  In particular, these critiques demonstrate that knowledge of what constitutes 
terrorist finance, who finances terrorism, how it is financed, and the mechanisms used by 
governments and other actors to analyze and respond to terrorist financing activity is both 
generally theoretically deficient and often not well-grounded in the observed empirical 
realities of the financial activities and contexts of terrorist actors.  This chapter surveys these 
deficiencies, an exercise that serves primarily to identify the bases upon which an improved 
conceptualization can be built. Furthermore, although these critiques successfully identify the 
specific deficiencies that exist in current understandings of terrorist finance, this chapter will 
demonstrate that they provide little guidance on explicitly how these shortcomings could be 
addressed.  The chapter’s conclusion summarizes the major obstacles to an improved 
theoretical understanding of terrorist financing, which the dissertation will progressively 
overcome. More simply, and in context of the empirical realities illustrated in Chapter Two, 
this chapter concludes that current discourse on terrorist finance in essence ‘asks the wrong 
questions’ of the evidence, which in turn has led to a destructive spiral of deficient theoretical 
foundations producing deficient empirical evidence, which then incorrectly informs theory, 
and so on.  Primarily this is the case because existing discourse tends to erroneously privilege 
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analysis of the particular methods and actors involved in financing terrorist groups over other 
knowledge that, I argue, is more conceptually central to terrorist finance. 
 
Chapter Four reframes how terrorist finance is conceptualized and presents an alternative 
conceptual foundation upon which an improved representation of the issue can be built.  
First, it addresses the conclusion of the previous chapter and posits what the ‘right questions’ 
are to ask about terrorist finance.  These questions indicate that, given the inherent 
power/knowledge dynamics behind transformation of ideas about terrorist financing into a 
hardened orthodoxy described in Chapter One, the right theoretical questions about terrorist 
financing should revolve around the structural and functional aspects of, first, the dynamics 
by which economic resources are instrumental to terrorist capabilities, and, second, what 
economic activity tells one about how terrorists interact with society/ies at large. Second, 
from this alternative conceptual foundation, this dissertation is then able to systematically 
build an improved framework for understanding terrorist finance. It finds that terrorist 
financing is properly – and most profitably – understood as a security issue, but one that 
revolves around the dynamics of political economic interaction, and perceptions of those 
interactions.  Locating the issue as such carries five crucial implications, namely that analysis 
of terrorist finance should: (a) be conducted at the level of individual political-economic 
exchanges (rather than at a macro or ‘system’-level); (b) engage more closely with the 
historical, cultural, and societal realities of the diverse political economic orders in which it 
occurs; (c) recognize that terrorist ‘finance’ often is more accurately about the exchange of 
value, not money; (d) engage more closely with political theory to understand the 
intersubjective and self-limiting political logic that appears to govern terrorist financing 
activity; and (e) explicitly accept that knowledge of terrorist finance is necessarily subjective 
and thus always in part a product of the relevant socio-political contexts that influence how 
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knowledge and language are produced and used in the contemporary world.  This chapter 
discusses how locating terrorist financing as a security issue that focuses on political 
economic interaction supports a conceptualization of the issue that can be used as a 
foundation for a new framework that coherently integrates the multi-dimensional and highly 
context-contingent dynamics of power competition and value exchange within the individual 
transactions that comprise the financial activities and contexts of terrorist actors. However, it 
also discusses how locating it as such is problematic given that ‘International Political 
Economy’ (IPE) discourse is only beginning to incorporate such concepts and tools into 
International Relations discourse, with some notable exceptions discussed in the chapter.  
The chapter concludes by arguing that although significant amounts of theoretical and 
empirical work remain, the ‘right questions’ formulated in this chapter represent the 
foundation for a more accurate and more useful conceptualization of terrorist financing, 
which can be used as a foundation for further empirical and theoretical research on the topic.  
 
Chapter Five presents a typology of terrorist finance that represents it dichotomously as 
political-economic activity that either is part of the ‘value chain’ of terrorist actors, or is 
along a ‘continuum of material support’ for varied socio-political activities related to 
terrorism. This dissertation aims to build an improved conceptual framework of terrorist 
finance upon which more coherent, comprehensive, and useful research about the financing 
of terrorism can proceed. This typology as presented is meant to be a viable framework 
within which systematic research about terrorist financing can proceed, and with which a 
more accurate, coherent, nuanced, and comprehensive understanding of terrorist finance can 
be built.  As such the typology is in part intended to be the foundation for future research and 
theoretical development, and a brief discussion is included on some possible future 
applications of it. 
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The dissertation concludes by arguing that the alternative conceptualization constructed in 
this thesis, and in particular the typology presented in Chapter Five, addresses (or at least has 
the potential to address) the deficiencies in current understandings of terrorism-related 
financial activity raised in the critiques, and as such both represents in itself an improved 
theoretical understanding of terrorist financing, but – just as importantly – is a framework 
within which further research can be undertaken to further improve this understanding.  This 
latter point is crucial because this dissertation does not have the scope to systematically 
specify many of the issues raised by its alternative theoretical understanding, and thus many 
of the actual conclusions about terrorist financing remain for subjects of future research  
Despite these limitations, the improved conceptualization of terrorist financing presented 
herein and the accompanying typology of the ‘reality’ of terrorist finance nonetheless 
represent a significant contribution to ‘terrorist financing studies’ in particular, and therefore 
also to debates on terrorism, contemporary international security, and international relations, 
in addition to related fields of practice.  Furthermore, the conclusion argues that this typology 
– and the reworked conceptual framework developed herein on which it is based – helps 
terrorist financing more fully engage in International Relations discourse by producing a 
clear analytic framework upon which further research can be based and sets of hypotheses 
about terrorist financing that can be tested.  For these reasons, it is argued, this dissertation in 
general and the typology in particular have reframed and improved how terrorist financing is 
represented and, ultimately, conceptualized.  The conclusion emphasizes this point by 
outlining how this dissertation could be applied to build a more formalized and systematic 
program of research on terrorism-related financial activity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Improving the Conceptualization of Terrorist Finance:  
Critique and Beyond 
 
Despite clear significance for contemporary international relations, the underlying reality of 
what has become known simply as ‘terrorist finance’ remains poorly conceptualized. This 
situation is surprising given that the collective global effort to counter the financial activities, 
contexts, and dimensions of terrorist actors is a major – and indeed was the original – ‘front’ 
of the “Global War on Terror” (and its successors),3 and the issue itself touches upon many 
important – and unresolved – issues of contemporary international security, international 
relations, and political economy. In response, a growing number of critiques from within 
academic discourse, government, journalism, and the private sector have attempted to 
document and demonstrate both the intellectual shortcomings of current, ‘orthodox’ 
perspectives of terrorist finance, as well as the impact these failures have had on society and 
policy.  However, this is where this critical literature stops, and thus ultimately where this 
dissertation begins.  This dissertation aims to build an improved conceptual framework of 
terrorist finance: not to provide ‘final’ answers to these questions, but to provide the 
necessary conceptual foundation upon which more coherent, comprehensive, and useful 
research about the financing of terrorism can proceed.   
 
This chapter begins this project, first by introducing and outlining the major problems with 
current approaches to conceptualizing terrorist finance.  It does so by framing these 
approaches as either ‘orthodox’ or ‘critical,’ simply to illustrate the fundamental debate 
                                                           
3 Although the administration of President Barack Obama has ceased using “Global War on Terror,” and similar 
phrases, it has continued to emphasize ‘fighting terrorism’ as a national security priority (see for example Oliver 
Burkeman, "Obama administration says goodbye to 'war on terror'," The Guardian, March 25, 2009.) Therefore, 
for sake of simplicity, this thesis will describe this continuity of policy, but not rhetoric, as “the Global War on 
Terror (and its successors).”   
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ongoing within terrorist financing research between those that generally accept the dominant 
ways the issue has been represented versus those that dispute the conceptual foundations of 
these dominant approaches.  As will be discussed, however, neither of these perspectives 
produce a coherent or useful conceptualization of terrorist finance.  Orthodox approaches fail 
for reasons outlined in the critical literature, but critical approaches also generally lack any 
coherent alternative way of representing the issue.  Ultimately, this first section below 
discusses the baseline assumption of this thesis that terrorist financing is currently poorly 
conceptualized, and that the specific place and contribution of this thesis is to construct a 
framework for representing terrorist finance that both addresses the problems raised in the 
critical literature and moves beyond such critique to produce a viable alternative.  In its 
second section, the chapter frames this complex project as a contribution to the idiosyncratic 
International Relations niche sub-field of ‘terrorist financing studies.’  It explains that the 
issue of ‘terrorist finance’ is at core a securitized problem of politicized representation, 
meaning that this dissertation’s attempt at improving conceptualization of the issue must 
focus on constructing an alternative way of representing terrorism-related financial activity; 
specifically one that, compared to existing representations, is more coherent, more nuanced, 
and more useful to relevant communities of thought and practices alike.   The third section of 
the chapter discusses the methodology of the thesis.  The fundamental methodological 
strategy of this dissertation is to improve the conceptualization of terrorist finance by 
developing an alternative framework for representing terrorism-related financial activity.  As 
discussed below, this strategy is achieved through a combination of research methods meant 
to build a framework within which ‘practical wisdom’ about terrorist finance can be 
produced.  
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Introduction 
This thesis sets out, most simply, to improve understandings of terrorist finance.  More 
specifically, its research question can be stated as: 
How can the conceptualization of terrorist finance be improved; given the failings of 
both ‘orthodox’ approaches to researching and analyzing terrorist financing, as well 
as the lack of any coherent alternative framework from the critical literature? 
 
In other words, this dissertation begins from the premise that terrorist financing is poorly 
conceptualized, both because what can be termed ‘orthodox’ approaches are not capable of 
systematically producing accurate and useful knowledge about the realities of terrorist 
financing, and because more ‘critical’ approaches offer few viable remedies to accompany 
their valuable diagnoses.  From this premise, the dissertation seeks thus to fill a gap; applying 
lessons learned from the critiques yet, importantly, moving beyond them in order to forge an 
improved conceptual understanding of terrorist finance.  This introductory section frames this 
dissertation’s project to so improve the conceptualization of terrorist financing. As such, it is 
worthwhile to first examine more closely the subject of this project, the phenomenon that has 
become known as “terrorist finance.” 
 
This dissertation understands terrorist financing to be, as de Goede writes, “a cultural 
imaginary and political problem in need of (security) intervention.”4  She argues that the 
topic of ‘terrorist finance’ originated from and remains driven by how it is “mediated” as a 
security concern, and as such is at core a topic of politicized representation.5  In particular, 
she writes, how terrorist financing is understood and how it is acted upon relates closely to 
how it has been represented across various “media” (e.g. academic discourse, think tank, 
private sector and governmental analyses, journalistic reporting, and popular culture) in ways 
                                                           
4 de Goede (2008), 292. 
5 de Goede (2008), 292. 
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that have produced potent images of “terrorist money” as a securitized problem.6   As it is so 
‘mediated,’ this thesis must confront and deal with certain idiosyncrasies peculiar to the study 
of terrorist finance.   
 
Most centrally, terrorism-related financial activity is represented as a significant international 
security threat that must be countered in order to fight terrorism and safeguard the legitimate 
financial system.  This is the foundational perspective upon which most existing approaches 
to dealing with the financial activities, contexts, and dimensions of terrorist actors rest, as 
will be discussed throughout the thesis.  This perspective, which is generally referred to 
below as the ‘orthodox’ approach, emerged primarily – but not exclusively – within the 
context of the historical moment following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001 and the accompanying declaration of a ‘Financial War’ against 
terrorism, and has evolved into the dominant ideational framework about terrorist financing.  
 
Although it is the ideational basis of most efforts to combat the financing of terrorism, this 
orthodoxy has manifestly failed to produce knowledge about terrorist finance that is coherent, 
comprehensive, or particularly useful. Representing terrorist financing in these terms has also 
therefore manifestly failed to achieve the intellectual, policy, or operational goals towards 
which this representation was originally directed at achieving.  
 
For instance, although there is not currently a consistent understanding of which activities 
and behaviors constitute terrorist financing versus which do not, nevertheless potent laws and 
regulations oblige banks across the world to develop and deploy – at great cost – 
methodologies and policies to calculate the ‘risk’ that a specific financial transaction 
                                                           
6 de Goede (2008), 293. 
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constitutes terrorist financing activity, even though without such understanding such 
‘calculations’ naturally are almost certain to be inadequate.  Similarly, intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies in many countries have taken legal and lethal action against people 
determined to be ‘financing terrorism,’ despite the fact that no coherent explanation currently 
exists for either how or why certain actors and behaviors are involved in financing terrorism 
but similar actors and behaviors are not, or a viable framework to identify, contextualize, and 
otherwise give meaning to global and localized trends and variations in terrorist financing 
currently exist. This is significant to International Relations because, in the above and other 
ways, the ‘orthodox’ representation of terrorist finance has not only been used to produce 
knowledge used by governments, the private sector, and academia to comprehend and 
research terrorist financing, but also which has provided potent justification of and 
explanation for various coordinated exercises of state and private sector power against those 
individuals, charities, socio-political movements, and others that are – or at least are 
perceived to be – involved in ‘financing terrorism.’ 
 
Almost in parallel to the rise of these orthodoxies, a growing discourse – referred to below as 
the ‘critical’ approaches – has challenged both the accuracy and the utility of such ‘orthodox’ 
representations of terrorist finance.  As introduced below and detailed in Chapter 3, while 
these critical approaches present in aggregate a compelling critique of the theoretical and 
conceptual foundation of existing understandings of terrorist financing, they do not present a 
coherent viable alternative framework for understanding the issue. This chapter introduces 
this critical literature and summarizes its major claims, but argues that while the central 
claims of these critiques are correct, the conceptual implications of the problems they raise 
have yet to be taken seriously, let alone remedied.  In particular, the critical literature fails to 
offer a coherent alternative epistemological framework that would address the problems 
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extant in ‘orthodox’ approaches to terrorist finance.  More simply, while the critical literature 
has successfully challenged ‘orthodox’ representations of terrorism related financial activity, 
it has not taken the logical next step and proposed a viable alternative approach to 
representing the issue.   
 
This thesis aims to accomplish this.  In particular it does so by reorienting representations of 
terrorist financing away from its current focus on “who finances terrorism and how they do 
it,” and towards a more socially-embedded understanding of how the exchange of value 
impacts and reflects the capabilities, behaviors, and relationships of terrorist actors.   The 
thesis also presents the foundations for a formalization of this alternative representation in the 
form of a typology that represents terrorist finance as either the process by which terrorist 
actors access value chains or the dynamics by which various individuals and communities 
express material support for terrorists or terrorism-related socio-political causes.  This 
alternative representation, the thesis demonstrates, is not only more intellectually sound, but 
also more politically useful, especially for liberal democracies confronting terrorism and 
related security threats.   
Baseline Assumption: Terrorist Finance is Poorly Conceptualized  
The baseline premise upon which this thesis rests is that terrorist financing is poorly 
conceptualized.  This assumption is based on the emergence and ultimate critique of what can 
be referred to as an orthodoxy about terrorist financing, the key ideas of which not only 
inform, justify, and drive various efforts to research and combat terrorist financing, but also 
which have been robustly and convincingly challenged by an emerging set of critical works. 
This section surveys the key areas in which this literature challenges existing 
conceptualizations and representations of terrorist finance.  This section briefly surveys these 
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critical works, and introduces the main challenges they present to orthodox perspectives, 
namely on grounds that ‘orthodox’ ideas about terrorist financing largely produce knowledge 
about terrorism-related financial activity that is not only often – if not mostly – inaccurate, 
but also not particularly useful to the various research and practitioner communities involved 
analyzing and responding to terrorist financing.  This section concludes by discussing that 
while these critical works offer important challenges to existing poor conceptualizations of 
terrorist finance, they nevertheless offer little in the way of a viable alternative 
conceptualization of terrorist finance that would resolve the problems raised by the critical 
literature.   
 
It must be emphasized that using the oppositional ‘orthodox’ and the ‘critical’ terminology 
herein is not meant to imply that these perspectives are rigid or reified intellectual positions.7 
In fact, both literatures encompass widely varying and often internally contradictory 
perspectives about terrorist financing.  The orthodox/critical dichotomy is used here simply to 
more clearly illustrate certain important elements about how terrorist financing is 
conceptualized, especially to the reader who is not a specialist in terrorist financing nor 
familiar with the idiosyncrasies, explained below, of researching the topic.  Aware of these 
potential shortcomings, this thesis employs the orthodox/critical terminology in order to, first, 
highlight simply that there is an ongoing, deeply contentious debate within terrorist financing 
discourse about the very conceptual foundations of the topic.  Second, setting so-called 
orthodox and critical approaches against one another helps illuminate the place of this 
particular thesis project, namely to provide a new conceptual approach that not only is a 
                                                           
7 As has been the concern concerning the emergence of the so-called “Critical Terrorism Studies” approach. See 
especially Jeroen Gunning, "Babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies," 
European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 236–243; and John Horgan and Michael Boyle, "A case against 
'Critical Terrorism Studies'," Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (Aprl 2008): 51-64. 
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viable alternative to the deficient ‘orthodox’ approaches, but also builds on but ultimately 
moves well beyond mere ‘critique.’  
 ‘Orthodox’ Approaches: An Introduction 
As a stand-alone topic, the study of terrorist financing has existed for only a few decades; the 
first monograph published in 1986.8 As relatively briefly introduced below and discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3, what can be termed as an ‘orthodox’ approach has emerged since 
then.  This orthodoxy reflects not an explicitly and coherently formulated ideational 
framework, but rather a general and (mostly) shared perspective about how to address a 
particular problem of international security, namely how to ‘fight’ the security threat 
represented by terrorism-related financial activity. As such, the orthodox approach to 
conceptualizing terrorist finance is, in essence, what Cox termed a “problem solving” 
perspective, which ultimately, as he famously wrote, “takes the world as it finds it.”9   
However, given that, as the critical literature demonstrates, the ‘world’ of terrorism-related 
financial activity remains incorrectly, incompletely, and inconsistently described in 
‘orthodox’ literature, by ‘taking the world as it finds it,’ orthodox approaches have ultimately 
produced, as will be discussed, not only deep misunderstandings of the problem of terrorist 
finance, but also, unsurprisingly, the failure of actions based on them.     
 
The rise of such orthodox conceptualizations of terrorist financing occurred because, as de 
Goede has described, a “qualitative assemblage” of similar thinking on terrorist finance 
developed over time, which eventually achieved “resonance” among disparate discourses that 
each concerned the ways in which ‘terrorist money’ represented a security threat.10  These 
                                                           
8 This was The Financing of Terror by James Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) 
9 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium 
10, no. 2 (1981).. 
10 de Goede (2008), 293. 
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resonating discourses included suspicions about corporate and Western government money 
laundering from those on the political Left,11 and objections to financial aid for Palestinian 
nationalist groups from those on the Right,12 but primarily revolved around the belief that 
targeting terrorist financing represented a useful strategy with which to prosecute the ‘Global 
War on Terror’ in the historical moment following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
(hereafter “9/11”).13  She cites the following statement from a senior U.S. Government 
official as exemplary of what I refer to here as the ‘orthodox’ conception of terrorist finance: 
The campaign to keep money out of the hands of terrorists has become a centerpiece 
of the overall war against terrorism… Focusing on and attacking terrorist money 
flows is important for several reasons. Financial records and audits provide 
blueprints to the architecture of terrorist organizations. By following the money trail 
through financial information sharing worldwide, we can save lives by unearthing 
terrorist cells and networks.
14 
 
Importantly, de Goede argues that once this ‘qualitative assemblage’ (or the ‘orthodox 
approach’ as referred to herein) emerged, this representation of terrorist finance around the 
securitized threat posed by ‘terrorist money’ became a self-referential intellectual framework 
largely decoupled from the discourses that had combined to produce it.  Once this occurred, 
this ‘orthodox’ conception of terrorist finance gained near universal currency among 
governments and thus also in the private sector,15 as well as wide acceptance throughout 
academic discourse,16 which led to the production of research aimed at solving the problem 
of terrorist finance, which did indeed ‘take the world as one finds it,’ however poorly 
conceptualized that ‘world’ actually was.  Chapter 3 traces this evolution of this orthodox 
approach in terms of what this thesis observes as three general ‘generations’ of orthodox 
                                                           
11 For example, Loretta Napoleoni argued in Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror 
Networks (New York: Seven Stories, 2005) that there existed a “new economy of terror” that she “calculated” to 
be $1.5 trillion, to which multinational corporations and Western governments were major contributors.   
12 See for example Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed--and How to Stop It (Chicago: 
Bonus Books, 2003); and Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: Free 
Press, 2003).  
13 de Goede (2008), 293. 
14 Juan Zarate, quoted in de Goede (2008), 293. 
15 See Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007). 
16 de Goede (2008), 293. 
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terrorist financing literature.  Although detailed in that chapter, it is useful to summarize the 
major elements of this evolution here.   
 
The first ‘generation’ of terrorist financing discourse refers to those descriptions of terrorist 
financing that analyze the problem only as a tangential logistic issue to the political and 
operational realities of terrorist groups.  Reflecting an evolution in the study of terrorism 
generally, the earliest of this literature focused on the financial links between states and 
terrorist groups, while the later works offer broader, but still superficial, descriptions of 
terrorist financing as tangential to other, larger issues.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
‘first generation’ analyses of terrorist finance tend to be narrow discussions of financial 
activity related to terrorist actors, often raised as mere tangents to broader discussions of 
terrorism and terrorists.  As such, conceptually, this first generation literature tends to assume 
a linearity in the reality and the meaning of financial activity to terrorist actors, which in turns 
produces an epistemic perspective that favors certain – usually ideological or geopolitical – 
variables over others.  For example, first generation literature often depicts the financing of a 
given terrorist actor as simply the product of a hidden network of ideologically driven 
sponsors – or often a sympathetic state sponsor.  In addition, first generation orthodox 
analyses of terrorist financing are generally characterized by a more superficial and less 
rigorous use of empirical evidence, and tend to rely – often uncritically – on tertiary sources, 
official documents and statements, and pieces or sets of data that are either low quality or 
heavily recycled.  The result is that first generation orthodox literature is of very little use for 
studying or ultimately understanding the complex, intersubjective realities of terrorist 
finance.   
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The second generation of ‘orthodox’ literature begins to view terrorist financing as a topic 
distinct from, although intimately related to, the problem of terrorism.  This generally heavily 
descriptive literature offers a more comprehensive description of terrorist financing, 
explicating the complex, variable, and global nature of the issue, but does so with little 
critical perspective about what theoretical contexts are needed for more contextualized, 
nuanced, and ultimately useful understandings of the topic.  In general, this second 
generation of orthodox literature is paradigmatic, and is characterized by uncritical utilization 
(mostly acceptance, but at times rejection) of popular or official claims and conclusions 
regarding ‘who finances terrorism and how they do it.’  This literature also tends to be overly 
deterministic about the complex realities of terrorist financing, a problem often manifested in 
analyses that begin with an a priori assumption about the involvement of a certain actor or 
behavior in financing terrorism, and then an analysis of how this actor or behavior could – 
often rather than has been – used to finance terrorism.  For example, belonging to this 
generation of orthodox literature are those uncritical discourses that represent hawala as a 
‘terrorist financing method,’ despite presenting little or no actual case evidence of the use of 
hawala to ‘finance’ terrorist acts or actors, or, even when there such evidence, offering only 
vague notions about the precise instrumentality of hawala services to a particular terrorist act 
or actor.  The result is that although the second generation of orthodox literature places a 
greater emphasis on empirical research – especially to identify the methods and actors 
involved in financing terrorism – the empirical evidence produced is, more often than not, 
grossly underdetermined.  In other words, although this literature presents a more robust 
empirical basis for analysis of terrorist financing, the meaning and conclusions drawn from 
this data are generally poorly formulated, which then in turn negatively influences any 
follow-on research seeking to augment this knowledge. 
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The third generation of terrorist financing literature attempts to fill these conceptual gaps in 
understandings of terrorist financing. In general, this generation of literature can be 
characterized by a focus on analyzing terrorist financing as a more holistic problem 
encompassing various economic, political, social, cultural, institutional, and historical factors.  
As Chapter 4 argues, engaging in the full complexity of terrorist financing activity is crucial 
to properly conceptualizing and representing it, and engagement in these factors helps 
address the problem of underdetermination of empirical data present in the second generation 
literature. However, as will be discussed, severe problems with this ‘orthodox’ literature 
remain, primarily, as the critical literature describes, because it too is based on poorly 
formulated – or even simply incorrect – assumptions and conceptualizations about terrorist 
finance.  In one example discussed later, while frameworks such as Makarenko’s ‘Crime-
Terror Nexus’ offer an integrated, coherent conceptualization of terrorist financing, it is 
ultimately self-referential and, in this case,  continues to rest on the mistaken17 assumption 
that one can draw such clean lines between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ money.   The result is that while 
the third ‘generation’ of orthodox literature offers some useful analytic theories and 
hypotheses about terrorist financing, it nevertheless fails to fully engage with and correct the 
underlying failings of orthodox approaches to terrorist financing, meaning ultimately that 
such literature remains too incoherent and, overall, of limited usefulness for conceptualizing, 
let alone understanding or confronting, terrorist finance in any systematic way.   
Orthodox Approaches and the ‘Financial War’ on Terrorism 
As mentioned above, orthodox representations of terrorist financing originated from a 
combination of different discourses that ultimately achieved ‘resonance.’  Nevertheless, these 
                                                           
17 See discussion in Chapter Three, as well as Marieke de Goede, "Hawala discourses and the war on terrorist 
finance," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 (2003): 513-532; and Mareike de Goede, "The 
Risk of Terrorist Financing: Politics and Prediction in the War on Terrorist Finance," Constructing World 
Orders Conference, Standing Group on International Relations, Transnational Politics of Risk Panel (Den 
Haag, September 9-11, 2004). 
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conceptualizations and representations of the issue are ultimately most closely tied to ideas 
about how to ‘fight it,’ and thus to the ongoing ‘Financial War’ on terrorism that emerged out 
of the historical moment following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  Therefore to 
understand ‘orthodox’ conceptualizations of terrorist finance, it is important to begin with a 
brief examination of how terrorist financing is ‘fought.’   
 
The ‘Global War on Terror’ (and its successors) currently being waged by the United States 
and allied governments18 began in fact in the financial arena.  On September 24th 2001, 
President George W Bush announced in the White House Rose Garden that,  
“At 12:01 a.m. this morning, a major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the 
stroke of a pen.  Today, we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the 
global terror network.”
19
 
 
This strike froze the assets of 27 “terrorist organizations, individual terrorist leaders, a 
corporation that serves as a front for terrorism, and several nonprofit organizations,”20 and 
was in fact the first public response to the al Qaeda attacks on the United States not quite two 
weeks prior.  President Bush, flanked by Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, used the symbolism of the moment to emphasize that such financial 
‘strokes of the pen’ would be a major component of a long battle by the United States and its 
allies to fight both al Qaeda specifically and ‘terrorism’ in general.  He stated at the time:   
“Make no mistake about it, I've asked our military to be ready for a reason.  But the 
American people must understand this war on terrorism will be fought on a variety of 
fronts, in different ways.  The front lines will look different from the wars of the past 
… We will lead by example.  We will work with the world against terrorism.  Money 
is the lifeblood of terrorist operations.  Today, we're asking the world to stop 
payment.”
21
 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                           
18 See footnote 3 regarding use of the “Global War on Terror” terminology. 
19 "President Freezes Terrorists' Assets: Remarks by the President, Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill and 
Secretary of State Powell on Executive Order," September 24, 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html (accessed October 27, 2007). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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The President and his cabinet officials made clear that the financial front would be a wide-
ranging campaign not confined to targeting simply the assets of those directly financing 
terrorist attacks, but also aimed at any state, individual, business, or organization that 
facilitated, supported, or in any way interacted with the ‘financial infrastructure’ of terrorism.  
Secretary O’Neill stated clearly, 
“This order is a notice to financial institutions around the world, if you have any 
involvement in the financing of the al Qaeda organization, you have two choices:  
cooperate in this fight, or we will freeze your U.S. assets; we will punish you for 
providing the resources that make these evil acts possible.”
22
 
 
Similar financial ‘strikes’ to the ones immediately after 9/11 continued apace for several 
years following, resulting in the freezing or seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars 
worldwide.23  In addition, several thousand individuals have been designated by the United 
States, European Union, United Nations, and other official bodies for their known or 
suspected role in financing terrorism, effectively blacklisting them from any dealings with 
any bank or other financial institution within the legitimate global financial system.24  This 
Financial War has also expanded to include a vast surveillance apparatus for monitoring the 
financial transactions of individual people and organizations by national and international 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, either using their own capabilities or via required 
reporting of ‘suspicious activity’ by financial and charitable sector actors.25 Overall, the 
Financial War closely reflects former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision 
                                                           
22 Ibid. 
23 No comprehensive statistic of the exact amount frozen or seized is available. Although United States, the 
United Kingdom, and other countries have frozen or confiscated hundreds of millions of dollars under counter 
terrorist financing related provisions, much of this money has been subsequently been ‘unfrozen,’ actions that 
are often not reported or reported much later. Discussions of these problems can be found in Thomas J 
Biersteker and Sue E Eckert, "The Politics of Numbers in the Financial “War” on Terrorism," International 
Studies Association Annual Convention (San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008); and Warde, 2007. 
24 See “Designations and Blacklists” section of Chapter 3.  
25 Especially via suspicious activity reports (SARs) and currency transaction reports (CTRs).   For a discussion 
of terrorist financing related surveillance and reporting, see for instance, Sue Eckert, "The U.S. Regulatory 
Approach to Terrorist Financing," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue 
E. Eckert (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2007); and R.T. Naylor, Satanic Purses: Money, Myth, and 
Misinformation in the War on Terror (London: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006). 
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that “the uniforms of this conflict will be banker’s pinstripes and programmers grunge just as 
assuredly as desert camouflage.”26   This “Financial War” therefore became not only an 
important component of the so-called ‘Global War on Terror,’ but also as a driver of ideas 
that terrorism-related financial activity not only represented a threat to international and 
national security, but also which could indeed be ‘fought.’   
 
Within this context, underlying the ‘Financial War’ are, to generalize, two different strategic 
ideas about how to fight terrorist finance: the ‘financial warfare’ and ‘financial intelligence’ 
approaches.  Although these two approaches are extremely different, if not contradictory, 
they both stem from and drive a set of ideas about terrorist financing that has evolved into an 
orthodoxy about the topic, and one that as we will see below produces both inaccurate and 
counterproductive knowledge about terrorist finance.  
Financial Warfare 
The first strategy of the fight against terrorist finance, which can be called the financial 
warfare approach, holds essentially that it is possible to degrade the operational capabilities 
of terrorists by disrupting their financial networks.  Using the threat of terrorism, the common 
justification of financial warfare can be succinctly explained by combining several clichés 
present in recent parlance, money is the ‘lifeblood’ of terrorism, which can be “cut off,” 
“fought,” “combated,” “countered,” “crushed,” and “disrupted” in order to “starve” terrorists 
of their financial “oxygen.”  More specifically, this approach seeks to degrade terrorist 
actors’ ability to commit terrorist acts, or more simply, to stop or at least lessen terrorism by 
targeting the money that enables terrorist operations.  Those who help finance terrorists or 
help sustain or support larger terrorist organizations or movements, just as those who train or 
lead them, must be considered as security threats in themselves, and therefore must also be 
                                                           
26 Donald Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War," New York Times, September 27, 2001. 
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confronted with direct action.  The U.S. National Security Strategy describes this strategy in 
the following terms:  
Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global 
reach and attack their … finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the 
terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.
27
 
 
 
The idea that terrorist financing is itself an international security concern may seem an 
obvious point, but terrorist financing was in fact not seen as an explicitly security issue until 
relatively recently. Prior to the expansion and formalization of the counter terrorist financing 
regime in the post-9/11 period,28 the international community and individual states had 
weaker regimes against money laundering, drug trafficking, criminal finance, and other 
finance-related ‘public bads,’ including terrorist financing.29   None of those issues, however, 
were considered an issue of national or international security, even if that which the financial 
activity supported was, i.e. terrorist acts.  This began to change after the 1998 bombings of 
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and accelerated greatly after the terrorist attacks 
in the United States on September 11, 2001.  After the 1998 bombings, the United States 
pushed the international community to recognize that both “assisting” terrorism, including 
through its financing, as well as “acquiescing” to such activity are on par with actually 
“organizing, instigating…or participating” in terrorism.30  In 1999, this principle was further 
codified by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269, which called on states to, 
“prevent and suppress in their territories…the financing of any acts of terrorism,” and to 
“deny those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts safe havens.”  This marked a 
significant change to the previous representation of terrorist finance as one of many forms of 
                                                           
27 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. 
28 For a description of this evolution, see Peter Reuter and Edwin Truman, Chasing Dirty Money (Washington 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004). 
29 See for example Eleni Tsingou, "Who Governs and Why: The Making of the Global Anti-Money Laundering 
Regime," in Global Financial Integration Thirty Years On: when it came and to where it might, ed. Geoffrey 
Underhill, Jasper Blom and Daniel Mügge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
30 UNSCR 1189, 1998 
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illicit financial activity, and can be explained by the concept of securtization.   According to 
Buzan and Waever,31 securitization occurs when the perception of a policy or political issue 
evolves into being seen as essential to survival, i.e. a threat to one’s ‘security,’ which “is 
dependent on both the status of the actor promoting the securitization of the issue, and on 
whether similar issues are generally perceived to be security threats.”32  Once an issue has 
become securitized, this legitimizes otherwise or previously illegitimate acts as ‘necessary’ 
and ‘extraordinary’ means to resolve the security problem.    
 
Under the regime in the late 1990’s, financial activity would be considered a security issue if 
it “assisted” terrorism.  In effect, this securitized ‘terrorist money,’ and thus broadened the 
scope of actors that could be considered to be involved in terrorism – i.e. not just those that 
planted the bombs but also those who paid for them to do it – and also therefore those that 
could be subject to counterterrorism efforts.  In other words, previously legitimate acts 
(providing financial support for those deemed to be terrorists by the United Nations) became 
not only illegitimate but also a threat to international security.  This process of securitization 
accelerated in the historical moment following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.   
 
This (new) idea that represented certain (terrorist-related) financial activity as a security 
threat was put into practice within the Financial War through actions and exercises of power 
such as asset seizures, targeted sanctions, designations, blacklisting, travel bans, laws and 
regulations that oblige, under penalty of multimillion dollar fines or criminal prosecution,33 
providers of financial services to identify and report terrorist financing activity. In one of 
                                                           
31 See for example Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in Security: a New Framework for 
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998).  
32 Waever (1998). 
33 For example, in a typical case the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority fined Forex, a northern European 
foreign exchange conglomerate, 50 million kronor ($7.8-million) for failing to demonstrate adequate 
implementation of internal counter terrorist financing and anti-money laundering policies. Deutche Presse-
Agentur, "Foreign exchange bureau fined by financial watchdog ," October 1, 2008. 
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many possible exemplars, the following statement by then-United States Secretary of 
Treasury John Snow illustrates the core representation of terrorist finance as a security threat:   
The work to track and shut down the financial network of terror is one of the most 
critical efforts facing us today, and we have achieved important successes in the 
mission to bankrupt the financial underpinnings of terrorism. Raising and moving 
money is now harder, costlier, and riskier for al-Qaida and like-minded terrorist 
groups.  We have frozen and seized terrorist assets, exposed and dismantled known 
channels of funding, deterred donors, arrested key facilitators, and built higher 
hurdles in the international financial system to prevent abuse by terrorists. … 
A robust international coalition is currently working to combat terrorist financing 
and to focus the world's attention on previously unregulated, high- risk sectors such 
as charities and hawalas. We have begun to focus our collective attention on our 
growing concern about the use of cash couriers by terrorists groups. In these efforts, 
we have enlisted the private sector worldwide — banks, money service businesses, 
broker-dealers, and the charitable community — to serve as the frontline in this 
battle. These efforts are contributing to our success.
34
 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between such ideas of financial warfare and how terrorist 
financing is represented is significant.   First, financial activity related to terrorism (i.e. “the 
financial network of terror” mentioned above) is seen to be an enemy that can be identified, 
targeted, and, eventually, destroyed.  This idea stems from the implicit and explicit conflation 
of terrorist financing and financial warfare as other contemporary security issues, particularly 
“asymmetric,”35 “emerging,”36 “transnational,”37 or “globalized”38 threats to international 
order and/or liberal democratic systems.  Second, it greatly expands the scope of individuals 
and groups who were to be considered threats and enemies, including ‘preemptive strikes’ 
                                                           
34 John Snow, "The Global War on Terrorist Finance," US Department of State Economic Perspectives, 
September 2004, 2. 
35 Robert Kimmit, "The Role of Finance in Combating National Security Threats," Soref Symposium, The 
Washington Institute, May 10, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=337 (accessed 
May 28, 2008). 
36 See for example John S. Pistole, "Identifying, Tracking and Dismantling the Financial Structure of Terrorist 
Organizations," Testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Washington DC, 
September 2003, 2003).  
37 See for example Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Introduction,” in Terrorism Financing and 
State Responses, A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007). 
38 See for example Napoleoni (2005). 
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against those posing an identified risk.  For example, under the USA PATRIOT Act,39 a 
jeweler would be considered a security threat (and therefore might be fined or imprisoned) if 
he did not comply with the law’s requirements to report activity that could indicate terrorist 
financing. These sanctions would apply even if the jeweler did not actually interact with 
terrorist actors or if he did, did not intend to do so.  This has also led to a wide expansion of 
discourse on how to improve the regulation and monitoring of ‘risky’ financial behavior.40   
 
The emergence of ‘financial warfare’ as a strategy not only against terrorists but also against 
financial activity linked to terrorists engendered a securitized view of this financial activity, 
which revolve around representations of terrorist financing as a distinct threat that can be 
identified and fought.  According to de Goede, this securitization of terrorism- or terrorist-
related financial transactions on one hand served to decouple terrorist financing conceptually 
and practically from other financial public bads like corruption or money laundering, which 
remained an issue of financial sector governance, rather than national and international 
security.41  This had the effect of de-problematizing terrorist financing,42 in that it engendered 
certain universalizing assumptions about financial and economic activity that could be linked 
to terrorists or terrorism, namely that such associated activity represented a security threat 
and must be countered.  As the critical literature and this dissertation shows, however, 
terrorist financing is an inherently ‘problematic’ issue that relates to many intrinsically 
contestable issues of international relations, and thus such assumptions simply must be 
nuanced within a coherent representational framework (like that which is proposed in this 
thesis).   
                                                           
39 Sections 326 and 314(a) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. 
40 See for example Michael Jacobson, "Extremism’s Deep Pockets: The Growing Challenge of Fighting 
Terrorist Financing," The Politic, Winter 2008. 
41 de Goede (2008). 
42 de Goede (2008), 292. 
  
 
37 
 
Paradoxically, the securitization of terrorist money also led directly to the application of 
certain concepts and policies designed for financial crime issues, especially money 
laundering, to the issue of terrorist finance.  The concepts so applied can be summarized by 
the common belief that terrorist financing is in essence “reverse money laundering,”43 in that 
terrorist financing involves obscuring the illegitimate end use of money, whereas traditional 
money laundering is the process of obscuring the illegitimate origin of money.  However, as 
the critical literature on terrorist finance and this thesis observe, this occurred not because 
such conceptualizations were appropriate for terrorist financing, but because it allowed 
terrorist finance to be presented as a depoliticized issue that could be understood via existing 
(money laundering/financial crime) conceptual frameworks and addressed via existing 
regulatory and policy approaches, with only relatively minor modifications.44  
 
In summary and for a combination of reasons (most especially the post-9/11 Financial War), 
the emergence of the strategy of financial warfare led to the deproblemization and 
depoliticization of the intrinsically problematic and politicized issue of terrorist finance.   
This in turn exacerbated existing and produced new concepts and assumptions about 
terrorism-related financial activity that, as will be discussed below and later in the thesis, 
have proved out to be misapplied, empirically or conceptually deficient, and even tangibly 
destructive.   
Financial Intelligence 
The second strategy of the Financial War has been the greatly expanded use of what is often 
termed “financial intelligence,” or in other words the exploitation of knowledge of the 
                                                           
43 See for example Tim Parkman and Gill Peeling, Countering Terrorist Financing: A Training Handbook for 
Financial Services (London: Gower Publishing, 2007), p34. 
44 de Goede (2008), 292. 
  
 
38 
financial activities of terrorists as a tool against them, specifically to identify, monitor, and 
ultimately act against terrorist actors. Financial intelligence is therefore a lens through which 
other terrorist threats can be better understood and confronted. In practice, it is a difficult and 
resource-consuming combination of extensive investigations, research and analysis of the 
various social, cultural, political, economic, and financial complexities relevant to the 
particular case, and decision making reliant on subjective judgment calls as much as, or even 
more than, objective fact.45  The strategy is based, however, on the belief that the value of 
financial intelligence often outweighs the value of actually stopping the terrorism-related 
financial activity being monitored. For example, in a complex operation the US Central 
Intelligence Agency successfully deployed Pakistani-American agents to infiltrate a money-
services business in Pakistan to such an extent that it was able to essentially “run al-Qaeda’s 
bank”46 for over a year, collecting a host of valuable information about the operations of 
those who used its services.  It was reported that this financial intelligence operation helped 
lead to the arrest of Khaled Sheik Muhammad and played a role in preventing several 
terrorist attacks.47  The financial intelligence approach has also led to intensified 
governmental efforts to track, monitor, and analyze potential terrorist financing activity, 
including the establishment of “Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)” in nearly every country 
in the world and other governmental organizations with this explicit mission.48  The value of 
the financial intelligence strategy in the larger counterterrorism context has been widely 
recognized, here described by former CIA Executive Director Busy Krongard in terms of the 
initial inter-agency group tasked to combat terrorist financing with the US government in the 
wake of 9/11: 
                                                           
45 See for example Kimmit, 2007. 
46 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
47 Suskind, 2006. 
48 See the Egmont Group’s worldwide list of FIUs at http://www.egmontgroup.org%2Flist_of_fius.pdf.  Other 
examples include the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS). 
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“The financial area was the most successful, coordinated area in the entire 
government in the war on terror.  From what this group did, we got enormous 
benefits from it.  It was the best example of real coordination of any, I think.  They 
worked quietly, under the radar.  Everyone benefited.” 
 
Compared to ‘financial warfare,’ the financial intelligence approach in many ways represents 
a more nuanced and contextualized securitization of financial activity linked to terrorism.  It 
forces responses to terrorist financing to be set firmly within broader operational, political, 
and other contexts, and thus forces at least some understanding of these contexts. Financial 
intelligence also rests on the assumption that financial activity is a security issue – and thus 
also ‘securitizes’ the activity itself – but largely does much more directly in the context of 
actual terrorist actors, instead of just in context of ‘terrorism’ in general.  This implies that a 
more nuanced, contextualized way of understanding terrorist financing is not only possible, 
but desirable, especially if it could be tied to a more explicit awareness of and engagement 
with one’s own intellectual, political, and operational goals.   
 
However, as the critical literature states and as will be discussed below, there currently exists 
no coherent conceptual framework to support such a nuanced and contextually sensitive 
approach: that is, no consistent concept of what activities constitute terrorist financing versus 
which do not; no coherent explanation for how or why certain actors and behaviors are 
involved in financing terrorism but similar ones in similar times and places are not; and no 
viable framework to systematically identify, contextualize, and otherwise give meaning to 
global and localized trends and variations in terrorist financing, all of which would be vital to 
any systematically successful effort to collect and exploit financial intelligence against 
terrorist actors.   
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The ‘Orthodox’ Conceptualization of Terrorist Finance: A Summary 
The above sections summarize how the Financial War – in both its ‘financial warfare’ and 
‘financial intelligence’ strategic formulations – led to the emergence of a securitized concept 
of financial activity related to terrorism that engendered a transformation of ideas about 
terrorist financing and the consequent creation and hardening of certain ideas about the issue. 
In summation, efforts to ‘combat’ the financing of terrorism (CFT) were framed in terms that 
could be presented as apolitical efforts to ‘secure’ the financial system against terrorist 
money, even though, as this dissertation and the critical works below demonstrate, doing so is 
intrinsically and unavoidably a political project involving the promotion of certain actors and 
interests against and instead of others.  This occurred because there was indeed a (temporary) 
politicized transformation in how ideas of terrorist financing were represented that were 
largely a product of various political and institutional changes in the post-9/11 moment.   
 
More specifically, the evolution of a securitized view of terrorism-related financial activity 
led to the emergence of three subsidiary ideas about terrorist financing that have also helped 
drive thinking and action related to terrorist financing that, as the critical literature describes, 
is not particularly accurate or useful.  These three ideas are, in essence, the core beliefs of 
‘orthodox’ representations of terrorist finance. The first is that terrorist actors possess 
financial 'infrastructures' and 'networks’ that can be identified, undermined, and destroyed. 
In particular, these so-called infrastructures and networks are primarily represented as any 
activity or actor that has economic or financial interaction with a terrorist.  However, as this 
idea entails certain a priori assumptions about both who is a ‘terrorist’ and the meaning one 
should attach to these interactions, this thesis will show that characterizations of such 
‘networks’ must be significantly contextualized and nuanced to accurately represent 
terrorism-related financial activity.  The second is that there is a strong correlative – if not 
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causal – relationship between financial activity and terrorism, or, pithily, ‘money is the 
lifeblood of terrorism.’  This idea entails the assumption that if terrorists have more (or less) 
money, there will be generally be more (or less) terrorism.  This relationship is far more 
complex and nuanced than this implies, however, as this thesis will demonstrate. The third 
idea is that analysis of terrorist financing should focus on uncovering the abovementioned 
‘infrastructures’ in order to diminish terrorism, and thus should revolve primarily around 
discovering “who finances terrorism and how they do it.”  Ultimately, as Chapter 3 discusses 
in detail, attempts to answer these questions underlie and drive ‘orthodox’ representations of 
terrorist financing.       
An (Incomplete) Critical Literature Emerges 
Nearly coincident with the development of these ‘orthodox’ approaches, a critical literature 
has evolved that raises direct and fundamental challenges to the definitions, assumptions, and 
systems and practices of power underpinning more orthodox representations of terrorist 
finance introduced above.  Unfortunately, as will be discussed, like other ‘critical’ 
approaches in International Relations discourse in general and the terrorism debates in 
particular, these critiques do not offer a coherent alternative framework that would address 
the trenchant critiques raised.  Horgan and Boyle remark that so-called ‘Critical Terrorism 
Studies’ (CTS) has so far failed – yet has the potential – to “offer a fully informed theoretical 
position, or set of related positions”49 that could produce an improved approach to terrorism 
research.  A similar criticism could be leveled at the critical literature described below, 
although unlike ‘CTS’ the critiques of terrorist financing orthodoxies have no pretense of 
being a unified discourse or school of thought, or anything other than a collection of 
independent works that each in their own way persuasively challenge various deficiencies in 
                                                           
49 Michael Boyle and John Horgan, "A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies," Critical Studies on Terrorism 
1, no. 1 (2008), 62. 
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the ‘orthodox’ literature.  This section introduces these critiques and some of their major 
claims to an extent that a reader who is not a specialist in ‘terrorist financing studies’ will be 
familiar with the literature and its problems. 
 
In aggregate and to generalize, the ‘critical literature’ argues that there exist major 
deficiencies in how terrorist financing is understood, and thus also in the institutions and 
practices that are based on this deficient thinking. This critical literature ranges widely, from 
policy-focused works such as those by Reuter & Truman,50 Sproat,51 Bierstecker & Eckert,52 
and Cassara;53 to critiques of specific issues within terrorist financing discourse such as from 
Passas54 (alternative remittance systems), Gunning55 (charities), and de Goede56 (regulation); 
to the fundamental if somewhat polemical challenges to the basic discursive foundations of 
the orthodox terrorist financing literature from Warde57 and Naylor.58   
 
For context, of the 168 publications cited in the Terrorist Financing Bibliography produced 
by the Targeting Terrorist Finances project of Brown University’s Watson Institute, thirteen59 
                                                           
50 Reuter and Truman, 2004.  
51 Peter Sproat, "The social impact of counter terrorist finance policies in the UK," Crime, Law & Social 
Change, no. 44 (2005): 441-464. 
52 Thomas J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert, "Taking stock of efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and 
recommenadations for the way forward," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. Thomas J Bierstecker 
and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
53 John Cassara, Hide & Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and the Stalled War on Terrorist Finance 
(Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2006). 
54 Nikos Passas, "Fighting terror with error: the counter-productive regulation of informal value transfers," 
Crime, Law & Social Change, no. 45 (2006): 315-336. 
55 Jeroen Gunning, "Terrorism, charities, and diasporas," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. Thomas 
J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
56 Marieke de Goede, "Financial Regulation and the War on Terror," in Global Finance in the New Century: 
Beyond Deregulation, ed. Libby Assassi, Duncan Wigan and Anastasia Nesvetailova (London: Palgrave, 2007). 
57 Warde, 2007.  
58 R.T. Naylor, Satanic Purses: Money, Myth, and Misinformation in the War on Terror (London: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2006).   
59 These are: Amicelle, A. (2008) "Migrant Remittances Marginalized: An Unintended Consequence of the 
Fight against Terrorist Financing?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th  Annual 
Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, California, 26 March 2008. Biersteker, T. and S. Eckert 
(2008), "Measuring Success in the Financial War on Terror‘." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
ISA's 49th  Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, California, 26 March 2008; 
Biersteker, T. J. and S. Eckert, eds. (2007). Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Routledge: London New 
York.  Alyson Bailes (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press; Biersteker, T.J. with P. Romaniuk (2004) "The 
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can be considered to be ‘critical’ works in that they critique the conceptual and political 
foundations of current conceptualization of the financing of terrorism, or the impact of such 
poor conceptualizations. While the bibliography leaves off several significant works, 
including those by de Goede and Naylor (cited above), in general a common theme runs 
throughout this literature that terrorist financing is currently poorly understood and poorly 
researched.    
 
Major Criticisms of Orthodox Approaches to Conceptualizing Terrorist Finance 
Even though compared to the overall body of writing on terrorist financing, ‘critical’ works 
represent only a small fraction, the critical literature robustly challenges existing 
conceptualizations of terrorist financing, in ways introduced below.  To summarize, however, 
these works argue that existing understandings of terrorist financing are at best severely 
dysfunctional, or at worst malignantly so.  In aggregate, these works’ critique can be 
summarized that despite the emergence and relentless prosecution of the global ‘financial 
war’ against terrorism, governments, the financial industry, and academia alike have no clear, 
systematic approach for understanding of the financial activities and economic foundations of 
terrorist actors.  However, as shall also be discussed below and later in the thesis, these 
                                                           
Return of the State? Financial Re-regulation in the Pursuit of National Security After September 11." In Maze of 
Fear. Security and Migration After 9/11, John Tirman (ed.), New York: The New Press, 2004; Cassara, J. 
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Govermentality and the Financial Action Task Force‘s Campaign Against Terrorist Financing.! Review of 
International Studies, 34: 553-573; Passas, N. (2006) !Setting Global CFT Standards: A Critique and 
Suggestions,! Journal of Money Laundering Control, 9(3): 281-292; Reuter, P. and E. Truman (2004) Chasing 
Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 
Vlcek, W. (2008), !Development vs. Terrorism: Money Transfers and EU Financial Regulations in the UK. 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 10(2): 286- 302; Vlcek, W. (2007) !Hitting the Right 
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critical works do not generally provide any viable alternative conceptualization of terrorist 
financing that would address the problems the works raise. 
Orthodox Approaches Produce Deficient Knowledge about Terrorist Finance 
It is hardly difficult to highlight examples of reliable observers stating that knowledge of 
terrorist financing produced within existing, ‘orthodox’ framework is grossly deficient.  In 
their large, mostly critical anthology, Bierstecker & Eckert concisely state, “terrorist 
financing remains a little understood and inadequately researched topic,”60 and remark that 
the poor state of understanding of terrorist finance represents a “humbling … admission of 
how little we know.”61 In particular, they describe the inadequacy of existing knowledge 
regarding some issues that are often mentioned as central to ‘fighting’ terrorist finance, 
writing, 
“There is still a great deal we do not know about the magnitude and different 
mechanisms of charities diversion, the use of informal value transfer systems, trade 
diversion and commodities, and about cash smuggling,”
62
  
 
Peter Reuter and Edwin Truman, two economists writing for the International Monetary 
Fund, question the efficacy of the assumptions underlying dominant, ‘orthodox’ approaches 
to understanding terrorist finance, stating explicitly: 
“The fact is that, to date, an elaborate system of laws and regulations that affects the 
lives of millions of people and imposes several billion dollars in costs annually on the 
American public has been based to a substantial degree on untested assumptions that 
do not look particularly plausible.”
63
 
 
                                                           
60 Biersteker and Eckert, "The Politics of Numbers in the Financial “War” on Terrorism," (2008). 
61 Bierstecker and Eckert, "Taking stock of efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and recommenadations 
for the way forward," (2008). 
62 Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, “Conclusion” in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Routledge, 2008 
New York, 301. 
63 Reuter and Truman, 2004, 7. 
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Similarly, Nikos Passas of Northeastern University describes the impact of the deficiencies in 
conceptualizing terrorist finance as “fighting terror with error,”64 and several other reliable 
analysts raise similarly fundamental doubts, such as that analytic conclusions reflect 
politicized a priori assumptions65 and are simply not supported by available evidence.66  In 
some respects there is nothing inherently wrong in the former, as terrorist financing is an 
inherently political and politicized topic, but, as this dissertation discusses, the question of 
whose politics is being served by representations of terrorist finance is a centrally important 
issue, especially when such representations produce knowledge of terrorist financing that is 
misleading or results to undesirable consequences.  For example, Ibrahim Warde, a professor 
at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, calls the dominant discourse on terrorist financing 
“lackadaisical”67 and describes how,  
“fixed ideas about terrorist financing [are] well entrenched, and axioms and 
assumptions [are] thoroughly internalized.  Facts and factoids [are] made to fit 
within [a preexisting] worldview.  Neither policy makers nor the media [give] much 
play to later stories that [debunk] the dominant terrorist financing narrative.”
68
   
R.T. Naylor, a criminology professor at McGill University, agrees (albeit more forcefully –
and polemically), saying about the overall discourse on terrorist financing that,  
“When the conventional tale is broken down into constituent parts, it is hard to find 
anything in it that stands up to scrutiny.”
69
   
 
These are serious claims that cannot be easily dismissed, especially in context of the efforts 
expended to combat the financing of terrorism described above.  Indeed, knowledgeable 
observers from outside academia echo these sentiments closely.  For instance, Lee Hamilton, 
head of the 9/11 Commission, stated, 
                                                           
64 Passas, “Fighting Terror with Error,” 2006, 315-336. 
65 Warde, 2007. 
66 Warde, 2007; Reuter and Truman, 2004; Gunning, 2008. 
67 Warde, 2007, 4. 
68 Ibid., 6. 
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 “despite all of our sophistication, we have neither starved the beast nor produced 
very good intelligence on how exactly these organizations continue to finance 
themselves.”
70
   
 
Furthermore, John Cassara, a former CIA case officer and retired Treasury agent who was 
one of a handful of people to have worked on many of the U.S. Government’s counter 
terrorist financing initiatives both before and after the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
describes in his book that in general, US-led efforts to combat terrorist financing “have been 
looking in the wrong places.”71   These critiques are seconded in the following candid 
statements from interviews with people from various fields of counter terrorist financing 
practice: 
“We don’t know what to look for.”
72
  
– Chief of Financial Crime and Intelligence of a major global banking group 
Efforts by the financial industry to detect and stop terrorist financing are “elaborate 
theater.”
73
 
 – Senior compliance officer of a major global banking group 
Regulations meant to combat terrorist finance are based on “quite a few myths.”74 
 – Senior official in the International Monetary Fund’s AML/CFT section 
“We need all the help we can get.  Most of what we know [about terrorist financing] is 
from news reports.”
75
 
 – Intelligence analyst, U.S. Department of the Treasury 
“In my opinion, terror finance policy makers are still not…asking the right 
questions.”
76
 
 – Former CIA officer, U.S. Secret Service agent, and senior Treasury official 
“It is impossible to point to…objective criteria for making decisions [about terrorist 
financing risk].77 
 – Managing Director for AML/CFT compliance of a major global banking group 
                                                           
70 Lee Hamilton, et al., Preliminary Report of the Council on Global terrorism: State of the Struggle against 
Global Terrorism (Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institute Press, 2006), 18. 
71 Cassara, 2006, 197. 
72 Name and employer withheld.  Interview with the author (London, November 2004). 
73 Name and employer withheld.  Interview with the author (Amsterdam, May 2009) 
74 Name withheld.  Interview with the author (Washington, DC, June 2007) 
75 Name withheld. Interview with the author (Washington, DC, February 2008). 
76 John Cassara, email exchange with the author, (Washington, DC, May 2009).  This statement has been 
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Such criticism of the prevailing discourse on terrorist financing has even seeped into popular 
culture sources.  For example, Nick Kochan, a journalist and author of best selling ‘factual 
thrillers’ about money laundering and terrorist financing recognizes the need for “a new 
mindset on terrorist financing,”78 which ultimately echoes Biestecker and Eckert’s more 
scholarly call for a “more mature phase of research”79 into terrorist finance.  
 
Given such withering, cross-cutting, and fundamental-level criticism, it is worth asking why 
this is the case, and also even, how can this be?  What are the reasons behind the 
development and, to date, virtually uninterrupted continuation of such a deeply faulty 
discourse?  These are important questions, especially for this thesis.  However, given that one 
could easily – and likely would be required to – spend at least an entire dissertation itself to 
thoroughly answer them, this section will only briefly sketch out what appear to be some key 
interrelated themes lying behind the gross failure of orthodox approaches intimated above.   
 
First, it is likely that an issue underlying the intellectual deficiencies of orthodox 
representations of terrorist finance relates to how the issue has been formulated in terms of 
‘protecting’ the world (but most especially Western and liberal states, their societies, and 
their financial systems) from terrorist finance.  In particular, de Goede and others have 
argued persuasively that what is referred to here as ‘orthodox’ discourse perceives terrorist 
financing as a way itself of understanding and therefore addressing contemporary risks, many 
of which were not terrorism.80  In particular, the argument goes, ‘terrorist finance’ was 
                                                           
78 Nick Kochan, "Terrorist financing: the need for a new mindset," Nick Kochan: Political Risk and Economic 
Opportunities, http://www.nickkochan.com/docs/terrorist_financing/mindset.htm (accessed May 30, 2007). 
79 Bierstecker and Eckert, "Taking stock of efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and recommenadations 
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conceptualized and represented in ways that, although demonstrably deficient for actually 
understanding and confronting financial activity of and related to terrorist actors, were 
nevertheless useful (because as a securitized issue, it had greater potency) for identifying and 
governing perceived risks from globalization and the political-economic power of non-state 
actors.81  Simply put, this was accomplished by representing ‘terrorist financing’ using an 
analogous strategy as was used for other ‘bad’ financial activity, namely as an undesirable 
element that can be identified and ultimately separated from desirable economic activity, if 
not stopped outright.  In this way, ‘terrorist finance’ is to terrorism as ‘money laundering’ is 
to crime, ‘kleptocracy’ is to corrupt national leaders, and, at times, ‘black market’ or ‘illicit 
finance’ is to unregulated, unrecorded, informal, extra-state, or even just non-Western 
economic activity.82     
 
The problem, however, starts with the fact that, as many authors have noted, segregating 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ economic activity is – conceptually and practically – ultimately an illusion, 
albeit at times a useful one.  For example, Amoore and de Goede (quoting Coutin) observe,  
“the legitimate and illegitimate spaces of globalization are more “mutually 
constituting and interdependent” than is normally assumed… In the field of money 
laundering and terrorist finance, there is increasing evidence that the ‘upper worlds’ 
and ‘underworlds’ are more closely linked and difficult to separate than is assumed 
in much policy literature”
83
   
Carolyn Nordstrom, an anthropologist who has conducted several years of field research on 
extra-legal economies, further argues that in this attempt to separate the legitimate from the 
illegitimate, huge swaths of global economic – and crucially therefore also social and 
political – activity are in effect ‘deleted’ from our collective understanding.  She writes: 
                                                           
81 See for example Mareike de Goede (2004).; and Amoore and de Goede (2005). 
82 For further discussion of these analogies, see R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, 
and the Underworld Economy (London: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Carolyn Nordstrom, Global 
Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World (London: University of California Press, 
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Leaving illegal economic activities out of the globalization debate…is part of a much 
larger process.  While there are excellent studies of extralegal activities in the world, 
none are incorporated into formal governmental and international organization 
economic indices….Deleting the illicit from formal economic analyses is not mere 
happenstance: it is linked to political and economic control.  Such control…require 
that the figures on the extrastate and practices that underlie them are neither 
transparent nor accountable.”
84
 
 
Although more research is required to trace precisely how this trend has impacted existing 
conceptualizations of terrorist finance, even this brief discussion helps put into context the 
development of such a deficient ‘orthodox’ discourse on terrorist financing.  As will be 
evident in the thesis, if not already so, ‘orthodox’ ways of conceptualizing and dealing with 
terrorist financing are grounded in declarations of such activity to be illegitimate and 
associated attempts to conceptually – and ultimately practically – segregate this ‘bad’ activity 
from its ‘good’ counterparts.  And therefore, at the very least, if illegitimate economic 
activity is, as Nordstrom claims, summarily ‘deleted’ from systems of research and analysis, 
and if terrorism-related financial activity is considered to – and in many cases already 
naturally does – involve such extra-legal and illegitimate activity, then it is certainly no 
surprise that research and analysis of terrorist financing is currently so deficient.   
 
Another factor that appears to have contributed and exacerbated deficiencies in how terrorist 
finance is currently conceptualized relates to the rise of the so-called ‘risk society.’  The 
central – yet often hidden – political dynamic of a risk society is, according to Beck, “how to 
feign control over the uncontrollable,” via a process of “targeted governance.”85  According 
to Amoore and de Goede, this represents the key strategy for governing how terrorist 
financing is understood and dealt with: 
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It is possible to argue that targeted governance in the war on terror is one way in 
which control over the uncertainties of globalization is feigned…Risk management 
via targeted governance, then, rests upon the representation of two worlds of 
globalization: one populated by legitimate and civilized groups whose normalised 
patterns of financial, tourist and business behaviour are to be secured; and another 
populated by illegitimate and uncivilized persons whose suspicious patterns of 
behaviour are to be targeted and apprehended.  
In order that the legitimate world of profitable global financial transactions and 
business and leisure travel can remain an alluring and enduring prospect, control 
over the illicit world of terrorism, trafficking or illegal immigration must be given 
credence. As we have argued, the impression of policing the behaviour in the 
‘illegitimate’ sphere rests upon the categorization and risk pooling of normality and 
suspicion, as well as problematic dichotomies between civil and uncivil everyday 
practices.” 86 
In other words, existing, orthodox conceptualizations of terrorist financing are heavily 
influenced by the role they are supposed to play in support of these strategies of ‘targeted 
governance.’  For example, by representing terrorist financing as a product of mysterious 
‘networks’ and ‘infrastructures’ of terrorist financiers, it is possible to devise policies and risk 
calculations about who may or may not be part of these networks and infrastructures that are 
need only to be plausible, rather than accurate.87  An obvious example of an application of 
such ‘targeted governance’ to terrorist finance are the various terrorist financing related 
designation and blacklisting programs mentioned above, which have become collectively 
known as “targeted sanctions.”  The Watson Institute, placing the strategy in context of 
earlier ‘untargeted’ sanctions, describes targeted sanctions in the following terms:  
Sanctions are an essential instrument of United Nations efforts to maintain 
international peace and security. Since the experience of comprehensive sanctions 
against Iraq in the early 1990s, the United Nations has increasingly embraced 
targeted sanctions as a means of mitigating the negative humanitarian impact of 
broad economic sanctions on civilian populations.  Targeted sanctions include 
financial, travel, aviation, arms and commodities restrictions on individuals or 
corporate entities with the objective of applying coercive pressure on transgressing 
parties, leaders and the network of elites and entities who support them.
88
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The problem, however, is that to avoid illiberal or unintended consequences practices of 
targeted governance, including ‘targeted sanctions,’ not only require extremely accurate 
calculations of the risk posed by the entity targeted, but also highly sensitive governance 
principles to avoid prejudicial mistakes in such an intrinsically politicized practice.89  
Unsurprisingly, neither condition can be guaranteed in a ‘risk society.’  In a clear example, a 
lawsuit involving entities apparently mis-designated as being involved in terrorist financing 
led the European Court of Justice in 2008 to rule that designations of individuals and entities 
“infringes” the “fundamental rights” of those blacklisted.90  Commenting on the case, the 
deputy chief prosecutor in Milan, whose office had investigated allegations of terrorist 
financing involvement of one of the accused, stated,  
"You can be added to the list for political reasons, without any serious evidence of 
wrongdoing. There is a risk of making many, many mistakes."
91
  
 
Therefore, while an approach based on targeted governance of terrorist financing activity 
may create policies that can be devised and defended within the political arena, it is 
nevertheless unsurprising when these policies eventually are challenged by the very realities 
they are meant to govern.  A similar failure of ‘targeted governance’ to reflect ground 
realities is evident in the following statement by Robert Grenier, a former senior CIA official: 
"It's not as much that we're not properly executing our strategy, it's that the strategy 
is of limited utility in countering terrorism financing given the mechanisms that 
terrorists use.” 
92
   
 
                                                           
89 For discussions of these particular issues as they relate to targeted sanctions, see David Cortright, George A. 
Lopez and Linda Gerber, Sanctions and the search for security (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); 
and Helen Keller and Andreas Fischer, "The UN Anti-terror Sanctions Regime under Pressure," Human Rights 
Law Review 9, no. 2 (2009): 257-266. 
90 Court of Justice of the European Communities, " Judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-402/05 P 
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Press Release No 60/08, September 3, 2008. 
91 Quoted in Craig Whitlock, "Terrorism Financing Blacklists At Risk," The Washington Post, November 2, 
2008. 
92 Meyer, 2008. 
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Ultimately, therefore, one can see that the intellectual deficiencies in orthodox approaches are 
not only severe, but also rooted in complex contemporary issues such as the above and likely 
other reasons that could be identified in further research.   Regardless, for the above reasons, 
these deficiencies reproduce themselves and can only be marginally countered unless a viable 
alternative way of representing terrorist financing, like that presented in this thesis, is 
developed.  
Orthodox Approaches Have Undermined the ‘Financial War’ 
The so-called “Financial War” on terrorism has played – and continues to play – an important 
role of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (and its successors).  As such, ‘fighting’ terrorist finance 
is a key component of contemporary liberal democratic responses to terrorism, whether done 
in context of the financial warfare or financial intelligence strategies discussed above.93 
Despite this central place within liberal democratic responses to terrorism, an increasing 
number of critical authors now argue that efforts to ‘fight’ terrorist finance have “stalled.”94  
These commentators from government, the private sector, and academia cite the simple fact 
that counter terrorist financing efforts have neither lessened the threat of terrorism nor met 
other more specific stated objectives.95  In particular, Warde observes that international 
cooperation to share financial intelligence and promote international legal standards relating 
to ‘financial integrity’ has been undermined by a lack of trust in the accuracy of terrorist 
financing designations.96 Furthermore, the recent shift to the more nuanced ‘risk based 
approach’97 for counter terrorist financing efforts within financial institutions appears not to 
                                                           
93 See for example Patrick O'Brien, "Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Patrick 
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be a natural evolution in response to a difficult regulatory problem, but rather the result of a 
sustained and ultimately successful challenge by the financial industry to the efficacy of 
costly counter terrorist financing regulations.98  
 
More centrally, it appears that terrorist actors have been largely unaffected by the financial 
war other than to switch to less formally regulated financial systems,99 and even that 
‘financial intelligence’ has been, in the words of the former head of the U.S. National 
Counterterrorism Center, “oversold” as a tool for responding to terrorism. 100  In fact, as 
Reuter & Truman have stated, “it is difficult if not impossible to establish connections 
between terrorism averted and any specific element of the regime [ to combat terrorist 
financing].”101  Therefore, despite the pronouncements mentioned above, the evidence seems 
to clearly indicate that liberal democracies are simply not winning the ‘Financial War.’  
 
A major reason for this, according to many critical authors, is that certain ideas about terrorist 
financing continue to hold currency even though many of them have been proven to be either 
incorrect or not useful.102   For example, de Goede and Passas write about the persistency of 
                                                           
financial institutions to apply “measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing are 
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empirically unfounded claims about the use of hawala in financing terrorism,103 Warde about 
the repeated – and demonstrably false – claims about the supposed relationship between 
shariah-compliant financial products and terrorism,104 and Cassara about the consistent 
misrepresentation of indigenous South Asian systems of exchange.105   
 
These deficiencies in the underlying ideas about terrorist finance – described in detail in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation – have meant that current approaches to the creation and 
application of knowledge of terrorist financing are seriously deficient.  These deficient 
approaches thus unsurprisingly have undermined the prosecution of efforts to ‘fight’ terrorist 
financing because its attendant policies and approaches are based on conceptually insufficient 
foundations,106 and more critical works provide no coherent alternative framework upon 
which an improved conceptualization of terrorist finance could be based. 
Orthodox Approaches Have Produced Anti-Liberal Social Consequences 
In the third instance, counter terrorist financing efforts have had serious anti-liberal and anti-
democratic social effects.  De Goede, Sproat, and organizations such as the Finmark Trust 
cite two main negative social consequences of efforts to counter terrorist finance.107  The first 
is an increase in the exclusion of already marginalized groups from both society and the legal 
financial system.108  There is evidence that new regulations against terrorist financing, such 
as those relating to the Know Your Customer (KYC) and ‘suspicious activity’ reporting 
provisions of various anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism laws enacted in several 
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countries over the past decade,109 have driven poor, uneducated, or migrant communities out 
of the formal, regulated financial system, for example by requiring identification even though 
many lack the ability to obtain it.   For instance, the Finmark Trust stated that in South Africa 
certain new rules and regulations recommended by the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) to stop terrorist financing and money laundering are difficult to implement because 
“one third of the population live in informal dwellings without formal address whilst up to 
half of the population lack the documents to verify their residential address.”110  This has put 
post-apartheid South Africa in a difficult situation, because on one hand the country seeks to 
integrate itself fully into the community of liberal democratic states, and abiding by the CFT 
regime is integral to this.  Although Sproat remarks that this is probably an overstated 
problem in the UK, the Finmark Trust has demonstrated that such requirements have helped 
exclude perhaps millions of people from the formal banking sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 
because the regulations left South Africa’s financial institutions, 
 “in a double bind: either they contravene the law, or they are forced to exclude from 
banking facilities clients from relatively poor and mobile constituencies who do not 
hold the necessary documents – thus contravening national policies which seek to 
increase financial inclusion.”
111
   
Given that promoting access to financial services such as those offered by banks is a major 
component to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, as well as to the 
development objectives of individual countries,112 this consequence is significant.   
 
This point is certainly not surprising considering other research on the impact various rich-
world-led ‘improvements’ to global financial system governance have had on developing 
countries.  For example Claessens & Underhill’s work on Basle II illustrates that developing 
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countries are marginalized in global financial governance, including, one can assume, the 
evolution of CFT-related Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations.113   This point supports a 
larger point that CFT has anti-liberal societal consequences for developing countries in that it 
undermines citizen-led governance in those countries, which in turn is aligned with work by 
Palan who observes that social exclusion is a consequence of the ‘dislocation of conventional 
political structures.’114  Relevantly, Palan’s work builds on Jessop’s115 work on the 
‘hollowing out of the state’ and Amin & Thrift’s116 work on the increased importance of 
direct global-local interactions at the expense of national and societal level governance, both 
of which underline the fact that Western-led efforts to govern financial and economic systems 
can at times have serious negative or at least unintended consequences for poorer countries, 
especially when these efforts are poorly designed and implemented, or based on deficient 
understandings of the problem they are meant to address.  This phenomenon is clearly 
evident in the application of the CFT regime in South Africa as local people’s access to 
regulated banking services is governed in significant part by the application of a global risk 
management regime in which they had little role in developing, of which they have little 
knowledge, and from which they receive little positive impact in return.  In this respect, 
efforts to combat terrorist financing do seem to have produced anti-liberal consequences.  For 
example, a KPMG survey reported that nearly seven out of eight of banks worldwide adhere 
to global anti-money laundering / counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) ‘standards’ based 
on the deficient knowledge described here, and that only 16% of banks employ AML/CFT 
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policies that are designed and implemented at the local level.117 This implies that current 
orthodox conceptualizations do not allow for representations of terrorist financing that are 
sensitive to local traditions, processes, and consequences. 
 
The other main anti-liberal result is what has been described as a de facto criminalization of 
any financial activity that falls outside the bounds of established (i.e. Western, formal, and 
regulated) economic practice.118  For example, in line with recommendations from the FATF, 
many countries have tried to regulate hawala and other ‘informal value transfer systems’ out 
of fear that they could be used by terrorists to move money and that, unlike Western style 
banks, they ‘leave no paper trail.’  The USA PATRIOT Act for example calls for money 
exchangers to record their transactions, abide by KYC rules similar to those for banks, and 
report any suspicious activity’ to the authorities.119  As de Goede points out: 
“These requirements seem reasonable. But although informal remittance operators in 
all probability know their clients on a more personal level than high street banks do, 
producing the official documents specified under KYC regulation may be 
problematic, especially, of course, for undocumented migrants. While informal 
money transfer networks have been widely vilified for ‘leaving no paper trail,’ it is 
more accurate to say that they do engage in extensive record keeping and KYC 
practices, but in manners that are not recognised by Western regulatory 
requirements.”120  
 
Again, however, if we continue to, as Passas says, “fight terror with error,” then the citizens 
and governments of liberal democracies will remain unable to make systematic, reasoned, 
and balanced decisions about conflicting priorities, which will necessarily exacerbate rather 
than mitigate the above problems.  To emphasize, the intention here is not to claim that 
exclusion from credit is anti-liberal.  Instead, exclusion of poor and migrant communities 
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from regulated – and therefore ‘legitimate’ – banking services based on an inability to furnish 
identification documents has the effect of undermining the rule of law and individual liberty, 
because it places social development goals (which aim, to use Sen’s121 view of ‘development 
as freedom’, to increase individual liberty by removing obstacles such as poverty and social 
exclusion) in opposition to the AML/CFT regime’s recommendations concerning KYC laws.  
This constitutes an illiberal consequence because CFT requirements in effect force countries 
like South Africa to choose between rule of law or socio-political liberty. 
 
However, despite these destructive deficiencies in existing conceptualizations of terrorist 
financing, the critical literature does not provide any viable alternatives to current 
approaches.  For example, no work outlines a way of analyzing terrorist financing activity 
that is sensitive to both the contexts and differences in values and perspectives of developing 
countries in which terrorist financing is assumed to occur, and as well as the interests and 
values of those powerful state interests that drive CFT efforts.  This dissertation begins from 
this assumption, and builds a conceptualization of terrorist financing that can be used as the 
foundation for such an alternative approach.   
Orthodox Approaches Have Enabled an Unexamined Expansion of State Power 
According to the ‘critical’ literature, deficiencies in ‘orthodox’ representations of terrorist 
financing have also produced a situation within democracies such as the United States in 
which citizens and their representatives cannot judge the efficacy of major changes in how 
their governments interact with state and non-state actors within and outside their borders and 
articulate opposition to changes they deem undesirable.  The United States, similar to every 
liberal democracy, is founded on the principle that “supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable 
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power …resides in the people, as the fountain of government,”122 and also therefore that 
government, if it is to be just, must only exercise power with the “consent of the 
governed.”123  However, ignorance about terrorist finance impedes citizens from wisely 
exercising their inalienable right of sovereignty over government by preventing full 
comprehension of exactly to what they are consenting.  In other words, the lack of an 
accurate and comprehensible epistemic foundation of terrorist financing analysis has 
undermined especially American and European citizens’ ability to exercise their rightful 
powers to oversee their governments and hold them accountable, at least regarding certain 
institutional changes engendered by the ‘fight’ against terrorist finance. 
 
One such change relates to the increased power of action granted to government institutions. 
For example, the United States Treasury now includes fighting illicit finance (of which 
terrorist financing is the major element) as one of its core institutional missions alongside the 
traditional Treasury priorities of currency, taxes, the economy, international issues, and 
financial markets.124  In order to meet this new mission, the department reinvigorated and 
expanded wholesale its use of economic sanctions as a method to continually confront both 
state and non-state security threats to liberal democratic states, primarily by creating new and 
well-funded offices within the department, such as its Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
formed in 2004.125  In fact, these new offices focused on illicit-finance have expanded so 
much that one Treasury employee commented in an interview that the new “financial 
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warriors”126 are “taking over the whole fifth floor” of the department’s headquarters building, 
crowding out long-established offices such as the Office of International Affairs.127 
 
Regardless of the actual or perceived benefits, such institutional change necessarily brings 
problems and thus needs public oversight and debate.  One such problem is the implication 
that ‘fighting terrorist finance’ provides blanket and permanent justification for ‘financial 
war’ against one’s enemies, a development that, in the American context, seems to 
improperly increase the power of the executive by circumventing the supreme sovereignty 
over decisions of war and peace that the people (via their elected representatives) 
constitutionally possess.  This risk is underlined by the fact that, as some former Treasury 
officials have noted, this expansion of the department’s use of economic warfare was 
produced in large part by a bureaucratic need to counter Treasury’s loss of its entire 
investigative and enforcement capabilities (in the form of the Secret Service and Customs 
Bureau) to the newly created Department of Homeland Security than by ‘purer’ motives to 
fight terrorism.128  Simply put, in order for potential anti-constitutional or anti-democratic 
consequences to be avoided, it is necessary for the public or its representatives to be able to 
make systematic cost-benefit calculations about such institutional change, something 
impossible without a solid conceptual and empirical understandings of terrorist finance.   
 
A second change engendered by terrorist finance relates to how the issue has allowed for 
increased state surveillance and control over the economic activity of non-state actors, which 
in turn has led to a shift in the expectation that government ought not, and legally cannot, 
monitor, access, or take control of a citizen’s economic assets without the same due process 
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as afforded in the larger judicial system.129  Roger Clarke especially, as well as other authors 
such as Wall, Levi, and de Goede, refer to such societal changes as ‘dataveillance,’ or “the 
proactive surveillance of what effectively become suspect populations, using new 
technologies to identify ‘risky groups.’”130  Dataveillance is based on “the proposition that 
each movement or transaction…leaves a trail of electronic traces, which means that 
individuals cannot easily disappear.”131  Examples of this include the various sanctions lists 
that designate certain individuals, businesses, organizations, and even organs of state 
governments as financiers of terrorism (thereby justifying the freezing or seizing of their 
assets and denial of use of the global financial system), as well as the surveillance of financial 
transactions provided by government cooperation with private sector actors such as SWIFT, 
FirstData Corp, and Western Union,132 in order to find what former U.S. Treasury official 
Aufhauser called “the electronic footprint of the terrorists.”133 
 
This represents a significant change in government-citizen relations within liberal democratic 
societies, and it seems likely, as some critical authors have argued, that these changes have 
undermined the core liberal democratic traditions of due process,134 equal protection under 
the law,135 and the protection of the free marketplace from undue government intervention136 
without much benefit in return (such as a corresponding diminution of threats from terrorist 
actors).  For example, the Belgian government, acting on evidence provided by the United 
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States, closed the bank accounts of Nabil Sayadi and seized his passport, as well as those of 
his wife and four children, for allegedly funnelling money to al Qaeda via a charitible 
organization, Foundation Secours Mondial.  Regardless of the continuing controversary over 
his guilt, he has never faced due judicial process in which he could challenge evidence of 
wrongdoing.137  Furthermore, the expansion of state power over the economic sphere has 
actually undermined, or at least been antagonistic to, the global free market in which liberal 
democracies have been so successful.  For example, compliance with counter terrorist 
financing regulations cost financial institutions several million dollars per year,138 and have 
apparently encouraged “[w]ealthy Arab and Middle Eastern investors” to remove GBP 15 
billion “out of the UK amid fears legitimate assets could be frozen in the war against 
terrorism.”139 
 
To illustrate these serious issues, it is useful to recall earlier legal, political and academic 
debates on money laundering, a distinct but closely related topic to terrorist financing.  It is 
widely accepted that most of the institutions, regulations, polices, and assumptions of the 
current ‘Financial War’ against terrorists – such as ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) 
requirements and the centrality of the Bank Secrecy Act – are either modeled after, or 
directly copied from, earlier efforts to counter money laundering.140  However, at the time 
that such measures came into effect, these efforts were sharply criticized in the United States 
by members of Congress of both parties, public advocacy groups, and even justices of the 
Supreme Court.  For example, in 1999, Lawrence Lindsey, a former Federal Reserve Board 
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Governor and later a close economic advisor to President George W. Bush, wrote in the 
Financial Times: 
It would seem clear that the current money-laundering practices are the kind of 
blanket search that the writers of the Constitution sought to prohibit.  Somehow 
'probable cause' does not seem to mesh with the one-in-25,000 odds that the currency 
transactions reports provide."
 141
 
 
The American Association of Retired People (AARP) expressed similar sentiments in a letter 
to various financial regulators in the United States, voicing concerns that anti-money 
laundering efforts were resulting in a "wholesale breach of the firewall protecting the 
individual's right to financial privacy."142  Earlier, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
wrote in a 1974 minority opinion in a case that challenged the constitutionality of the Bank 
Secrecy Act: 
"It is, I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with the [U.S Treasury] Secretary that all 
bank records of every citizen ‘have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or 
regulatory investigations or proceedings.’ That is unadulterated nonsense unless we 
are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot make…A 
mandatory recording of all telephone conversations would be better than the 
recording of checks under the Bank Secrecy Act, if Big Brother is to have his way."
143
 
 
Representative Ron Paul (R-Tex) summed up the crux of this argument, saying in a 1999 
hearing, “This violation of privacy imposes a great cost with little benefit.”144  He also makes 
the point – echoing the long tradition of American libertarianism – that even major security 
or law enforcement benefits associated with such new powers of surveillance do not 
necessarily make them right or good for a liberal, democratic society, given, for example, that 
the U.S. Constitution is far more deeply concerned with preventing tyranny by limiting the 
power of government than with promoting security and order by maximizing governmental 
efficiency.   
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The point, to emphasize, is not that these claims are necessarily correct or incorrect, good or 
bad, but simply that these changes in liberal democratic societies engendered by the ‘fight’ 
against terrorist finance are debatable. In other words, given that differing interpretations of 
anti money laundering laws exist (specifically interpretations that anti-money laundering 
laws represent violations of liberal democratic principles) the above examples therefore 
imply (given that the CFT regime is largely based on the original AML regime) that it is 
unreasonable to assume that the CFT regime is necessarily similarly in line with liberal 
principles just because it has been widely adopted by liberal democratic governments.  These 
examples here are not meant to favor any particular interpretation, but simply to show that 
because of the deficiencies in orthodox approaches described above, it is currently impossible 
for citizens of liberal democracies to make an informed opinion about whether, or the extent 
to which, these changes are valid.  Such informed debate is crucial to the maintenance of 
liberal democratic principles, especially the rule of law and limited and accountable 
government, but without a reliable and thorough understanding of the reality of terrorist 
finance, citizens will continue to lack the tools to evaluate and decide what is best for their 
society and themselves and thus to wisely grant their sovereign consent to a particular way of 
balancing the competing priorities raised by the ‘financial war.’    
 
In other words, improving how terrorist financing is conceptualized touches on the expansion 
of state surveillance over its citizens, as well as questions about the capacity of citizens of 
liberal democracies to understand and evaluate – which is their right and responsibility – not 
only this expansion of surveillance, but also more generally the institutional changes 
engendered by responses to contemporary security threats, like terrorism. 
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Ultimately, fighting terrorist financing has been widely and successfully used as a 
justification for expanding dataveillance, even though – as the critical literature demonstrates 
– government officials and scholars alike largely agree that terrorist financing is not well 
understood.  Therefore, given that the problem (terrorist financing) is not well understood, it 
is difficult or impossible for citizens to make an informed judgment about dataveillance and 
other (often illiberal) changes in liberal democratic society driven or justified by a desire to 
‘fight terrorist financing;’ which indicates therefore that problems in producing accurate and 
useful knowledge about terrorist financing can and have led to the undermining of liberal 
democratic principles and practices (in this case (informed) consent of the governed). 
 
However, despite these destructive deficiencies in existing conceptualizations of terrorist 
financing, the critical literature does not provide any viable alternatives to current 
approaches.  For example, the literature neither outlines how liberal democratic societies 
could exploit financial data in ways that both fight terrorism and continue to abide by liberal 
democratic principles, nor convincingly demonstrates that no such balance is achievable.  
This dissertation begins seeks to in part fill this gap, and construct a conceptualization of 
terrorist financing that can be used as the foundation for such an alternative approach.   
A Foundational Assumption 
The above sections outline the most significant shortcomings in both orthodox and critical 
conceptualizations of terrorist finance, which when combined highlight fundamental 
deficiencies in how terrorist financing is constituted as a (mediated) concept within 
International Relations discourse.  More simply, these deficiencies in existing terrorist 
financing discourse signify core flaws in how the issue is conceptualized.  This thesis aims to 
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improve this conceptualization; a project that intends provide a foundation for, in turn, also 
improving how terrorist financing is constituted, researched, and ultimately acted upon.   
 
Humbly, however, it must be recognized that the above represents justification for an 
assumption that terrorist financing is poorly conceptualized, rather than a full demonstration 
of that fact.  As explained in this section, this choice is made for the simple reason that doing 
otherwise is not truly necessary for this particular project, and in any case is not realistically 
possible within the confines of a PhD dissertation. 
 
To begin with the latter point, the thesis chooses to frame the claim that current 
understandings of terrorist financing are poorly conceptualized as an assumption because a 
fully demonstrated argument of this claim would require research and analysis that in itself 
could fill an entire book, or perhaps even half an academic career, and thus be far outside the 
scope of a PhD dissertation.  This is the case for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, the 
study of terrorist financing itself has not been well located within IR discourse, and thus does 
not benefit from a clear set of conceptual tools with which this dissertation could improve the 
conceptualization of the topic.  In other words, given that terrorist financing remains to be 
definitively located within IR discourse, it would require a large amount of research and 
analysis (indeed something akin to that which is provided in Chapters Two, Three, and Four 
of this dissertation) to arrive at a conclusion (like that presented in Chapter Four) about how 
to locate the issue of terrorist financing within IR.  Second, as discussed above, both the 
‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ terrorist financing literatures are deficient in their own ways (poor 
conceptualizations, and no viable alternatives presented, respectively), and no work yet exists 
that systematically documents these deficiencies, or how these deficiencies came about; 
knowledge of both of which would be necessary to fully demonstrate that terrorist financing 
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is poorly conceptualized.   Indeed, given that analysis of terrorist financing is produced and 
used not only by academia but (primarily) also by various law enforcement, regulatory, 
intelligence, financial industry, charitable, and other non-academic communities, any attempt 
to systematically prove how precisely both orthodox and critical works on terrorist financing 
are problematic would require in depth investigation into the various and complex 
power/knowledge interactions among these various public, private, and research entities.  For 
example, it would be extremely helpful to understand the exact extent to which the more 
‘orthodox’ discourse on terrorist financing influenced and were influenced by (especially 
American and European) government actions and pronouncements, and how internal 
ideological and bureaucratic trends within those governments influenced these orthodoxies 
about terrorist financing. Such research would help answer, for example, questions about how 
precisely orthodox approaches to understanding terrorist finance, as Warde posited, 
influenced and were influenced by the neo-conservative ideological movement in the United 
States after 2001,145 or how, if at all, the United States Treasury’s desire to regain 
bureaucratic stature and influence following the evisceration of its enforcement capabilities in 
2002-3 contributed to the promotion and dissemination of deficient – but politically and 
bureaucratically useful – ideas about terrorist financing, as Cassara has argued.146    However, 
while these and other similar themes would be extremely interesting topics of research – and 
which would be highly relevant and helpful to this dissertation – they would simply be far 
outside the scope of what is possible in one PhD dissertation. 
 
Of course, the above begs the question of whether this dissertation is in fact premature, given 
that these power/knowledge dynamics may in fact hold the key to understanding the roots of 
the deficiencies of current conceptualizations of terrorist finance.  However, I argue that this 
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is not the case and also that it is sufficient for this chapter to present the underlying premise 
that terrorist financing is poorly conceptualized as an assumption, because, it is in fact only 
tangentially important for the purposes of this dissertation to understand exactly how and 
why these deficient conceptualizations came about.  For example, it is not necessary for this 
dissertation to know the exact answers to the questions raised above.  What is necessary is the 
claim that terrorist financing is poorly conceptualized, and at least a reasonable understanding 
of what these deficiencies are.  First, this chapter’s discussion of the orthodox and especially 
the critical literature provides evidence of the former that is more than sufficient upon which 
to base an assumption that terrorist financing is poorly conceptualized, and thus require 
improvement.  This validates the purpose of this dissertation and provides it with intellectual 
context.   Second, Chapter Three thoroughly surveys the orthodox literature and orthodox 
approaches, and presents full extended critiques of the main ways in which these approaches 
and literature are conceptually deficient, according to both the critical literature and my own 
original analysis.  This provides evidence about the nature of these deficiencies sufficient to 
conduct analysis and make judgments about better alternatives.   
 
Ultimately, therefore, in order to address the complexities, difficulties, and idiosyncrasies of 
researching terrorist finance, this dissertation, has for sake of clarity and coherence postponed 
presentation of the bulk of the necessary literature surveys for this dissertation to Chapter 
Three, rather than perhaps more traditionally in the thesis’ first chapter.  The following 
section, however, introduces the critical and orthodox perspectives about terrorist financing 
and discusses how this dissertation will go beyond existing critiques to reach an improved 
conceptualization about the financing of terrorist actors.   
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Contributing to ‘Terrorist Financing Studies’ 
De Goede argues that because it concerns a securitized, “mediated” issue, research into 
terrorist financing can never be simply a “neutral recording of a prior material reality” or 
simply the search for the hidden “truths” of terrorist financial networks.147  This may seem to 
pose a fundamental problem for this thesis, given its objective is, in essence, to improve how 
the ‘material reality’ of terrorist financing is conceptualized.  However, this thesis holds 
instead that this simply means that research into terrorism-related financial interactions must 
engage with and be aware of both as the empirical realities of terrorist financing activities and 
interactions, as well as how these interactions are represented and mediated in various 
relevant discourses.  In fact, given that this dissertation seeks to improve the 
conceptualization of terrorist finance in ways that will produce more accurate, coherent, and 
useful knowledge of the realities of terrorist financing activity, a major focus of the 
dissertation will be on determining exactly which discourses are relevant to terrorist finance 
and how best to represent these interactions within those discourse.  But this also raises a 
problem in that if this dissertation will be about in part determining where to intellectually 
locate terrorist financing, then where exactly is the thesis as a whole to be located?   
 
The answer posited below is that this thesis rests within and contributes to what can be 
termed ‘terrorist financing studies.’  Terrorist financing studies is, as discussed below, an 
idiosyncratic niche sub-field of International Relations discourse, concerned primarily with 
International Security, but also which necessarily includes knowledge from various other 
parts of the IR discipline as well as from outside it.  The next sections discuss the challenges 
of locating terrorist financing research within IR discourse – and thus why ‘terrorist financing 
studies’ is an appropriate context for this thesis, the place of terrorist financing studies as a 
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sub-field within international security debates, and finally the audiences of this thesis, which 
are simply those audiences that necessarily ‘mediate’ any representations of terrorist finance.    
The Challenge of Locating Terrorist Financing Research within International Relations 
Terrorist financing has not yet been definitively located within the International Relations  
discipline.   Returning to de Goede’s conception of terrorist finance as an object of study, she 
observes that terrorist financing was not originally and is not currently problematized in 
context of other political-economic issues of international society such as corruption, money 
laundering, or fraud, but instead exists as a problem of international relations “only in 
relation to fighting ‘terror’ and especially relating to the assertion that “money is the 
lifeblood of terrorism.”148   Interestingly, however, the study of terrorist finance has also not 
benefited much from the terrorism debates.   This is largely because, as surveyed in Chapter 
Three, the evolution of dominant ‘orthodox’ terrorist financing discourse has primarily 
focused simply on increasing the sophistication with which one can “uncover” the ostensibly 
“hidden” financial “networks” and “infrastructures” of terrorist groups, and thus has largely 
failed to investigate the demonstrable problems with how terrorism-related financial activity 
is represented, mediated, acted upon, and fundamentally conceptualized.    
 
More simply, terrorist financing has not – until this dissertation at least – been definitively 
“mediated” within any particular field of intellectual endeavor.  This stems in part from the 
fact that the IR literature that actually explicitly addresses the topic is severely limited, 
especially when compared to the high levels of attention the topic has engendered both within 
the media and among governments and the financial industry.  For example, the Watson 
Institute at Brown University periodically publishes a “Terrorist Financing Bibliography,” 
which – while not entirely comprehensive – more or less represents the ‘canon’ of literature 
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on terrorist financing.149  In its 2007 iteration, this bibliography included 168 scholarly, 
journalistic, and official publications, but only eight of which were published in IR 
journals.150  While several other works listed were indeed the work of IR scholars (i.e. 
members of International Relations, Political Science, or similar faculties) presented in other 
venues (such as journals in other disciplines, non-scholarly publications, or conference 
papers), this statistic nevertheless clearly illustrates that terrorist financing has to date 
received scarce attention within International Relations discourse proper.   
 
This is perhaps to be expected to some extent, considering that, intellectually, terrorist 
financing crosses many complex and unsettled areas of thought and practice, only some of 
which are systematically dealt with within IR discourse.  For instance, with only the most 
cursory understanding of the topic, one could reasonably surmise that terrorist financing 
pertains to not only the terrorism debates, but also discourses on international political 
economy, anti-money laundering, financial regulation, criminology, law and international 
regimes, security studies, global governance, the role of non-state actors in the international 
system, politics, globalization, conflict, and area studies, among others.   
 
The problem, therefore, is one of putting the cart before the horse.  Given the dearth of IR 
scholarship explicitly on the topic, choosing from the outset any single one of these 
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150 For example, they are faculty members within departments of International Relations, Political Science, or 
similar. These IR works are: Aydinli, E. (2006) “From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the 
Global Jihadists’ Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(3): 301-313; Basile, M. (2004) “Going to 
the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network is Likely to Withstand the27(3):169-88; Horgan, J. and M. 
Taylor (2003) “Playing the 'Green Card'-- Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 2,” Terrorism & Political 
Violence, 15(2): 1-60; Horgan, J. and M. Taylor (1999). “Playing the Green Card:1,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 11(1), 1-38; Levitt, M. (2003) “Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical and Conceptual 
Challenges.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 27(1): 59-70; Passas, N. (2003) “Cross-border Crime and 
the Interface Between Legal and Illegal Actors.” Security Journal, 16(1): 19-37; Napoleoni, L. (2006) “Terrorist 
Financing: How the New Generation of Jihadists Funds Itself.” RUSI Journal, 151(1): 60-65; Winer, J.M. and 
T. J. Roule (2002) “Fighting Terrorist Finance.” Survival, 44(3): 87-104. 
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discourses would necessarily constrain the literature, theories, concepts, and methodologies 
available to improve the conceptual basis of terrorist financing; and more importantly would 
do so before one could establish a basic conceptual understanding of the issue.  Therefore, 
given both that terrorist finance is such an inherently “mediated” topic and that the objective 
of this dissertation is to improve the overall conceptualization of terrorist financing, it would 
be arbitrary – and thus intellectually unsound – to simply pick a discourse to mediate this 
project, when which discourse is most appropriate remains unsettled. More briefly, it is clear 
that terrorist financing relates to the abovementioned discourses, but it is impossible, at this 
juncture, to fit this thesis within any single one (or even how precisely the issue fits in with 
any of them), simply because one cannot confidently locate terrorist financing within any 
specific part of IR discourse without knowledge of how terrorist finance is properly 
conceptualized, which, again, is an objective of this thesis.  Therefore, in this way, the 
intellectual and disciplinary context of terrorist financing – i.e. the decision of which 
disciplinary lens is most appropriate to mediate research on terrorist finance – is in many 
ways more a puzzle for this thesis (which it addresses in Chapter 4), rather than a starting 
point of it. A key contribution of this dissertation is thus an explicit solution to the problem of 
where to locate this complex, cross-disciplinary topic.   
 
However, this situation remains unsatisfactory for our purposes here, as locating this 
dissertation’s research within IR is necessary intellectually and academically.  Therefore, this 
thesis makes explicit that this dissertation sits within ‘terrorist financing studies,’ which is in 
fact simply the cross-disciplinary aggregation of discourse that explicitly deals with the issue 
of terrorist financing.  
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A Dichotomous Discourse 
Importantly, the discourse that can be termed “terrorist financing studies” actually 
encompasses two distinct (albeit naturally related) topics of study – the study of terrorism- 
and terrorist actor-related financial and economic activity on one hand, and the study of state, 
international, and other responses to the problem of ‘terrorist finance.’  For sake of example, 
John Horgan’s and Max Taylor’s two-part examination of the financial activities of the Irish 
Republican Army would fall into the first category,151 but Marieke de Goede’s critical 
examination of counter terrorist financing regulation in context of the ‘War on Terror’ would 
fall into the latter.152  This thesis is explicitly focused on improving conceptualizations of the 
former, and therefore does not engage with analyses of responses to terrorist financing – or 
thus with the literature in IR, IPE, and elsewhere about these responses – unless they pertain 
to how the financial dimensions of terrorist actors are (mis) conceptualized.  It is important to 
note that often individual authors or for that matter individual works will be relevant to both 
the study of the financial dimensions of terrorist actors, and the study of state, international, 
and other responses to the problem.  For example, John Cassara’s work on how poor 
conceptualizations of terrorist financing have caused the ‘Financial War on Terror’ to “stall” 
would be relevant to both.153  Similarly, while most of the literature by de Goede concentrate 
on counter terrorist financing efforts, these works also carry important explicit and implicit 
theoretical insights that help explain the realities of terrorism-related financial activity.154    
 
The point here is to distinguish works that only pertain to counter terrorist financing efforts 
and which do not add any new research or insights about the realities of terrorist financing.  
                                                           
151 John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing the Green Card: Financing the Provisional IRA, Part I," Terrorism 
and Political Violence (Frank Cass) 11, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 1-38; and "Playing the Green Card: Financing the 
Provisional IRA, Part II," Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003): 1-60. 
152 Marieke de Goede, "Financial Regulation and the War on Terror," in Global Finance in the New Century: 
Beyond Deregulation, ed. Libby Assassi, Duncan Wigan and Anastasia Nesvetailova (London: Palgrave, 2007). 
153 Cassara (2006). 
154 e.g. de Goede (2003). 
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This is important to do from the outset because – as explored throughout the thesis – efforts 
to counter terrorist financing do not necessarily reflect – and in fact often have little or 
nothing to do – with the complex ground realities of terrorist financing.  In other words, 
literature that focuses only on examining counter terrorist financing efforts necessarily will 
mediate their own analyses through the mediation perspective of their object of study.  In but 
one of many similar examples, in her examination of the evolution of the Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) regime, Tsingou summarizes several established critiques concerning the 
(in)appropriateness of incorporating counter terrorist financing (CTF) into AML efforts.155  
However, since her examination is exclusively focused on how CTF fits in with AML, she 
uncritically repeats and accepts certain problematic policy perspectives about terrorist 
finance.156  Therefore, in order to avoid unduly privileging the assumptions about these 
realities upon which literature that focuses exclusively on counter terrorist financing efforts is 
necessarily based, this thesis is explicitly focused on using and contributing to the literature 
that relates to the understanding the realities of terrorist finance.   
Contributing to International Security Discourse 
Terrorist financing studies represents a unique niche sub-field of study that is centrally 
concerned with issues of international security, but which can nevertheless be seen as related 
to but significantly distinct from other related sub-fields. The above context broadly implies 
that within International Relations discourse, ‘terrorist financing studies’ – and thus also this 
dissertation – is best positioned as an issue of International Security, rather than of IPE, Law, 
International Organizations/Regimes, Criminology, or any of the theoretical sub-fields 
mentioned above that relate to various specific aspects of or issues raised by terrorist 
                                                           
155 Tsingou, "Who Governs and Why: The Making of the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime," in Global 
Financial Integration Thirty Years On: when it came and to where it might, ed. Geoffrey Underhill, Jasper 
Blom and Daniel Mügge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
156 One could reasonably assume that Tsingou, like other authors who exclusively focus on analysis of counter 
terrorist financing efforts, simply lack either the space or inclination to examine the complex empirical realities 
of terrorist-related financial activity.   
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financing.  This is because while terrorist financing does revolve around many concepts that 
normally fall outside security discourse (e.g. political economic decision making and socio-
cultural dynamics), the topic is perceived in securitized terms and practices meant to 
understand and control terrorism related financial activity are designed to be and are carried 
out as security practices.    
 
Therefore, terrorist financing, and therefore the study of it, relate closely with what has been 
referred to as the “liberal problematic of security.”  This, in essence, relates to a recognition 
that even successfully securitizing a particular issue or activity does not produce ‘more’ 
security, but simply leads to changed conditions in which certain (desirable) actors and 
actions achieve gains relative to their undesirable counterparts.157  The problem arises in that 
whether these changed conditions are sufficiently beneficial – and to whom they are 
beneficial – are highly contestable and by no means objective.  Terrorist financing, as will be 
discussed in the succeeding chapters, is a difficult issue of international security because it 
very clearly and openly pits various priorities of modern liberal society – such as 
counterterrorism and the free market/open society – against one another.158  In particular, it 
underlines de Goede’s perspectives that the realities of ‘terrorist finance’ are not depoliticized 
and unproblematic security issues,159 but rather reflect many different intrinsically political 
and problematic acts, practices, and beliefs – both on the part of those who are involved in 
financing terrorism, and those seeking to research, analyze, and understand the issue.  This 
dissertation seeks to understand and confront these problems with our understanding of 
                                                           
157 Mark Duffield, Development, Security, and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008), p2-3. 
158 One could of course also add privacy, expansion of state government, exclusion of minorities, and other 
liberal principles, although these have been shown to be of much less concern than counterterrorism and free 
market issues.  
159 de Goede (2008), 292. 
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terrorist finance, and to ultimately propose an improved conceptual framework through 
which both scholars and practitioners can resolve them.  
 
This places terrorist financing studies squarely in terms of this ‘liberal problematic of 
security,’ which in turn relates it to other contemporary international security discourse.  
Most obviously, this embeds terrorist financing studies, and thus this dissertation, into the 
fundamental questions of terrorism studies.  Horgan and Boyle, for example, remarked that 
“terrorism studies is ineluctably political.”160 More precisely, however, terrorism studies 
relates to security concerns within liberal politics, in that nearly all terrorism scholars, from 
early, so-called ‘orthodox’ thinkers such as Wilkinson161 (who focuses on how liberal states 
can respond to terrorism) to more recent ‘critical’ authors like Jackson162 (who focuses on the 
emanciapatory elements of how terrorism is understood and debated), are centrally concerned 
with the ‘liberal problematic of security’ by researching how best to understand and respond 
to securitized threats from ‘terrorists’ in context of a liberal political perspective.   
 
More broadly, this locates this thesis indirectly with other research concerning how security 
issues are understood (and therefore acted upon) within liberal constructs.  This discourse 
includes a range of International Relations research, most of which is not cited here, but 
which includes not only perhaps more obvious works such as Cramer’s on understanding and 
conceptualizing contemporary conflict163 and Duffield’s on the relationship between 
economic development and security,164 but also research unrelated to conflict or terrorism, 
                                                           
160 John Horgan and Michael Boyle, "A case against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'," Critical Studies on Terrorism 
1, no. 1 (Aprl 2008): 51-64. 
161 e.g. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillian, 1977). 
162 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
163 Christopher Cramer, Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing (London: Hurst & Company, 2006). 
164 Duffield (2008). 
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such as Lang’s work on understanding the nature of punishment in contemporary 
international society.165 
 
Ultimately, locating this dissertation within ‘terrorist financing studies,’ as defined above, is, 
despite any potential awkwardness, currently both the most accurate and the most useful way 
to describe the audience of the thesis, given that, as described in this chapter, the study and 
analysis of terrorist financing is a niche sub-field that crosses a diverse number of fields of 
study.  
The Community of Terrorist Financing Analysts 
The above discussion has explained that this thesis seeks to improve the conceptualization of 
terrorism-related financial activity, specifically within the bounds of “terrorist financing 
studies,” which is a securitized discourse mediated through a variety of politicized media.  As 
such, it is crucial to identify explicitly the audience of this thesis; i.e. those communities of 
thought and practice that mediate knowledge of terrorist finance and thus also to which this 
thesis will contribute.  This audience can be referred to as simply the ‘community of terrorist 
finance analysts.’ This community includes those in the academy, the public sector, the 
financial industry, and the charitable sector who by interest or vocation are explicitly 
interested in understanding terrorist finance. This would include, for example, scholars such 
as Marieke de Goede, Nikos Passas, Yee-Kuang Heng, and others who have written 
explicitly on – and therefore been forced to engage with the idiosyncrasies of researching – 
terrorist finance, as well as members of various communities of public, private, and 
charitable sector practice.  For clarity, a shorthand way by which one could envision the 
academic members of this ‘community of terrorist financing analysts’ that comprises the 
niche sub-field of ‘terrorist financing studies’ would be those authors listed in the Watson 
                                                           
165 Anthony Lang, Punishment, Justice, and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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Institute’s Terrorist Financing Bibliography, whether or not they are normally considered a 
scholar of International Relations or another discipline.  Within spheres of practice, the 
‘community of terrorist financing analysts,’ and thus the audience of this thesis, include 
professionals working in at least the following areas: 
! Financial intelligence or compliance sections of financial institutions. For sake of 
visualization, this could include, for example, those who are members – as is the 
author – of Deloitte’s Financial Advisory Service’s Anti-Money Laundering Strategic 
Leadership Group (AML-SG).166 
! Military or intelligence community analysts who specialize in collecting, analyzing, 
and exploiting data about the financing of terrorist actors, such as the analysts resident 
in the “Threat Finance Exploitation Branch” of United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM TFEB).167 
! Law enforcement agents and attorneys who investigate and prosecute terrorist 
financing cases, as well as those who defend them, such as the Terrorist Financing 
Operations Section of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
! National government regulators who formulate and enforce regulations regarding 
terrorist financing, such as the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom. 
! Legislators and executive administrators who make and implement laws against 
terrorist financing, such as elected political leaders as well as appointed cabinet 
ministers (e.g. of finance, defense, or internal security) and their deputies. 
                                                           
166 Deloitte’s AML-SG is “an advisory group that focuses on anti-money laundering (AML) and economic and 
trade sanctions (ETS) developments facing the financial services industry…The AML SLG facilitates the 
industry, government and peer-to-peer dialogue that can contribute to a better understanding of issues, which, in 
turn, can result in improved compliance practices.”  See AML-SG’s website < www.deloitte.com/us/amlslg > 
for more information. NB: The author has been a member of the AML-SG since November 2008, and was 
invited to join based on the potential utility of the research presented in this dissertation to members of this 
community of analysts within the financial industry.   
167 NB: The author, at the time of writing, was under contract with USSOCOM TFEB to apply elements of the 
research contained in this dissertation to the formulation of an analytical training program in the field of ‘threat 
finance exploitation.’ 
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! International standard setting bodies and regulatory forums, such as the Financial 
Action Task Force and the regionally focused bodies.   
! Other professions or the general public, as long as they are interested in terrorist 
financing or attempts to regulate and ‘fight’ it.   
! Members of social, political, or cultural communities that are perceived to be more 
likely to be involved in or supportive of terrorist financing (e.g. diaspora groups who 
belong to the same identity group as a terrorist organization). 
 
Consequently, it should be noted that since this dissertation sits within ‘terrorist financing 
studies’ and has an intended audience of this ‘community of terrorist financing analysts,’ the 
analysis and findings of this dissertation do not necessarily sit within and are not necessarily 
written for researchers of contemporary political economy, terrorism, international security, 
organized crime, risk analysis, or even money laundering, or – more generally – political 
theory, economics, and philosophy, even though several individual parts of this dissertation 
will be of interest, and indeed have already proven to be a publishable contribution, to those 
debates.168  For example, although the dissertation incorporates extremely valuable insights 
from IPE scholars such as Susan Strange and Leonard Seabrooke, this dissertation is not a 
work of IPE, nor does it strictly sit within ‘terrorism studies,’ because much of its research 
falls outside the boundaries of most of that sub-field’s existing discourse.  Instead, the 
audience of this thesis is this ‘community of analysts’ of terrorist financing described above, 
and thus sits within ‘terrorist financing studies’ sub-field of IR.    
                                                           
168 Portions of this thesis have been published in the journals Politics (a political studies journal) and Global 
Crime  (a criminology journal), and a modified version of the conclusion has been accepted for publication in 
Axiomathes (a philosophy journal). 
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Methodology: Critiques and their Application 
This dissertation aims to improve understandings of terrorist finance.  Determining a 
systematic and sound methodology with which to approach this objective is remarkably 
difficult however.  In part, this is to be expected because, as discussed above, this thesis 
would be arbitrarily limited if set within the methodological confines of a particular discourse 
of IR, and since ‘terrorist financing studies’ is a relatively immature sub-field, it as yet lacks 
a coherent methodological approach, especially to improve the conceptual foundations of its 
own discourse.  On a broader level, another obstacle to deciding on a methodological 
approach for this dissertation is the fact that, on a more generic level, there are wildly 
different approaches within the International Relations discourse with which one could 
‘improve’ understandings of a topic.       
 
Although there are several interpretations of the methodological divisions in IR discourse, the 
most useful here is Cox’s division between so-called ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ 
approaches to International Relations research.169  Each of these approaches offer 
methodological tools crucial to this dissertation, but neither is alone sufficient for this project.  
For this reason, this thesis forges an approach that grounds this project within the IR 
discourse in a way that avoids dogmatically adhering to either of these often-reified 
approaches.  
 
Regarding a ‘critical’ approach, because this thesis seeks to improve how ‘terrorist finance’  
is fundamentally conceptualized, it logically begins from and is embedded in existing 
relevant critiques.  In this way, this dissertation, in order to be intellectually sound, must 
locate itself as a ‘critical work,’ in that it must examine and critique (or apply existing 
                                                           
169 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium 
10, no. 2 (1981). 
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critiques) the “nature of the world”170 and think about how this nature came about and why.  
For our purposes here, the ‘world’ with which this thesis is concerned refers to how 
terrorism-related financial activity is represented and thus conceptualized.171  This thus 
implies that this thesis properly sits within methodological traditions such as those of 
constructivists or critical theorists.  But the problem, as discussed herein, is that while these 
critiques do provide valuable reflections and criticisms on both the ‘nature’ of terrorism-
related financial activity and how it is currently (mis)represented, they nevertheless do not 
provide any coherent or viable alternative that could be used to actually arrive at a more 
systematic, accurate, and useful conceptualization of terrorist finance.  Given that this is our 
purpose here, this dissertation is therefore not exclusively a ‘critical work,’ even though it 
begins from and its foundation is primarily based within critique. 
 
A similar paradox arises concerning application of strictly ‘problem solving’ approaches to 
this project, which as mentioned above, “take the world as it finds it…as the given 
framework for action.”172  This thesis, in part, aims to construct a representation of terrorism-
related financial activity that can be mediated in a more useful way for the various 
components of the ‘community of terrorist financing analysts.’  In other words, this thesis is, 
in essence, inherently also a problem solving work as it aims to develop a framework for 
producing knowledge applicable to those who can take action based on this knowledge. In 
this respect, this thesis should properly sit within other problem solving approaches of IR, 
such as quasi-scientific theory building exercises within IPE and Political Science, which 
offer approaches that enable systematic interrogations of observed empirical reality within 
                                                           
170 Scott Burchill, "Introduction," in Theories of international Relations, ed. Scott Burchill (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2005), 19. 
171 Again, given  that ‘terrorist finance’ is a “mediated” topic, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
172 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium 
10, no. 2 (1981). 
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the structures that exist as they exist, and the refinement of theoretical constructs based on the 
results of these observations. 
 
The problem, of course, is that a strictly ‘problem-solving’ approach requires a priori 
acceptance of certain established frameworks of thought – e.g. ontologies, methodologies, etc 
– about one’s topic and the institutions and structures that produced this knowledge.   This 
makes it impossible, however, for this dissertation to apply exclusively a problem-solving 
approach because the critical literature on terrorist finance clearly demonstrates that current 
frameworks for thinking about terrorism-related financial activity are fundamentally and 
thoroughly deficient, and that institutions using this knowledge have, for various reasons, 
simply replicated and thus deepened these deficiencies.  In other words, although it 
incorporates systematic analysis of observed reality and is distinctly conscious of and 
responsive to specific political and institutional norms and interests, this dissertation is not 
strictly a ‘problem solving’ work because problem solving works begin precisely from the 
type of framework that this dissertation will develop at its end.  In other words, given that it 
examines problems with how knowledge of terrorist financing is represented and produced 
and then attempts to advance this knowledge by developing an improved conceptualization, 
this thesis in effect applies critical and poststructural methods and approaches of 
investigation to the objective of creating a foundation for better empirical/positivist research, 
as well as theoretical investigation.   
 
This thus leaves a conundrum, in that critical approaches end where this dissertation begins, 
yet problem solving approaches begin from where this thesis will end.  To address this, it is 
useful to view International Relations discourse, most basically, as simply one of debate and 
intellectual contest.  More explicitly, ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically, 
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International Relations is inconsistent, incongruous, and amorphous; with no agreement 
among scholars on what constitutes ‘theory’ in International Relations, what structure of 
knowledge by which it should be governed, what purpose it is supposed to serve, or from 
what methods it should be derived.  Linklater distills this diversity into four fundamental 
points of contention.173  A brief examination of these points helps ground this dissertation’s – 
and any, for that matter – attempt to systematically examine and improve the 
conceptualization of a complex inter-subjective issue such as terrorist finance.   
 
The first fundamental point of contention that Linklater identifies is on the “levels of 
analysis.”  These debates revolve around what fundamental subject matter, and to what 
scope, a researcher should consider.  Burchill observes that this primarily requires 
determining what actors should be studied (e.g. states, individuals, organizations, 
corporations, etc); what processes should be analyzed (e.g. pursuit of power, management of 
the international system, socio-economic exclusion, etc.), and what outcomes should be 
favored (e.g. preservation of the present international system, diminished levels of inequality, 
increased individual freedom and agency, etc.). 174 As mentioned above, such ontological 
questions of what constitutes the “knowable reality”175 of terrorism-related financial activity 
are central to its understanding, and are thus a core question for this thesis.   
 
The second point of difference concerns the purpose of the conceptual and theoretical 
enquiry.  The study of people within international society “never exists in a void,”176 but is 
always tied to purposes and desired outcomes, as well as the norms that influence them.   
                                                           
173 See Andrew Linklater, "The question in the next stage in International Relations theory: a critical-theoretical 
point of view.," Millennium 21, no. 1 (1992). 
174 Scott Burchill, "Introduction," in Theories of international Relations, ed. Scott Burchill (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2005), 16. 
175 Burchill (2005), 17. 
176 Burchill (2005), 19. 
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Examples of different analytic purposes include not only the broad debates between and 
within critical and problem-solving approaches, but also more specific debates on how to 
bring conceptual cohesion to the IR discipline, how to include theories from other disciplines, 
and many others.  Because International Relations research can point towards a vast range of 
purposes and outcomes, it is crucial to assess these factors, not only when analyzing existing 
concepts, theories, and evidence but also when conceptualizing under- or poorly-researched 
problems of International Relations, as this dissertation attempts.  This is especially crucial in 
this thesis, which, by placing terrorist financing within the context of how it is represented 
and mediated by and for the ‘community of terrorist financing analysts’ (and in particular in 
terms of a ‘liberal problematic of security’) is focused on interrogating how knowledge of 
terrorist financing has been and is to be used.  This ensures that the improved 
conceptualization presented in this thesis will indeed be done, as Booth wrote, “with one’s 
feet firmly on the ground,” and is not an exercise in “constructing castles in the air.”177 
 
The third point centers on what methodologies are most appropriate for the study of 
International Relations, and for specific topics within the discipline.  Debates on this point 
mirror that of the problem-solving/critical theory debate.  In general, the debate is between 
‘positivist’ approaches that attempt to incorporate into International Relations the empirically 
based methodologies that have proven successful in the natural and social sciences, and more 
‘critically’ oriented methodologies that focus on “emancipating” thought – and therefore 
people – from the constraints of society as it currently exists.  This thesis, as discussed above, 
uses critiques – mostly existing ones from the critical literature – as a foundation upon which 
a framework for representing terrorism-related financial activity can be built, which in turn 
could not only support an improved conceptualization of ‘terrorist finance,’ but also enable a 
                                                           
177 Ken Booth, 'Beyond critical security studies', in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. Ken Booth 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 
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more systematic, accurate, and useful approach for conducting empirical, positivist research 
about the issue. It is perhaps helpful to emphasize here that by basing this dissertation’s 
analysis in critical and interpretative approaches, it does NOT reject positivism.  Instead, 
given that creating accurate knowledge of terrorist financing is not yet possible using 
positivist approaches – despite even the existence of a descriptive literature on terrorist 
financing and because the deficiencies in existing epistemologies (as detailed in the critical 
literature, and in Chapter 3) hinder, if not preclude, the nuanced evaluation of ‘the right 
questions’ I propose in Chapter 4 – this thesis must but engage with and employ critical 
approaches in order to explicitly produce an improved epistemic framework of terrorist 
financing that can be used beyond this dissertation for positivist research on the topic.   
 
The fourth main point of contention concerns the relationship International Relations 
concepts have with concepts and theories from other disciplines, namely “is International 
Relations distinct from, or related to, other areas of intellectual endeavor?”178  This is also a 
crucial issue regarding how terrorist financing is conceptualized, given that, as discussed 
above, it crosses a variety of fields and sub-fields of intellectual endeavor and academic 
discourse.  This thesis addresses this question directly in Chapter Four, by reframing the issue 
of terrorist financing and discussing specifically which areas of existing knowledge are most 
useful and applicable to the topic, so reframed. 
 
It is clear that there is great tension among the various alternative, overlapping, and 
competing conceptual traditions within International Relations discourse.  This tension does 
not require resolution, however, because, as Burchill remarks, “there are few benefits to be 
gained from theoretical [or conceptual] purity.”179   In fact, this tension and the intellectual 
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competition and interplay that results from it, is one of IR’s greatest strengths as a discipline 
in that it allows for research that does not simply explain or predict, but “tell[s] us what 
possibilities exist for human action and intervention,” and defines “not merely our 
explanatory possibilities, but also our ethical and practical horizons.”180  The alternative is 
perhaps more internally consistent and intellectually ‘pure,’ but ultimately is an ideology, not 
sound basis for understanding a dynamic and complex issue of human experience like 
terrorist finance.  Instead, such dynamic inconsistency in fact uniquely positions International 
Relations to address a complex and contentious issue, but only if done with appropriate 
intellectual rigor.   
 
Therefore, at the most basic level, the methodology of this dissertation is simply to construct 
a framework that can play a role in the IR discipline’s debate on specifically terrorist finance 
and more generally the issues of international society touched on by terrorist finance, in terms 
of Linklater’s four contested areas. In this way the International Relations discipline is 
uniquely suited to the conceptual demands of this thesis, and given the idiosyncrasies of the 
IR sub-field ‘terrorist financing studies,’ this conceptual framework therefore is at core a 
framework for representing terrorism-related financial activity in ways so it can be better 
mediated by the community of terrorist financing analysts. As discussed above and 
throughout the thesis, ideas about terrorist financing are in constant transformation.  This 
thesis ultimately sits comfortably within that tradition.   
An Intellectual Journey 
Philosophically, the methodological approach utilized in this thesis is similar to approaches 
aimed at constructing what Aristotle termed phronesis.  Sometimes translated as ‘prudence,’ 
                                                           
180 S. Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond , ed. S. Smith, K. Booth 
and M. Zalewski (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13. 
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the term is often also translated as ‘practical wisdom,’ a phrasing that better fits the 
objectives of this dissertation.  In terms of this thesis, aiming for practical wisdom reflects 
this attempt to build a coherent framework that not only represents and conceptualizes 
terrorism-related financial activity in ways that are embedded within how such activity is 
mediated as a politicized and securitized discourse (i.e. the ‘critical’ piece in reference to 
above), but also can be used (largely in future research beyond this dissertation) to produce 
knowledge about terrorist finance that can be put to ‘practical’ uses by the community of 
terrorist financing analysts (i.e. the ‘problem solving’ piece).   Generally speaking, this means 
on one hand that the practical wisdom to be developed by this dissertation will provide a 
conceptualization of terrorist finance that can engage in four areas of debate described above, 
and on the other hand will provide knowledge that can be used to serve particular practical 
uses, which, given the inherently contested nature of terrorism and finance, can be assumed 
to relate to the liberal problematic of security.  In particular, in order to construct a superior 
approach for representing and producing knowledge of terrorist financing, the thesis makes 
clear theoretical choices about how to reframe terrorist financing, primarily in Chapters Four 
and Five.  
 
Chapter Four reframes how terrorist finance is represented and thus conceptualized, 
specifically in context of both Chapters Two and Three.  Chapter Two provides the reader 
with a baseline of knowledge about terrorism-related financial activity by illustrating its 
empirical and conceptual realities via a study of a case that encompasses a full range of 
terrorism-related financial activities as well as related insights into the empirical contexts and 
conceptual implications of such activities, while Chapter Three problematizes the existing 
conceptualizations of terrorism-related financial activity introduced in this chapter, via a 
combination of survey and critique focuses especially on identifying and assessing the 
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deficiencies in orthodox approaches to the issue.  Building on these two chapters, Chapter 
Four begins by positing what the ‘right questions’ are to ask about terrorist finance (in 
response to the ‘wrong’ questions posed in orthodox representations, as discussed in Chapter 
Three).  These questions indicate that, given the inherent politicization and mediation of 
terrorist financing as a securitized issue, the right theoretical questions about terrorist 
financing should revolve around the structural and functional aspects of, first, the dynamics 
by which economic resources are instrumental to terrorist capabilities, and, second, what 
economic activity tells one about how terrorists interact with society/ies at large. Second, 
from this alternative conceptual foundation, Chapter Four – and thus this dissertation – is 
then able to systematically build an improved framework for conceptualizing terrorist 
finance. It finds that terrorism-related financial activity is properly – and most profitably – 
understood as a security issue, but one that centrally revolves around political economic 
interaction.  Reframing terrorist finance in such terms carries five crucial implications, 
namely that representations of terrorist finance should: (a) be conducted at the level of 
individual political-economic exchanges (rather than at a macro or ‘system’-level); (b) 
engage more closely with the historical, cultural, and societal realities of the diverse political 
economic orders in which it occurs; (c) recognize that terrorist ‘finance’ often is more 
accurately about the exchange of value, not money; (d) engage more closely with political 
theory to understand the intersubjective and self-limiting political logic that appears to 
govern terrorist financing activity; and (e) explicitly accept that knowledge of terrorist 
finance is necessarily subjective and thus always in part a product of the relevant socio-
political contexts that influence how knowledge and language are produced and used in the 
contemporary world.   The chapter concludes by arguing that to ultimately move the terrorist 
financing discourse beyond critique and achieve an improved theoretical bases for 
understanding it, a new framework must be developed that coherently integrates the multi-
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dimensional and highly context-contingent dynamics of power competition and value 
exchange within the individual transactions that comprise the financial activities and contexts 
of terrorist actors, and proposes some avenues for future research to further specify how such 
a reframed conceptualization of terrorist financing can address the liberal problematic of 
security. 
 
Chapter Five presents a typology of terrorist finance that represents it dichotomously as 
activity that either is part of the ‘value chain’ of terrorist actors, or is along a ‘continuum of 
material support’ for varied socio-political activities related to terrorism. Typologies at the 
same time are a familiar concept within the counter terrorist financing community and useful 
to the objectives of liberal democracies regarding terrorism, namely warfighting, rule of law, 
and empirical-rational governance.  By definition, they are a way to categorize activity, or in 
other words are essentially an epistemic framework for the representation of particular 
material reality.  The typology presented here therefore is meant to provide the 
epistemological foundation for more accurate profiles of the persons and activities involved 
in financing terrorism, at both system and individual transaction levels.  Again, this typology 
as presented is meant to be a coherent mechanism for reframing research, understanding, and 
conceptualization about terrorist financing, in ways that are more coherent and more useful to 
the community of terrorist financing analysts than current representations.  As such it is 
intended to be the foundation for further empirical research into and more cogent theorization 
of terrorism-related financial activity.  In this context, the thesis concludes by briefly 
examining how this re-conceptualization of terrorist finance could be – and indeed in some 
cases already has – been applied to the needs of the community of terrorist financing 
analysts, and with a proposal for an even more formalized program of research based on this 
thesis that could lead to the more systematic collection of empirical data about terrorism 
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related financial activity.  In other words, the thesis concludes by showing how this thesis’ 
alternative conceptualization can change – and has already changed – how terrorist finance is 
represented and mediated in both fields of thought and practice.  
 
As such, this thesis represents an intellectual journey; one that begins at the deficient existing 
conceptualizations introduced above in this chapter, and, through a combination of empirical 
investigation, critical interrogation, conceptual reformulation, and, finally, an epistemological 
re-representation, arrives ultimately at a more coherent and useful framework for researching 
and understanding terrorist finance.  Interestingly, although this thesis is (broadly) grounded 
in a search for Aristotelian practical wisdom, its journey from critique to a framework for 
analysis and action means that it necessarily also relates to other seemingly disparate 
philosophical traditions that concern understanding the creation of knowledge within certain 
contingent political, social, historical, ethical, and other realities.  In particular, it is notable 
that Chapter Three’s interrogation of the problems and politicized roots of existing 
representations of terrorist finance is not only a ‘critical’ perspective, but one indicative of 
Foucault’s perspectives of the interrelationships among knowledge and systems of power.  At 
the same, however, Chapter Four’s objective-oriented approach to reframing the conceptual 
basis of terrorist finance echoes Nietzsche’s explicit embrace of knowledge as a tool of 
power.  And finally, it is not difficult to see how the typology presented in Chapter Five is 
implicitly aligned with Classical Realist perspectives that construct frameworks for 
knowledge creation that simultaneously serve specific power structures, but are also aware 
that these structures are socially, politically, and historically contingent and eminently 
changeable.   
 
  
 
91 
Although it may seem unusual – or perhaps even indefensible to some – to employ such a 
hybrid approach, the methodological approach of this thesis nevertheless reflects established 
perspectives within International Relations, such as those by Williams,181 Molloy,182 
Connolly,183 and Owen,184 among others, which recast these different approaches, either 
individually or in conjunction with one another, not as irreconcilable and reified doctrines, 
but as often wholly compatible perspectives within a rich and ecumenical tradition of 
political and social thinking, especially as they relate to issues of knowledge and its creation 
and use.  Moreover, this philosophically hybrid approach provides the methodological tools 
necessary to improve the conceptualization of terrorist finance, and thus help mature the 
study of this topic and also the emerging International Relations sub-field of ‘terrorist 
financing studies.’ 
Research Methods 
More specifically, this dissertation employs an appropriate mixture of research methods.  I 
have used a diverse mix of library documentary source research from scholarly, quasi-
academic, government, and journalistic provenance.  The scholarly work encompasses works 
from many different fields of study within International Relations, particularly terrorism, 
security studies, peace and conflict, international political economy, and international 
political theory.  I have also used extensively works from other disciplines, including 
economics, sociology, history, psychology, anthropology, geography and even computer 
science.  This secondary research was complemented with fieldwork, key interviews, and 
personal observation in Northern Ireland, Washington DC, and along the border of the 
                                                           
181 Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
182 Sean Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). 
183 William Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault," Political Theory, 
August 1993: 365-89. 
184 David Owen, Maturity and Modernity: Nietzche, Weber, and Foucault (London: Routlege, 1994). 
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Republic of Georgia and Chechnya (Russia).  This fieldwork gave me the nuance crucial to 
many of the issues that lacked extensive empirical or theoretical foundations, especially 
surrounding the involvement of legitimate and other non-terrorist actors involved in 
terrorism-related financial activity.  The particulars of the research methods employed in the 
case study are explained in a methodological note preceding the case study in the next 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
This first chapter introduced not only how and why ’orthodox’ representations of terrorist 
finance is, as the emerging critical literature states, so deficient, but also the failure of these 
critical approaches to present a viable alternative framework for representing and 
conceptualizing terrorism-related financial activity. Nevertheless, the chapter also introduced 
the idea that while it may be complex and difficult subject to research, terrorist finance is, at 
core, simply a very specific aspect of human experience – albeit one around which massive 
amounts of power, material resources, knowledge creation, and normative judgment revolve 
– and thus is eminently comprehensible.   
 
The next chapter presents an empirical case study of terrorist financing in order to look more 
closely at the ‘everyday’ realities of terrorist finance as a phenomenon of the human 
experience.  This case, of terrorist financing along the Chechnya-Georgia border between 
1999 and 2002, offers a valuable empirical baseline upon which the rest of the dissertation 
can proceed.  The case was chosen because it forces consideration of all of the major 
concepts raised within terrorist financing analysis, including especially the subjective nature 
of terrorism and finance, the complex role of state and non-state actors, and the 
intersubjective dynamics of agency, power, and economic exchange.  As such, it provides a 
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illustrative empirical foundation for this dissertation’s attempt at improving the analysis of 
terrorist finance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Reality of Terrorist Finance:  
An Illustrative Case Study of the Empirical and Conceptual 
Realities of Terrorist Finance 
This chapter examines the empirical reality of terrorist finance, as illustrated by a historical 
case study of those activities along the Chechnya-Georgia border that financed Chechen 
separatist and al-Qaeda fighters between 1999 to 2002.   This case aims to describe a ‘typical’ 
case of terrorist finance at a level of detail that highlights the fact that while the complex, 
subjective ground realities of terrorist financing are often difficult to measure and understand, 
they are nevertheless observable and comprehensible.   The chapter thus puts the critical 
literature discussed in the previous chapter into context, and provides a baseline of sorts for 
the next chapter’s more systematic and comprehensive critique of existing epistemological 
frameworks currently used.  The chapter is organized to first present the historical case study, 
and then to introduce and discuss the major epistemic themes that this ‘typical’ case 
illustrates.   
A Note on Methodology 
This chapter is based in large part on fieldwork conducted in the Republic of Georgia in July 
and August 2006, during which more than 20 people were interviewed – both formally and 
informally – from government agencies, academic research institutions, and NGOs, as well as 
from those communities that participated in the events described.  In many instances, these 
interviews led to either further interview subjects or documentary sources, and at times these 
interviews were followed up later, either in person or via electronic means.  Most interview 
subjects agreed to be interviewed only on the condition of anonymity, and thus in lieu of 
names, a relevant description of their position has been provided when possible.  The chapter 
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also includes evidence and interpretation gained from my own personal observations, and 
data from open sources, especially local news reports.   
 
Generally speaking, conducting empirical research of terrorist financing is very difficult, 
given that primary documentary evidence is acutely rare,185 and interviewing those involved 
or suspected to be involved in financing terrorist actors are, unsurprisingly, reluctant to speak 
to researchers.  Secondary source evidence tends to be much more readily available, either in 
the form of news reports, or through interviews of government officials, journalists, or others 
with knowledge of primary evidence of terrorist financing activity (e.g. via their own contact 
with and/or surveillance of participants), although it can be problematic.186  Therefore, this 
case research adopts a common sense and pragmatic method to generalize about the 
reliability of information drawn from secondary sources, namely that its reliability can be 
assumed to be a function of both the general reliability of the source in question, and the 
veracity of the original data. Assessment of the latter is usually not possible for academic 
researchers given that journalists, officials, and other secondary sources are normally 
ethically, professionally, or legally prohibited from divulging their original sources.  This 
means that judgments about the efficacy of collected data is largely a function of the general 
reliability of the secondary sources in question, which, one can assume, can be evaluated in 
two general ways.   
 
First, for interviews, this chapter follows an accepted standard used in organized crime and 
corruption research and recently elucidated by Kupatadze,187 which, to summarize, holds that 
                                                           
185 Notable exceptions that exemplify this rarity are the Al Qaeda in Iraq Financial and Accounting documents, 
collected and translated by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.  Available for download at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/summaries%20in%20pdfs/Financial%20and%20Accounting.pdf 
186 See Warde (2007) for a discussion. 
187 Alexander Kupatadze, “Organized crime before and after the Tulip Revolution: the changing dynamics of 
upperworld-underworld networks.” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, Nos. 3 – 4, September – December 2008, 
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information from government officials, NGO employees, and others in positions of authority 
or trust can be presumed to be reliable if no other evidence disproves or discounts it and it 
can be independently corroborated, for example by another interviewee or a published 
account. Second, in the case of published materials, this research operates on the common 
sense assumption that published evidence deserves a presumption of accuracy if it was 
published in a source that would be reasonably considered to be an established, professional 
(i.e. non-tabloid), and generally respected publication.188    
 
A special note is required to explain the use as a major source of the newspaper Alia for a 
large portion of the empirical data presented below.  For reference, Alia is an established, 
well-known independent Georgian-language newspaper published in Tbilisi.  The U.S. State 
Department indicates that it is considered to be a reputable and serious journalistic source. 
According to the State Department, Alia was Georgia’s “leading independent daily 
newspaper” during the period covered by this article, and had the highest circulation of any 
Georgian newspaper in 1999 and in 2003, with nearly 20% more subscribers than the state 
controlled newspaper.189  Alia is regularly cited by other major news sources, including in 
Russia, such as Izvestia and others.190  In addition, while ideally a broader range of secondary 
sources would be desirable, informal interviews by the author with knowledgeable Georgian 
                                                           
p280. 
188 For reference, this is largely the same presumption used by several major intelligence agencies, which 
relevantly obtain much – if not most – of their data on terrorist financing issues from either ‘open sources’ (i.e. 
published media accounts) or the ‘grey literature’ (unpublished but not confidential documents, such as 
commissioned analyses or some interview notes). Interviews with six analysts from three different agencies 
within the U.S. intelligence community, January and July 2008.  Each analyst was asked about the general 
extent to which their offices utilized open source and grey literature information for terrorist financing related 
analysis.  Also, see Dax R. Norman, “How to Identify Credible Sources on The Web,” Thesis for the Joint 
Military Intelligence College, 9 December 2001 for an extended discussion about how the U.S. intelligence 
community measures credibility, reliability, and validity of open and other sources.  
189 United States Department of State, “Georgia,” 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
(Washington DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 23, 2000); and United States 
Department of State, “Georgia,” 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington DC: Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2004). 
190 Citations include Izvestia: http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article3113263/ and the Press Folder (a Russian 
news aggregation website): http://www.etpress.ru/periodicals/?content=periodical&id=6. 
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researchers and journalists from other publications indicate that Alia has a reputation for 
investigative reporting, which may explain why so much information relevant to this case has 
been published there and not independently elsewhere, and consequently why this chapter is 
compelled to rely compartively heavily on its reporting.   
 
Furthermore, it is important to again emphasize that the purpose of this case study is to 
illustrate and illuminate the complex, ‘on-the-ground’ realities of terrorist financing, rather 
than provide a comprehensive evidentiary basis upon which social scientific theoretical 
conclusions could be directly rested,191  This even further mitigates the heavy reliance of this 
source, and therefore, with the necessary caveats presented here, this case study as written is 
appropriate and sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation.   
A Case Study of Terrorist Financing along the Chechnya-Georgia 
Border, 1999-2002 
This first section provides a snapshot of the empirical complexity of terrorist finance through 
one historical perspective of a terrorist financing case, the funding of Chechen terrorism 
along the Georgian-Chechen border.  It is a historical example meant to illustrate the reality 
of terrorist finance, and as such, it is the product of extensive field and literature based 
research and extensively introduces and illustrated the complex empirical and conceptual 
realities of terrorist finance as it occurs at an individual level.  
                                                           
191 For a discussion of what is and what is not a case study, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
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Background 
The Georgian-Chechen border lies in a remote high-mountain region in the Central Caucuses.  
Completely impassable during the winter months,192 the border at other times can only be 
crossed on foot or horseback, or by four-wheel drive vehicle solely via the 300km road from 
Tbilisi to Shatili.  The region is (sparsely) inhabited by the Kist, Tush, and Khevsur peoples, 
among others,193 and although distinct from one another, all of these ethnic groups are 
characterized by strong social, cultural, and linguistic traditions that have changed little since 
the Middle Ages.194  For example, similar to the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan,195 
these groups have strict traditions of hospitality and honour, are only nominally governed by 
the central national government, and are largely egalitarian in how they govern themselves 
and settle disputes, relying on a complex mixture of social and familial customary law 
blended with religious beliefs.196  These beliefs combine ancient pagan traditions with 
Orthodox Christianity (or Sufi Islam in the case of the Kists) and play both significant 
spiritual and nationalistic roles.  Although austere, these beliefs are, as Sanikidze and Walker 
described, part of a “tradition of religious tolerance and eclecticism,”197 an observation 
confirmed by a period of field research among Khevsur villagers and elders.198  All 
inhabitants of the border region identify themselves as Georgian for official purposes, 
although the Kists are descendents of the Chechen and Ingush peoples (who collectively are 
referred to as Vainakhsi), and during Soviet times it was common for Kists to move to 
Chechnya for employment.199  Most of the Kist population lives in the Pankisi Gorge, a 
                                                           
192 So much so, in fact, that neither Russia nor Georgia guards most of the border during the winter. Newspaper 
Alia, no. 182 (November 25-26, 2000). 
193 See Shorena Kutiskdze and Vakthang Chikovani, "Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey," 
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2002, 13, note 29. 
194 Kutiskdze and Chikovani, 2002. 
195 The Economist, "Pushtunwali: The Pushtuns' tribal code ," December 19, 2006. 
196 Kutiskdze and Chikovani, 2002. 
197 George Sanikidze and Edward W. Walker, "Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia," Berkeley Program in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Fall 2004, 30. 
198 Personal observations of the author (Khevsureti, Georgia, July 2006). 
199 Sanikidze and Walker, 2004, 26. 
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remote broad valley (not a gorge, in fact) about 85km from the Chechen border.  Beginning 
during the first Chechen conflict, Chechen militants established a relatively large base of 
operations in the gorge in order to train personnel and raise funds to support its operations.  It 
is believed that many of the terrorist attacks committed by Chechen forces had a connection 
to Pankisi Gorge, either as a supply point, training centre, or planning base.   
 
From 1999-2002, Georgia was by almost any measurement a poor and corrupt country.  In 
2002, the World Bank estimated its per capita GDP as $2,220 (just richer than Mauritius and 
Angola, but poorer than Papua New Guinea)200 while Transparency International ranked it as 
the 17th most corrupt country in the world,201 an assessment shared by an overwhelming 
majority of Georgian citizens.202 Exacerbating this were large numbers of displaced persons, 
both from the 1992-93 conflict in Abkhazia (300,000)203 and the wars in Chechnya 
(4,170).204  Most of the Chechen refugees migrated to Kist (ethnically Chechen Georgian) 
villages in Pankisi Gorge where most of them took shelter with local families.205   
Expenditures 
Terrorist expenditures in the region primarily focused on weapons purchases, the cross-
border smuggling of people to fight with Chechen terrorist groups, training, and day-to-day 
needs.  The day-to-day needs of Chechen fighters in Georgia, or boeviks, included food, 
                                                           
200 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 (accessed May 
2007). 
201 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2002, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2002 (accessed May 2007). 
202 Transparency International, Corruption Barometer, 2003, 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1566/8095/file/barometer2003.en.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
This is the earliest year for which these statistics are available.  The proportion of Georgian citizens who felt 
that corruption somewhat or significantly affected cultures and values was 93.4%; political life: 79%; business 
environment:  94.6%; and personal and family life: 68.5%. 
203 This conflict resulted in the forced expulsion of approximately 300,000 ethnic Georgians from their homes in 
Abkhazia, and their eventual resettlement in various parts of the country. 
204 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR 2002 Global Report: Georgia, 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3edf4fcf0.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
205 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2002. 
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medicine, and clothing.  As will be discussed later, this was acquired in a number of ways, 
including receiving donations from Islamic and international charities, the black market, 
theft, as well as the hospitality of local civilians.   
 
Available evidence shows that the weapons materiel purchased ranged from relatively cheap 
and available handguns, bullets, Kalashnikovs, and detonators206 to expensive and harder-to-
get weapons, such as 9M111 Fagot anti-tank missiles, !"# handheld anti-tank grenade-
launchers, and ‘Strela’ surface-to-air missile systems.207 Often, corrupt Georgian officials 
facilitated these purchases.  For example, Akaki Kegoshvili, the commander of the Georgian 
peacekeeping battalion in the Tskhinvali district and Major Kornel Lazashvili, chief of 
finance of the same battalion, were both caught in 2001 smuggling a full car-load of weapons 
into Chechnya.208  Tskhinvali was a major transhipment point for weapons smuggled into 
Chechnya throughout the period.209 
 
A large amount of money also went to smuggling foreign (non-Chechen) fighters into 
Georgia and across the border to join various Chechen armed groups, as well as training and 
indoctrinating them. In the case of smuggling, sometimes this involved purchasing for about 
$400 the assistance of a Georgian guide to show them ‘weak points’ in the border where 
crossing was possible.210  Alternatively, these fighters could purchase more guaranteed 
                                                           
206 Newspaper Alia, no. 62 (May 2001).   
207 Newspaper Alia, no. 39 (March 2001); and Newspaper Alia, no. 62 (May 2001). 
208 Newspaper Alia, no. 62 (May 2001). 
209 For example, in May 2001 traffic police stopped and searched a suspicious Georgia-registered car in 
Tskhinvali. The search revealed the occupants, four Chechens and one Georgian, were transporting ‘Fagot’ anti-
tank missiles, detonators, detonation materials and a large quantity of money.  During questioning in the 
Tskhinvali police station, one of the Chechens shot a policeman and all managed to escape to a private house, 
where they took and later killed a hostage, throwing him out of window. Ossetian special forces ultimately 
raided the building, killing two of the Chechens and arresting the others. Newspaper Alia, no. 62 (May 2001). 
210 Newspaper Alia, no. 109 (September 4-5, 2001). 
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passage by directly bribing relevant Georgian police and border officials to facilitate the 
border crossing.211  
 
Although many belonged to separate networks with different particular agendas, the foreign 
fighters going to Chechnya were most generically motivated by a desire to join a global 
‘jihad’ against those seen to persecute Muslim peoples – in this case Russia – and came 
predominantly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab countries, but also occasionally 
from European countries such as the UK and France.212  Many of these foreign nationals – 
herein referred to as ‘foreign fighters213 – were later involved in terrorist attacks or al-Qaeda 
related cells around the world after their experiences in Chechnya, including for example, the 
Moscow and Beslan attacks, as well as the 2003 ‘Ricin Plot” in London.214  In many 
instances, corrupt Georgian law enforcement and intelligence personnel also facilitated the 
smuggling of people later involved in terrorism.  According to several sources, the going rate 
of such transport was about $10,000 per head, paid in either US dollars or Deutsche Marks.215  
Much of this activity occurred in Pankisi Gorge, where Georgian police demanded bribes of 
about 10 lari (approx. 6 USD) to enter or leave the Gorge.216   
 
                                                           
211 Newspaper Alia, no. 46 (845) (March 23, 2000); and Former senior official of Georgian Ministry of State 
Security, interview by the author, Tbilisi (July 2006). 
212 al-Shishani, 2006; and Newspaper Alia, no. 90 (July 21-22, 2001).  
213 This term is simply meant to convey that these actors have both traveled from abroad, and are engaged in 
what they believe to be militant operations on behalf of a violent interpretation of radical Islamism, and thus 
should be seen simply as a catchall term to encompass various – and often conflicting – strands of violent 
Islamist radicalism, such as salafism and takfirism. For a detailed background on foreign fighters in Chechnya, 
see Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:412–433, 2008. 
214 See Brian Glyn Williams, "The 'Chechen Arabs': An Introduction To The Real Al-Qaeda Terrorists From 
Chechnya," Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 1 (January 2004). 
215 Newspaper Alia, no. 39 (March 2001); and Newspaper Alia, no. 46 (845) (March 23, 2000). 
216 Newspaper Alia, no. 191 (December 11, 2000). 
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Some of the approximately sixty217 foreign fighters resident in the Gorge also apparently 
received indoctrination and training in military and terrorist operations while in Pankisi.  Few 
details are available about the specific expenses of the training camps.  One clue may be in 
contemporary press sources that reported that multiple mosques were built in Pankisi Gorge, 
including one in the valley’s administrative centre Duisi, which taught the strict Wahhabist 
interpretation of Islam promulgated by Saudi Arabia that is not only common among foreign 
fighters but also considers the Sufi beliefs of the indigenous Kists and Chechens to be 
heretical.218  Although no information could be found about the exact activities of these 
mosques, it was widely reported that large numbers of Arab and Turkish men frequented 
them.219  As Wahhabi beliefs are largely antithetical to local interpretations of Islam and 
benign visitors would be highly unusual in this remote region, especially considering the 
larger context of events there during this period, this may indicate expenditures on methods 
of radicalization and indoctrination via the mosque.  
Sources of Funds  
The money used to purchase the above goods and services had a variety of ultimate origins, 
including direct, intentional funding, criminal activity, and legitimate commerce.  In the first 
instance, it is well known that substantial funding for Chechen terrorist groups originated 
from benefactors in the Middle East and Islamic world, primarily from Saudi Arabia, but also 
Pakistan, Qatar, and Yemen.220  Typically, these funds were given as fulfilment of the sacred 
duty of Zakat, or alms giving, one of the five pillars of Islam.221  According to the Qur’an, 
                                                           
217 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:412–433, 2008, 422. 
218 Sanikidze and Walker, 2004, 29. 
219 Newspaper Alia, no. 191 (December 11, 2000). 
220 See for example al-Shishani, 2006, and J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
221 See Burr and Collins, 2006, Chapter 1. 
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money given as Zakat could be used, among other purposes222 for humanitarian aid to the 
poor as well as to promote “the way of Allah.”223  This latter purpose has in some more 
radical interpretations of Islam been equated to justify the financial support for acts of war 
and terrorism under the banner of holy struggle, or jihad. 
Zakat can be given in the path of Allah. By this is meant to finance a Jihad effort in 
the path of Allah, not [only] for Jihad [but] for other reasons.  The fighter (mujahid) 
will be given as salary what will be enough for him.  If he needs to buy arms or some 
supplies related to the war effort, zakat money should be used provide the effort is to 
raise the banner of Islam.
224
 
 
In several cases, fundraising revolved around the lobbying efforts of a small cadre of well-
connected salafist activists, allegedly including Sheikh Yousef al-Ayyri in Saudi Arabia and 
Mahmoud Hamdi al-Ahdal in Yemen, who sponsored fundraising events for potential donors.  
Perhaps reminiscent of a Western political party benefit dinner, these events often involved 
propaganda material (literature, combat films, etc), and speeches by returned mujahedeen as 
part of an extended pitch for funding.225  
 
Chechen militant groups allegedly have also received direct financial support from an 
unlikely source: the United States Government.  According to contemporary Georgian 
newspaper accounts and corroborated by interviews with a former senior Georgian Ministry 
of State Security counterterrorism official,226 in March 2002 American personnel apparently 
made contact with a Chechen militant leader – probably Ruslan Gelayev227 – to discuss the 
                                                           
222 The seven categories of who is eligible to receive Zakat: the poor, converts, the oppressed and indebted, 
those committed to the spread and triumph of Islam, newcomers to the faith, and those “whose hearts have been 
reconciled to the truth.” Burr and Collins, 2006, 12-13.   
223 Fi Sabeelillah, see Qur’an, Sura 62. 
224 Quoted in Burr and Collins, 2006, 13, note 5. 
225 al-Shishani, 2006. 
226 Newspaper Alia, no. 54 (May 7-8, 2002). Former senior official of Georgian Ministry of State Security, 
interview by the author, Tbilisi (July 2006).  
227 Contemporary news reports simply state that American agents made contact with “Chechen field 
commanders.”  However, given that Gelayev was the field commander of Chechen militants operating within 
Georgia and that the foreign fighters later arrested had been subject to his command, it is unlikely that American 
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104 
transfer of Arab fighters associated with Al-Qaeda into American custody.  In exchange for 
these Arabs – one of whom may have been al Qaeda shura (consultative council) member 
Saif al-Islam al-Masri – the American officials reportedly “promised to help financially in the 
‘holy war’ against Russia.”228  In late April 2002, representatives of Gelayev received a 
shipment of weapons allegedly from a courier arranged by the US officials.229  Such a deal 
had precedent in Afghanistan where US officials gave weapons and cash to various militant 
leaders in exchange for assistance against US enemies.230  According to these accounts, this 
led to conflict within the Chechen groups over the division of the spoils, particularly between 
Jaber, field commander of Khattab’s231 group, and Abu-Amer, representative of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Georgia.232 
 
Chechen terrorists also engaged in a number of criminal schemes to generate money for their 
cause, both independently and in concert with the local population.  A particularly lucrative 
enterprise was the production and trafficking of heroin. Owing to a confluence of factors,233 
Georgia during the period was a major transhipment route for heroin smuggled from 
Afghanistan and Central Asia to Europe.  A significant portion of this trade occurred in 
Pankisi Gorge, where heroin was both processed (from imported morphine base) and 
repackaged (from wholesale shipments of processed heroin from the east into ‘retail’ 
packages that could be distributed more widely throughout Europe).234  In addition, Pankisi 
                                                           
228 Newspaper Alia, no. 54 (May 7-8, 2002). 
229 Newspaper Alia, no. 54 (May 7-8, 2002). 
230 See for example Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 
231 Khattab was considered to be the head of al Qaeda (i.e. foreign jihadist fighters) in Chechnya 
232 Newspaper Alia, no. 54 (May 7-8, 2002). 
233 A combination of its geographic location, high levels of corruption, and a desire to become a key overland 
trade route 
234 See U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001, Available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/; and U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/. 
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served as a point of entry for smuggling heroin in and out of Georgia,235 sometimes using 
traditional handicraft containers carried by couriers to smuggle the drugs to Tbilisi and into 
Eastern and Western Europe, where it was sold.236  At the time, heroin in Pankisi sold for the 
equivalent of $200 - 300 per gram, although it could be sold in Tbilisi and Europe for double 
that price.237   The price of opium decreased over the period,238 which would have had an 
effect on the revenues generated by Chechen boeviks in Pankisi.  In 2001, Chechens militants 
also established two heroin production laboratories among their training facilities in Pankisi 
Gorge to replace one that had recently been destroyed in Shatoi, Chechnya.239  The heroin 
produced by these labs is likely to have joined the same trafficking routes mentioned above.   
 
Chechens also engaged in other criminal activity in Georgia as a means of raising funds. One 
such method was counterfeiting, specifically the importation of high quality US dollars from 
Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, which replaced lower quality notes that had been produced in the 
Chechen cities of Argun and Groznyy.  Much of this fake currency was smuggled into 
Chechnya via Georgia or was used to purchase goods and services in Georgia.240  Chechen 
militants also generated funds through the kidnap and ransom of businessmen, journalists, 
local civilians, humanitarian workers, and others.  In one case, two kidnapped Spanish 
businessmen were reportedly ransomed for EUR 300,000.241  In another case, two women 
                                                           
235 Irakli Chikhladze, "Traffic Control," Caucasus Reporting Service. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 
August 24, 2001. 
236 Newspaper Alia, no. 130 (August 19-20, 2000). The US State Department cited Georgia throughout the 
period as “a secondary transit route for narcotics flowing from Afghanistan, transiting Central Asia to Europe.” 
U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001, Available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/. 
237 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001. 
238 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001.  
239 Newspaper Alia, no. 3 (January 8, 2001).  The U.S. State Departments contradicted this in a 2001 report, 
stating, “There is no known … synthetic drug production in Georgia.” U.S. Department of State, International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001. 
240 The imported notes were of sufficient quality as to require special equipment for detection. Newspaper Alia, 
no. 38 (837) (March 9-10, 2000). See also Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), "“Council of Europe 
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working for the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in Pankisi Gorge 
and held for a ransom of many thousands of dollars, although they were eventually released 
after the local population of Kists (ethnic Chechens living in Georgia) vigorously protested to 
their captors.242 
 
In addition, some funds used by Chechens in the Chechnya-Georgia border region originated 
from ostensibly legitimate sources.  For example, Koj-Akhmed Nukhaev, former Chechen 
Chief of Foreign Intelligence, ‘godfather’ of Chechen mafia, and supposed model for the 
Frederick Forsythe film ‘Icon,’ created several organizations and businesses for both profit 
and aid to Chechen militants.  In the late 1990s, Nukhaev founded the “Caucasian-American 
Chamber of Commerce” in Washington D.C. and the “Transcaucasian Energy Consortium” 
to, among other things, provide a commercial vehicle to sell oil from Chechnya. Nukhaev 
also allegedly owned a 39% stake in the St. Petersburg branch of large car-producing Russian 
company “Logovaz.” The profits from these enterprises not only made Nukhaev wealthier, 
but also allowed him to establish organizations such as “Chechen House,” which produced 
pro-Chechen propaganda, organized holidays for Chechen boeviks, and conducted 
fundraising appeals.243 
Transfer and Flow of Value 
Financing terrorist actors involves not only methods to raise and spend money, as described 
above, but also the capacity to move and store acquired resources until they could be spent.  
To understand the complex processes by which this occurred along the Georgian-Chechen 
border, it is useful to think of money as simply an instrument of value, and that the 
intermediate steps between revenue and expenditure are in fact simply the repeated transfer 
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and conversion of value.  For example, in a modern society, a typical person deposits cash 
into a bank, which stores its value according to regulations until she decides to transfer 
money to meet an expense, at which time the cash is converted into other equivalent forms of 
value through a variety of instruments, such as back into cash (e.g. via an ATM withdrawal), 
or directly into goods and services (e.g. payment by check or credit card).  Therefore it is 
important to remember that the transfer of value may or may not take the form of actual cash 
or any cash equivalent.  
Islamic Charities and their Local Agents 
As described above, significant funds from wealthy benefactors in the Middle East made 
their way to the Georgian-Chechen border to buy weapons, build mosques, transport 
volunteers, and establish training camps, often under the guise of charitable and pious Zakat 
donations.  The ways in which this money reached its ultimate end use of financing jihad in 
Chechnya can be complicated.  The following describes some of the activities in the region 
related to two global Islamic charities that have since been officially designated by the United 
Nations as terrorist financing organizations.   
 
The Al Haramein Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a large charitable organization based in Saudi 
Arabia, was founded in 1998 to “provide relief and aid to Muslim people and groups 
wherever they are, should they face disasters endangering their being, their religious beliefs, 
or their freedom.”244  AHIF served as a conduit for primarily Saudi donors who wished to 
give to various needy recipients, primarily the poor and dispossessed, but also including those 
engaged in jihad.  Those wishing to give could simply deposit money into one of two 
designated bank accounts administered by the Saudi Royal Family for this purpose.  The 
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money from these accounts – #6/98998 and #2/9292245 – was then transferred to the 
foundations’ 50 offices around the world, ostensibly for the construction of mosques, schools, 
literature, websites, and other da’wa246 activities.  In the case of Georgia, some of these funds 
were wired directly into the accounts of the Tbilisi-based “Muslim Protection Organization” 
at the Bank of Georgia.247  Another more significant channel was through the “Foundation for 
Chechnya (FfC),” a 25-employee AHIF affiliate based in nearby Baku, Azerbaijan.  
According to several sources, the Foundation for Chechnya regularly sent couriers to Georgia 
to carry cash and supplies to the boeviks in both Pankisi Gorge and Chechnya proper.248  
Contemporaries described one of the leaders of FfC (and member of the majlis al-shura 
(consultative council of al-Qaeda)), Abu Omar Mohammed al-Serif (aka Abu Serif) as the 
primary “conduit through which the financing of the Chechen fighters was exercised.”249  
 
Chicago, USA – based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) is another Islamic charity 
that facilitated the transfer of funds to Chechen terrorist groups via Georgia during the period 
1999-2002.   Similar to AHIF, BIF funds were centrally collected and then transferred to a 
local affiliate, “Madli” (a.k.a. Georgian Relief Association, a.k.a. MADLEE),250 which then 
distributed the funds by courier to boeviks in Pankisi and Chechnya.251  Madli was a 
Georgian-registered charity that had received a total of $850,000 by 1999,252 and $685,560 
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 The act of preaching Islam or spreading the word of God. 
247 Newspaper Alia, no. 121 (September 26, 2001). According to Vakhtang Kutateladze, Minister of State 
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248 Burr and Collins, 2006, 39.  
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between January and April 2000,253 primarily via wire transfer.254  According to statements to 
the Georgian government and the United Nations, Madli supposedly was engaged in various 
medical and health related humanitarian aid projects in Pankisi Gorge.255  The indictments of 
several employees of BIF for providing material support for terrorism in the United States 
claim that Madli was in fact a conduit for funds going to Chechen terrorism. 
 
Although no hard evidence is publicly available proving Mali’s involvement in terrorist 
financing, several pieces of contextual evidence demonstrate that this claim is almost 
certainly true.  First, the total of $1.53 million that Madli received in 1999 and 2000 is 
considerably more than could have been spent on its stated humanitarian aid mission, which 
consisted primarily of providing free food and medical care through a small clinic in Pankisi 
Gorge.256  For comparison, the entire 2000 aid budget of the International Federation of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, which had a similar but much more comprehensive mandate in 
the region, was CHF 260,000 ($156,157), or one-tenth of what Madli received.257  Second, 
Saif al Islam al Masri, one of the al-Qaeda members turned over to the American government 
in Pankisi Gorge258 (see above), had served as BIF’s liaison to Chechnya in the mid 1990s.259  
This lends credence to the allegation as it fits a pattern identified in other cases of charities 
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transferring value to terrorist groups of having facilitating agents at various stages of the 
transfer process, especially close to the end recipients.  Third, interviews of native Georgian 
UN staff who were present in Pankisi Gorge in 2000 and who were personally familiar with 
Madli and its humanitarian work confirmed that the perception at the time was that Madli 
“was already involved in terrorism financing.”260   
Pankisi Gorge: Arms, Cars, Drugs & Corruption  
In 1999-2002 an estimated 100 foreign ‘jihadist’ fighters and 2000 Chechen boeviks lived 
and operated along the Chechen-Georgian border.261  These terrorist actors employed a 
different system of value transfer, governed by a combination of the market, the state, and 
social principles, and involving a variety of financial instruments, only one of which was 
cash. This section examines anecdotally this system as it evolved in Pankisi Gorge between 
1999 and 2002.  
 
Figure 2.1 depicts some of the ways in which value was transferred among the major actors 
in Pankisi during the period.  The complexity of the value transfer processes is immediately 
evident.262 In order to simplify the discussion to fit this space, this section will focus only on 
the intermediate transfer of value that resulted in two of the important operational 
expenditures mentioned above: weapons and safe passage.     
 
                                                           
260 Interview with former member of UN Association Georgia Team in Pankisi Gorge.  Tbilisi, July 2006 and 
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261 al-Shishani, 2006. 
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 Figure 2.1 
 
Small arms are virtually ubiquitous among the population along the Georgian-Chechen 
border, 263 however during 1999-2002, military scale weapons were available in the region 
for sale to Chechen boeviks and foreign foreign jihadists.  Some of these weapons originated 
from the armories of the Georgian security, police, and military establishments,264 while 
others were sent via courier from Turkey, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and even Russia.  
For example, in January 2000 Georgian security forces discovered a large shipment of 
weapons near Pankisi Gorge that apparently originated from the Russian military base at 
Vaziani.  Georgian authorities accused corrupt Russian security services of facilitating the 
theft, an accusation lacking direct evidence but with historical precedent.265  Russian 
                                                           
263 Personal observations of the author (Khevsureti, July 2006); and Kutiskdze and Chikovani, 2002. 
264 Former senior official of Georgian Ministry of State Security, interview by the author, Tbilisi (July 2006).   
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authorities counter-charged, however, that Georgian authorities worked with Russian 
organized crime to smuggle the weapons to Chechen militants in order to undermine Russian 
influence in the region.266  This explanation is also plausible, as there had been great 
geopolitical enmity between Tbilisi and Moscow since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
In addition, federal-level Georgian security services were known at the time to control the 
trade in weapons along the Georgian-Chechen frontier.267  
 
Regardless of the truth of this specific case, members of the Georgian security services did 
indeed facilitate or at times even personally conduct (see above) the transport and sale of 
weapons to Chechen boeviks, either via Pankisi Gorge or directly at the border.268  These 
weapons were often paid for in cash raised either from Middle Eastern charities or the sale of 
heroin, smuggled or stolen goods, or fraudulently obtained humanitarian aid,269 or were 
exchanged for non-cash direct barter of the same.270   
 
The use of stolen cars, for either raising cash or barter, was an especially common instrument 
of transferring value. Georgian criminals and drug addicts stole cars in Tbilisi and took them 
to Pankisi to either sell to the boeviks or to exchange for heroin. The owners of the stolen cars 
were then obliged to go to Pankisi and pay ransom to a middleman who would in turn get 
their car back. If the police facilitated the negotiation, which was common, the potential 
ransom amount increased.271  The stolen cars also served as an instrument to store value for 
longer periods.  Reportedly, there were up to 2500 stolen vehicles in Pankisi Gorge during 
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the period, often with Chechen and local Kists having 8-10 cars per family.272 These cars 
served as virtual bank accounts for many desperately poor residents of the Gorge, as they 
could be sold, rented, or bartered to others if necessary, including of course to Chechen or 
foreign militants.   
 
In other cases, weapons were exchanged for other instruments of value, including shares in 
lucrative business ventures. One such case was the cooperation between Levan Kenchadze, 
deputy minister for Georgian State Security and chief of its anti-terrorism unit, and Khizri 
Aldamov, the unofficial ‘ambassador’ of the Chechen separatists to Georgia.  Evidence 
suggested that these two influential men used their personal and professional networks to in 
effect invest in one another’s financial interests. For example, Kenchadze was implicated in 
another suspected shipment of several truckloads of weapons into Chechnya in May 2002.  
At the time, Russian news sources reported that the shipment was smuggled under the guise 
of humanitarian aid provided personally by Almadov.273  Kenchadze and Almadov also 
cooperated to meet another significant expense for Chechen terrorist groups in the region: 
safe passage. 
 
In December 2000, an officer in the Ministry of State Security of Georgia spoke 
anonymously about this cooperation to the Georgian newspaper, Alia:  
“Concerning the [Ministry of State Security], they are involved in arms smuggling. 
The roles are distributed and the security service, Georgian police and Russians do 
not interfere in each other’s affairs. The employees of regional and district security 
department work very well but the anti-terrorist center (under Kenchadze) is a real 
obstacle on the way of fighting against all this. The people who appointed Kenchadze 
do not want to fight terrorism.   
The [Ministry of State Security] also controls the inflow of Chechen refugees and 
boeviks. Khizri Aldamov is a frequent guest of Kenchadze.  Chechens pay and [the 
Ministry ensures that] a corridor for them on Georgian territory is ready.  Aldamov 
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meets the refugees after they cross the border. It is impossible for the refugees to sit 
in the bus and go to Pankisi: there are many checkpoints on the way. Aldamov tells 
these people how much they have to pay. There is no differentiation between who is a 
boevik and who is not. Aldamov contacts security service people and they escort the 
Chechens.”
274
 
 
According to reports, Kenchadze personally drove or escorted an estimated 150 Chechen and 
foreign fighters to the Chechen border at Shatili, sometimes all the way from the Georgian-
Turkish border, during the period.275  As mentioned above, the rate for this service was 
$10,000 per head.  
 
The motivations behind involvement in value transfer for terrorist financing activity are 
complex.  In the case of official corruption, evidence shows that Georgian government 
officials, depending on their background and level of authority, solicited bribes for reasons as 
varied as profit, economic survival, geopolitical calculation, or even simply fear.276  
Similarly, Chechen fighters and those helping finance them were often bound to codes of 
honor and social bonds to the local populace.  For example, Christian Georgians in 
Khevsureti would regularly shelter and feed passing Chechen fighters, and provide them 
guidance through the high mountain passes as required by their strict customs of 
hospitality.277  Furthermore, many of the Chechen militants were in fact blood relatives of 
those local Georgian Kists native to Pankisi Gorge.278 This obligated certain codes of conduct 
among the actors in the region, regardless of their political or economic goals.  On one hand, 
this greatly facilitated the transfer of value into and through Pankisi Gorge to Chechen 
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terrorist groups.  For example, female relatives of Vepkhia Margoshvili, a criminal leader in 
Pankisi Gorge responsible for smuggling large quantities of money (including counterfeit US 
dollar banknotes included), arms, military uniforms, computers and food from Arab countries 
into the region, married Arab jihadists who trained in Pankisi.279  Such familial ties would be 
significant in this region, particularly because any betrayal of his brothers-in-law would carry 
consequences and to swear blood revenge on those who hurt him and his family.  On the 
other hand, violation of these codes by some of the Arab salafi-jihadists,280 for example the 
teaching of intolerant Wahhabi doctrines, actually encouraged local Kist elders to cooperate 
with Georgian military forces in their successful campaign to expel all Chechen boeviks in 
Pankisi in 2002-2003.  In the Georgian highlands, the word of the elder is still “regarded as 
law,” above even inter-family blood feuds.281   
Major Epistemic Themes 
This case is typical in the sense that it immediately raises some important conceptual points 
about terrorist financing that are obvious throughout the available empirical evidence of 
terrorist finance.  The above case illustrates that terrorist financing, when seen at the 
individual level of detail at which it actually occurs, is empirically complex and non-linear; 
intrinsically is a contested and subjective issue; involves primarily non-state actors but is as 
an issue is primarily defined by states; is governed by the complex dynamics of human 
agency and the competition for power; and is poorly described by the International Relations 
discipline.  This section discuss the relevance of these themes to improving the analysis of 
terrorist financing, which then serves to illuminate what an improved analysis of terrorist 
finance ‘needs’ on a conceptual level.  This section, when combined with the above case 
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study, provides a baseline with which one can more systematically critique and evaluate 
existing analysis of terrorist finance, which is the focus of the next chapter.   
Empirical Complexity and Non-Linearity 
Perhaps the first thing one notices in the above case is that terrorist finance is extremely 
complex, especially in terms of the variety of actions and actors involved.  In the first 
instance, the case demonstrates that terrorist actors finance their activities through an 
incredibly diverse set of methods, which are illustrated in Table 2.1.  Evidence from news 
reports and the research literature points to just a complex picture, with terrorist actors 
relying on methods that range from diverting the proceeds of legitimate businesses282 to 
sophisticated tax arbitrage and smuggling schemes283 to direct fundraising from 
sympathizers284 to simple theft.285  Furthermore, this activity is not only varied, but also in 
many cases is identical to perfectly innocent – or at least not politically neutral – behaviors.   
 
This banality of terrorist financing activity means that defining activities such as wire 
transfers, bank deposits, charitable donations, auto theft, or drug dealing to be ‘terrorist 
financing’ activities is entirely dependent on the context and consequence of these actions 
and the everyday choices that produce them.  This in turn raises an important question about 
attempts such as those in the second and third ‘generations’ of orthodox literature on terrorist 
finance to research and analyze terrorist financing realities with systematic or thematic 
frameworks: If terrorist financing is an aggregation of various context-driven and often banal 
‘everyday’ decisions, should not terrorist financing research be focused on collecting data 
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about and fully engaging with the various and complex social, cultural, historical, political, 
economic and other dimensions of these individual level interactions? In other words, it 
seems clear that the sheer banality of many of the activities that are considered to be ‘terrorist 
financing’ implies that the dynamics of everyday choices should be a key element of the 
epistemology of how the financing of terrorist actors is conceptualized, and in particular 
should likely be researched at the most local level possible in order to be appropriately 
sensitive to the complexity and nuance of these contexts.   
 
 
If terrorist financing involves in large part banal activity, however, then this indicates a 
danger of securitizing such ‘normal’ activity.  More precisely, as Amoore and de Goede point 
out, such specification necessarily entails “articulation of new powerful definitions of 
normality and abnormality in [terrorism-related financial] transactions,” which, given the 
intrinsically securitized nature of ‘terrorist finance,’ ultimately can constitute a form of 
“violence” against those whose banal activity are targeted in the name of ‘fighting’ terrorist 
finance.286  Ultimately, therefore, the banality of much of the activity in the above case 
illustrates that ‘terrorist finance’ is indeed a complex and problematic issue.  
 
Table 2.1: How is Terrorism Financed? 
Activities Involved in Financing Chechen Terrorism, Georgian-Chechen Border, 1999-2002 
 
! Bank Accounts, deposits from 
individuals 
! Bank Accounts, wire transfers 
! Bank Accounts, withdrawals 
! Barter 
! Black Market 
! Bribes 
! Business shares, barter of 
! Cash couriers (cross border) 
! Cash couriers (internal) 
! Counterfeiting US dollars  
! Crime  
! Donation of weapons 
! Fundraising meetings 
! Heroin, production  
! Heroin, protection of smuggling  
! Heroin, sale 
! Heroin, smuggling  
! Hospitality of locals 
! Humanitarian Aid, barter of 
 
! Humanitarian Aid, fraudulently 
obtaining  
! Humanitarian Aid, theft of 
! Humanitarian Aid, use of 
! Kidnap and ransom 
! Stolen cars, barter of 
! Stolen cars, rent of 
! Stolen cars, sale of 
! Stolen cars, use of 
! Theft 
! Zakat Donations 
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The same can be said about the diversity and complexity of the actors involved in terrorist 
finance.  As Table 2.2 illustrates, there is no single profile of who finances terrorism, and 
indeed no consistent profile either.  For example, although terrorist actors in Chechnya 
received many donations from wealthy benefactors in the Middle East who adhered to 
various radical Islamist ideologies, it does not follow that all wealthy extremists in the 
Middle East will necessarily donate to the Chechen cause.  Of course it may mean that such 
actors are likely to donate to the Chechen or similar cause, but this claim will need to be born 
out in the evidence.  
Table 2.2: Who Finances Terrorism? 
Actors and Actor Types Involved in Financing Chechen Terrorism, Georgian-Chechen Border, 1999-2002 
Actors, Individual Name Known 
! Akaki Kegoshvili (district commander of 
Georgian peacekeeping battalion) 
! Major Kornel Lazashvili (district chief of 
finance of Georgian peacekeeping battalion) 
! Abu Omar Mohammed al-Seif (FfC) 
! Saif al Islam al Masri (BIF) 
! Khizri Aldamov, (‘ambassador’ of Chechen 
separatists to Georgia) 
! Levan Kenchadze, (deputy minister, 
Georgian State Security chief of 
counterterrorism) 
 
Actors, Organization Name Known 
! Al Haramein Islamic Foundation  
! Benevolence International Foundation 
! Foundation for Chechnya  
! Georgian Government 
! Madli  
! Muslim Protection Organization  
! Russian Government 
! Saudi Royal Family 
! United States Government 
Actor Type 
! Arms traffickers 
! Charities, benefactors 
! Charities, facilitating agent for 
! Charities, international 
! Charities, leader of 
! Charities, locally-based 
! Charities, national liaison for 
! Civilians, local 
! Government Officials, counterterrorism 
! Government Officials, intelligence 
! Government Officials, local law enforcement 
! Government Officials, military 
! Government Officials, national law enforcement 
! Heroin Traffickers, transnational  
! Heroin Traffickers, local 
! Heroin, buyers of 
! Organized Criminals, Georgian 
! Organized Criminals, Russian 
! Organized Criminals, other 
! Refugees 
! Refugees, representative of 
! Stolen Cars, owners of 
Actor Nationality/Ethnicity 
! American 
! British 
! Chechen 
! French 
! Georgian 
! Khevsur 
! Kist 
! Pakistani 
! Qatari 
! Russian 
! Saudi 
! Yemeni 
 
 
Ultimately, although it is immediately apparent that, empirically, terrorist financing is 
extremely complex, involving huge variations in the types of people involved, their motives, 
their geography, their activities, and the consequences of these actions, the above case 
illustrates the important if perhaps somewhat obvious conclusion any effective model for 
understanding terrorist financing will need to account for essentially infinite variation of type, 
motive, context, and consequence of terrorism-related financial activity, much of which, as 
discussed later, has little to do with either money or terrorism.  
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This of course is not a new observation.287  However, such extreme variations (only 
superficially described here) also imply some deep problems with existing epistemic 
frameworks used to give some order to this complex issue.  For example, as in the above 
case, existing literature and government agencies often categorize terrorist financing 
activities according to whether it is for the generation, movement and storage, or expenditure 
of money for terrorist purposes. In general, ‘generation’ typically refers to the ultimate 
origination of funds; ‘movement’ and ‘storage’ refers to any activity that transfers value from 
one already generated source of funds into an already purchased expenditure; and 
‘expenditure’ refers to the goods and services acquired by terrorist actors for direct and 
specific use in terrorist operations (such as weapons).  For example, the FBI states explicitly 
that the analytic function of its Terrorist Financing Operations Section is based on “the 
premise that the required financial support of terrorism inherently includes the generation, 
movement, and expenditure of resources.”288 This simple demarcation seems logical and a 
common-sense method for organizing descriptions of terrorist financing, and for this reason, I 
used it in the above historical case.  However, these distinctions are blurred in reality and, 
worse, epistemologically it falsely implies a ‘linearity’ that simply is not present in the 
evidence.   
 
For example, many of the funds ‘generated’ by those sympathetic to the Chechen cause were 
‘moved’ via global charitable foundations and ‘stored’ in bank accounts before being 
‘expended’ on items such as weapons, clothing, and transport.  While useful as a rough 
method of organizing diverse descriptive material (as done above), such a linear epistemic 
                                                           
287 See for example Paul Allan Schott, "Chapter I: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Definitions and 
Explanations," in Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: World Bank/International Monetary Fund, 2006). 
288 Michael Morehart, "Statement of Michael Morehart Section Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations, 
Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation," Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs (Washington DC, April 4, 2006). 
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framework belies the extreme complexity and variation in actual terrorist financing activity 
and implies conclusions that are not necessarily true.  For example, the fact that money raised 
in the Middle East ended up funding terrorist actors in Georgia and Chechnya does not 
necessarily imply terroristic intent on the part of the donors, or the existence of a global 
‘infrastructure’ of Chechen financing, or indeed anything in particular.  Both of those claims 
must be evaluated on their own merits.  In the first instance, for example, such a judgment 
depends on whether the benefactors gave money intending to fund ‘terrorism,’ ‘jihad,’ 
‘Chechen resistance,’ or even simply ‘humanitarian aid.’   This is important not only 
analytically (in that it provides a more accurate and nuanced explanation of what really 
occurred), but also because it provides the basis for better responses to such activity.  In a 
similar situation, police in the United States have in the past found it necessary to make 
subtle distinctions among the motives and actions of those financing the Irish Republican 
Army.  Just as in the Chechen-Middle East case, there are important differences among those 
that ‘generated’ money for IRA, especially among the fundraisers of NORAID, the local 
politicians supporting and seeking supporting their constituents, and the Irish-American 
policemen who give money to Irish ‘resistance’ in a New York bar.289  It is important to 
remember that just because these subtle epistemological differences are often hard to detect 
does not mean they do not exist or can be ignored. 
 
Similar problems are immediately evident with other common epistemic frameworks. For 
example, the ‘crime-terror nexus’ debates suggest that the criminal nature of terrorist 
financing activity is relevant, and the criminal nature of activity or actors involved is a 
relevant epistemological framework.  However, in the above case, Chechen separatists 
interacted with heroin traffickers very differently that they did with arms traffickers, both 
                                                           
289 Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 (July 1996), 524. 
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criminal groups.  Similarly, the legal literature suggests ‘intent’ as a sufficient 
epistemological line.  However, it does not seem logical to group actors together with as 
diverse explanations of their behavior as the U.S. Government officials (acting in the service 
of their country), corrupt Georgian officials (acting in their economic self-interest), and 
benefactors from the Middle East (acting on their ideology).  Similarly, grouping actors or 
actions together by virtue of their social, cultural, or geographic origin (e.g. should Khevsur 
and Saudi aid to Chechens be treated the same?) or ideological provenance (e.g. salafist-
jihadism vs Chechen nationalism) seems similarly illogical.   
A ‘Contested’ Issue  
Analysis of any problem usually starts with a definition of the issue being analyzed.  Terrorist 
financing is typically defined extremely precisely.  The United Nations, for example, offers 
this widely accepted definition of terrorist financing activity as that which:  
"…by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects 
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to 
be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [a terrorist attack - as defined by a 
listed set of other UN conventions].”290    
 
The empirical reality of terrorist financing, however, clearly shows that few things related to 
the financing of terrorism lend themselves to objective definition, beginning with the word 
‘terrorism.’  Terrorism, as many have noted,291 is a fundamentally contested term, a truth 
evident in the above case.  Using Schmid’s definition of terrorism as the “peacetime 
equivalent of a war crime,”292 Chechen militants, for example, committed terrorist acts and 
are thus terrorists.  However, when viewed through other ontological lenses, they are also 
                                                           
290 United Nations, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
291 See for example Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); and 
Martha Crenshaw, "Current Research on Terorrism: The Academic Perspective," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 15 (1992), 1. 
292 Alex Schmid, "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem," in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. 
Alex Schmid and Ron Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass, 1993) 
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‘boeviks’ (fellow Caucasians), ‘holy warriors’ (Salafists), ‘combatants in a secessionist 
conflict’ (academic analysts), ‘freedom fighters’ (Chechen nationalists). Also ambiguous is 
when one can consider such a foreign fighter a ‘terrorist’ – and thus when financing him 
becomes terrorist financing.  Does a newly arrived fighter become a terrorist only when he 
commits a terrorist act? Or when he receives training for how to commit one?  Or perhaps 
when he ‘joins’ a terrorist ‘group’ (and should any group that uses terror as a weapon be so 
defined)?  Or finally when he expresses a wish or intent to commit a terrorist act?  As one can 
see, the difficulty in drawing these lines was reflected above in my own writing through the 
interchange between the words ‘terrorist,’ ‘militant,’ ‘boevik,’ ‘fighter,’ and ‘jihadist’ in the 
above case, depending on which word was most illustrative of the point at hand.  The point 
for our purposes here is not that it is necessary to choose the one ‘right’ term, but to realize 
that all these terms are true at the same time but vary according to one’s analytic perspective.  
This realization is not novel, especially for those familiar or sympathetic with post-structural 
or constructivist perspectives of International Relations.  However, it is important to 
explicitly make this point regarding discourse on the financing of terrorism because it implies 
that perspectives, purposes, and biases about terrorism and finance influence the outcomes of 
analyses of terrorist financing, and that it is therefore important to not only be aware of this 
fact but also to explicitly incorporate analysis of these biases and this subjectivity into 
research about terrorist financing.  More simply, this implies that analysis of the reality of 
terrorist financing should incorporate analysis of one’s underlying ideas about terrorism, 
financing, and relating issues.   
 
The definition of ‘financing’ is similarly problematic.  Even though financing is usually 
equated with money, only some of the financial instruments used to finance terrorism in the 
above case were actual cash or its equivalents (e.g. checks, banks accounts, etc).  Cars, food 
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and medicine, drugs, and even less tangible things like business interests, training, and 
religious duties all served as vehicles of exchange.293  This means that the definitional 
boundaries of what activities constitute “financing” are blurry.  For example, the distinctions 
among what is financing versus that which is logistics, supply, support, etc are both 
inherently unclear and in fact change depending on a variety of social, political, economic, 
and operational realties.  Therefore, as hinted above, it is best to view terrorist financing as 
revolving around the generation, movement, storage, and expenditure of value in support of 
terrorism, rather than a definition that focuses exclusively on money.  This conception of 
terrorist financing will be fully elucidated later in this dissertation.   
 
De Goede’s vision of a post-structuralist International Political Economy (IPE) helps explain 
the diffuse nature of economic value and how it is created through the continual negotiation 
of power and knowledge, via her discussion of the social construction of the idea of capital.  
She argues that ‘capital’ has a fundamentally “contested and contingent nature…which 
impl[ies] that the existence of capital cannot be assumed as an unproblematic empirical 
starting point to academic enquiry.”294  She goes on, stating: 
“Financial practices do not exist prior to, or independently from, ideas and beliefs 
about them, a point powerfully illustrated by the social and discursive nature of 
money and credit. Money, whether in the form of coin, paper, stock or electronic 
transfers, takes on value only through a social and discursive network which 
underpins the expectation that the monetary instrument retains its value over time 
and space.”
295
 
 
Ultimately, the empirically observed reality implies that terrorist financing is inherently a 
subjective or ‘contested’ issue for which objectified definitions or pseudo-scientific analysis 
is inappropriate, because definitions of both terrorism and financing are unsettled, and the 
                                                           
293 For example, training camps can be characterized as the use of monetary resources to add value to personnel, 
i.e. to convert monetary value into labor value. 
294 Marieke de Goede, "Beyond economism in international political economy ," Review of International 
Studies, no. 29 (2003), 81. 
295 de Goede, "Beyond economism," 2003, 81. 
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dynamics of how knowledge of both is created and interpreted influence analytic outcomes.  
This in turn implies that the analysis of terrorist financing is itself a political project and 
therefore that a core question is not whether it serves certain interests, but which interests it 
serves (e.g. narrow personal ones like the career prospects of a member of the national 
security ‘Id’ or broad normative ones like liberal democracy). 
 
This helps confirm that terrorist financing is, as discussed in Chapter One, a contested topic, 
rather than an unproblematic, ‘scientific’ one.  This implies that not only are the meanings 
and implications of these words intrinsically unsettled, but also that the processes by which 
knowledge, meaning, and ultimately action are derived about the issue are open to 
interpretation.  In other words, how one researches and analyzes terrorist financing is 
ultimately open to interpretation.  As we shall see later, this ties analysis of the issue closely 
to the purposes of analysis.  This means in turn that analysts of terrorist finance bring their 
own biases to their analysis, which while natural and indeed inevitable need to be accounted 
for within any systematic epistemic framework.  More generally, this highlights the need for 
epistemologies of terrorist finance that can remain applicable within different and even 
competing ontological paradigms.  More simply, the intrinsically contested nature of terrorist 
finance means that we need a way to understand terrorist financing that may not be 
‘objective’ but is nevertheless systematic.  
The State and International Society 
The Chechen case illustrates several immediate impressions about the role played by states 
and other elements of international society in terrorist financing.   Given the contested nature 
of terrorist finance discussed above, it is important to examine who plays the major roles in 
formulating, producing, and using knowledge of terrorist finance.  The above case illustrates 
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that the clear – and obvious – answer is the state.  For example, the issue of ‘terrorist 
financing’ was important only to those states for which terrorism was important.  The 
governments of both Russia and the United States viewed terrorism as a significant security 
issue, and both indicated that terrorist financing activity in Georgia threatened their security, 
albeit for different reasons.  The United States saw the presence of foreign fighters as a threat 
because it could possibly open up another base of operations for al-Qaeda against U.S. 
interests.  Russia however used the foreign jihadist presence to further legitimize an 
essentially local struggle against Chechen secessionists.  (In fact, the Chechens did the same, 
in reverse, legitimizing their own cause within the Islamic world by calling it a jihad, even 
though they quickly turned in their Arab compatriots when the dynamics changed after 
2001.)296   In other words, a basic operating assumption is that our understanding of terrorist 
financing exists not a priori but exclusively within its relationship with the state, highlighting 
again the considerable power/knowledge issues in the issue. 
 
Knowledge of terrorist financing is affected on the same lines, meaning that in this case 
activity that opposed the above state-defined interests (e.g. fund transfers from the Middle 
East that funded the movement of al Qaeda personnel across the Chechen border) were 
considered ‘terrorist financing,’ but activities that were aligned with these states’ interests 
would not be considered as such (e.g. the transfer of money from the United States 
Government to Chechen separatists to fund the hand over of al Qaeda personnel).  This 
implies that the analysis (including definitions) of terrorist finance seems to be tied most 
closely to the interests of powerful actors, specifically states, but also dominant narratives 
(e.g. ‘fighting’ terrorism) and normative frameworks (e.g. security of ones values).  This 
conclusion is supported by evidence showing that states make exceptions based on their 
                                                           
296 Because of increased pressure by the United States and its allies after 9/11. 
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concept of legitimate non-state actor violence.  For example, while neither the United States 
nor Saudi Arabia actively pursue all those directly involved in financing al Qaeda, they are 
looser with those financing the IRA and HAMAS respectively.297  This means in turn that 
epistemologically the analysis of terrorist financing is inevitably oriented towards and 
governed by these subjective state-defined interests and norms, rather than some value-
neutral understanding of‘ objective’ reality.  The precise dynamics of how these interests and 
norms impact analysis remains an open question, and is one that this dissertation seeks to 
address. 
 
Interestingly, although the above case implies that the state is the primary determinant of how 
terrorist financing is analyzed, it clearly indicates that it is at most only somewhat important 
in determining how such activity actually occurs. This case directly involved activity in at 
least 15 different sovereign states, indicating that terrorist financing is a truly transnational 
phenomenon for which state borders are not very important.  Interestingly, empirical 
evidence that the state is peripheral to terrorist financing activity is found consistently 
throughout the literature.  For example, in his 1986 study of the IRA, PLO, and other groups, 
Adams argues that successful terrorist groups function in ways similar to a corporation, 
complete with a business model, investments, management structures, and cooperative 
agreements with businesses, criminal groups, other terrorist groups, and, occasionally, 
governments.298 Adams separates terrorist financing from politically dominant narratives and 
presents evidence that state governments play a relatively small role in terrorist financing, 
and then typically only as business partners.299  His comparison of terrorist groups to 
corporations challenges the image of terrorist financing as primarily a political or ideological 
                                                           
297 See for example James Adams, The Financing of Terror (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); and Matthew 
Levitt, HAMAS: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (London: Yale University Press, 2006), 
respectively. 
298 Adams, 1986, 240. 
299 Adams, 1986, 240-243. 
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expression, whether by a state, a group, or an individual. His main critique of 
counterterrorism efforts is that they fail to consider the non-political dimensions of terrorist 
groups, such as financing activities.  His factual research supports this argument that all 
terrorist groups eventually become embedded into human society, and do so not on a political 
or ideological level, but on various social, economic, and institutional levels, often that of 
their supposed enemy.  “Capitalism,” Adams observes, “can…corrupt the most idealistic of 
terrorists.”300 In other words, the state seems to be a subsidiary actor in terrorist financing, 
responding and reacting to the actions of non-state and extra-state actors rather than vice 
versa.  In fact, the above case illustrates that in responding to terrorist financing, states in fact 
are often so weak that they are able to influence outcomes only by cooperating with one non-
state actor or another, such as Georgian government cooperation with the Chechen separatists 
or the US Government’s cooperation with field commander Gelayev. This may be why state 
responses, which tend to be legal and military, such as the shutting of bank accounts and the 
arrest of corrupt officials, do not typically impact terrorist financing.  For example, in the 
case, the flow of funds to the Chechen and foreign jihadist militants in the border region was 
halted only by the forced expulsion of these people had any lasting effect on terrorist 
financing activity in the region.  This illuminates a problem with existing understanding of 
terrorist financing at the outset, as the literature persists in framing terrorist financing through 
the lens of states, even though its own evidence clearly and demonstrably shows that the state 
is only occasionally important.   
 
The above case also illustrates certain things about the actions of non-state actors and 
communities; especially about how their various social, political, cultural, economic, 
normative, and institutional dynamics influence and are influenced by terrorist financing 
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activity. It is immediately evident that the individual and individual choice plays a large 
aggregate role in the financing of terrorism.   The place of the individual is an unsettled issue 
in international relations, but it is clear from the above case that analysis must be done to 
illuminate and explain exactly how and how much power individuals exact on an 
international security problem like terrorist financing.  Terrorism related financial activity 
naturally is also closely related to the activities of the groups involved, whether criminal, 
legitimate, or terroristic.  In this way, analysis of terrorist financing must consider not only 
group operational dynamics, such as on what the money will be spent, but also the larger 
contexts in which the group sits.  In the above case, one can see that terrorist financing 
activity was determined not only by the operational needs of the Chechen groups, but also the 
social, political, economic, and even cultural imperatives of other groups.  For example, the 
financing of the foreign jihadists were impacted by the Chechen groups’ long and short term 
needs and strategies, the historical and political perspective of the fundraising organizations, 
as well as the global geopolitical situation which influenced the behavior of the host Chechen 
groups. 
 
Terrorist financing is also embedded into contexts of collective violence.  For example, in the 
above case the dynamics of the financial networks seem to in part reflect various factors 
present in collective violence.  For example, the donors of the funds seem to have been 
expressing participation in a certain transnational form of collective violence, while the 
native Kist villagers both exploited collective violence to benefit economically and resisted 
continued deterioration of their societal structures in order to ensure that their communities 
did not suffer from the same state of conflict found in Chechnya.  This demonstrates that 
analysis of the dynamics at an individual level is necessary to understand terrorist financing.   
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It is crucial for any effective epistemological framework to account for these complex and 
varied non-state level societal dynamics. 
 
That the state is simultaneously central to the analysis of terrorist finance yet marginal at best 
to the empirical reality of it highlights the need for an epistemic outlook that can account for 
actors and behaviors at all levels of international society, without privileging any actor or 
institution – such as the state – over any other, unless the evidence points to doing so in a 
particular circumstance. 
Agency  
The above case also implies clearly that understanding terrorist financing requires a deep and 
systematic understanding of human agency.  On a conceptual level, each terrorist financing 
action described above or indeed anywhere is in fact simply the product of a human choice.  
To return to an earlier example, the wealthy Middle Eastern benefactors who donated to the 
Chechen cause did so because they chose to, i.e. they exercised agency to provide certain 
economic resources to certain actors for certain motives, each of which can and should be 
systematically analyzed.  One could even say the same of those who paid the ransom for the 
kidnapped Spanish businessmen, albeit their menu of alternatives was much narrower.  The 
point is that understanding the dynamics of human choice and agency is central to 
understanding terrorist finance. 
 
Motive and intent are obviously an important element of agency, and are often assumed to be 
a central determinant of terrorist financing activity.301  Nevertheless the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the complex and multifaceted dynamics of human agency (i.e. choices) are 
                                                           
301 See for example Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: Free Press, 
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actually more important factors for understanding the complexities of terrorist financing 
activity.  This is because people become involved in financing terrorism for a near infinite 
number of reasons, and via ever changing mechanisms. Rather than a simple deterministic 
dimension, the dynamics of individual and collective choice and motive in terrorist financing 
are multi-layered.  For example, did the Khevsurs who gave food, shelter, and directions to a 
passing Chechen field commander finance terrorism?  On one hand, they gave goods and 
services of significant value to someone involved in terrorist acts, and therefore at least in 
terms of U.S. ‘material support’ law financed terrorists.  However, a reasonable person could 
persuasively argue that because their primary intent was to be true to their local customs 
rather than support terrorism and that since their relationship with neighboring Chechen 
people is ancient and inherently local, it is incongruous to apply a term like ‘terrorist 
financing’ to this activity, especially if it comes with moral, legal, or political sanction.  
Whatever the answer, it begs the question of what does a designation (or lack thereof) of 
‘terrorist financing’ mean?  Similarly, would it be accurate to view the popular unrest that led 
to the release of Red Cross personnel as an act of ‘counter terrorist financing,’ as that was the 
result.  These definitional debates, which will be explored in more detail and resolved later, 
show that intent, action, and consequence cannot be equated, and that the process of 
understanding terrorist financing is intrinsically complex.    
 
Ultimately, the above case illustrates that although motive is an important factor to analyze, it 
seems that consequences of agency are more centrally relevant to the analysis of terrorist 
finance.  This reflects various conceptions of agency, including Hobson & Seabrooke’s 
“action centered agency.”302  This implies that analysis of the specific methods of – or even 
the particular individuals involved in – terrorist financing is irrelevant unless placed within 
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the context of the dynamics of political economic decision making that lead to the choice of 
those techniques or the involvement of that person.  This will be explored in more depth later 
in the dissertation. 
Power 
One also notices the importance of power in the empirical reality and the analysis of terrorist 
finance. The empirical reality of terrorist financing clearly demonstrated that power dynamics 
are central determinants of terrorist financing activity.  Power, in the most general sense, is 
the ability to affect the thoughts and behavior of others.  The factors influencing thinking and 
behavior related to terrorist financing in the above case are complex and have not only 
material, political, economic dimensions, but also social, cultural, ideational, and ethical 
factors as well.  For example, the funding of the foreign jihadists relied, among other things, 
on the potency of a particular theological interpretation of Islam among the benefactors, 
social and trust networks among intermediaries, organizational acumen to transfer the funds, 
and force of arms to intimidate police and civilians into cooperation.  Conversely, the funding 
process also exploited the weakness of such things as the Georgian legal, regulatory, and 
bureaucratic systems, and the social and cultural traditions of the Kist and Khevsur peoples.  
 
The tangible power of identity is also evident, as identities shifted in importance and meaning 
depending on shifts perceptions and circumstances.  This explains why young Arab men 
intending to fight with Chechen separatists could be perceived simultaneously as examples of 
the ‘way of God,’ welcome guests, or threats to international security as various identities 
and their manipulation played hugely significant roles in determining behavior and its 
outcome.   
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On a structural level, these power dynamics seem to indicate that terrorist financing is at the 
same time more social than the deterministic law of the jungle (or market), yet more 
formalized than anarchy.  In the above example, elites typically win out, but only within 
many constraints bounding their behavior and even who get to become an elite.  In fact, the 
above case indicates that the power dynamics of terrorist financing may be complex, but they 
do seem to follow certain identifiable patterns.  These patterns however are not well 
understood by conceptions of power that rely on the state, laws, and the political-economic 
self interest as its main instruments.  In other words, even though the exploitation of power is 
familiar, the exact manifestations of such dynamics may be foreign to the largely Western, 
rationalist academic and policy-making communities that currently dominate thinking and 
practice around terrorist financing.  These structures also sometimes challenge popular 
conceptions of state political economic power, but reflect the realities of terrorist financing as 
described above. What is clear, however, is that in the above case, those with more power, or 
those whose structures could most withstand competition from other power structures, 
determined behavior.  Terrorist financing activity then followed these channels of power. 
 
Ultimately, the evidence clearly shows that power dynamics constrain, condition, and 
influence the political-economic decision making at the core of all terrorist financing activity.  
This is interesting because power does not have an explicit place within existing analytic 
models of terrorist financing and is not discussed much in the literature.  Nevertheless the 
implication from the evidence is that that analysis of power, especially its structure and its 
impact on agency, must be at the center of analysis of terrorist financing. 
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Terrorist Financing and the International Relations Discipline 
It is perhaps self-evident that terrorist financing would be a natural subset of the study of 
terrorism, and since the terrorist financing literature presents very little theoretical 
underpinnings to its descriptions, it would seem logical to borrow conceptual frameworks 
from the terrorism debates.  The terrorism debates, however, currently have limited 
applicability to understanding terrorist financing.  This is because studies of terrorism tend, as 
Richmond has remarked, to focus on “individual and group dynamics, legal and military 
regimes, and prevention within a legalistic and state centric framework.”303  As the above 
case illustrates, the empirical realities of terrorist financing activity shows that traditional 
state, legal, and moral boundaries are often insignificant and thus lose their analytic import, 
meaning in turn that the analyses within the terrorism debates that are based on such factors 
become of only very limited relevance.  The terrorism debates have not yet found a stable 
conceptual home within mainstream International Relations discourse, and therefore have not 
been able to take advantage of the full scope of IR understanding.  This is caused both by a 
lack of effort within the terrorism field to bridge the gaps, and the inability of International 
Relations discourse to address the issues that are most relevant to terrorism. 
 
To better illustrate these shortcomings, take a hypothetical case involving terrorism-related 
hawala transactions.  The hawala market, a form of what Passas has dubbed Informal Value 
Transfer Systems,304 is generally “self-regulated through widely adopted normative guidance 
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place either without leaving a formal paper-trail of the entire transaction or without going through regulated 
financial institutions at all.” Nikos Passas, "Informal value transfer systems, money laundering and terrorism," 
Report to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), 2003, 
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on operators’ (hawaladars) obligations to each other and to their customers.”305  Within this 
context, let us assume that the hawaladar in this illustrative hypothetical case is a legitimate 
broker in Pakistan who is not involved in terrorism.  The broker makes a financial transaction 
for a family friend, whom he knows to be a terrorist group member, but does so because the 
friend is also the brother of his wife. The terrorism debates provide no way to analyze this 
event, first because it has no way of understanding social dynamics other than in linear 
political terms.  According to the terrorism frameworks, the broker would be considered a 
terrorist because he knowingly gave material support to another terrorist.  Defining the broker 
as such, his actions, logically flowing from this a priori claim, would likely be analyzed 
according to a set pattern of political motivations and actions – e.g. any ideological positions, 
past actions, etc.  The fact that he felt obligated to his brother-in-law and that is all probably 
would not play much of a factor.  Although International Relations and terrorism discourse 
has already incorporated some analysis of these areas, for example research into kinship,306 
and the anthropological bases of behavior,307 it nevertheless still lacks the analytic tools to 
specify and give appropriate meaning to interactions such as the above. This case, therefore, 
reflects the three problems of terrorism studies – the linearity of action and intent when there 
was none, the reliance on policy frameworks for analytical definitions, and the inability to 
understand how non-terrorists interact with terrorists.  
 
Terrorist financing encompasses a diverse set of issues that are intrinsically important to 
contemporary international relations, particularly those relating to the competition for power 
and economic resources, the role of the individual within the international system, and of 
course as a window into the often invisible processes lying behind terrorism.  Terrorist 
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financing is indeed exactly about the conflicting political processes at play in the world that 
impact various security agendas.  In many respects, terrorist finance is where terrorism – now 
a central topic of IR study – and “normal” society intersect and interact.  Terrorist financing 
brings up a host of issues relating to contemporary forms of state power, the dynamics of 
state and non-state interaction, international and localized political economies, the evolution 
of liberal societies in context of terrorism and other non-state actor political violence, and the 
often invisible dynamics lying behind terrorism.  In this way, terrorist financing is a hugely 
significant issue of international relations. In many ways, it seems that terrorist financing is at 
core a problem of political economy.  However, given that the political economy literature 
does not speak directly to terrorist financing, this implies that it is important to explore the 
conceptual foundations of an improved epistemological understanding of terrorist finance 
before placing it into one disciplinary confine or another.  This insight therefore further 
highlights the intellectual context and relevance of this dissertation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the empirical realities of terrorist finance, and demonstrates that, 
empirically, terrorist finance is complex in the activities, motives, context, and consequences 
involved; tied primarily to individual and non-state level actions, actors, communities, and 
social dynamics; inherently a subjective or ‘contested’ issue for which objectified definitions 
or pseudo-scientific analysis is inappropriate; ultimately a product of human agency, within 
structural contexts; governed by power structure which constrain, condition, and influence 
the political-economic decision making at the core of all terrorist financing activity; and by 
definition an issue of political-economy.   
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This implies, epistemologically, several things.  First it implies that an effective model for 
understanding terrorist financing is possible, but will need to account for almost infinite 
complexity in the processes and dynamics by which the individual and collections of 
individuals interact with various aspects of international society, including but not 
exclusively states.  Second, it means that analysis of the specific methods of – or even the 
particular individuals involved in – terrorist financing is irrelevant unless placed within the 
context of the dynamics of political economic decision making that lead to the choice of 
those techniques or the involvement of that person.  Third, it is clear that financing the 
analysis of terrorist financing is itself a political project and therefore that a core question is 
not whether it serves certain interests, but exactly what interests analysis serve, and how well 
it does so.  Fourth, we find that analysis of power, especially its structure and its impact on 
agency, must be at the center of analysis of terrorist.   
 
For these reasons, this chapter demonstrates that this dissertation will need lead the way in 
constructing the epistemological foundations of an improved understanding of terrorist 
finance, given that the political economy literature does not speak directly to terrorist 
financing.  As the next chapter shows, there is currently a large disconnect between current 
frameworks used to analyze terrorist financing, and these empirical and epistemological 
realities about the issue.  In other words, we see that the problems with terrorist financing 
analysis stem from the fact that we may be simply asking the wrong questions.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Wrong Questions: 
Deficiencies of Orthodox Frameworks for Producing Knowledge 
about Terrorist Finance  
This chapter problematizes existing conceptualizations and representations of terrorism-
related financial activity by first surveying and then critically examining the ‘orthodox’ 
literature on terrorist finance.  The chapter begins by summarizing the main features of the 
‘orthodox’ conceptualization of terrorist finance, and then traces the evolution of this 
approach through three rough ‘generations’ of literature from both within and outwith 
academic discourse.  It finds that epistemologically, analysis of terrorist finance is generally 
oriented towards answering four fundamental questions: ‘What is terrorist financing?; ‘Who 
finances terrorism?’; ‘How is terrorism financed?’; and ‘What are the indicators of terrorist 
financing activity?’  Within orthodox approaches, it is assumed that answering these 
questions will produce knowledge sufficient to successfully respond to terrorist financing and 
thus in this way to terrorism.  This chapter finds, to the contrary, that doing so even 
systematically and comprehensively produces much data that is at best analytically irrelevant 
and at worst counterproductive to counterterrorism and other relevant objectives of liberal 
democracies.  As this chapter discusses, this is primarily because existing epistemologies of 
terrorist financing, exemplified by these questions, assume that terrorist financing can be 
analyzed objectively and (pseudo-) scientifically, separate from and unconscious of the 
subjective political objectives and realities such analysis intends to and actually does serve.  
In other words, this chapter finds that the everyday reality of terrorist financing remains so 
poorly understood because analysis is not yet based within an epistemic framework capable 
of systematically and simultaneously assessing political and normative realities of terrorist 
finance, as well as its empirical content.   
 
  
 
138 
A Survey of the Orthodox Literature 
As this chapter discusses, the study of terrorist financing has evolved from a tangential topic 
of a peripheral field of International Relations into an issue given significant attention in both 
academic and policy communities. This increased interest has spurred the development of a 
growing body of literature dedicated to describing exactly how terrorism is financed. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the literature on terrorist financing from within International 
Relations is remarkably inadequate.  Nevertheless, terrorist financing has been the subject of 
many works from journalism, government, and external academic disciplines that together 
exhibit what can be generally described as an ‘orthodox’ approach to the topic.  To highlight 
the continuing evolution of the subject, this overview of the literature is presented in terms of 
three ‘generations.’  This categorization was chosen to elucidate the broad evolutionary 
phases that ontological and epistemological understandings of terrorist financing have 
undergone. It is crucial to note, however, that this categorization is meant only to be a 
common sense way of organizing analyses that have more in common than they do 
differences.  It is by no means to imply that these ‘generations’ do not exist concurrently 
(they do), or that there is a linear progression from one specific work to another (there 
generally is not), or even that an individual work could not reasonably be seen to fit into 
more than one ‘generation’ (some do).  This categorization is intended, simply, to highlight 
how orthodox thinking on terrorist financing has indeed evolved over time, but in ways that, 
they critical literature points out, mean that terrorist financing remains poorly conceptualized.   
 
The first generation of terrorist financing discourse refers to those descriptions of terrorist 
financing that analyze the problem only as a tangential logistic issue to the political and 
operational realities of terrorist groups.  Reflecting the evolution of terrorism studies, the 
earliest of this literature focused on the financial links between states and terrorist groups, 
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while the later works offer broader, but still superficial, descriptions of terrorist financing as 
tangential to other, larger issues.  The second generation of the literature begins to view 
terrorist financing as a topic distinct from, although intimately related to, the problem of 
terrorism.  This heavily descriptive literature offers a more comprehensive description of 
terrorist financing, explicating the complex, variable, and global nature of the problem, but 
does so with little critical perspective about what theoretical contexts are needed for more 
thorough, systematic, and useful understandings of the topic.  
 
The third generation of terrorist financing literature attempts to fill these conceptual gaps in 
understandings of terrorist financing. In general, this generation of literature can be 
characterized by a focus on analyzing terrorist financing as a more holistic problem 
encompassing various economic, political, social, cultural, institutional, and historical factors.  
As Chapter 4 argues, engaging in the full complexity of terrorist financing activity is crucial 
to properly understanding and conceptualizing it, and this engagement in these factors helps 
address the problem of underdetermination of empirical data of the second generation 
literature. However, as will be discussed, severe problems with this ‘orthodox’ literature 
remain, primarily, as the critical literature describes, because it remains based on basic 
assumptions and conceptualizations about terrorist finance that, the critical literature 
convincingly argues, are fundamentally wrong.  
First Generation: Financing as a Tangent to Terrorism 
The first ‘generation’ of the ‘orthodox’ literature on terrorist finance is defined here as those 
discusses terrorist financing not as a stand-alone topic, but strictly within the confines of 
other issues, such as terrorism in general, or the operational activities of a particular terrorist 
group.  As such, first generation approaches to understanding terrorist finance are 
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inextricably and unreflectively tied to the a priori  assumptions and prejudices underpinning 
the author’s perspectives on the primary to which terrorist finance is subordinate. In 
aggregate, this literature is bound by a common view that terrorist financing is primarily an 
instrumental logistical issue that is tangential to other political, organizational, and 
operational issues seen as more central. it neither provides much specific information about 
the dynamics of terrorism-related financial activity, nor does it provide much in the way of an 
analytic perspective or framework within which such activity could be understood. These 
first generation works were the first to introduce the financing of terrorism into international 
relations discourse, and in some respects laid the foundation upon which later research into 
the topic was based.   
 
It is in fact not necessary – or perhaps even possible – to truly ‘survey’ this first literature, 
given that most of the’ ‘literature’ are simply asides that mention terrorism-related financial 
activity, usually included to support larger points and arguments. For example, this paragraph 
from a New York Times article is a common manifestation of how information relating to 
terrorist financing is used as supporting material:  
Lebanese officials said that Colonel Zaaroura had complained about orders from Mr. 
Arafat to cut expenses, including the salaries of guerrillas in Lebanon, because of a 
financial drain on the P.L.O. resulting from the war in the Persian Gulf. Saudi 
Arabia and other oil-producing Arab countries stopped financing the P.L.O. after 
Mr. Arafat sided with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the gulf conflict. The 
P.L.O. used to receive $60 million a year from the Saudis alone. P.L.O. officials 
refused to comment on the money problem.
308
 
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, it is more useful to focus on how terrorist finance is 
dealt with in two well-known works on terrorism, both of which demonstrate the limitations 
and ultimate shallowness of this first generation of discourse on terrorist finance.   
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The first work is Claire Sterling’s book entitled The Terror Network. 309   Sterling’s 1981 
book was intended to be an exposé on the supposed inner working of international terrorism.  
Regarding financing, the book claimed that most terrorist groups, including the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, the Red Brigades, and other groups, were directly funded by the 
Soviet Union. Although it achieved much notoriety among governments, media, and the 
general public,311 soon after its publication, Sterling’s claims about Soviet funding of 
terrorism were discredited, as they were in fact largely drawn from a covert CIA 
disinformation campaign that planted evidence implying a Soviet financial link to these 
terrorist groups.312   
 
The problem evident is the use of inherently contestable and usually grossly underspecified 
financial ‘links’ to simply support  certain a priori assumptions.  In the case of Sterling, an 
American journalist openly sympathetic to the political stance President Reagan had then 
taken against the Soviet Union, these assumptions were political (if not ideological), 
specifically that the USSR was engaged in a deliberate, controlled mission to destabilize the 
United States and its allies through terrorism.313 Her book, in essence, set out to prove this 
and tangential terrorist financing discussions were useful tool to serve her larger arguments.  
Despite Sterling’s ignominy, the problem to emphasize is not of journalistic diligence or 
scruple, but of the tendency in the first generation literature to, as Warde describes, “cherry 
pick” facts about terrorist financing that suit a larger, tangentially related discussion.317   
 
It must be noted that this also occurs in the works of far more rigorous and analytical authors 
than Sterling. For example, in his work Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman discusses the 
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financial dealings of terrorist groups only a handful of times, and does so only tangentially in 
and order to support larger points, such as the continuing importance of state governments in 
fostering terrorism,318 or terrorist use of the internet.319  Hoffman also uses financial 
information to argue that al Qaeda possessed significant operational strength well into the 
‘Global War on Terror’ and thus constituted an “enduring threat.”  To support this argument, 
however, Hoffman repeats the myth320 – which had been discredited two years earlier by the 
9/11 Commission321 – that Osama bin Laden has a large fortune that clandestinely funds al 
Qaeda operations around the world.  As with the Sterling, the important point for this thesis is 
that knowledge about terrorist financing is problematic, and thus literature that 
unproblematically employs such knowledge simply to support a priori assumptions or larger 
arguments does not provide a sound representation of terrorism-related financial activity.   
 
To summarize, the first generation of orthodox terrorist financing literature is ad hoc and 
unsystematic, yet also is firmly embedded within the ‘orthodox ideas’ described in Chapter 
One. ‘First generation’ knowledge of terrorist finance tend to be narrow discussions of 
financial activity related to terrorist actors, often raised as mere tangents to broader 
discussions of terrorism and terrorists.   As such, conceptually, this first generation literature 
tends to assume a linearity in the reality and the meaning of financial activity to terrorist 
actors, which in turns produces an epistemic perspective that favors certain – usually 
ideological or political – variables over others.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact the 
such information is often then repeated and cited elsewhere in discourses on terrorism and 
terrorist finance, or even used as a basis for government policy or other exercises of state 
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power against ‘terrorist financiers.’323  This has the consequence, as Croissant and Barlow 
write, that ‘‘controversial and far-reaching conclusions are based on anecdotal evidence that 
has been taken out of context or is derived from unverifiable, anonymous, or highly partisan 
sources.324  In turn, as Vleck, writes, “the problem [becomes] that these are the figures fixed 
in on-going media coverage rather than the figures that emerge over time from more detailed 
investigation and analysis.”325   As will be discussed below, however, the frameworks that 
could support such “detailed investigation and analysis” are grossly deficient.   
Second Generation: Terrorist Finance as an Aggregation of Typologies 
The second ‘generation’ of terrorist financing literature examines terrorist financing as a 
stand-alone topic, and thus provides far more in depth examination of terrorism-related 
financial activity.  It provides a body of heavily descriptive work that, while not 
comprehensive, does provide an empirical basis of research on the issue. However, the 
overriding focus of this literature is description of the actors, methods, and techniques used 
by terrorists to fund their activities.  Perhaps because there was an enormous need for the 
facts of terrorist financing, this literature fails to provide any kind of conceptual framework 
for understanding the problem.  As will be argued, the theoretical void left by the second 
generation literature is just as important as the factual void left by the first.  
 
As demonstrated here, the second generation literature is dominated by works from 
investigative journalists, governments, think tanks, private companies, and occasionally 
researchers from various academic disciplines, although rarely International Relations.  
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Although often stylistically written and sometimes poorly footnoted, these descriptive 
accounts collectively provide a compelling picture of the breadth and complexity of terrorist 
financing activities.  They fall into three broad categories: broad-brush descriptions of the 
global terrorist financing system, studies of particular sub-topics, and exposés of specific 
terrorist group financing.  These are not strict delineations, and often authors and even 
individual works cross these categorical boundaries.  Nevertheless, the distinctions are a 
useful way of critically examining this literature.   
 
In general, this second generation of orthodox literature is paradigmatic, and is characterized 
by uncritical acceptance – or at times rejection – of repeated or official claims and 
conclusions about ‘who finances terrorism and how they do it.’  This literature also tends to 
be overly deterministic about the complex realities of terrorist financing, a problem often 
manifested in analyses that begin with an assumption about the involvement of a certain actor 
or behavior in terrorist financing, and then an analysis of how this actor or behavior could – 
rather than has been – used to finance terrorism.  For example, most of the problematic 
discourses on the supposed role hawala plays in terrorist financing belongs to this generation 
of orthodox literature, given that this literature (discussed below) uncritically accepts that 
hawala is a ‘terrorist financing method’ and proceeds to analyze how this may occur, often 
with little actual case evidence of the use of hawala to ‘finance’ terrorist acts.  The result is 
that although the second generation of orthodox literature places a greater emphasis on 
empirical research – especially in identifying the methods and actors involved in financing 
terrorism, this empirical evidence is, more often than not, grossly underdetermined.  In other 
words, although this literature presents a more robust empirical basis for analysis of terrorist 
financing, the meaning and conclusions drawn from this data are generally poorly 
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formulated, which then in turn negatively influences further research that seeks to ‘fill in’ 
empirical gaps. 
Descriptions of Terrorist Financing Typologies 
The first category of second-generation literature are those works that concentrate on 
describing in depth the various typologies of terrorist financing.  Overall, these works have 
helped partly fill gaps in various silos of knowledge hindering more systematic and coherent 
understanding of terrorist financing.  However, they tend not to present conceptual 
frameworks that would be useful in extrapolating this factual data into broader, more 
applicable contexts. For sake of space, this section will survey only one of sub-literatures on 
the various means by which terrorists apparently are financed.   
The Commodity Trade 
The literature on the role that commodities such as gold, diamonds, tanzanite, and oil play in 
terrorist financing provides some interesting data regarding the means by which terrorists 
have generated money, but it does not provide any conceptual framework to understand 
terrorist finance.  Trade in these commodities is robust in rich country markets, but is lightly 
monitored and regulated in the poor countries from which they originate. Winer and Roule 
point out that the commodity trade exhibits a lack of transparency in production and a weak 
international monitoring regime.332 Various authors have described the ways in which 
different commodity markets have been used by terrorists. Farah has written extensively on 
the how al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas have all benefited enormously from the gold trade 
in Dubai, the tanzanite trade in Tanzania, and the diamond trade in West Africa.333  In a more 
general sense, Winer and Roule have discussed the general role of “illicit resource 
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extraction” in terrorist financing.334 They argue that the illicit commodity trade has a 
particularly subversive effect on existing political and social orders, and an equally beneficial 
impact on violent non-state actors, like terrorists, who challenge those orders. Their work 
further demonstrates that terrorism is financed on various levels separate from, and 
sometimes in opposition to, political realities.  They argue: 
“Illicitly extracted resources have provided economic rewards to the criminal, the 
corrupt, and the subversive in direct relation to the ability of such persons to evade 
laws that would restrict or regulate such transactions. These rewards in turn enable 
them further to build corrupt networks of officials and private sector elements to 
facilitate further exploitation.  Because illicit extraction turns the resources of a 
country against the principles of democratic government, it undermines existing 
standards of governance, whether already comparatively weak or strong.  Because 
illicit extraction provides political and economic power to regimes and forces that 
would otherwise be illegitimate, it becomes a central mechanism to sustain those who 
otherwise would not have sufficient popular support to retain power over people, 
geography, or the resources themselves.”
335
 
 
In these ways, commodity trading makes an ideal vehicle for terrorist financing. To gain 
access to the high income potential of a commodity, terrorist actors must only interact with 
those in control of the resource; and as these actors tend have power disproportionate to their 
legitimacy, they are free to interact with them outside traditional social or political 
boundaries that would otherwise confine more legitimate actors.  This results in situations, as 
Farah describes, in which Islamic militants, African warlords, and Jewish businessmen 
cooperate to trade diamonds.336  Furthermore, because of strong demand from the rich 
countries of the West, commodities are an easy gateway into Western economies.  There 
have been many examples of terrorist groups selling commodities to wholesale buyers, who 
then sell them directly into Western markets.337  
 
Group-Specific Descriptions of Terrorist Financing 
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Another main area of second-generation terrorist financing literature includes the descriptive 
accounts of the financial activities of specific terrorist groups. These include descriptions of 
the financing of the PIRA by Horgan and Taylor;338 of al Qaeda by Basille339 and the US 
Government;340 and of Hamas by Levitt,341 among others. These works present factual 
accounts of terrorist financing activity in terms of the organizational dynamics of the terrorist 
group, and are thus valuable contributions to the overall body of data accumulated on terrorist 
financing.  However, with the notable exception of Horgan and Taylor, little effort is made in 
these works to fit the accumulated facts into conceptual frameworks other than traditional 
state and policy centric approaches, which, as will be argued below, are necessary but not 
nearly sufficient to explain terrorist financing.  Also, such a narrow approach limits these 
descriptions’ applicability to other situations, other terrorist groups, and other contexts.   
 
Group-level descriptions of terrorist financing present a relatively clear aggregate picture of 
terrorist financing, despite the respective differences in material, sources, subjects, and 
analytical sophistication. They describe terrorist groups as seeking and receiving funding 
from a diverse network of sources, including charities, diaspora networks, businesses, crime, 
and legitimate businesses. Common to all these sources is that they are at a societal level. 
However, only Horgan and Taylor analyze these societal phenomena.  The rest of this 
literature describes it, but then subsumes it to the political dynamics of the terrorist group. 
For example, Levitt describes Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and other groups as “systematically” 
engaged with social and cultural organizations, individuals, and charities that are outside the 
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strict boundaries of the operational terrorist group.342  He presents evidence that Hamas 
operational/political leaders claim authority over all such societal level efforts, so that they 
“conceal” political violence “behind” societal-level activities in such a way that charities, 
foundations, and non-terrorist donors provide recruits, logistics, and cover for terrorists.  The 
problem with Levitt’s approach is that he describes terrorist group engagement in an array of 
societal level activities, such as football teams, social work, and religious societies343 but 
presents solely political analyses of these activities.  In particular, this causes Levitt to largely 
ignore the issue of agency, in that while the leadership may purposely seek out societal level 
elements to exploit, there is no discussion as to how and why non-terrorists acquiesce to this 
exploitation.  As Onuf observes, agency is the power to make choices on the behalf of 
someone else.344  In the political realm, governments exercise this power to become agents 
for all citizens within their sovereign boundaries.345  Linklater points out that along with this 
authority sovereignty requires the loyalty of those subject to a government’s agency.346  
Loyalty can be assured in many ways – for example, by democratic faith in the will of the 
people, physical fear instilled by dictatorships, or sincere belief in a divine right of the king to 
rule as he pleases.  If this loyalty breaks down, however, the government loses its power of 
agency, and therefore its sovereignty over its people and their choices.  
 
To illustrate these points, take the example of social welfare payment scheme of Hamas, in 
which, according to Levitt, the group donates up to $3 million per month to Palestinian 
civilians.347  These grants are strategic, supporting families of suicide bombers, prisoners, and 
those who can offer specific services to Hamas, such as use of their home to hide weapons, 
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or, in one case, use of a library photocopy machine.348 Although Hamas’ actions can be 
understood in political terms, the actions of the civilians cannot.  Non-terrorist behavior is far 
more complex, and incorporates economic, social, cultural, and moral factors.  For example, 
political frameworks are grossly insufficient to understand the actions of a Palestinian 
charitable worker who is paid (or intimidated) to funnel donations to Hamas, although this 
worker may be politically opposed to the group.  Despite actions that financially support 
Hamas, this worker is not necessarily an ‘agent’ of Hamas, that is, Hamas does not exercise 
political agency over her actions, even though they end up supporting its operations.    
 
This reflects a chronic shortcoming in the terrorist financing literature that while descriptions 
of terrorist financing center on the role of societal level activities, its analysis tends to 
examine the problem almost exclusively in political terms. This leaves these works without 
much purchase with their own descriptions, and demonstrates that because terrorist groups 
exploit societal factors to finance their activities, the literature must encompass both societal 
and political analysis.  
 
Horgan and Taylor, however, present an alternative approach to examining the financing 
activities of a particular terrorist group.  In their analysis, they align descriptive accounts of 
terrorist financing activity with conceptual frameworks that include more than only political 
considerations.  In their study of the financing of the Provisional IRA, Horgan and Taylor 
couple several important conceptual insights with their description of the diverse and 
complex financing activities of the PIRA. First, they discuss the importance of research 
terrorist financing as a separate, although related, issue to political violence. They argue that, 
“finance is one of the most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the 
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development of a large, sophisticated terrorist group and its political wing.”349 “Conducting a 
terrorist campaign requires human resources (in terms of individuals prepared to take the risk 
of planting a bomb or aiming and firing a weapon) but it also requires material resources: 
bombs, rifles or other forms of weaponry. Meeting this fundamental requirement for 
munitions has always been one of the major priorities of the Provisional IRA, to the resources 
of a campaign of violence and maintain the motivation of its volunteers.”350   
 
This is a significant insight as it in effect separates a terrorist group’s financing activities 
from its political/operational side, because it is sets financing as a priority, i.e. something to 
pursue in and of itself, and not simply in a subordinate role to the political activities.  In this 
way, terrorist financing and terrorism are distinct phenomena. This leads into the second 
important insight, by implication, that which separate phenomena require separate analytical 
approaches.  They remark that one of the widespread failings of the study of terrorism is that 
“all too often, we are beguiled by the rhetoric of political violence into focusing on the 
political agenda of terrorism, but in doing so we frequently fail to appreciate the sometimes 
substantial organizational and financial context to terrorism and terrorist campaigns.”351  This 
financial context, as emerges in the aggregated descriptions of terrorist financing, occurs 
primarily on societal levels.  For example, Horgan and Taylor describe how the PIRA 
becomes institutionalized, shifting from having a politically based raison d’etre to economic 
and institutional ones.352  On a theoretical level, this means that financial self-sufficiency 
brings with it new levels of analysis, because the political/policy dynamics become less 
relevant to the existence, behavior, and continuation of terrorist groups operations. Therefore, 
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terrorist financing research must find its own analytical path, rather than simply aping the 
operational/political approaches.  
 
The second generation of the orthodox literature on terrorist finance gives much more explicit 
and systematic attention to the topic than the first generation, but this greater attention 
generally self-serving (policy relevance) and closed to new thinking.   
 
Third Generation: Terrorist Finance as a System 
The third generation of terrorist financing literature is characterized by a focus on analyzing 
terrorist financing as a more holistic problem encompassing various economic, political, 
social, cultural, institutional, and historical factors.  As Chapter 4 argues, engaging in the full 
complexity of terrorist financing activity is crucial to properly conceptualizing and 
representing it, and engagement in these factors helps address the problem of 
underdetermination of empirical data present in the second generation literature. However, 
while the third ‘generation’ of orthodox literature offers some useful analytic theories and 
hypotheses about terrorist financing, it nevertheless fails to fully engage with and correct the 
underlying failings of orthodox approaches to terrorist financing, meaning ultimately that 
such literature remains too incoherent and, overall, of limited usefulness for conceptualizing, 
let alone understanding or confronting, terrorist finance in any systematic way.   
 
The “Crime-Terror Nexus” 
One sub-area has been research seeking to describe and conceptualize the links that exist 
between terrorist groups and organized crime.  As Kostakos observes,353 there is debate 
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within this discourse about what lies behind an apparent increase in linkages between 
organized criminal organizations and terrorist actors over time to a variety of factors, with 
works attributing this various to a decline in state sponsorship in the late 1980s forced 
existing terrorist groups to become self-sufficient through criminal enterprise,354 the 
coincident evolution of networked forms of organization among both criminal and terrorist 
groups,355 and exploitation of political, social, and economic unrest during the immediate 
post-Cold War period.356   
 
There is also important disagreement about how to conceptualize these ‘crime-terror’ 
linkages.  Schmid, in a perspective later dubbed the “methods, not motives” approach,357 
posits that these linkages occur because both terrorists and criminals are rational actors they 
will seek to cooperate on specific activities if there is a pragmatic rationale to do so, but at the 
same any such linkages will be self-limiting given that terrorist and criminal groups are 
driven by wholly different underlying rationales – i.e. politics vs profit, respectively.358  He 
also notes, however, that the process of such interaction can change the behavior of the 
groups involved: 
“When organised crime groups try to perpetuate themselves, a process of 
politicization takes place. On the other hand, originally political underground 
organisations engaged in various practices of illegal fundraising run the risk of 
gangsterization.”
359 
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Other authors, however, have challenged this approach as too decontextualized. Makarenko, 
for example, observes that such terrorist involvement in criminality is not monolithic, but 
occurs on a continuum of “convergence.”360  Along this continuum are manifested four broad 
“crime-terror relationships,”361 each of which reflects different combinations of not only the 
motives and internal operational methods of criminal and terrorist groups, but also 
interactions with wider social, political, and economic trends.362 Similarly, Shelley and 
Picarelli argue that seeking to identify sharp differences between the motives and operations 
of terrorist and criminal groups – and thus how these ‘different’ actors interact – actually 
serves to restrict research and limit possibilities for researching and understanding the 
complex realities of how violent political and criminal actors come about and operate in 
various societies.363    This evolution is also echoed in commentary from those from related 
fields of practice, as illustrated by former Section Chief for Financial Crimes for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Dennis Lormel, who has argued:  
“First, we must understand vulnerabilities [to terrorist financing] in terms of 
systemic societal vulnerabilities and areas of vulnerability to terrorist interests. 
Systemic vulnerabilities represent systemic weaknesses that terrorists and criminal 
elements…exploit in furtherance of their activities. It’s incumbent that individuals 
and entities responsible for controls recognize such weaknesses and implement 
mechanisms to minimize such exploitation…[Therefore,] developing mechanisms to 
identify emerging trends, as well as systemic and institutional vulnerabilities, is an 
important step in disrupting terrorist funding flows”
364
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 This literature begins to indicate that perhaps terrorism is financed not only by criminal, 
violent, and other “anti-hegemonic”365 individuals, but by actors that are simply embedded 
into the fabric of society, including both is considered its legitimate and illegitimate sections.  
For example, Farah describes many individuals who have facilitated commodity trades for 
terrorist groups, but who also work for legitimate organizations, including the United Nations 
and the diamond conglomerate, de Beers.366  Levitt’s research similarly examines many 
recognized charitable organizations found to be involved in terrorist financing, typically 
through the exploitation of religious or cultural norms of giving.367  Even US President 
George W Bush interacted with terrorist financing actors on an economic level, as an 
executive of the US corporate partner of Bank Credit Commerce International (BCCI), the 
defendant in one of the first ever terrorist financing prosecutions.368 In some respects, the 
policy community is ahead of academia in recognizing the need for new, more conceptually 
comprehensive approaches to terrorist financing.  
 
Research on linkages among criminal and terrorist groups is thus relevant to understanding 
terrorist finance.  However, this appears to be the case not because the literature exposes any 
criminal underbelly funding terrorism, but because it gives some insight into how terrorism-
related financial activity, as well as the meaning and importance we attach to it, is intertwined 
with the societal environment in which it occurs.  Recognition of the importance of 
understanding how terrorist financing is embedded in societal contexts both matches with the 
initial impressions from Chapter Two, and, as the next chapter demonstrates, is key to 
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building an alternative and improved conceptual framework for understanding terrorist 
finance. 
Descriptions of the “Global System” of Terrorist Financing  
Several authors have written expansive descriptions of the global terrorist financing ‘system.’ 
The first to attempt a systematic description of the complex ways in which terrorist groups 
fund their activities, details the financing activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Red Brigades, and M19.369  Adams argues that 
successful terrorist groups function in ways similar to a corporation, complete with a business 
model, investments, management structures, and cooperative agreements with businesses, 
criminal groups, other terrorist groups, and, occasionally, governments.370 Adams separates 
terrorist financing from politically dominant narratives. He presents evidence that state 
governments play a relatively small role in terrorist financing, and then typically only as 
business partners.371  Furthermore, his comparison of terrorist groups to corporations 
challenges the image of terrorist financing as unproblematic expression of undesirable 
political or ideological ideas.372  His main critique of counterterrorism efforts is that they fail 
to consider the non-political dimensions of terrorist groups, such as financing activities.  His 
factual research supports this argument that all terrorist groups eventually become embedded 
into human society, and do so not on a political or ideological level, but on various social, 
economic, and institutional levels, often that of their supposed enemy.  “Capitalism,” Adams 
observes, “can…corrupt the most idealistic of terrorists.”373  Although not stated explicitly, 
Adams’ account implies that financial activities reflect a process of societal-level 
institutionalization, and understanding and exploiting this is the key to countering terrorist 
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financing, and therefore countering terrorism.   The major shortcoming with Adams’ work, 
however, is that as a journalistic work, it does not embed these analytical insights into any 
kind of coherent theoretical framework. 
 
Coming later, works such as those by Napoleoni,374 Ehrenfeld,375 Kiser,376 and Rapheali,377 
provided other universalizing narratives about the “vast, underground…financial network” 
that supposedly lay behind global terrorism, as well as at least early efforts to counter it.     
These works generally present what appears a catalog of data about the global system of 
terrorist financing. Napoleoni, for example, argues that terrorism is financed through a 
network of indifferent and unscrupulous members of the liberal economic system.378 
Ehrenfeld’s account of the global terrorist financing system, while politically opposite, is 
similar in its structure and its shortcomings.  She argues that by a diverse and global network 
of criminals and hate-filled, “evil” terrorist sympathizers funds terrorism.379 This includes 
many Westerners and others who are the supposed enemy of many of the terrorist groups 
that, she argues, feed off them.   
 
However, such data, presented and cited as corroborated, unproblematic, and uncontested 
‘fact’ has often be shown to be either inaccurate or grossly inadequate to support the grand 
conclusions about the global systems of terrorist financing supposedly – and mysteriously – 
at work.380 As Warde observes: 
“An instant canon on terrorist financing was established in the days after the [9/11] 
attacks.  The laundry list was familiar and mindlessly repeated: the bin Laden $300m 
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fortune, business fronts legal and illegal, Islamic charities, Saudis, rich Arabs, 
hawalas, drugs, gold and diamonds, etc.  From the popular press to prestigious think 
tanks, the lists were almost identical.  Repetition looks like corroboration.”
381
 
 
Ultimately, as de Goede has described,382 it was in large part these provocative narratives, 
based on what appeared to be large amounts of empirical data, that came to primarily mediate 
how terrorism-related financial activity was represented, despite the fact that other ‘orthodox’ 
approaches described above, while deficient, provided at least a foundation upon which a 
more coherent understanding of terrorist finance could be built.  The next several sections of 
this chapter will examine in more depth what these deficiencies are in current 
conceptualizations of terrorist finance, and will demonstrate that underpinning these failings 
in existing terrorist finance discourse are simply that the ‘wrong’ questions are being asked 
about terrorism-related financial activity. 
Deficiencies in Understanding What Constitutes Terrorist Finance 
Definitions 
In his discussion of the inherent difficulties in defining terrorism, Hoffman observed that 
“most people have a vague idea or impression of what terrorism is but lack a more precise, 
concrete, and explanatory definition.”397  It may therefore be surprising that definitions of 
terrorist financing, at least in law and in most political discourse, are both precise and widely 
– if not universally – accepted.  As we shall see, although such objectified definitions are a 
predictable institutional response to a complex issue, they are nonetheless epistemologically 
insufficient and analytically counterproductive.   
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The United Nations defines terrorist financing as an action in which an actor has  
"…by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects 
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to 
be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [a terrorist attack].”
398
    
This is in essence the international consensus definition of terrorist financing, although there 
are national and institutional variations as well.  For example, the United States government 
defines terrorist financing as any act that: 
 “provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, 
location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or 
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out [a terrorist 
attack].”
 399
    
 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund jointly offer a simpler definition of 
terrorist financing as: 
 “the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan, or 
engage in it.”
400
 
 
Despite employing different wording, these definitions are thematically similar and offer 
precise and objective constructions of what terrorist financing ‘is,’ illuminating a stark 
contrast with its complex, subjective realities evident in Chechen case of the previous 
chapter.  Common sense tells us however that such objective definitions of terrorist financing 
are necessary for legal, political, and bureaucratic purposes, and are constructed to support 
those uses.  For example, the U.S. Government’s definition seems to be aimed at providing 
the legal foundation for making a clear political distinction between terrorists and non-
terrorists, i.e. by deterring terrorist sympathizers from becoming monetary supporters and 
provide a tool with which to prosecute not only fundraisers and money remitters, but also 
lawyers, website operators, and others who have allegedly provided financial and non-
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financial support to terrorist groups.  Similarly, the United Nations definition fits the 
organization’s purposes by giving deference to national laws and thus satisfying its 
conflicting obligations to respect state sovereignty while also executing the will of the 
international community to ‘fight’ terrorist finance. This is an unavoidable fact of 
international law, however (and is hardly limited to terrorist financing).  International legal 
definitions are intrinsically reactive in that they codify definitions of legal matters in ways 
that reflect relevant global power dynamics.  However, the international legal definition of 
terrorist finance is problematic because while it serves the purposes of powerful states, it does 
not fully reflect the on-the-ground empirical realities of actual terrorist financing activity, a 
situation that is likely to eventually undermine the legal frameworks that rely on this 
definition.  To investigate this issue, it is useful to deconstruct the consensus U.N. definition 
in terms of empirical evidence.  Ultimately, we find that this definition is indeed structured to 
serve the interests of the defining institution, but not necessarily systematic analysis.   
 
 “By any means:” The definition begins with a firm statement of the empirical complexity of 
terrorist financing, successfully capturing in epistemological terms the vast range of activities 
that can be involved.  In fact, as we see later, virtually any activity can end up facilitating 
terrorist finance, including, as evident in the Chechen case, exchange of cash, training, 
services, goods (legal and illicit), and anything else of value.  The full text of U.S. definition 
cited above also captures this complexity, stating that the provision of any of the following to 
a terrorist actor constitutes terrorist financing:401 
“…currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials. 
402
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On one level, this indicates recognition that financing activity can take virtually any form, or 
in other words that capital is indeed “contested and contingent” as de Goede claims,403 
reflecting the everyday epistemological complexity evident in the Chechen case.   
Interestingly, however, this recognition can also pose problems for liberal democratic society.  
This is because if the state deems that any activity can potentially be involved in financing 
terrorism, than potentially any activity in which one is involved can be deemed terrorist 
financing by the state.  In other words, because ‘terrorist financing’ cannot be defined by 
actual conduct (i.e. other than via a tautological formulation like ‘financial activity related to 
terrorism’), it must be defined by some sort of political judgment about the economic 
behaviors involved.  This is not necessarily contradictory with liberal principles, but can 
become so if those political judgments – and thus determinations of terrorist financing 
activity – become arbitrary.   
 
“Directly or indirectly:”  This opens up the definition even further to encompass those 
activities that are further removed from terrorist acts themselves.  Where precisely this line is 
however is unclear and is largely left up to the subjective judgments of those using the 
definitions.  In Chapter Two described an instance in which, strictly speaking, the U.S. 
government funded the same actors as did the designated terrorist financier Benevolence 
International Foundation (BIF), albeit for different purposes, and thus technically financed 
terrorism (or separatists guerillas or holy warriors, depending on perspective) at the same 
level of directness or indirectness as BIF.   Again, while including both direct and indirect 
economic interaction is epistemologically sound, it may nevertheless conflict with liberal 
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democratic values like equal protection under law if allowed to justify arbitrary political and 
legal judgments.   
 
“Unlawfully:” The immediate implication of this portion of the definition is that terrorist 
financing is necessarily illegal and thus also illegitimate. Napoleoni, for example, exhibits 
this conflation in her repeated references to the “illegal/terror economy.”404  This is however 
demonstrably not an accurate characterization of the on-the-ground realities.  First, even 
though many of the actions involved in financing terrorist actors (such as car theft and drug 
trafficking) happen also to be criminal, many (like bank deposits or donations) are not 
inherently illegal or illegitimate, but only become so when they support terrorism.  Second, 
laws change over time and across place, meaning that assuming terrorist financing to only 
occur within the criminal ‘world’ excludes many activities that should be included.  In fact, 
given that law, generically, is at base an institutional codification of norms and power 
structures within a society, terrorist financing activity that falls within the bounds of law is 
likely to illuminate many interesting but hidden insights about how terrorists interact with 
wider society and vice versa.  
 
Take for example the case of al Qaeda’s financial activities leading up to the attacks of 
September 11th 2001.  In Spring 2000, al Qaeda members deposited several hundred thousand 
dollars into bank accounts in Dubai.   In July 2000, SunTrust Bank in Florida opened a joint 
account for two of the 9/11 hijackers, issued them debit cards, and over the next ten weeks 
accepted $109,000 in transfers from the Dubai accounts, all of which was either used to fund 
the attacks or was transferred out of the country by other al Qaeda members after the 
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attacks.405  In one sense, all of this activity was illegal in that U.S. law prohibits giving 
material support to terrorists and bank accounts and debit cards certainly count for material 
support.  In other sense, however, at least some of this activity was legal because first of all 
SunTrust had no intention to interact with terrorists, and furthermore because until early 2004 
the United Arab Emirates had no law prohibiting financial interaction with a terrorist or 
terrorist group. 406  In the latter case, this is largely because the local perception was that 
financial services implied no more agency or responsibility for their ultimate use than would 
be true for any other service, in the same way that Westerners would not consider a grocer 
who sells fruit to a terrorist to be a supporter of terrorism.407 Analytically, therefore, 
assuming that terrorist financing has to be illegal results in complicated if not tortured 
epistemological formulations of what should properly count as terrorist finance.    
 
Conversely, aligning one’s definitions of terrorist finance with the law is very much in line 
with liberal democratic principles.  Counting as terrorist financing only those activities that 
are illegal insulates actions from the subjective whims of those in power, as their definitions 
of terrorism and financial support of it can be very different than what could be upheld as 
law.   And given that liberal democratic societies are meant to be “empires of laws not 
men,”408 this formulation well serves the objectives of liberal democratic societies.  However, 
as mentioned above, it fails to be very useful analytically because it makes it impossible to 
see common elements among epistemologically similar activities, such as when a terrorist 
actor receiving money from a charitable foundation versus from a state welfare program.  
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Ultimately, therefore, the legality of terrorist financing activity is an important issue for 
society, but not so much for the serious analyst of the topic. 
 
“Willfully:” In the absence of objective definitions and profiles of terrorist financing activity, 
analysts typically rely on intent to separate terrorist financing activity from that which is not.  
However, from the above case, intent is a hazy concept.  For example, is the motive of the 
corrupt low level border policeman to facilitate terrorist financing or to make enough money 
for his family?  The point is not that this will always be known, or that not having direct 
terroristic intent absolves one of terrorist financing, but that analytically it is necessary to 
accept the intent and motive are insufficient criteria for defining terrorist financing, even 
though it is useful in a legal and policy sense.  This also has the result of separating scholarly 
analysis of terrorist financing from law and policy concerned with stopping it.   To return to 
the SunTrust / Arab Bank example, the former Treasury official and think tank analyst Matt 
Levitt stated that the primary difference between the two banks is their ‘intent.’409  This begs 
the question, ‘intent to do what, precisely?’  One could argue that because Arab Bank was 
facilitating funds transfers for HAMAS – a terrorist group with no designs against the United 
States – it actually is less important analytically that SunTrust, which facilitated funds 
transfers for al Qaeda – a group determined to strike American targets.  This is simply to 
show that delineations of intent are subjective and closely tied to ones own analytic 
objectives.   
 
“Provides or collect funds:” This part of the definition relates to the role of individual 
agency, in two significant ways.  First, it suggests that the international community (via its 
definition) recognizes that the human choices that in aggregate result in what is known as 
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‘terrorist financing’ occur on many different levels. This captures one of the key epistemic 
themes of the previous chapter in that terrorist financing consists of all sorts of human 
choices and actions, only some of which involve direct, linear interaction with terrorist 
actors.  In general, the wording implies that individual actions should be categorized 
according to how closely one’s choices relate to the activities of terrorists, and specifically 
between those who provide funds to terrorist actors and those who collect it on their behalf.  
In one way this fits with the empirical realities observed in the previous chapter by 
suggesting important differences between, for example, the wealthy benefactors who 
gathered funds in the Middle East for the cause of holy war, and the organizations that 
ensured that these funds actually purchased weapons, clothing, and other supplies.  In another 
sense, however, this is a poor epistemological division because distinguishing between 
‘providers’ (who presumably have direct interaction with a terrorist actor) and ‘collectors’ 
(who have indirect interaction such as through an intermediary who will then ‘provide’ the 
funds to the terrorists) does not give much foundation about the significance of these 
interactions. For example, the U.S. Treasury was technically a ‘collector’ of terrorist funds as 
it collected the taxes that paid the Chechens to hand over the al Qaeda fighters, but this fact is 
significant only in certain contexts and for certain purposes.  This in turn indicates that the 
nature and meaning of human agency in relation to the realities of terrorist financing activity 
require much further specification. 
 
Second, this part of the definition unintentionally raises the problematic nature of the word 
‘funds.’  Even though funds are usually equated with money, only some of the financial 
instruments used to finance terrorism in the above case were actual cash or its equivalents 
(e.g. checks, banks accounts, etc).  Cars, food and medicine, drugs, and even less tangible 
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things like business interests and training410 all served as vehicles of exchange.  This means 
that the definitional boundaries of what activities constitute ‘funds’ and thus ‘financing’ are 
blurry, as the case study indicated.  For example, if financing is the provision or collection of 
funds then the distinctions among what is financing versus that which is logistics, supply, 
support, etc are both inherently unclear and in fact change depending on a variety of social, 
political, economic, and operational realties.  Therefore, as hinted above, it seems better to 
view terrorist financing as revolving around the exchange of value in support of terrorism, 
rather than a definition that focuses exclusively on money.  This conception of terrorist 
financing will be fully elucidated later in this dissertation.   
 
“Intention that [funds] should be used in full or in part in order to carry out [terrorist 
attacks]:” In context of the above discussion, this section of the definition helps specifies the 
issue of agency.  First, it explicitly narrows the relevance of agency to its direct relationship 
with terrorist acts themselves, and not general support for a terrorist cause.  This is useful in 
that it prevents analysis of terrorist financing from degenerating into a game of ‘six degrees 
of separation’ in which virtually any person or organization can be financially linked to a 
terrorist actor, although at several steps removed.  This of course can lead to decidedly anti-
liberal consequences, as one person’s choice to trade with another (non-terrorist) actor can be 
determined to be ‘terrorist financing’ because several steps later an associate of an associate 
of an associate interacted financially with a terrorist.  On the other hand, this formulation 
seems to contradict an important reality of terrorist finance, namely that money is ‘fungible’ 
and that just because one does not intend to finance terrorism does not necessarily mean that 
one will not.  For example, even though HAMAS has a large humanitarian component, one 
would be naïve for instance to believe that writing a check to the group with ‘humanitarian 
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aid only’ in the subject line (i.e. the donation’s intent) would necessarily prevent HAMAS 
from benefiting militarily from this money.  This is not simply because the group could 
misappropriate the funds, but because, as Levitt among others point out, money given for one 
function of an organization ‘frees up’ money to be spent elsewhere.411  Again this points to an 
acute epistemological need to specify not only the dynamics and consequences of the full 
diversity of human agency within terrorist finance, but also a more explicit statement of one’s 
analytic objectives regarding this knowledge as this will largely determine the significance of 
the individual actions and the human choices that led to them.   
 
“Knowledge that [funds] should be used in full or in part in order to carry out [terrorist 
attacks]:” In some ways, this introduces a superior epistemic alternative to intent, in that 
intent is an important concept, but one inextricably bound to particular and very changeable 
political and analytic objectives.  ‘Knowledge’ on the other hand implies much more about 
the exercise of human agency, as well as its significance.  For instance, investors (at least 
successful ones) do not purchase stock simply with the ‘intention’ of making a return, but do 
so with some level of ‘knowledge’ (really an educated guess or calculation of high 
probability) that the stock will increase in value.  The same is true for the everyday, often 
‘inaudible’ choices that make up terrorist financing.  After all, is it not much more relevant if 
someone engages in terrorism-related economic behavior with the knowledge that such 
behavior will or is likely to lead to terrorist attacks, regardless of what his actual intent is?  
Analytically, this is important, as it puts more focus on the consequences of terrorist 
financing activity, rather than simply the conduct of it, which is especially important given 
the subjective and politicized nature of the issue.  This adds another layer of complexity for 
analysts in that knowledge in how one comes to know such information, i.e. whether or the 
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probability funds will be used for terrorism, and knowledge of how the analyst can measure 
and observe this are both difficult research problems.412   
 
In the end, asking ‘what is terrorist financing’ is simply the wrong question.  Given that it 
cannot be answered in a way that does not serve specific political goals, I argue that it is 
better to cut out the pretention of objectivity and simply ask both ‘what are my analytic 
objectives?’ and ‘what epistemological formulations best and most consistently serve them?’  
As we have seen, analysts of terrorist financing already implicitly base their analysis on these 
two questions, so it seems wise to ask and answer them explicitly and transparently.    
Deficiencies in Understanding Who Finances Terrorism 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the empirical evidence of terrorist financing indicate 
clearly that people identified as ‘involved’ in terrorist financing fit no pattern, other than 
perhaps the tautological ‘those involved are those we determine to be so.’  Nevertheless, this 
is unsatisfactory analytically, and the literature has tried many epistemic frameworks to ‘draw 
lines’ that separate ‘terrorist financiers’ from those are either not or just insignificantly 
involved.  This section examines three common epistemic frameworks – designations, 
legitimacy, and financial support of terrorism-related political causes – used to answer the 
question, “who finances terrorism?”  As demonstrated, however, each of these frameworks 
fails to account for the dynamics of individual and collective decision making by attempting 
to uncover non-existent patterns of ‘who’ finances terrorism, and thus produces information 
that is of limited usefulness to the analyst.   
                                                           
412 This dissertation lacks the scope to resolve this problem, but it seems that research from economics on 
decision making with ‘imperfect information’ would be relevant. 
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Designations and Blacklists 
The question of ‘who’ is involved is a critical component to existing epistemological 
formulations of terrorist financing.  Many exercises of state power that rely on terrorist 
financing data – such as monitoring bank accounts – focus on identifying the ‘perpetrators’ 
and tracking, disrupting, or deterring their activities or when possible punishing them for 
their involvement in financially supporting terrorism.  At the center of these efforts and thus 
how the literature comprehends ‘who’ finances terrorism is the U.S. Treasury’s list of 
“specially designated nationals (SDNs),”413 as well as the various other official lists of 
‘designated,’ ‘sanctioned,’ ‘high risk,’ or ‘politically exposed’ persons and entities compiled 
by the United Nations, the United States, and many other countries.414 These lists represent 
an official record of thousands of individuals, businesses, organizations, and charities that 
have been determined by these bodies to be or are likely involved in financing terrorism, 
money laundering, or financial crime. Throughout the literature, terrorist financing 
involvement is often measured not against some specific framework of behavior, but in 
relation to these lists, specifically whether someone is on the list, linked to someone on the 
list, or someone who is not on the list but should be because they are doing things similar to 
those already on the list. As such, the lists are in many ways the sun around which current 
understandings of who finances terrorism revolve.  Such gospel-like reliance on these lists 
however obscures many important issues about who finances terrorism, making them 
severely problematic as an epistemic foundation of analysis.   
 
First, it is logical to begin by asking whether those that are on the list do in fact ‘finance 
terrorism.’  In fact, this is not the case.  The Somali remittance provider Al Barakaat, for 
                                                           
413 The SDN list is available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/  
414 For example, as of October 2007, the company World-Check – the largest relevant vendor – monitors 313 
lists, although most of these lists are not explicitly related to terrorist finance activity. 
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example, was in 2001 designated by the United Nations, European Union, and the United 
States as a major terrorist financier, but, as the 9/11 Commission states, 
“notwithstanding the unprecedented cooperation of the UAE, significant FBI 
[Federal Bureau of Investigation] interviews of the principal players, involved in Al-
Barakaat (including its founder), and complete and unfettered access to its financial 
records, the FBI could not substantiate any links between al-Barakaat and terrorism.
 
415
 
Despite such a clear exoneration, al Barakaat’s owner and its Somalia office not only remain 
on several designation lists,416 but the company has also since then been used by the press417 
and international organizations418 as a supposed case example of terrorist financing behavior.  
This underlines that terrorist financing definitions are often a matter of politics and image 
over objective analysis.   
 
In another instance, Aufhauser tells of how the initial counter terrorist financing efforts of the 
United States after 9/11 were similarly more focused on appearing to achieve objectives 
rather than analytic accuracy:  
“It was almost comical.  We just listed out as many of the usual suspects as we could 
and said, Let’s go freeze some of their assets.”
419
  
The analytic implication of this is that just because one’s assets are frozen does not 
necessarily mean that that person is actually involved in terrorist financing.  Aside from the 
ethical, anti-liberal implications of assuming guilt until proven innocent, it means that the 
researcher cannot trust even the official designations.  This is not because the designations 
                                                           
415 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the 
Commission, (Washington DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 84. 
416 Nikos Passas, "Fighting terror with error,” (2006), 331. 
417 Michael Freedman, "Financing Terror: Why the US Can’t Stop the Flow of Billions to Drug Lords, 
Smugglers, and Al Qaeda," Forbes, October 17, 2005. 
418 Financial Action Task Force, “Typology 6: Regulatory Investigation Detects and Disrupts  
Terrorist Activity: Case Example 6,” Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 23.  For a 
discussion, see Nikos Passas, "Fighting terror with error,” (2006), 332.  
419 Quoted in Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
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are as baseless as Aufhauser admitted.420 Nevertheless, it does indicate that these 
designations are politicized products and thus analysis of them must account for those 
underlying politics.   
 
Second, as an aggregated dataset of actors involved in financing terrorism, the lists are 
grossly underspecified and cast a very wide and inconsistent net.  For example, the U.S. 
Treasury and the United Nations designated Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, despite lacking evidence 
that directly implicated him individually in financing any specific terrorist actor, in large part 
because of his financial and social relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, a global Islamist 
movement that, in some of its manifestations, has been known to provide ideological, 
political, moral, religious, and financial support or justification for terrorism or terrorist 
groups.421  But this criterion could be applied to many organizations and thus individuals 
such as Sinn Fein, the Ku Klux Klan, and others.  Also, since the Muslim Brotherhood is a 
diverse movement consisting of many distinct organizations in different places, e.g. the 
Brotherhood in the US is different than in Palestine, it would follow from the designation’s 
reasoning that there should be many more entities on the list – including in fact anyone who 
supports an organization that supports terrorism.  But this is a line that is not drawn, because 
it would encompass many that would not seem to fit on the list.  In summary, the institutions 
doing the designating are conflating several different types of actor ‘involved’ in financing 
terrorism, i.e. the supply chain, the common causer, and the direct agent.  These designations 
do not have room for the nuance that exists empirically in those who finance terrorism.   
 
                                                           
420 Which to be fair was referring to a very specific period post-9/11 in which there was enormous pressure just 
to start somewhere – a phenomenon familiar to anyone who has worked in a bureaucracy that is suddenly 
confronted with an immediate yet seemingly insurmountable problem. 
421 United States Department of the Treasury, "The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New 
Financiers of Terror," Press Release (PO-3380) (August 29, 2002 ). 
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In other words, it is clear that the lists serve the interests of those making them, meaning 
simply that the US and UN for example have an interest in identifying those involved in 
international terrorism and thereby restricting their access to the world’s financial system.  
Designations are products of political and bureaucratic/institutional decision making, not 
systematic, empirically based research.  Specifically, they are products of the intelligence 
process, which carries important implications.  First, is that these designations are based 
typically on classified intelligence information, which naturally means the evidence 
underpinning them cannot be verified.  Although there have been cases of ‘bad’ and overtly 
politically motivated intelligence seeping into the intelligence process (most notoriously 
Iraq), one can assume that in general the intelligence informing the designations is of the 
quality demanded by the respective intelligence agency.  A second and more important 
recognition is that intelligence information is by nature uncertain.  As many intelligence 
veterans have noted, intelligence estimates are exactly that – estimates and best guesses, not 
verified proven fact. Policies and actions based on intelligence therefore are political 
decisions based on best guesses.  Such actions are not simply blind instruments of 
unquestionable truth. Therefore, because designations are a product of the intelligence 
process, it is necessary to view the designations in light of how this knowledge was arrived 
at. In other words, designations must be seen as political actions of the designating body, and 
NOT statements of truth or fact.   
 
Designations thus need to be taken with a grain of salt.  The precise coloring of this salt is 
that designations should be seen as an institutional-political product of the designating body 
(i.e. the US Government or the UN) that reflects that body’s view of terrorist financing.  
There is simply no basis for designations to be taken as empirical fact or analytic gospel, and 
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thus conclusions based on such designations that do not consider the various political, 
institutional, and historical contexts are unreliable.  
Legitimacy and the Question of Who 
Another common basis used to judge involvement in financing terrorism relates to 
legitimacy, specifically the assumption that because terrorism is illegitimate then so must 
those who fund it.  However, the significance of legitimacy is much more complex, in three 
major ways.  The first is that lines and definitions of legitimacy constantly change over time, 
place, social position, cultural norms, etc; as evidenced by the changing views of American 
law enforcement towards fundraising activities for the IRA (i.e. change in legitimacy over 
time), and the divergent views of similar fundraising activities in support of HAMAS in the 
U.S., E.U., and Arab countries (change over place).  Terrorist financing is thus not always 
illegal, illegitimate, or exploitative.   
 
Second, terrorist financing actors exist on all sides of legitimacy, however such lines are 
drawn.  Terrorists and non-terrorists regularly interact in the financial sphere, just as 
interaction between drug traffickers and Mexican law enforcement, Russian soldiers and 
Chechen militants, and Palestinian terrorists and Israeli companies is a fact of the everyday 
life in those contexts, whether cataloged in the literature or not.422  For example, must we 
exclude consideration of SunTrust from analysis of the 9/11 attacks, just because they are a 
legitimate actor?  Similarly, is it not important to understand how the son of a U.S. president 
and later a president himself came to use the services of the same bank used by Abu Nidal 
and allegedly Osama bin Laden (as well as Saddam Hussein and the heads of the Medellin 
                                                           
422 See for example Moises Naim, Illicit (London: William Heinemann, 2005) for more discussion about how 
supposedly opposing groups regularly ‘do business’ with one another. 
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cocaine cartel)?423 Whether intentional or not, criminal or not, accidental or not, it is still 
participation.  Surely, the ‘legitimacy’ of these actors should not force us to delete them from 
the record, although it may lead us to condition our analysis of it.   
 
The third is that relying analysis on assessments of legitimacy is dangerous because they 
change so often and are easily manipulated, making analysis relying such judgments similarly 
so.  For example, common in the literature is a focus on making initial judgments of the 
legitimacy of an actor and then using that evaluation to judge any further evidence of the 
actions of that actor.  Sometimes this initial judgment is made nearly a priori, for example in 
some cases of members of diaspora groups or involvement in other illicit behavior (e.g. a 
hawaladar arrested for not registering his remittance business).  Therefore, the actions of a 
person giving money to Hamas, once judged to have done so, are seen in that light.  Thus 
protestations of innocence become ‘denials,’ and lack of evidence becomes to skill at 
‘deception.’  This also works the other way.  Legitimate actors involved in financing 
terrorism, once judged to be legitimate, become exempt from being judged as financiers of 
terrorism.  It is this reasoning that provides justification not only for the Reagan 
administration’s funding of death squads in El Salvador, but also for Iran to fund Hezbollah 
in the name of “regional politics” and arms traffickers to explain away their interactions with 
violent groups as “just business.”   The point here is not that legitimacy is epistemologically 
irrelevant or incorrect, but that it must only be applied for particular uses within particular 
contexts, namely when politics and self-interest dictate.  In other words, legitimacy deserves 
                                                           
423 This refers to the case of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), a large network of banks and 
corporate entities that provided financial services for a number of wealthy clients in the 1980s.  It was the 
subject of a large federal investigation during 1989-1991, and was shut down in 1991. One senior U.S. 
investigator said in 2002 that, "BCCI was the mother and father of terrorist financing operations."  In 1987, 
George W. Bush received a $25 million loan from a BCCI company for his company, Harken Energy. See 
Thomas Petzinger Jr., Peter Truell and Jill Abramson, "Harken Energy Had a Web Of Mideast Connections;In 
the Background: BCCI," The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1991; and Jonathan Baskin and David Sirota, 
"Follow the Money: How John Kerry busted the terrorists' favorite bank.," The Washington Monthly, September 
2004. 
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a much less important place in analysis than it is typically accorded.  Such a demotion of 
legitimacy in analysis of terrorist financing is likely to be controversial, because it ignores or 
even challenges many political positions about the financing of terrorism.   
Deficiencies in Understanding How is Terrorism Financed  
The third common question asked in the literature is ‘how is terrorism financed?’  Again, 
although seemingly common sense, answering this question raises another of ‘so what?’  So 
what, for example, if we know that terrorists use charities, drugs, money laundering, hawala, 
or any other method to finance their activities?  Knowing this does not, we shall see, 
necessarily tell us anything about truly important issues such as how to respond to/diminish 
terrorism, how to safeguard the rule of law in context of a security threat that uses liberal 
democratic traditions against it, or even how to understand the complex political economic 
decision making processes of particular terrorist actors.  This section demonstrates that 
analysis of the methods used in terrorist finance is only secondarily important to its analysis.  
Given the sheer diversity in the methods used, I critique this question from the literature 
through the prism of the Financial Action Task Force’s ‘Basic Concepts’ of terrorist finance.  
Although it is not the only epistemological framework used to analyze the methods and 
techniques of terrorist financing, it is nevertheless representative.   
Critiquing the FATF ‘Basic Concepts’ 
Given the empirical complexity of the topic and the demand for applicable analysis within 
the context of the ‘Financial War,’ much attention has been given to the classification of 
terrorist financing activity.  Although various classification frameworks are evident in the 
literature, such as by criminality of the act, country profile, or terrorist actor involved, none 
are adequate to provide a systematic epistemic foundation for analysis. The Financial Action 
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Task Force for example stated that of the various methods in existence of classifying terrorist 
financing activity, “none…could be considered individually as an analytical method.”424  To 
confront these problems, the FATF proposed an improved classification system agreed upon 
at the meeting of their “Methods and Trends Project Team” held in Moscow on 6-8 
December 2005 to take a “first step in identifying common elements” within terrorist 
financing activity.”425  Under this framework, the “basic concepts” concerning how terrorism 
is financed are the ‘techniques,’ ‘mechanisms,’ ‘instruments,’ ‘schemes,’ ‘typologies,’ and 
‘trends’ of terrorist finance.426  The remainder of this chapter is structured along these lines, 
and these terms are defined in its respective section below.  The exception is that I argue that 
“typologies,” defined by the FATF as “a series of [terrorist financing] schemes [that] appear 
to be constructed in a similar fashion or using the same or similar methods,”427 can be 
subsumed into the concept of ‘methods,’ which is simply the aggregated use of specific 
techniques, mechanisms, instruments, and schemes in a particular instance.  This conflation is 
supported by the fact that the FATF itself often conjoins the terms typology and method 
when referring to terrorist financing activity. In general, however, it can be stated that this 
classification approach makes fewer assumptions about the nature of terrorist financing, and 
which is more empirically accurate as what activities are important to understand depend on 
the context and the analytical objective.   
Instruments 
The first category of activity involved in terrorist financing deals with “instruments,” defined 
by the FATF as “an object of value (or representing value) that is somehow used in the 
[terrorist financing] process.”428 The FATF cites as common terrorist financing instruments 
                                                           
424 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 91. 
425 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 91. 
426 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 89. 
427 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 90. 
428 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 89. 
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cash funds, checks, travelers’ checks, letters of credit, precious stones, real estate, and 
securities,429 and to these from the literature can be added diamonds,430 gold,431 falsified trade 
invoices,432 and stolen cars,433 among many more.  However, it seems immediately evident 
that one should expand the definition to include non-material instruments of value as well, as 
the Chechen case clearly shows that terrorist financing in fact often involves exchange of 
value in many forms other than money or its equivalents.  For example, one could easily 
include also trust, obligation, interpersonal relationships, and other social goods, as these 
often act as ‘stores of value,’ i.e. a financial instrument, which can be redeemed for material 
goods or services.  Although a more expansive definition of value fits within the FATF’s 
framework, little to no research has yet been done regarding how to do so, such as a 
taxonomy of non-material forms of value. 
Techniques 
The second category of activity involved in terrorist financing deals with “techniques,” 
defined by the FATF as “a particular action or way that the [terrorist financing] activity is 
carried out.””434  These include the use of cash couriers,435 over- or under-invoicing within an 
import/export transaction,436 transmission of money via wire transfers, bank deposits, 
currency exchange, and many others.  One can assume that however that the techniques used 
in terrorist finance are products of various political, economic, and/or societal logics 
                                                           
429 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report (Paris, 2004-2005), 89. 
430 Farah (2004). 
431 Douglas Farah, "Al Qaeda's Road Paved With Gold: Secret Shipments Traced Through a Lax System In 
United Arab Emirates," The Washington Post, February 17, 2002. 
432 Cassara, 2006. 
433 See Chapter 2. 
434 FATF, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report, 2004-2005, 89. 
435 Stuart Levey, "Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
U.S. Department of the Treasury," The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
and the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation 
(Washington DC, May 4, 2005). 
436 Cassara, 2006. 
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appropriate to the respective political, economic, and/or societal environment, although no 
research exists that specifies how or hwy these variations occur.     
 
One technique that receives a great deal of attention in the terrorist financing literature is 
money laundering.  Money laundering is generally defined as the act of concealing or 
disguising the nature, location, source, ownership or control of illegally gotten money, or 
more simply the ‘cleaning’ of ‘dirty’ money.  Throughout the literature, there is a 
consistently implied and explicit conflation of money laundering and terrorist financing. For 
example, the FATF regularly refers to “ML/TF” methods, and the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and others just as often refer to joint “AML/CFT” efforts.437  As 
discussed in Chapter One, it was simply assumed that since money laundering and terrorist 
financing are both undesirable economic activities, then they must be similar.438 However, 
the empirical evidence reveals that terrorist financing is very different than money 
laundering.   
 
Terrorist financing is often seen as simply the “reverse” of money laundering,439 in that the 
former involves the ‘dirtying’ of clean money, rather than the latter’s cleaning of dirty 
money.  Although this conception does illuminate an interesting contrast in that while money 
laundering typically involves a financial flow from the many and the small (e.g. from street-
level drug transactions) to the few and the big (e.g. to the leaders of the drug cartel), the flow 
of terrorist financing, however, generally continues back down to the many and the small (i.e. 
                                                           
437 See for example Schott, Reference Guide, 2006, Chapter 1.  According to Warde, this conflation arose in 
context of liberal and neoliberal actors’ concerns about the negative effects of financial globalization and 
deregulation, particularly the ease by which illicit actors could exploit the technological, efficiency, anonymity, 
and wealth generating effects of the changes in global capital markets. Warde, 2007, 37. 
438 See pages 49-52. 
439 Stefan Cassella, "Reverse Money Laundering," Journal of Money Laundering Control 7, no. 1 (2003), 92. 
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diversity in both originators and recipients),440 the two activities are nevertheless 
conceptually “exact opposites.”441  This is because money laundering operates on a crime for 
profit basis, while the “ultimate benefit”442 of terrorist financing activity revolves around how 
instrumental it is for particular desired political effects.  In other words, terrorist financing by 
definition has no intrinsic significance outwith the context of those political objectives.  
Second, terrorist operations are generally cheap,443 which means that terrorist actors need to 
launder money only when in the rare case of a small number of actors control large amounts 
of a terrorist group’s money.  This does occur within larger, more highly organized groups 
such as the IRA, HAMAS, PLO, Hezbollah, and others, but does not for grassroots terrorist 
movements such as al Qaeda and others that lack the capability for any centralized 
‘paymaster.’444  Third, as many institutional responses against terrorist finance are modeled 
after efforts to fight money laundering, the topics’ fundamental epistemic difference calls into 
question the epistemic basis of these responses.445  And, given that analysis of terrorist 
financing typically follows from these responses, it similarly enforces the critical literature’s 
conclusion that “the use of a money laundering approach to combat terrorist financing is at 
the origin of many dysfunctions of the financial war” 446  Fourth, given that ‘reverse money 
laundering’ implies that the defining de-legitimizing activity occurs only in the future, it 
raises an significant normative problem in that it requires one to base analytic conclusions 
(e.g. that an actor is a terrorist financier) not on systematic evaluation of empirical evidence 
and contextualizing concepts, but on analytic deductions grounded in an uncertain mix of a 
                                                           
440 James Gillespie, "Follow the Money: Tracing Terrorist Assets," Seminar on International Finance, Harvard 
Law School (April 15, 2002), 15. 
441 Warde, 2007, 36. 
442 William Wechsler, Treasury Special Advisor To The Secretary And Deputy Secretary William F. Wechsler 
Testimony Before The House Committee On Government Reform, Subcommittee On Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy And Human Resources (June 23, 2000). Wechsler was the Special Adviser to the US Secretary of the 
Treasury from 199-2001. 
443 Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 2004. 
444 See Warde, 2007. 
445 See Don Brownlow, "War on Terrorist Financing: Conference Report," International Banking Systems 
Journal, no. 17.1 (September 2007) for a discussion. 
446 Warde, 2007, 36. 
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priori character judgments and predictions of future behavior.  This of course is de rigeur in 
politics and the intelligence community, but is demonstrably outside what is (or should be) 
accepted in academic analysis. 
Mechanisms 
The third category of activity involved in terrorist financing deals with “mechanisms,” 
defined by the FATF as “a system or thing that carries out part of the [terrorist financing] 
process.447 These include charities, financial institutions, banks, international trade, kinship 
ties, social bonds, criminal trade, dawa, money laundering, Islamic banks, and front/cover 
companies, among many others.   It is useful to examine more closely some of the terrorist 
financing mechanisms most often mentioned in the literature.  For space reasons, we will 
examine only the mechanisms of drug trafficking, specifically in context of al Qaeda and 
heroin.      
 
Much has been written on the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban and the trade in 
Afghan heroin.  The following is from a think tank’s ‘primer’ on terrorist financing is 
indicative:  
“Criminal activities, such as smuggling, counterfeiting and the narcotics trade, 
account for another large portion of terrorist funding.  For instance, al Qaeda and 
the Taliban reportedly reaped millions of dollars a year through the production and 
sale of opium from Afghanistan.”
448
   
The above claims are all factually correct, but as a whole the statement and the rest of the 
document raises the question, “So what?”   Although presented as ‘analysis,’ this primer is 
primarily just description and repetition, which ultimately tells the reader nothing of any 
analytic significance.  For example, it reveals nothing about the political economy of 
terrorism, nothing about the dynamics of political support for al Qaeda, and very little about 
                                                           
447 FATF, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report, 2004-2005, 89. 
448 Center for Defense Information, "CDI Primer: Terrorist Finances," October 25, 2002, 
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/finance_primer-pr.cfm (accessed October 2006). 
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the logistical chains on which al Qaeda and the Taliban rely.  Of course such descriptions 
could serve as a foundation on which to either guess about these issues or conduct further 
research, but given the significance of the ‘Financial War,’ it seems that one should have a 
higher bar of analysis.  In other words, statements like the one above, although common 
throughout the literature, essentially are extended answers to a question that is not worth 
asking in the first place.  
 
The Chechen case illustrates this further.  This case shows that the important knowledge 
concerns the political-economic dynamics of how the drug trade, terrorist groups, and local 
and national institutions interact with one another.  It does not ‘indicate’ anything about ‘how 
terrorism is funded’ in some universal sense.  The interaction between drugs, organized crime 
and terrorism is simply a function of the political-economic dynamics of the particular 
region, and empirically for any kind of useful insight it must be analyzed on those terms.   
For example, it is likely that heroin profits in Afghanistan today only go to those Taliban and 
al-Qaeda fighters that provide some kind of service, e.g. armed protection or transportation 
routes, to heroin traffickers.  Of course, if one’s objective is not analytic truth but serving a 
particular personal or political agenda, then this conflation works very well. The point is that 
looking at the problem of drugs/crime and terrorism in universalized, theoretical terms 
cripples analysis of the most relevant aspects of terrorist financing: the interaction between 
political and economic interests and behavior in the area under analysis.      
Schemes 
The fourth category of activity involved in terrorist financing deals with “schemes,” defined 
by the FATF as “the particular [terrorist financing] process that combines various methods 
(techniques, mechanisms and instruments) into a unique operation.”449  This is similar to 
                                                           
449 FATF, Terrorist Financing Typologies Report, 2004-2005, 89. 
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‘cases,’ as in case studies.  For example, the IRA’s laundering operation after the Northern 
Bank robbery in which they attempted conceal the stolen funds by buying an entire bank and 
large amounts of real estate in Bulgaria would constitute a scheme.450  Similarly, the whole 
Pankisi Gorge operation might be seen as a scheme to finance Chechen terrorists.451  
However, the idea of grouping diverse activity into a ‘scheme’ is an epistemological 
formulation more appropriate to law enforcement than to the broader objectives of systematic 
analysis, primarily because an academic analyst can reach the same insights about how 
different actions and actors relate to one another without it. 
Trends 
The fifth category of activity involved in terrorist financing evaluated here deals with 
“trends,” defined by the FATF as “the evolution of a [terrorist financing] method … over 
time,” which “must take into account the temporal aspect (frequency and repetition) and 
geographic aspect (pervasiveness), as well as the transformation over time of individual 
methods and typologies.”452 The study of patterns of methods is important because it “can 
detect the weaknesses that will allow appropriate counter-measures to be developed.” 453 At a 
macro level, the literature discusses two major trends.   
The Growing/Shrinking ‘Financial Infrastructure’ of Terrorism 
The first is the fluctuating fortunes of the ‘global financial infrastructure of terrorism.’  The 
‘financial infrastructure’ of terrorist groups is often referenced to in public and academic 
discourse.  For example, referring to the transnational al Qaeda network, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary O’Neil referred to “destroying terrorism's financial infrastructure,” the “financial 
underpinnings of terrorism” which needed to be “shut down,” and “stamping out the financial 
                                                           
450 The Daily Telegraph, "IRA bid to buy bank," February 22, 2005. 
451 See Chapter Two. 
452 Ibid., 90. 
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network that funds terrorism.”454 The assumption is that there exists a relatively unified 
coherent, underground, hidden enemy financial network that needs to be found, attacked, and 
destroyed.  Napoleoni has estimated the size of this network at $1.5 trillion. This money 
constituting this “New Economy of Terror” is evenly divided conveniently into three sectors:  
$500 billion in capital flights, money which moves illegally from country to country, 
undetected and unreported; $500 billion in what is commonly known as the Gross 
Criminal Product, money generated primarily by criminal organizations; $500 
billion in the New Economy of Terror—money produced by terror organizations—of 
which as much as one third is represented by legal businesses and the rest comes 
from criminal activities, primarily the drug trade and smuggling.”
455
 
 
Naylor, Warde, and others have challenged these statistics as completely unfounded and 
unscientific claims. Reuter and Truman also describe how it is currently impossible to make 
any accurate or near accurate estimation of the amount of money in the illegal economy, let 
alone that which is going to terrorist groups.456  Naylor remarks on a similar phenomenon of 
“accounting one-upmanship”457 with the so-called “Gross Criminal Product.  He states: 
“All that those frightening statistics about a deluge of “narcodollars” or a 
burgeoning world Gross Criminal Product really prove is that it is not necessary to 
take the square root of a negative sum to arrive at a purely imaginary number.  But 
the objective was not to illuminate the shadowy world of crime so much as to 
enlighten politics about the need for larger law enforcement budgets and more 
arbitrary police powers.  Therefore those magic numbers assumed the status of 
religious can and were rarely revised, except heavenward.”
458
 
 
This view of a unitary financial infrastructure is pervasive.  For example, President Bush and 
other senior American officials often refer to the “balance sheet,” of al Qaeda,459 i.e. that the 
movement is at least is coherent enough that it has a budget and expenditures. This was true 
of “al Qaeda Prime”460 in that they had income and outputs, like an organization. But such 
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terminology has not evolved as understanding of al-Qaeda has evolved and as the 
organization has evolved into an amorphous movement.  In addition, this description of 
remarks by Tony McNulty MP, the UK’s Minister of State for Security, Counter-Terrorism 
and Police, in a keynote address:   
“McNulty pointed out that, while the level of threat was higher than ever, the 
networks behind it are on the one hand getting more sophisticated but on the other 
hand, at the point of delivery, they are getting more simplistic. For example, the 7/7 
bombings in London [7 July 2005 in which 52 people were killed and around 770 
were injured] cost less than £5000, a large portion of which was spent on plane 
tickets to Pakistan. However, the infrastructure that supports the terrorist 
organisations themselves costs millions.”
461
 
 
This reasoning however makes no sense.  It implies first that terrorism is perhaps the most 
economically inefficient exercise in existence. An economist would ask why would terrorists 
raise “millions” of dollars, for example, to commit attacks that only cost a few thousand 
dollars?  And furthermore why would people give so much money to something that cost so 
little?  Would not those who hate freedom and support terrorism have more efficient ways to 
use their wealth to wreak havoc?   If they are so grossly inefficient, why are they such a 
threat?  Surely a group of people as inept would not be a threat to a great nation like the 
United States?  Or if they are not so inefficient, what is the rest of the money used for?  As it 
is not used for terrorism, it must be used for actions that are not, but may be related to, 
terrorism.  This therefore implies that terrorism and its financing are part and parcel of larger 
social and political fabrics, even though the discourse does not discuss which or how.  Some 
alternative implications are that terrorist groups are hording this money for some other 
purpose, or that are unable to get it to where it can be used for attacks.  This is highly 
unlikely at least in the case of al Qaeda as the movement is truly global.  The last alternative, 
which is the most supported by the empirical evidence is that those “millions” are not strictly 
“financing terrorism,” but merely supporting the diverse and complex aspects of a political 
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cause which also happens to be supported by terrorists.  This is the inverse of the traditional 
claim in that supporter of the cause are supporting the terrorists.   
Increasing ‘Self-Sufficiency’ 
The other major trend analyzed here is towards self-sufficiency.  This was one of the first 
theoretical frameworks used to understand terrorist financing was modeled after the 
operations of corporations.  In this framework, terrorist groups make individual and 
collective decisions to strategically accumulate wealth and to use that wealth to achieve 
organizational goals, such as execute terrorist attacks, maintain organizational integrity, 
conduct public relations, and generate more wealth.  Terrorist financing therefore is seen as 
the economics of a vast and highly sophisticated business, 
 
Adams argues that successful terrorist groups function in ways similar to a corporation, 
complete with a business model, investments, management structures, and cooperative 
agreements with businesses, criminal groups, other terrorist groups, and, occasionally, 
governments.462 Adams separates terrorist financing from politically dominant narratives. He 
presents evidence that state governments play a relatively small role in terrorist financing, 
and then typically only as business partners.463  Furthermore, his comparison of terrorist 
groups to corporations challenges the image of terrorist financing as primarily a political or 
ideological expression, whether by a state, a group, or an individual.464  His main critique of 
counterterrorism efforts is that they fail to consider the non-political dimensions of terrorist 
groups, such as financing activities.  His factual research supports this argument that all 
terrorist groups eventually become embedded into human society, and do so not on a political 
or ideological level, but on various social, economic, and institutional levels, often that of 
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their supposed enemy.  “Capitalism,” Adams observes, “can…corrupt the most idealistic of 
terrorists.”465   
 
This conception of terrorist groups as a business has been assumed by some literature to 
mean that that terrorist groups efficiently distribute funds, raise funds from variety of sources, 
operate secretly/covertly as either some sort of evil secret organization along the lines of Dr. 
No’s SPECTRE or a network of cells, and imply that there is general agreement cell 
members all agree on how to achieve their costs.  But the everyday reality is much more 
banal; involving for example Ayman Al-Zawahiri “nit-picking” about expenditures as low as 
$1,573,466 and the disillusionment of a Kashmiri separatist who stated that running a terror 
movement as akin to running a business using poor and illiterate boys.467  
 
Michael Leeden states that Osama bin Laden is the “CEO of a multinational terrorist 
corporation,”468 and |the best way to think of the terror network is as a collection of mafia 
families.”469  This conception also is found among serious analysts, such as Bruce Hoffman, 
who also wrote an article comparing bin Laden to a CEO.   Hoffman makes his case in terms 
of bin Laden’s management approach, remarking: 
“in the 1990s he did what the executives of transnational companies did throughout 
much of the industrialized world—namely, design and implement a flexible new 
organizational framework and strategy incorporating multiple levels and both top-
down and bottom-up approaches. In his top-down mode bin Laden has defined 
specific goals, issued orders, and ensured that they are carried out.”
470
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Although Hoffman’s metaphor may advance understanding of bin Laden to some audiences 
and for certain purposes (e.g. those that see him simply as some sort of crazed cave-dwelling 
fanatic), it does not advance understanding of terrorist financing because it simply contradicts 
its empirical reality. The business/mafia analogy would be sustainable if everyone in the 
entire supply chain of a terrorist group had the intention and agency to financially support 
terrorist groups, but this also is not empirically supported (see section below on intent). 
 
Third, is that a mafia/business view has the implicit assumption that terrorist groups or even 
terrorism itself is a finite organization to which you can make people ‘stop payment,”471 and 
to which one can stop “doing business.”472   Of course these were remarks by a politician 
seeking to motivate his country after an attack, but the problem is that many serious analytic 
pieces since then echo, repeat, or otherwise base their analysis on this framework, which is 
not supported by empirical evidence.  Terrorist groups are not finite organizations.  Some 
have been relatively organized and hierarchical, such as the PLO and IRA, but regardless of 
the organizational structure, the essential essence of groups that commit terrorism is political 
and social.  Therefore, other than as a vulgar analogy for purely public consumption, viewing 
terrorist actors as a business or a mafia organization is simply not accurate and counter 
productive, as it leads to all sorts of false conclusions and unproductive analytic pathways.  
There are of course when terrorist groups have behaved like a mafia or a business in raising 
money, for example the IRA would make capital investments in London property, but this 
analogy is only useful for those specific groups in those specific time and place 
circumstances.  They do not however capture the reality of terrorist financing for most 
terrorists active today. This may come from bureaucratic dynamics that forced the U.S. 
government to switch its anti-illicit financing focus from South American drug cartels to 
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transnational terrorists.473  Therefore, the conception of terrorist financing as a mafia/business 
falls apart.  Of course, while this is true for certain aspects of certain groups involved in 
terrorism, the empirical evidence does not support this being a central or even dominant 
framework for thinking about terrorist financing. Such a conception is helpful perhaps for 
certain circumstances and for certain (not very knowledgeable) audiences, but it is not an 
empirically sound description for most terrorist financing activity.  For example, Hezbollah 
in some ways acts as a multinational corporation, but if for most analyses it would probably 
be more useful to view its behavior with the metaphor of a ‘mini-state.’   
 
Above all, this examination of methods by which terrorism is financed raises the question, 
“So What?”  Is it really important to know which methods finance terrorism?  Entire forests 
have been wasted analyzing the topic, but why exactly is it important to know if al-Qaeda 
finances itself by using diamonds, or banks, or wire transfers?  Is not more salient to ask, in 
these instances, whether diamonds are an established and consistently used part of the 
logistical supply chain for terrorist operations (answer: probably not); or which, if any, 
agents, i.e. people acting on their direct behalf, of al Qaeda ever incorporate diamonds as part 
of their supply chain (answer: maybe); or perhaps do profits from diamonds fund those with 
common cause with al Qaeda (answer: no).  Analysis from this perspective begins to hint at 
the conclusion that terrorist financing is not a form of money laundering, or financial crime, 
or even some knowable combination of methods. Instead it may be simply a form of political 
support for terrorist groups, and secondarily an element of the supply chain of specific 
terrorists.  These questions – i.e. “what is used for the supply chain of attacks,” “how do the 
few direct agents of terrorist actors raise and move funds,” and “how much financial support 
is provided to the larger popular, but not necessarily terrorist, movement” – address the core 
political-economic issues at hand, while “how is terrorism financed” does not.  They also hint 
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at an alternative way to represent this activity, which is explicated in the following two 
chapters of this thesis.  It is partly for this reason that this dissertation posits that a framework 
of analysis based around the chains of value used by terrorist actors will produce more 
accurate and more useful knowledge about ‘terrorist finance’ than currently employed 
frameworks. Of course, these questions are methodologically more difficult to answer, which 
only emphasizes the need for a superior representation of terrorism-related financial activity. 
Deficiencies in Understanding Why Terrorism is Financed  
The final question in the literature relates to identifying indicators capable of distinguishing 
terrorist financing activity from ‘normal’ financial activity, or as the financial intelligence 
chief for a large global bank put it, “what to look for.”475  This is an extremely important 
question as much – if not most – analysis of terrorist finance used by governments and the 
private sector focuses on developing indicators to flag ‘risky’ or ‘suspicious’ behavior or 
‘links’ to terrorists and other threatening or illegitimate actors.  In fact, some scholars argue 
that these efforts amount to “data war” in which the focus on collecting and analyzing such 
data has created new mechanisms of governance and control within the War on Terror.476    
 
This section examines several of the common categories of indicators, and demonstrates that 
despite this attention none of them are reliable predictors of terrorist financing activity.  This 
is, I argue, because they tell us nothing about the relationship between agent behavior and 
structural context, which is the centrally important issue for analysts.  This therefore implies 
that successful analysis of terrorist financing must involve systematic analysis of how the 
individual context-contingent and subjectively interpreted human choices of which terrorist 
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financing is comprised influence and are influenced by the various political, economic, 
social, institutional, historical, normative, and cognitive contexts in which they occur in a 
way tailored to particular objectives.  In other words, it implies that in order to know ‘what to 
look for,’ one needs a teleological theory of behavior within given political-economic 
contexts. 
Motive: The Analytic Siren 
Intent is often portrayed as the most reliable indicator of involvement in terrorist financing.  
It promises to solve one of the most difficult analytic problems in terrorist financing – how to 
distinguish between terrorist financing activity and that which is not when the underlying 
actions are identical.  For example, Matthew Levitt, when asked why Sun Trust should not be 
considered as an actor that had been involved in financing terrorism, he stated because of a 
lack of intent.477   Nevertheless, intent is complex, as established by the complex and multi-
layered sets of motives evident in the Chechen case above.478  For example, did the Khevsurs 
who gave food, shelter, and directions to a passing Chechen field commander finance 
terrorism?  On one hand, they gave goods and services of significant value to someone 
involved in terrorist acts, but on the other, their primary intent was to be true to their local 
customs rather than support terrorism.   
 
To answer these questions, it helps to create preliminary taxonomy of these motives, simply 
to illustrate the diversity of intent.   First and most obviously, terrorist financial activity can 
indicate preparation or an intension to commit acts of terrorism, or in other words, the use of 
financial resources as a direct instrument to enable the execution of acts of terrorism.  But the 
instrumentality of this is very complex and varies with the situation. In some cases, financial 
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activity is an instrument to a specific operational end.  Second, is the intent of organizational 
imperative, such as, in the Chechen case, the foreign jihadists who needed money for their 
travels, and thus raised it for specifically this purpose.  This indicates certain things, such as a 
desire for people to join jihad and a societal base to support such actions.  Third, is the 
motive of Socio-Political Expression, for example the villagers expressing their hospitality, 
or zakat giving. In other cases, it is an expression of social, political, or cultural norms.  
Fourth, is the motive to serve specific state policy.  In other cases, it is indicative of (often 
hidden) lines of political or social support, e.g. U.S. government policy, but also al Qaeda 
shura policy, etc,479 or can serve either a group or a state.  Other motives relate to 
interpersonal interaction and relationship of exploitation.   
 
This diversity means that intent is not only complex, but also intrinsically problematic.  For 
instance:  
“When it comes to charities suspected of terrorist involvement, at what point can a 
series of independent actions be said to indicate coordinated and malevolent intent? 
And if they do in fact indicate such intent, what should be done about it? In all cases, 
further investigation would be needed in order to support the case for an arrest 
warrant or subpoena that eventually could be used to put the charity out of 
business.”
480
 
Intent relies on a judgment of legitimacy, which is often irrelevant to behavior.  But a 
judgment of legitimacy is necessary in politics, i.e. to show that you are one’s ally or enemy.  
Therefore, if one uses intent as the deciding factor, then that allows you to make allies or 
enemies with those you judge to have bad intentions. What it discourages you to do, 
however, is consider contradicting evidence, think of and act on alternatives (good and bad, 
i.e. how can you accommodate an enemy, is this not appeasement?).  This has led to the 
exploitation of intent for political ends.  This is possible because once one’s intentions are 
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judged to be illegitimate or terroristic then evidence is often manipulated to fit this 
perception, intentionally or unintentionally.  For example, a person with the intent to fund 
Hamas will have his actions examined in a different light than one whose intent was judged 
to be more legitimate.  This has policy implications, but analytically it is dangerous as it 
makes analytic conclusions subject to pre-determined political judgments.  In this analytic 
tradition,481 recognizing the variety of motives and intent becomes tantamount to moral 
culpability or exoneration of illegitimate acts.  By keeping the issue of intent a powerful 
element in terrorist financing analysis it allows analysts to choose and fight for particular 
‘sides,’ i.e. political positions.  For these reasons, intent is not a viable analytic anchor. Intent 
is a siren, luring analysts with promises of easy and self-serving opportunities for judgment. 
But unless intent is placed in proper perspective as a sometimes-useful waypoint on a long 
odyssey of discovery, then nothing will be left of the analysis but detritus drifting in a sea of 
terrorism talk.    As the next chapter will show, however, even though most current analysis 
is pinned to choice and intent, power is actually the more salient factor in terrorist financing, 
its importance, and its operation. Terrorist financing analysis must wade into the analysis of 
motives, individual choice, and its consequences.  These are areas long covered by 
psychology and economics, but not international relations or political science.  
Funding Terrorism vs Funding Politics 
One popular assumption originating in the ‘Global War on Terror’ is, to paraphrase President 
Bush, ‘those who support terrorists are just as guilty as those who commit the acts of terror 
themselves.’  In one way, this statement is in essence a powerful rhetorical argument against 
justifying financial support for terrorist activities by virtue of support of the cause for which 
the terrorist actor fights.  Epistemologically, however, this statement exemplifies the 
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difficulties and pitfalls of separating financing terrorism, which is illegitimate in liberal 
democracies, and financing politics, which is legitimate.   This section examines this 
problem, and finds that the lack of any systematic way of distinguishing between the two is 
both a major cause and symptom of many of the failings in current analysis of terrorist 
finance. 
 
It seems logical to begin by exploring terrorists’ engagement in legitimate politics.  Some like 
Hezbollah, Hamas and the IRA have robust strategies to work both within and outwith the 
legitimate political system.  Therefore money that goes to the ‘political wing’ of a terrorist 
group is not funding terrorism per se but is very much funding the objectives of an actor that 
commits terrorism. It may seem that the important question therefore is whether entities like 
Sinn Fein should be characterized as just terrorists by another name, ‘armed political parties,’ 
or simply the legitimate political movements they claim to be.  However, more important is a 
systematic accounting of how these groups relate to the societies in which they exist.  For 
example, it is more important to understand that Sinn Fein collected millions of dollars from 
the Irish diaspora on a platform of armed resistance to British ‘rule’ than to determine which 
of the above labels is most apt.  Similarly, it is more profitable analytically to know the 
political, societal, and operational implications of HAMAS’ fundraising network in the 
United States and Europe than to quibble over what epithet should describe those involved in 
it.   
 
Less highly organized terrorist groups represent the radicalized and violent ‘sharp end’ of 
wider and usually looser socio-political movements.  In these cases, distinguishing between 
those that finance terrorist activities and those that just provide support for a common cause 
is much more difficult, but for liberal democracies also more important.  For example, most 
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of the prosecution’s case in the trial of several board members of the Holy Land Foundation 
(HLF) who allegedly operated a fundraising ring for HAMAS relied on the argument that the 
defendants’ were guilty of financing terrorism because they raised money for a humanitarian 
organization run not by HAMAS but by people who shared the political, social, and religious 
objectives of the group.482  This epistemic formulation in the discourse, especially to argue 
that people who do not explicitly support terrorist activity or actors but do support ‘terrorism-
linked’ causes are labeled as ‘complicit’ in terrorism, by virtue of their financial 
interactions.483  For comparison, if one used this standard for the Michigan Militia (the 
perpetrators of the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing), then one could view as terrorist financing 
fundraising activity for any militia group in the United States, as the Michigan Militia was a 
part of a larger movement of mostly unrelated groups who supported armed resistance to the 
U.S. Government.  In fact, one would not need to stretch the analysis too far to argue, 
according to this epistemological standards, that fundraising for the Republican party was 
tantamount to supporting Timothy McVeigh – or at least being ‘complicit’ in his actions – 
given the long standing position of the party is that, as Ronald Reagan said, “government is 
not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”484   Ultimately, this 
demonstrates that terrorist financing is indeed an important reflection of how terrorist actors 
relate to their societies, however the poor epistemic frameworks present in the current 
discourse are grossly inadequate for systematic and insightful investigation between the exact 
relationship between funding politics and funding terrorism.    
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Deficiencies in Understanding ‘What to Look For’  
‘Suspicious’ and High ‘Risk’ Activity 
There are many activities that have been deemed ‘suspicious’ for purposes of valuation of 
risk.  For example, the following is taken from the official training guide published by the 
United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC),485 and provides a 
list of “potentially suspicious activity that may indicate terrorist financing,” and for which 
banks should look when interacting with customers:      
Activity Inconsistent with the Customer’s Business  
1. Funds are generated by a business owned by persons of the same origin or by a business that involves persons of 
the same origin from high-risk countries (e.g., countries designated by national authorities and FATF as non-
cooperative countries and territories).  
2. The stated occupation of the customer is not commensurate with the type or level of activity.  
3. Persons involved in currency transactions share an address or phone number, particularly when the address is also 
a business location or does not seem to correspond to the stated occupation (e.g., student, unemployed, or self-
employed).  
4. Regarding nonprofit or charitable organizations, financial transactions occur for which there appears to be no 
logical economic purpose or in which there appears to be no link between the stated activity of the organization 
and the other parties in the transaction.  
5. A safe deposit box opened on behalf of a commercial entity when the business activity of the customer is unknown 
or such activity does not appear to justify the use of a safe deposit box. 
Funds Transfers  
6. A large number of incoming or outgoing funds transfers take place through a business account, and there appears 
to be no logical business or other economic purpose for the transfers, particularly when this activity involves high-
risk locations.  
7. Funds transfers are ordered in small amounts in an apparent effort to avoid triggering identification or reporting 
requirements.  
8. Funds transfers do not include information on the originator, or the person on whose behalf the transaction is 
conducted, when the inclusion of such information would be expected.  
9. Multiple personal and business accounts or the accounts of nonprofit organizations or charities are used to collect 
and funnel funds to a small number of foreign beneficiaries.  
10. Foreign exchange transactions are performed on behalf of a customer by a third party, followed by funds transfers 
to locations having no apparent business connection with the customer or to high-risk countries.  
Other Transactions That Appear Unusual or Suspicious  
11. Transactions involving foreign currency exchanges are followed within a short time by funds transfers to high-risk 
locations.  
12. Multiple accounts are used to collect and funnel funds to a small number of foreign beneficiaries, both persons and 
businesses, particularly in high-risk locations.  
13. A customer obtains a credit instrument or engages in commercial financial transactions involving the movement of 
funds to or from high-risk locations when there appear to be no logical business reasons for dealing with those 
locations.  
14. Banks from high-risk locations open accounts.  
15. Funds are sent or received via international transfers from or to high-risk locations.  
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16. Insurance policy loans or policy surrender values that are subject to a substantial surrender charge.486  
 
These or similar487 indicators, are circulated widely within private and public sector actors 
who are charged to exercise power to identify people likely to be involved in financing 
terrorism and take steps against them, such as not allowing them to open a bank account.  
However, even a cursory knowledge of the everyday realities of terrorist financing activity 
would illuminate the fact that these ‘indicators’ have little bearing on its actual conduct.  For 
example, banks with Afghan, Pakistani, Filipino, or Iranian restaurants as clients likely 
accept funds that “are generated by a business owned by persons of the same origin or by a 
business that involves persons of the same origin from high-risk countries.”488  Similarly, 
many students and migrant workers regularly send and receive funds “via international 
transfers from or to high-risk locations.”489   
 
At best, these indicators describe very specific and relatively rare techniques used by 
terrorists wishing to conceal their identity and use the formalized banking sector.   
Furthermore, many of these indicators much more often indicate normal behaviors for certain 
segments of society.  Originally modeled after (i.e. copied from) the anti-money laundering 
regime, the staying power of these indicators seems incredible given such obvious 
inconsistencies, but is clear evidence that better indicators have not been developed.  From 
the user’s perspective this is irrelevant, however, as they are not judged on the accuracy of 
these indicators, but merely on how well they adhere to them and related laws and 
regulations.  The financial intelligence chief quoted above summed this up pithily, saying, 
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“We have come to fear the good [counter terrorist financing laws] much more than the bad 
[terrorist financing].”490 
‘Links’ to Terrorist Actors 
Another supposedly reliable indicator of involvement in terrorist financing is that a positive 
‘link,’ ‘association,’ or ‘relationship’ with a known or suspected terrorist actor indicates 
involvement in terrorist financing.  Used throughout the literature as well as extensively by 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies,491 this indicator generally operates according to a 
two-step reasoning process.  First, the analyst determines who is a terrorist, via for example 
official lists of designated terrorists, defendants in terrorism-related court cases, or 
information that the actor overtly or covertly supports a terrorist group or associated socio-
political cause.  Second, any money that flows to and from this actor is thus either financing 
terrorism (if it goes to something somehow associated with the terrorist group or its cause), or 
part of a process of ‘money laundering’ (layering, placement, integration) or other criminal 
deception.   This method of finding meaning in ‘links’ to terrorists is extremely problematic, 
however.  For example, the 9/11 Commission Report took to task those that acted on such 
spurious linking:  
“These initial designations [of suspected terrorist financiers in the wake of 9/11] 
were undertaken with limited evidence, and some were overbroad, resulting in legal 
challenges.  Faced with having to defend actions in courts that required a higher 
standard of evidence than was provided by the intelligence that supported the 
designations in the first place, the United States and the United nations were forced 
to “unfreeze” assets.  The difficulty, not completely understood by the policy makers 
when they instituted the freezes was that the intelligence community “linked” certain 
entities of individuals to known terrorist groups primarily through common 
acquaintances, group affiliations, historic relationships, phone communications, and 
other such contacts.  It proved far more difficult to actually trace the money from a 
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suspected entity or individual to the terrorist group, or to otherwise show complicity, 
as required in defending the designations in court.”
492
 
 
Part of the underlying problem that is obvious is that International Relations (including 
International Political Economy) lacks solid understanding of the political and economic 
impacts of social networks, and thus few tools to understand the dynamics of ‘links,’ 
‘associations,’ ‘networks,’ and other relationships among agents.  The method of ‘Social 
Network Analysis’ has some potential to mitigate these problems, but it is inappropriate for 
this dissertation, as it is still a relatively new and relatively underdeveloped field and requires 
complete immersion in its methods and ontologies.493  Ultimately, therefore, the meaning and 
significance of economic ‘links’ to terrorists are thus hugely underspecified and conceptually 
under determined. 
Support for Terrorist Causes 
Another rather obvious indicator of an individual’s involvement in terrorist financing is 
support for the political or social objectives of a terrorist group.  Many authors imply or 
explicitly state that such support is a strong indicator of involvement in terrorist financing.  In 
some respects, this claim is strongly supported by the empirical evidence.  For example, 
many of the known terrorist financing cases involving al Qaeda, the IRA, LTTE, and Hamas 
involve actors participating because of their support for either the specific actions of the 
terrorist group, or the broader political cause for which the group is ostensibly fighting.  
Examples of the former involve the fundraising events organized by NORAID or sympathetic 
jihad recruiters described in Chapter Two.  These actors had knowledge that their money was 
                                                           
492 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the 
Commission, (Washington DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 47. 
493 For an example of social network analysis applied to the study of al Qaeda, see Marc Sageman, 
Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).  For a summary of 
social network analysis, see Steve Ressler, "Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: 
Past, Present, and Future Research," Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 2 (July 2006).  
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going to directly fund militant action.  Examples of the latter include the Irish Americans, 
often police officers and firefighters, who donated money to the cause of a “United Ireland” 
or to help the “widows and orphans” of the conflict in Northern Ireland, as well as numerous 
Arab and Muslim people around the world who raise and donate money either to similar 
‘widows and orphans’ humanitarian aid campaigns for the Palestinian people, or more 
directly to support the “resistance movement” against Israeli occupation of Gaza and the 
West Bank.  In general, these donors gave money more as an expression of support for a 
vague and amorphous socio-political cause, rather than for specific direct action.  This 
dichotomy is a double-edged sword for the efficacy of this indicator.  This is because it 
ultimately depends on what type of support, and the level of knowledge the agent has about 
what the consequences are likely to be of his support.  In this way, support alone is not a 
reliable indicator, even if that support is expressed materially.  The Department of Defense 
confronts a similar conundrum in its Counterinsurgency field manual.  It states:    
“Support/tolerance [for an insurgency] provided either willingly or unwillingly by 
the populace, results in safe havens, freedom of movement, logistic support, financial 
support, intelligence, and new personnel for the insurgency. It should be noted that 
support/tolerance is often generated using violent coercion and intimidation of the 
people. In these cases, even if the people do not favor the insurgent cause, they are 
forced to tolerate the insurgents or provide them material support.”
 494
 
 
Therefore, again, it seems that this indicator depends entirely on the social-political-economic 
context of the behavior, and the purpose and objective of the analyst.   
Contextual Indicators  
Other indicators of terrorist financing focus on how social, political, and economic 
circumstances supposedly can indicate the presence of terrorist financing activity.  These 
imply that because activity occurs within certain ‘higher risk’ contexts, then this indicates a 
                                                           
494 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
the Army, 2006). 
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higher likelihood of terrorist financing involvement.  Although such contextual information is 
very valuable to terrorist financing analysis, the exact relationships between actors and the 
contexts of their actions (i.e. agents and structures) remains under researched and 
underspecified.  Therefore, as indicators such contextual data is not particularly useful.  
 
One common indicator is that activity occurs in or involves actors or entities originating from 
countries that are not fully compliant with the global legal and regulatory regime established 
to combat the financing of terrorism.  Activities related to these countries are supposedly 
higher risk because they lack the financial controls that, the implication goes, keeps terrorists 
from using the financial systems of compliant countries.  Several methods are used to 
determine which countries are fully, partially, or not compliant.  One is the Financial Action 
Task Force’s Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) List.  This is often cited, 
for example by in the FFIEC document cited above and by the FATF itself, as a reliable 
indicator of higher risk activity.  However, one significant problem is that since October 
2006, no countries are on the list.495  This means, ostensibly, that all countries are in 
compliance with the globally accepted recommendations of the FATF about how to structure 
laws and regulations to fight terrorist financing.  But this of course does not mean that no 
terrorist financing occurs in any of these countries.  Similar problems exist with other 
attempts to calculate the ‘risk’ of an activity based on a ‘risk profile’ of the societal context.  
For example, a recent attempt by World-Check, a vendor to banks and governments of 
controlled-access databases of ‘high-risk’ individuals, to develop a system to measure risk by 
country is similarly flawed.  In fact, the company does not in fact promise that its product, 
                                                           
495 The countries on the original 2002 list were Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, 
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Myanmar was the last country to be delisted, in 2006.   
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called ‘Country-Check’ produces accurate assessments of risk, but only that it is “a 
methodologically justifiable model for country-specific risk assessment.”496 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that existing epistemological frameworks used to analyze terrorist 
financing are insufficient for systematic analysis of the topic, largely because they have been 
constructed to serve interests other than systematic evidence-based analysis of terrorist 
financing.  To review, we have seen above that defining terrorist financing, like terrorism, is 
probably more trouble than its worth because by asking ‘what is terrorist financing’ one is 
really just asking ‘what are your goals of analysis?’ Second, this chapter highlighted that 
analysis of individual and collective decision making and what influences it is more relevant 
to analyzing terrorist finance than trying to uncover non-existent patterns of behaviors by 
which terrorist financiers can be identified.  Third, analysis of the methods used in terrorist 
financing are actually not particularly relevant to the analysis of terrorist financing.  Finally, 
this chapter demonstrated that successful analysis of terrorist financing must involve 
systematic analysis of how the individual context-contingent and subjectively interpreted 
human choices of which terrorist financing is comprised influence and are influenced by the 
various political, economic, social, institutional, historical, normative, and cognitive contexts 
in which they occur in a way tailored to particular objectives, i.e. a teleological theory of 
terrorist financing related decision making within given political-economic contexts is 
needed. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that existing discourse on terrorist finance is so 
deficient likely because it is simply asking the ‘wrong questions’ about the phenomenon, i.e. 
                                                           
496 World-Check, "What is Country-Check?," http://www.country-check.com/beta/main.php (accessed May 
2008).  
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framing it epistemological frameworks that produce knowledge that is not particularly useful 
and is analytically illogical or incorrect.    In particular, this chapter implies that the ‘wrong 
questions’ about terrorist financing relate specifically to uncovering ‘who’ finances terrorism 
and the supposedly “mysterious”497 ways they do it. Most simply, these questions are ‘wrong’ 
because their answers – while important – are demonstrably less important than the answers 
of the ‘right’ questions described above.  However, they remain dominant in terrorist 
financing discourse, as well as counter terrorist financing practice, largely, one can 
reasonably hypothesize, because they lend well to the bureaucratic, institutional, and indeed 
political processes involved in the governmental and private sector efforts to identify and 
track terrorists and their supporters, especially in terms of providing fodder for national and 
international designation processes, and to the various risk management structures used to 
‘calculate’ risk that a particular individual or behavior is involved in financing terrorism.498 
 
I posit that asking these questions is ‘wrong’ because they privilege knowledge that is 
secondary to the objectives of terrorist financing analysis.  First, these questions imply a 
surety and objectivity in the answers that is simply not warranted given that both terrorism 
and finance are inherently contested issues, and consequently diminish the centrally 
important role of the normative, political, and social contexts of both the ‘terrorist financing’ 
activity in question and the analysis of it.  In other words problem with these questions, on 
their face, is that the answer to the who, what, where, when, and how of terrorist finance is 
always, “it depends.”  Who finances terrorism depends not only on how one defines 
terrorism, but also on conceptions of ‘financing’ (e.g. does only money count, or all forms of 
                                                           
497 Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," Strategic Insights (Center for 
Contemporary Conflict) IV, no. 1 (January 2005). 
498 Marieke de Goede, "Money, Media, and the Anti-Politics of Terrorist Finance," European Journal of 
Cultural Studies 11, no. 3 (2008); and Mareike de Goede, "The Risk of Terrorist Financing: Politics and 
Prediction in the War on Terrorist Finance," Constructing World Orders Conference, Standing Group on 
International Relations, Transnational Politics of Risk Panel (Den Haag, September 9-11, 2004). 
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value exchange, and how many degrees of separation from origin to terrorist?), both of which 
depend not only on one’s normative and political outlook, but one’s analytic purposes.  For 
example, if Iran’s government does not consider Hezbollah to be a terrorist group, should 
Iranian funds transfers to the group count as terrorist financing?  The answer of course 
depends on what one believes about Hezbollah (i.e. that it is ‘terrorist’), as well as one’s 
purpose of analysis (e.g. a bank will only be concerned with the funds transfer if and when it 
is made illegal, while governments opposed to Hezbollah will be regardless).  The same is 
true of analyzing ‘How’ terrorism is financed.    
 
Second, analysis of the actors and methods involved in terrorist finance is in fact secondary 
to understanding the instrumentality of financial activity and what such activity tells one 
about a terrorist actor’s place in wider communities.  This is also because terrorist financing – 
as a contested and political issue – is closely tied to the objectives of the analyst, whether 
they be from academia, government, or the financial industry (or from a terrorist group, for 
that matter).  In other words, ‘what to look for’ – i.e. determining the who’s, what’s, how’s, 
where’s, and when’s – depend entirely on the purpose and perspective of the analyst.  For 
example, ‘who finances al Qaeda’ will be answered differently by a political economist, an 
anthropologist, an intelligence analyst, and a bank compliance officer.  In fact, because every 
analyst of this contested topic necessarily bring different norms, objectives, and priorities – 
and thus different ontologies epistemologies, and methodologies – to the analysis of terrorist 
finance, such questions will be answered differently by an FBI special agent (who would be 
likely be primarily focused on evidence of law breaking) as by an FBI intelligence analyst 
(who would likely be interested in the larger universe of financial support for radicalized 
social movements, much of which may actually be legal).  However, shifting and narrowing 
analysis of terrorist finance to the questions proposed herein enables analysts from all 
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professional and disciplinary perspectives to analyze the issue on the same plane, without 
requiring them to adopt the same perspective or purpose.   
 
To resolve these problems, the next chapter posits what the ‘right questions’ are to ask about 
terrorist finance, and argues that the epistemic focus of analysis – or the ‘variables,’ if one 
prefers positivist language – of terrorist financing should be the dynamics and consequences 
of political-economic decision-making and its consequences, rather than the ‘who’ and the 
‘how.’  In other words, the ‘right questions’ to ask about terrorist financing concern the 
instrumentality of economic activity for terrorist actors and what such activity tells one about 
the relationship terrorist actors have with wider societies.  Answering these questions shows 
that financial activity is a conditioning – rather than determining – factor of terrorist 
behavior, and that the relationships terrorists have with those that support either them or the 
causes for which they fight are as complex and multidimensional as any other socio-
economic interaction.  Furthermore, given that terrorist financing is tied directly and 
exclusively to the beliefs and objectives of those analyzing it – i.e. the issue’s politics – 
analysis of the financial activities requires explicit recognition of one’s purpose of analysis, 
as well as enough critical distance so as to not let one’s analysis become slavishly obedient to 
specific political whims and ideologies.  As we will shall see, only by thus explicitly focusing 
analysis of terrorist financing on the impact and the ‘reflection’ of such financial activity can 
any government or financial institution ever hope to systematically understand the financing 
of terrorism, let alone develop successful legal, regulatory, or political responses to it. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Right Questions: Reframing Representations of Terrorist 
Finance around the Dynamics of Power, Value, and the Individual 
Exchange 
This chapter reframes how terrorist finance is conceptualized and presents an alternative 
conceptual foundation upon which an improved representation of the issue can be built. 
Building on both the empirical and conceptual realities of terrorism-related financial activity 
illustrated in Chapter Two, and the specific deficiencies identified in Chapter Three, the 
chapter presents the foundations for an alternative and ultimately superior conceptual 
framework for representing and conceptualizing terrorist finance.  It begins in the first section 
by arguing that, given the intrinsically contested, intersubjective, and complex nature of 
terrorist financing, it is more salient to focus analysis explicitly and exclusively on how 
financial activities influence the behavior of terrorist actors, and what financial activities tell 
us about how terrorist actors relate to wider local, national, and global societies.  In the 
chapter’s second section, I argue that this shift in focus enables – and calls for – the 
reframing of terrorist financing as an issue of political economy, specifically an issue that 
revolved around the concepts of power and value, in general, and, specifically, the forms and 
practices of power influences the individual exchange of value of which terrorist finance is 
comprised.  The chapter’s third section discusses the implications of reframing analysis of 
terrorist finance around these political economic concepts; in particular how it brings forth a 
new set of assumptions that provides an original epistemic foundation for not only better 
analyzing the empirical realities of terrorist finance, but also producing useful insights 
relevant to liberal democratic responses to terrorism within the contemporary global political 
economy, which together form the conceptual foundation of practical wisdom about terrorist 
finance. 
 
  
 
205 
The previous chapters demonstrated that existing understandings of terrorist financing are at 
best severely dysfunctional, or at worst malignantly so, according to a compelling critical 
literature that has emerged from both within and outside academia.  In aggregate, these 
works’ critique can be summarized that despite the emergence and relentless prosecution of a 
global ‘financial war’ against terrorism, governments, the financial industry, and academia 
alike have no clear, systematic approach for understanding of the financial activities and 
economic foundations of terrorist actors. At the root of these dysfunctions, the previous 
chapter argued, is a consistent tendency to ask and answer the ‘wrong’ questions about 
terrorist finance.  This chapter argues that whereas analyses of terrorist financing that focus 
on the contested notions of who finances terrorism (let alone the debates on what is terrorism 
to begin with), what methods do – and do not – constitute terrorist financing activity, and 
what behaviors are ‘red flags’ of involvement in financing terrorism produce the deficient 
knowledge detailed in the critical literature, analysis of terrorist financing would be more 
profitable were it to center on how financial activity impacts terrorists’ conduct and 
capabilities, and what it reflects about their relationships with wider communities.    
A New Epistemic Foundation: Asking The ‘Right Questions’ about 
Terrorist Finance 
I propose an alternative epistemic starting point for the analysis of terrorist finance that, this 
paper demonstrates, is both more accurate and more useful than focusing analysis around the 
commonly asked – but ‘wrong’ – questions of ‘who finances terrorism and how do they do 
it.’  The ‘right’ questions, I propose are: 
1. How do financial activities influence the behavior of terrorist actors? 
2. What do financial activities tell us about how terrorist actors relate to wider local, 
national, and global societies? 
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Question 1: How do financial activities influence the behavior of terrorist actors?  
This first question relates to what terrorist financing tells us about terrorists – especially their 
capabilities and behaviors – and thus in essence focuses on understanding the instrumentality 
of financial activity to terrorist actors.  Answering this question lies at the heart of any effort 
to understand the how terrorist actors are influenced by their economic circumstances, 
including for example financial intelligence efforts, counterterrorism policies, or academic 
research into the actions of terrorist actors.   
 
It is common sense to state that financial activities are in some manner instrumental to 
terrorist activity.  Many analyses in the literature, however, assume that the instrumentality of 
terrorist financing is merely a reflection of the capability of terrorist groups.  In this 
conception, terrorism is portrayed as a simple “motivation + capability” equation, with 
financial activity being a, if not the, key determinant of the latter variable.499 This claim is 
somewhat obvious.  Financial dynamics do indeed generally influence the capabilities of 
terrorist actors, as well as their short-term tactical decisions and long-term strategic 
directions.500  However, the discourse provides little to no insight into exactly by what 
geometry financial activity is instrumental to terrorist activity, leading to the mistaken 
impression that terrorism related financial activity is simply the product of functional 
calculations, even though the evidence clearly indicates that on both tactical and strategic 
levels financial activity is as much a product of social, political, and economic contexts than 
simple functional calculations.501  Financing is thus an instrument of terrorists’ capabilities, 
                                                           
499 Steven Emerson and Jonathan Levin, "Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention: 
Saudi Arabia, Terrorist Financing and the War on Terror," Testimony of Steven Emerson with Jonathan Levin 
Before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Washington DC, July 31, 2003). 
500 John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing the Green Card: Financing the Provisional IRA, Part I," Terrorism 
and Political Violence (Frank Cass) 11, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 1-38. 
501 Jeroen Gunning, "Terrorism, charities, and diasporas," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. 
Thomas J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
  
 
207 
but – importantly – one that appears to function primarily according to the particular 
political-economic dynamics in which terrorist actors operate.    
 
One important implication of orienting analysis to how financing affects terrorist behavior is 
that it shifts the focus on the diverse set of individual choices that in reality comprise the so-
called financial ‘networks’ and ‘infrastructures’ of terrorist actors.  More precisely, given that 
terrorism is a form of political violence, asking this question implies that terrorist financing is 
at core an issue of political economic decision-making within certain contexts.  This limits 
analysis of terrorist finance to specifying the relationship between terrorist behavior, the 
political economic contexts in which terrorists operate, and the purpose of analysis.  Once so 
disciplined, analysts can systematically identify the social, cultural, economic, psychological, 
normative, ideological, and political dynamics of terrorist-related financial activity in terms 
that explicitly serve their particular analytic goals; thus creating more useful datasets 
specifically of terrorist capabilities and the multi-dimensional factors influencing those 
capabilities, which would of course offer a much more potent body of knowledge upon which 
to base policy and action than is currently available.   
 
Underlying this question, however, is the conclusion that the realities of terrorist financing 
are fundamentally relational, in that they have no meaning except in relation to either other 
realities (e.g. the military capability of a terrorist group) or one’s purpose of analysis (e.g. to 
identify associated law-breakers).  This in turn means that defining, specifying, and analyzing 
those relational elements, whether the cultural context of terrorist financing activity or the 
biases of an analyst, must be at the core of any analysis.  This matches with understandings of 
finance and money from poststructural and economic sociological approaches to international 
relations and political economy.  For example, Dodd observes that the value ascribed to 
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money, in whatever form, exists only in relation to the various social networks and discursive 
constructions upon which rest people’s expectations about its value over time and space.502   
 
Given that accepting that terrorist financing is meaningless except in relation to something 
else may seem hopelessly ‘postmodern’ and thus useless to many, especially perhaps in the 
counterterrorism and financial intelligence communities.  However, the intrinsic relationality 
of terrorist finance is crucial to achieving a systematic – and therefore practically applicable – 
conceptual basis for understanding the issue.   In order to further specify the dynamics by 
which financial activity is instrumental to terrorist activity – and also to counter any claims 
that this is simply soft-minded relativism – it is useful to incorporate the neo-classical 
economic conception of ‘flow.’  
 
Economists uses the term ‘flow’ to describe problems in which the analytic objective is not to 
measure variables in an absolute sense (which is termed a ‘stock’ problem), but to assess the 
importance of each variable relative to something else.503 The most common example of a 
‘flow’ problem in economics is economic growth, a product of many variables, including for 
example the production and consumption of financial, material, human, and social capital, the 
efficiency of institutions, technological progress, each affecting positively or negatively the 
others. These variables are incorporated into one predominant metric of growth is Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which measures not absolute economic wealth, but economic 
wealth relative to certain specified variables, in this case time (per annum) and population 
(per capita).  
                                                           
502 Nigel Dodd, The Sociology of Money (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).  See also Geoffrey Ingham, The nature of 
money (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).  
503 Partha Dasgupta, Economics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  The use 
of the concept of ‘flow’ here is meant to emphasize that it is the relationship among the many variables of 
terrorist financing that is important to knowledge of it, rather than the nature of any particular set of those 
variables.  Although this is essentially analogous to economic sociological approaches (see especially Jens 
Beckert, "The social order of markets," Theory and Society 38 (2009): 245-269.), for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the concept of ‘flow’ makes this point more concisely.  
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Terrorist financing is a similarly structured problem.  Although it is also the product of many 
distinguishable variables, such as motive, ideology, economic desire, cultural obligations, etc, 
nevertheless the important metric depends on the relative relationship among certain 
variables. However, researchers, governments, and the media often frame terrorist financing 
as a stock problem – i.e. how much money do terrorists have, and how do they produce, 
move, and spend it – resulting in analysis that largely revolves around determining which 
actors and actions should or should not be stuck with the ‘terrorist financing’ label.  The 
problem, however, is that even if the variables of terrorist financing were identified (e.g. by 
more accurate behavioral profiling, perhaps aided by modeling & simulation or other 
information technologies) current epistemological formulations prevent any thorough 
analysis of how they relate to one another, and thus hinder systematic assessment of how 
financial activities are or are not instrumental of actual terrorism-related behavior.  
 
This is because the financing of terrorism is demonstrably an issue of flow – how much 
resources do terrorist use per relevant unit.  For example, it is obvious that it is less important 
to know the absolute size of the stock of wealth possessed by a specified terrorist group, and 
more important to know exactly where, when, how, why, and for what they use this wealth.  
In her examination of the global extra-legal economy, Nordstrom offers an explanation of 
‘flow’ that is very useful for its application to terrorist financing:  
“Modernists have a long tradition of taking “place” very seriously and assuming its 
centrality in shaping identity.  The state is about the static.  The defined and the 
bounded.  It has borders that are set and inhabitants that have sovereign identities 
that are equally set…. Flow carries a set of cultural realities shaped by the people 
creating it is (rather than merely being composed of) political, economic, 
philosophical, and poetic forces.” (Nordstrom, 2007) [emphasis added] 
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Thus, just as economic growth concerns the relationship between income, time, and 
population, applying the concept of ‘flow’ to our understanding of terrorist finance points us 
towards analysis of the political-economic relationships, interactions, and movements within 
the global system that produce power, value, identities, motives, behaviors, and even actors 
that relate to those we deem to be ‘terrorists.’ Interestingly, while this concept of ‘flow’ is 
conceptually similar to sociological perspectives of ‘markets’ – which hold that markets are 
“fully social institutions, reflecting a complex alchemy of politics, culture, and ideology”504 – 
the concept of flow or any similar conceptualization that are capable of being used to 
systematically understand and research relational political-economic exchanges cannot be 
found in either International Relations or International Political Economy discourse.  
Regardless, it nonetheless superbly articulates the constant interplay among forms and 
practices of power, the exchange of value, and individual political-economic decision making 
within varied social orders that lies at the heart of the financing of terrorists as well as our 
understanding of it.   
Question 2: What do financial activities tell us about how terrorist actors relate to wider 
local, national, and global societies? 
The second ‘right’ question relates to what terrorist financing tell us about society, 
specifically about terrorists’ relationships with and within it.  This implies that in reality the 
financial activities of terrorists are not just instruments of specific terrorist objectives, but 
also reflections of their complex relationships with various members of and trends in relevant 
societies.   This may not seem like a new insight, as observers as diverse as Paul 
Wolfowitz505 and Ibrahim Warde506 have argued that terrorist financing is in large part a 
                                                           
504 Greta Krippner, "The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the Paradigm of Economic Sociology," Theory 
and Society 30 (2001), p782.  See also Jens Beckert, "The social order of markets," Theory and Society 38 
(2009): 245-269. 
505 quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, "Bush and Top Aides Proclaim Policy of ‘Ending’ States that 
Back Terror; Local Airports Shut After Arrest," New York Times, September 14, 2001. 
506 Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007). 
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function of the level of popular support for a terrorist group. However, ‘popular support’ only 
captures one aspect (popularity) of how terrorist actors relate to wider societal contexts.  
Instead, the above question compels one to explicitly consider the full range of social, 
political, economic, cultural, normative, and cognitive factors that influence and are 
influenced by the interactions that make up terrorist financing.  More simply, asking this 
question allows, and indeed compels, analysts to engage more deeply with the everyday 
realities of terrorist finance than is currently possible.  As with the first ‘right’ question, these 
issues are to date grossly underspecified.  
 
The following Congressional testimony about the financial activities of Hezbollah contains a 
common but analytically counterproductive view common in current terrorist financing 
discourse, and can thus be used to illustrate the beneficial implications of orienting analysis 
of terrorist financing towards analysis of its place within larger societal contexts: 
While some of [the social service] funds undoubtedly paid for Hezbollah’s military 
and terrorist operations, other funds enable the group to provide its members with 
day jobs, to drape itself in a veil of legitimacy, and to build grassroots support 
among not only Shia but Sunni and Christian Lebanese as well.
507
  
 
This representation is based on an assumption that Hezbollah relies on a financial ‘network’ 
or ‘infrastructure’ to fund its operations, components of which include the social service 
organizations mentioned in the testimony, as well as various donors, legitimate and criminal 
business ventures, and financial middlemen and facilitators.  Again, while this may seem like 
a common sense way to describe the financing of Hezbollah, given that Hezbollah no doubt 
cynically exploits its social welfare activities to further its political and military objectives, I 
                                                           
507 Matthew Levitt, "Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List," Testimony to the Committee on Foreign 
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argue that characterizing this as “a veil of legitimacy” summarily excludes much that is 
important, and includes too much that is largely irrelevant.   
 
For example, the analytic perspective represented in the above statement obscures the multi-
dimensional reasoning behind popular support for Hezbollah, and the equally complex and 
nuanced dynamics by which otherwise legitimate actors (such as businesspeople or even state 
governments) choose to interact financially with Hezbollah.  To summarize a large and 
complex topic, Hezbollah arose from, and exists firmly within, the complicated contexts of 
Lebanese social, political, and cultural life.508 The group, as one of the two major Shi’ite 
movements in Lebanon, is very much a product the country’s multi-sectarian society, 
comprised of 18 different sects, the largest and most important of which are the Sunni 
Muslims, Shi’ite Muslims, and Maronite Christians.  To understand its financing, it is 
unavoidably important to understand that Hezbollah has evolved from one of many armed 
factions to become simultaneously a regional actor (e.g. as an armed force that acts 
independently and on behalf of its allies Iran and Syria), an influential socio-cultural player in 
Lebanese society (e.g. as a political party and media provider), and to a large extent a state-
within-a-state (that has replaced the country’s central government in fulfilling many aspects 
of the social contract). Within this context, it is thus significant that that Hezbollah draws 
large amounts of funds not only from Shi’a Lebanese, but also from non-Lebanese Shi’a, 
Lebanese Christians, and Sunnis from Lebanon and elsewhere, as well as of course its state 
sponsors, because this means that Hezbollah represents the resentments and aspirations of not 
only its members (e.g. in intra-Shia politics), but also of all Shi’a (e.g. in Lebanese sectarian 
politics), and at times all Lebanese or even all Arabs (e.g. during the 2006 war with Israel).   
 
                                                           
508 Adham Saouli, "Stability Under Late State Formation: the Case of Lebanon," Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19, no. 4 (December 2006). 
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When placed into this general context, it is clear that, for example, specifying the nature and 
dynamics of popular support for Hezbollah – in all its normative, societal, political, and 
analytic complexity – is far more intellectually sound and practically applicable than 
determining who or what lurks behind the ‘veil’ of Hezbollah’s financial network.  For 
instance, the United States Government would have a different set of policy options available 
if financial support reflected actual support for the group’s political objectives compared to if 
such support simply reflected (more temporary) appreciation of Hezbollah providing 
reconstruction aid after the 2006 war with Israel (which was more efficient and effective than 
that from the Lebanese government.509  
 
In other words, once one shifts focus away from inevitably politicized debates on who and 
what should count as part of Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure or not, and towards a 
systematic evaluation of what its financial activities tells us about the group’s place in local 
and international society, a much deeper and more productive understanding of the terrorist 
group can be achieved.   The practical implication is that such systematic, societal-oriented 
analysis of its financial activities could provide the foundation of knowledge to devise sets of 
policies to address these aspirations and resentments and thus undermine Hezbollah and 
diminish its capabilities.  More generally, by granting significant insight into both the 
political economy of Lebanon and Hezbollah’s true place within it, it provides a basis for 
outside actors (such as opposing governments) to monitor, influence, or undermine both 
Hezbollah and its donors (including Iran).  In other words, asking the above question leads to 
more nuanced assessments that should be crucial components of liberal democratic responses 
to terrorism because they provide a foundation and structure of knowledge upon which 
rational, effective, and principled action can take place.  The same cannot be said of current 
                                                           
509 Gulfnews, "Hezbollah's welfare services ensure grass-roots support," August 12, 2006. 
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policies that focus robotically on who endless, and ultimately irrelevant, debates on whether a 
specific business, charity, or wire transfer should count as ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Hezbollah’s 
financial ‘infrastructure.’ 
Summary 
The above ‘right’ questions, when viewed as the basis for an alternative epistemological 
foundation of how terrorist financing is represented, may appear to be an awkward 
conceptual fit to on one hand focus on the structural aspects of terrorist financing behavior, 
and on the other exhibit a theoretical emphasis on the importance of agency and reasoning.  
In particular, it raises the related question of whether a conceptual focus on the 
instrumentality of finance is appropriate, especially since the reasoning behind one’s 
engagement in terrorism-related financial activity would be central to any conceptualization 
of terrorist finance that focused on seeking to understand related political-economic decision 
making.  However, given that terrorist financing is a product of not only human reasoning, 
but also the relationship this reasoning has to both decisions based on these reasons as well as 
the consequences of these decisions, this section argues that by reorienting conceptualizations 
of terrorist financing and thus also research on the issue around the above two questions, this 
potential awkwardness is resolved.  In particular, it is resolved because an epistemic focus on 
these questions and their answers implies that the structural dynamics of terrorist financing (a 
typology of which is presented in the next chapter) depends on human choices (agency) about 
terrorist group values, objectives, and goals, which are themselves a product of rationality & 
freedom and the place of the individual in global society.   
 
In this way, the above section provided the first step beyond the deficient understandings of 
terrorist finance, and beyond also the critiques surveyed in Chapter Three.  Asking the ‘right 
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questions’, is nothing else, locates terrorist finance in the larger dynamics of how terrorists 
participates in wider political-economic communities, and what this participation means for 
these communities.  In this way, terrorist finance is, importantly, a security issue, albeit one 
with that is strongly informed by various political, economic, social, cultural, institutional, 
ideational, and other knowledge. 
 
In one way, this chapter simply acts on acceptance of the full epistemological consequences 
of recognizing that the analysis of terrorist finance is itself a political project meant to serve 
specific interests of liberal democratic society.  More precisely, it provides a viable 
alternative to dominant analytic approaches that require one to uncover dark secrets about the 
global ‘infrastructures’ and “mysterious” networks that supposedly finance terrorism.  
However, while the world of terrorist finance is indeed often invisible and inaudible to the 
casual observer, it is very much knowable and comprehensible – if one asks the right 
questions.  This dissertation fundamentally argues that what is referred to as ‘terrorist 
finance’ is at core simply a certain sub-set of political economic activity about which liberal 
democratic societies are currently concerned.  It can thus be observed, analyzed, interpreted, 
and acted upon, just like any other manifestation of human behavior. This subtle but 
important epistemological shift subordinates normative debates about ‘bad’ (i.e. terrorist) 
versus ‘good’ financing, and replaces them with a foundation of analysis that is not only 
closer to the specific (liberal democratic) interests and objectives it is supposed to serve, but 
also enables access to more analytic tools required to meet those objectives. 
 
More specifically, this chapter argues that the focus of analysis – or the ‘variables,’ if one 
prefers positivist language – of terrorist financing should be the dynamics and consequences 
of political-economic decision-making and its consequences, rather than the ‘who’ and the 
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‘how.’  In other words, the ‘right questions’ to ask about terrorist financing concern the 
instrumentality of economic activity for terrorist actors and what such activity tells one about 
the relationship terrorist actors have with wider societies.  Answering these questions shows 
that financial activity is a conditioning – rather than determining – factor of terrorist 
behavior, and that the relationships terrorists have with those that support either them or the 
causes for which they fight are as complex and multidimensional as any other socio-
economic interaction.  Furthermore, given that terrorist financing is tied directly and 
exclusively to the beliefs and objectives of those analyzing it – i.e. the issue’s politics – 
analysis of the financial activities requires explicit recognition of one’s purpose of analysis, 
as well as enough critical distance so as to not let one’s analysis become slavishly obedient to 
specific political whims and ideologies.  Only by thus explicitly focusing analysis of terrorist 
financing on the impact and the ‘reflection’ of such financial activity can any government or 
financial institution ever hope to systematically understand the financing of terrorism, let 
alone develop successful legal, regulatory, or political responses to it. 
Reframing the Bases for Conceptualizing Terrorist Finance   
This section part of the chapter presents a new set of assumptions about the nature of terrorist 
financing activity.  These premises reflect the insights from the case study of Chapter Two, 
the critiques of existing discourse in the previous chapter, and the reformulated ‘right’ 
questions above.  As such, they represent the basis of the reformulated epistemological 
framework that is the central objective of this dissertation.   
Terrorist Finance is a Compendium of Individual Exchanges 
Previous chapters have shown that even though it is common today to view terrorist 
financing in terms of the economic ‘networks,’ ‘infrastructures,’ or even the ‘lifeblood’ 
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behind terrorist actors.  These formulations exclude much about the everyday realities of 
terrorist finance that is relevant to analysts and includes much that is not.  The first premise 
therefore is that terrorist financing is best characterized instead as, to borrow a phrase from 
Carolyn Nordstrom’s work on the anthropology ‘extra legal’ political economies, a 
‘compendium of individual exchanges.’510 The financing of any terrorist group, any terrorist 
attack, any terrorist movement is a product of dozens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions 
of individual interactions.  In the case study of Chapter Two, for example, the raising and 
transfer of funds from the Middle East to Chechnya consisted of many of distinct individual 
interactions like the original fundraising appeal to the international wire transfer of funds to 
the bribery of corrupt border officials to ultimate purchase of weapons or supplies, each of 
which occurred according to its own unique and complex dynamic of human agency.  I argue 
therefore that it is at the level of these individual choices in which the empirical reality of 
terrorist financing can – and indeed must – be best observed. Even though this raises certain 
methodological difficulties discussed below, this premise represents the cornerstone of the 
new epistemic foundation of terrorist financing analysis presented in this dissertation. 
 
In many ways, this premise is obvious.  For example, it should not tax the intellect to accept 
that a claim such as “Iran funds Hezbollah,” is in fact a simplistic aggregation of a huge 
variety of individual interactions and exchanges.  It should also be logical to recognize that 
each of these individual exchanges occurs according to its own logic, in its own context, and 
producing its own result. What may not be obvious however are some of the implications of 
this assumption.   
                                                           
510 This phrase was used in Nordstrom, Global Outlaws, 2007. 
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Contextualized Choice 
The first implication relates to the unit of analysis of terrorist financing.  It has been 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation that there is no set profile of who is involved in the 
financing terrorism.  Legitimate and criminal, willing and unwilling, American and Zambian, 
and people of all types in between have been known to participate in some way or another in 
financing terrorism.  Terrorist financing at a fundamental level of analysis involves a series of 
human choices that leads to conduct that financially supports terrorism.  As these choices 
influence and are influenced by the environment in which they occur, it can be said that the 
above assumption implies that the fundamental unit of analysis of terrorist financing is 
‘contextualized choice.’  This greatly simplifies the inherent complexity in terrorist financing 
analysis.  As discussed earlier, existing literature attempts to understand this complexity by 
focusing on a variety of units of analysis, including methods, actors, motives, and structural 
contexts, under the assumption that terrorist financing occurs through some undiscovered 
combination of these factors. However, to use scientific language, viewing terrorist financing 
as a “compendium of individual exchanges” focuses analysis of this vastly complex topic 
towards one dependent variable – human choice – and one independent variable – the context 
of that choice.  Although these variables are themselves very complex, this is nevertheless a 
significant epistemological improvement over existing frameworks. 
Rationality and Freedom 
The second implication is that these ‘contextualized choices’ are rationally and freely chosen.  
In order to explain what this means, however, it is necessary to begin by discussing what it 
does not.  Rational choice is a contentious idea especially in IR discourse.  In fact, ‘rational 
choice’ has become an almost poisonous term, as it popularly refers to a stilted discourse 
resting on prespecified axioms, such as internal consistency, intelligent pursuit of self-
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interest, or maximization.511  Such conceptions of rational choice assume people to be 
‘rational fools,’ who must – “by the analytical force of non-distinction” – adhere to universal 
orderings of human behavior. This regiments understanding of human agency by “the 
authoritarianism of some context-independent axioms or by the need to conform to some 
canonical specification of “proper” objectives and values… [and] have had the effect of 
arbitrarily narrowing permissible ‘reasons for choice,”512 such as laws and legality. In 
International Relations this has manifested itself in the belief that people are bound to act in a 
certain way, for example, to maximize self-interest (neo-Realism) or welfare (neo-
liberalism), or in reaction to oppression, deprivation, or “ancient hatreds.”513  Similarly, much 
of the terrorist financing literature assumes that those involved in financing terrorism are 
‘rational fools,’ instrumentally acting for terrorist, evil, criminal, or other pre-specified ends.  
Such a “theoretical and methodological straightjacket,”514 however, is not the only 
conception of rational choice, even though it may be the most prevalent in the IR literature.   
 
The Nobel economist Amartya Sen provides a very different theory of rational choice as 
“reasoned scrutiny,” or the broad “need to subject ones choices to the demands of reason.”515 
According to Sen, “reasoned scrutiny” simply means that people have reasons for acting, not 
all of which are self interested or maximizing or particularly logical to an outsider. This is a 
much richer conception of rationality that also proves highly applicable to understanding the 
‘contextualized choices’ that comprise terrorist finance. This helps explain the choices that 
comprise terrorist financing, which are influenced not by some set of universal factors, but by 
                                                           
511 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom (London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4. 
512 Ibid., 6. 
513 See Ibid., 7 footnote 4. 
514 Ash Amin and Ronen Palan, "Towards a Non-Rationalist International Political Economy," Review of 
International Political Economy 8, no. 4 (2002)., 561.  Specifically, Amin and Palan argued that the ‘rational 
fool’ conceptualization of human agency is analytically deficient, as has Sen (2002, 48).   
515 Sen, 2002, 4. 
  
 
220 
different reasons and pressures, some of which may change the actor’s behavior, and some of 
which may not, all for a variety of reasons. According to Sen:  
“Seeing rational choice as choice based on reasoned scrutiny has far-reaching 
implications on decisional complexity precisely because of the extensive reach of 
reason, which cannot be captured by a priori axioms or by very general 
admonitions.”
516
  
 
Assuming that the choices going into terrorist financing are rational naturally focuses 
attention on the rationales driving these choices. Sen points out that his conception of 
rationality does not require centrality of oneself in individual decision-making.  This is 
important, especially for issues such as terrorist financing and terrorism, because it is 
typically on behalf of a group, real or imagined, that people make decisions to engage in, for 
example, terrorist financing activity.  This implies, in other words, that someone involved in 
financing terrorism can make a ‘reasoned’ choice that in fact conflicts with other choices, 
with one’s moral values, or with one’s objectives.  What would drive a person to choose to 
finance terrorism if doing so conflicted with his values or goals?  The answer lies often in the 
context in which such decisions were made.  In other words, the rationales informing 
individual choices are not just a product of context-independent norms or objectives, but of 
the environment.   
 
It is again helpful to turn again to Sen, now to understand the relationship between the 
individual choices involved in terrorist financing and the contexts that influence and are 
influenced by them. In conjunction with his theory of rationality, Sen argues that people are 
existentially autonomous and that their reasoned choices are conditioned by their 
environment and experiences, which restrict and open up different menus of choices.  More 
simply, rationality and freedom go hand in hand, explaining both the core dynamic of the 
                                                           
516 Ibid., 48. 
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individual decisions that lead people to engage in conduct that helps finance terrorism, the 
processes by which such choices interrelate with the contexts in which they occur.  In context 
of IR discourse overall, this is roughly analogous to constructivism in which structures 
matter, but they can change and can change by the choices of agents; and in particular to the 
poststructural IPE and economic sociology approaches that discuss the social, ideational, and 
discursive foundations of how value (such as money) and its exchange (such as ‘finance’) is 
perceived and acted upon.517 
Analyzing Choices 
The third implication is methodological, specifically that observing, measuring, and 
interpreting terrorist financing at the level of the individual exchange creates certain 
methodological challenges, which do require further development outside the scope of this 
dissertation, but which are by no means insurmountable.  Within these caveats, it seems 
appropriate to at least introduce a method of analysis based on the epistemic core of those 
choices, namely the dynamics of freedom and rationality within the compendium of 
individual exchanges that comprise terrorist finance. 
 
In context of Sen’s conception, levels of freedom are relatively straightforward to measure, 
although not always easy.  In general, they can be measured be assessing what influences 
constricted or enlarged the menu of choices available.  Such factors have included social 
pressures, such as a kinship bond, moral norms, such as belief against terrorism, ideological 
beliefs, such as support for a terrorist group, among others.  The key factor here however is 
not the presence of these influences, but how they affect the actor from achieving his 
objectives, i.e. from achieving what he has chosen to do. This ties analysis of actual financing 
                                                           
517 See especially Nigel Dodd, The Sociology of Money (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); Geoffrey Ingham, The 
nature of money (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); and Marieke de Goede, "Beyond economism in international 
political economy ," Review of International Studies, no. 29 (2003). 
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choices made to actual terrorist goals, which helps clarify many complexities that are 
typically conflated in terrorist financing analysis.  For example, it is common for the 
literature to state that someone is ‘linked’ or ‘associated’ or in the ‘network’ of an actor that 
is either a terrorist or a terrorist supporter.  These links are usually grossly underspecified, 
negatively impacting both analysis of terrorist financing and the actor ‘linked’ to terrorism if 
that link is spurious or irrelevant.   Another example is to clarify intent.  In every interaction, 
people have various intents. For example, the Khevsur villagers who gave food and shelter to 
passing Chechen terrorists did so as an cultural expression of hospitality rather than some 
political or operational act.  Similarly, those benefactors who donated money to the Chechen 
jihad may have done so in an honest, if perverted in many people’s eyes, interpretation of the 
religious duty of zakat giving.  Thus this is a fruitful avenue by which one can determine the 
meaning, importance, and ultimate relevance of any financial activity connected to terrorism.   
 
Measuring rationality is slightly more problematic.  One problem, as Sen observes, there is 
no set criteria for determining what should be considered reasoned scrutiny/rationality.  
Rationality depends on actors’ own reasoning and thus measuring rationality means recording 
the reasoning by which actors arrive at their decisions without a priori judgment.  To do 
otherwise would deny recognition of individuals’ freedom to choose what motivates their 
decisions, which in turn would prejudice analysis of rationality towards our own norms and 
interest.  To some this might imply legitimization of choices that violate fundamental values 
and preferences of others, but it is simply an analytic necessity to maintain a systematic 
analytic method.  In practice, this would most likely be achieved either by collecting data 
from interviews, statements, or observation/surveillance on rationales used in choice that lead 
to involvement in terrorist financing, or deduction from contextual clues such as known 
cultural patterns of rationality in particular circumstances (e.g. hospitality traditions).  Doing 
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so, as this section demonstrates, enables systematic analysis of how terrorist financing 
activity influences and is influenced by the contexts in which it occurs.  This in turn implies 
that, although it would take much time and effort to map out the dynamics of these exchanges 
individually and in aggregate, it could serve as the basis for developing a superior basis for 
terrorist financing analysis, or in the words of the Canadian intelligence service, a “generally 
accepted model for terrorist financing that provides a clear and common strategic 
understanding of how terrorist financing operates and a sound basis for deciding how to 
respond to it.”518 
Terrorist Finance Concerns the Exchange of Value Not Money 
Terrorist finance obviously implies monetary exchange.  Yet, as the second epistemological 
premise states, the reality of terrorist finance is that it involves the exchange of value in any 
form, not just money. For example Chechen terrorists were financed in part by heroin that 
was exchanged for stolen cars which was then exchanged for weapons.  No money ever 
changed hands.  Similarly, the IRA, HAMAS, and other groups regularly grant nationalist, 
cultural, and/or religious legitimization to donors ‘in exchange’ for material support.   In 
other words, non-monetary forms of value not only play an important role in terrorist 
financing exchanges, but are in fact I argue the objects being exchanged.  Of course, this is a 
conceptual device to incorporate consideration of these non-monetary forms of value into 
analysis, rather than an argument that people involved in the exchanges explicitly draw up 
bills of sale for “cultural legitimization.”  Nevertheless, reorienting analysis towards value 
rather than money enables a richer and more comprehensive account of the dynamics of 
terrorist financing activity, but one that also can potentially complicate analysis of it.  
                                                           
518 Canadian Press, "CSIS developing new model for understanding terrorist financing, documents show," April 
20, 2008, http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5g-zSC8Bb1S49xg9EuhBzIzzk3_WA. 
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Fortunately, however, this broad conception of value corresponds roughly to the notion of 
‘capital’ used in economics and, to a lesser extent, sociology.    
Value as Capital 
Capital in its most generic sense refers to items of value used to produce goods or services. 
As mentioned earlier, capital is a “contested” concept that is “contingent” on both 
perceptions and societal contexts.519  Ideas about capital in economics discourse are actually 
not fundamentally different, although its focuses on developing various classifications of 
capital such as ‘physical’ and ‘financial’ capital, as well as in its ‘social,’ ‘human,’ and 
‘individual’ forms.520  At its most basic level, therefore, capital is simply a socially and 
cognitively constructed expression of value.  However, because capital is a more developed 
term it is useful to frame this discussion of the exchange of value within terrorist financing in 
terms of some of these forms of capital. 
 
First, terrorist financing involves the exchange of financial, physical, and material capital, 
includes not only money, but also, as observed earlier, goods such as weapons, food, or 
humanitarian aid.   Second, we have seen that terrorist financing often involves the exchange 
of services or mutual agreements, such as protection rackets in which armed protection is 
exchanged for logistical services, or the facilitation of material or financial capital across 
borders.  These forms of value can also be characterized roughly as ‘human capital,’ which 
has been defined as: 
                                                           
519 de Goede, "Beyond economism,” 2003. 
520 For example, to illustrate the diversity of views of capital, two different well established conceptualizations 
of these other forms of capital include that presented in Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), and Pierre Bourdieu, "The forms of 
capital," in Handbook for Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education,, ed. J.G. Richardson (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
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“practical knowledge, acquired skills and learned abilities of an individual that make 
him or her potentially productive and thus equip him or her to earn income in 
exchange for labor.”
521
     
From this term one can see immediately that, in context of the Chechen case of Chapter 2, the 
transport and facilitation services provided to the foreign jihadists by corrupt Georgian 
officials were not simply a product of malevolent intent or unscrupulous rent-seeking.  
Instead, it comes closer to the full reality of the situation to see it as an exchange of financial 
capital for human capital, which in this case included, among other things, the Georgians’ 
practical knowledge of the safest place to cross the Georgian-Chechen border.  Third, 
terrorist financing, like any human activity, involves “social capital,” defined by Putnam as, 
“features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”
522
 
 
Employing this term, one can easily also see that the Georgian officials also exploited various 
relationships, positions of authority, cultural bonds, and other forms of social capital in 
exchange for the financial capital provided to them by the foreign jihadists.  However, it also 
illuminates another side of the exchange other than the Georgians and the foreign jihadists, 
namely the interaction among them and other societal actors.  For example, for the Khevsurs 
and some Kists, various cultural norms and economic motivations lead them to ‘facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ in a way that, in the instance, resulted in 
what we would term ‘terrorist financing.’  In other words, assuming terrorist financing to be 
the exchange of value leads forces the analyst into a much fuller appreciation of the complex 
realities of the problem, while still maintaining methodological clarity.  For example, to 
understand better the dynamics of value exchanges, it would be useful to understand the role 
                                                           
521 Paul Johnson, "Human Capital," Glossary of Political Economy Terms, 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/human_capital (accessed June 2008).  This is also similar to ‘individual 
capital,’ which Becker defines as training, education, technical skills, or other productive knowledge. Gary 
Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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of financial activity itself in the societies in which the activity takes place.  For example, in a 
different incident in the Chechen case, ‘terrorist financing’ activity was also as an expression 
of belief and an act of charity to certain Middle Eastern benefactors.  These donors saw their 
largesse as meeting their duty in Islam through either zakat to donate money to a worthy 
cause,523 which in some interpretations of Islam includes violent struggle against an ‘enemy 
of the faith.’  Such competing perspectives about terrorism or terrorist financing are often 
portrayed according to the ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ cliché.  
However, analyzing the issue as an exchange of value within particular contexts avoids this 
unproductive dichotomy because it enables systematic analysis of opposing views and norms, 
without needing to adopt one or the other.  This is not objectivity per se, but simply a device 
to analyze normative, cultural, or other difficult or controversial content in a systematic way.   
 
A methodological problem, however, with this assumption is that because this opens up 
analysis to such a diversity of variables, it also forces the analyst into difficult 
methodological terrain.  For example, one cannot easily collect data on specific interpersonal 
interactions, especially when they occur in secret or in dangerous or foreign areas.  Therefore, 
even though all forms of capital and value can, at least in theory, be observed, collection of 
reliable data is admittedly a significant issue.  However, Nordstrom and others have argued 
that anthropological methods can be used to make economic surveys of populations that 
otherwise would not accessible,524 and Horgan, Silke, and others have shown that 
interviewing terrorists and those that interact with them, is not only possible but necessary.525  
It is clear, therefore, that this assumption brings both epistemological and methodological 
benefits to the analysis of terrorist finance. 
                                                           
523 Looney, 2006. 
524 Carolyn Nordstrom, Fieldwork Under Fire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996). 
525 John Horgan, "The Case for First-Hand Research," in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, 
Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Frank Cass, 2004). 
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Greater Engagement with ‘Everyday’ Realities 
The third assumption is improving how terrorist financing is conceptualized required greater 
engagement with the everyday realities that impact and are impacted by terrorism related 
financial activity. In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau argues that while 
social science has methods for observing and cataloging the various instruments and 
dynamics of politics, economics, society, and culture, it has few formal ways to evaluate how 
or why individual people use, alter, and are affected by them.526  Greater engagement with 
‘everyday’ realities would lead to an approach to representing and conceptualizing terrorist 
financing as a product of people’s behavior within particular contexts, and therefore that 
understanding terrorist finance requires comprehending the meaning of these behaviors, not 
just the details of their execution.  This represents a clear alternative to the ‘orthodox’ 
approaches that is written to imply that understanding terrorist finance requires one to 
uncover dark secrets about the global ‘infrastructures’ and “mysterious”527 networks that 
supposedly finance terrorism.  Engagement with these everyday realities means that these 
realities can be observed, analyzed, interpreted, and acted upon, just like any other 
manifestation of human behavior.  In other words, this dissertation assumes from the outset – 
and demonstrates throughout – that terrorist financing is very much an ‘everyday’ activity in 
which certain individuals make certain decisions that lead to particular outcomes that in 
different ways and for a variety of reasons results in enabling certain opponents – terrorists – 
of liberal democratic societies.  As such, it is worth beginning with a discussion of the 
diversity of political-economic spaces in which terrorist financing as an ‘everyday’ activity 
occurs.   
 
                                                           
526 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Stephen F Rendall (Los Angeles: University of 
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527 Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," Strategic Insights (Center for 
Contemporary Conflict) IV, no. 1 (January 2005). 
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Diversity of Political-Economic Spaces 
Terrorist financing occurs in many different spaces, other than the state.  Some are 
characterized by governance structures in which ideational factors such as cultural traditions 
(e.g. duties of hospitality), norms (e.g. those that value profit above all else), religious or 
ideological belief (e.g. those believe in fighting jihad), and/or identity play a significant role 
in influencing political action.  Within such cognitively constructed spaces, however, the 
influence of the political order tends to be only as deep as the cognitive beliefs that underpin 
it, and because people often change their minds and beliefs depending on shifts in perceptions 
and circumstances, these orders can similarly often change.  This is different from formalized 
legalistic political orders in which institutions provide a permanence, or at least a persistence, 
to power structures that if properly constructed can outlast even wide swings of social, 
cultural, or political belief.  This is the reason why the U.S. Constitution has survived so long, 
because it institutionalized certain power structures of liberal democracy which have become 
more or less universally accepted.  The political orders in which terrorist financing occurs, 
however, are typically far less persistent but are oriented more to the individual needs and 
goals of particular actors within particular time/place contexts.  This explains why Chechen 
militants could simultaneously perceive young Arab men intending to fight with Chechen 
separatists as welcome guests, examples of the ‘way of God,’ or expendable commodities, as 
changing circumstances forced the Chechen to prioritize and re-prioritize the various 
identities, norms, and roles on which their political-economic order rested.  This also explains 
how the Pashtuns in Afghanistan regularly switch between supporting the Taliban and the 
NATO forces.  The Pashtuns have a very stable internal political order, and are thus free to 
negotiate and renegotiate depending on the situation in order to achieve their political goals.   
 
  
 
229 
In addition, terrorist financing often exhibits more socially based orders, in which trust 
especially plays large roles.  Those involved in terrorist financing regularly interact only with 
those with whom they have either built trust.  Trust can develop in a number of ways.  It can 
be based on a social or cultural bond, the dynamics of which can vary tremendously.  For 
example, kinship bonds are often strong, while ideological bonds have proven to be weak 
indicators of trust, as they are more easily changed.  Reciprocity can also serve as a 
foundation of trust, including positive reciprocity – such as a mutually profitable economic 
exchange – or negative – as in a coercive threat.  Both are common techniques of maintaining 
political order in terrorist financing activity.   
 
The varying political orders in which terrorist financing occurs have certain important 
common implications.  First, it means that what may seem like anarchy is more accurately 
characterized as alternatively governed political space.  In other words, conceptually, the 
relevant political order of terrorist financing is neither anarchy, nor government, but, more 
generically, governance.  This helps one see that those involved in financing terrorism are to 
some extent able to ‘pick and choose’ the political-economic order in which they could most 
advantageously operate (i.e. that which had structures of governance and authority from 
which they could generate most political-economic advantage).  Methodologically, this 
complicates the analysis of terrorist financing by forcing consideration of political-economic 
spaces with which Western research might find alien, but which are nevertheless where the 
reality of terrorist finance occurs.   
Power and Order 
Engaging with the everyday, ground realities of terrorist financing means, conceptually, 
engagement with the concept of power.  Dynamics of power are central to the everyday 
realities of terrorist finance, meaning therefore that analysis must be expanded to include the 
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full diversity in the forms of power on which these political orders are based.  Power, in the 
most generic sense, is the ability to affect the thoughts and behavior of others.  Various forms 
of power are at play in terrorist finance, from the material to the ideational, meaning therefore 
that the forms of power that influence terrorist financing behavior are more diverse than the 
forms of power we Westerners typically allow to have authority over our behavior.  For 
example, in Western society the power of religious duty and hospitality are almost always 
secondary to the power of the state and law in influencing behavior, but as was demonstrated 
in Chapter Two, the opposite can just as easily be the case.  
 
Analytically, therefore, we must accept that relevant power relationships occur not only on 
material, political, economic levels,528 but also on social, cultural, ideational, and ethical 
levels.  In the Chechen case for example, the ability of fundraisers to solicit donations from 
wealthy benefactors was a product of the power of fitting the Chechen cause into particular 
ideational and ethical frameworks, frameworks that are likely foreign to most westerners.  
Similarly, the power of the cultural traditions among the Kist and Khevsur populations 
influenced behavior as much and often more than action by government actors.  This wider 
conception actually fits closely with ideas about power in classical Political Realism, as 
illustrated in this statement from Morgenthau: 
“[The] content and the manner of the use of power are determined by the political 
and cultural environment…Thus power covers all social relationships which serve 
that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one 
mind controls another.  Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is 
disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western 
democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in 
nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.”
529
  
                                                           
528 For example when police facilitate terrorist financing activity out of fear of reprisal of not doing so, or the 
various exploitation of economic and political dominance. 
529 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967), 9. 
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Ultimately, this more nuanced expression of power is a vastly improved conceptual 
foundation upon which to base deeper and more useful understanding of the complexities of 
the topic at hand. 
Fluid Hierarchies 
Another implication of this assumption is that hierarchies of power and influence are fluid 
within the everyday realities of terrorist financing, and that within the exchanges that 
comprise terrorist financing, elites (i.e. those with more power) typically win out, but who is 
an elite and what they are capable of achieving are highly fluid across variations in context.  
Analysts therefore must be prepared to describe the nature of elite-servant hierarchies, 
understand the processes by which these hierarchies came about, and be able to account for 
how they change.  It is a truism that in all power structures, elites win out, but what we see in 
terrorist financing is that there are many constraints that bound elite behavior and determine 
who becomes an elite that are different from that in Western society. In other words, the 
exact manifestations of elite domination depend on unique, context-specific dynamics of 
political power competition, which often are foreign to the largely Western, rationalist 
academic and policy-making communities that currently dominate thinking and practice 
around terrorist financing.  Terrorist financing activity then followed these channels of 
power.   
 
Power and political order are naturally closely related to legitimacy.  Empirically, there are 
competing structures of legitimacy in terrorist financing.  Legitimacy is based on many 
different things, including culture, norms, fear, force, repression, agreement, etc.  For 
example, the legitimacy of the Georgian government was based on their military and policing 
capabilities, while the legitimacy of the Chechen militants was based on their jihad against 
Russia. Another example of the diversity of legitimacy is that Saudi Arabia does not consider 
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Hamas to be a terrorist organization and therefore funding it would not be terrorist financing.  
Cultural factors are at play, for example in the United Arab Emirates financial services 
providers did not consider their services to be related to terrorism even if they served terrorist 
actors.  This was for the same reason that a grocer who sold food to known terrorists would 
not be viewed by most as ‘supporting’ terrorism.  Legitimacy plays a huge role in 
governance, which is why the state-based structures upon which we rely to combat terrorist 
financing are so easily ignored, i.e. because they lack legitimacy.  Sometimes they lack 
legitimacy because of lack of power and authority, such as by a government of a weak state.  
Other times, they lack legitimacy in a normative sense, e.g. the ability of the U.S. to influence 
behavior of Hamas.   
The Order of Terrorist Finance 
This means that analytically we must formulate the problem of terrorist financing with the 
assumption that there are competing forms of legitimacy, meaning that our sense of 
legitimacy may at times lose out to other forms.  This challenges the efficacy of rejecting all 
discussion of either the legitimacy of terrorism, and thus material support for terrorists, or the 
illegitimacy of counter terrorism or our own society.  I argue that it is an analytic necessity to 
incorporate these competing views of legitimacy into our analysis of terrorist financing.  
Methodologically, this comes close to the verstehen (interpretative understanding) method, 
employed by for example Weber and Habermas, in which a social phenomenon is examined 
by an outside observer from an indigenous perspective. 
 
I argue that, given the fact that terrorist financing occurs in an almost infinite variety, any 
attempt to situate terrorist financing into one or a set of particular political spaces is doomed 
to fail.  Therefore, the arena in which terrorist financing occurs seems to be not one particular 
political ‘space’ – such as ‘the criminal world’ or ‘the community of terrorist sympathizers’ – 
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but rather as simply the arena in which endless competition among political spaces occurs.  
For example, it would be incorrect to view the financing of Hezbollah as occurring within 
exclusively either a state context (which would ignore the significant fundraising and 
criminal activities of the group) or a non-state context (which would ignore the support it 
receives from Iran).  This is because the arenas in which Hezbollah-related financial activity 
occur changes according to how well the actors involved are able to act successfully within 
variable contexts.  In other words, the space in which terrorist financing occurs changes 
according to the ability of terrorist related actors to exercise power, define and enforce 
legitimacy and lines of discipline, and control of knowledge within that space.  In other 
words, to understand terrorist financing it is much more salient to understand the process by 
which it is governed within and across contexts, than to assess static behavior within specific 
place or contexts.   
 
We see therefore that terrorist financing is at its base a problem that should be formulated 
around the issue of power, not authority.  This means that formulations of the problem that 
revolve around institutions, structures, or even agents will be insufficient without a thorough 
accounting of how power is exercised within terrorist financing, both at individual and 
aggregate/global levels. For example, terrorist financing exhibits a similar diversity in the 
forms of order that compete with and often run counter to the political orders based on 
institutional authority (e.g. laws, common ethics) within which we in the West are familiar 
and upon which we rely for our own political order.  Duffield observes that there has been an 
“emergence of new cross-cutting governance networks involving state and non-state actors 
from the supranational to the local level…[suggesting] that the nature of power and authority 
has changed.”530  He goes on to describe the nature of these shifts: 
                                                           
530 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001), 8. 
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“Coming from the South, there has been an expansion of transborder and shadow 
economic activity that has forged new local-global linkages with the liberal world 
system and, in so doing, new patterns of actual development and political authority – 
that is, alternative and no-liberal forms of protections, legitimacy and social 
regulation.  Emerging form the North, the networks of international public policy 
have thickened and multiplied their points of engagement and control.  Many 
erstwhile functions of the nation state have been abandoned to these international 
networks as power and authority have been reconfigured.”
531
 
 
In terms of terrorist financing, this means that individuals are free to interact with nearly any 
other individual within complex and dynamic contexts. Therefore, as global society is 
reordered, both on macro and micro levels, terrorist financing actors attempt to adapt, and 
those who are able to do so successfully gain most advantage from the new orders. The 
conflict literature has similarly shown that violent non-state actors are often adept at 
exploiting the changing terrain of international governance, an ability that is not often 
matched in attempts to challenge them. Lormel also observed this, remarking that “Terrorist 
financing characteristics and methodologies constantly evolve due to changing dynamics in 
world events, such as the global response to terrorism and the ability of terrorists to adapt to 
the environment.”532  Terrorist financing thus exhibits political orders that compete with and 
often run counter to the political orders based on institutional authority within which we in 
the West are familiar and upon which we rely for our own political order.  In other words, 
this means that terrorist financing ultimately raises and relates to questions about how the 
individual interacts with global society.  However, it is important to note that answering these 
questions cannot yet be systematically done with either existing orthodox or critical 
approaches.  The typology presented in the next chapter, however, does provide a framework 
with which research to answer these questions among others can proceed. 
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Greater Engagement with Political Theory  
The fourth assumption is that terrorist financing, as a mediated and inherently politicized 
issue requires greater explicit engagement with political theory in general, and in particular 
certain analytic devices political theory offers to understand and deal with the contradictions 
and complexities of the realities of competition over power within societies.  
 
As discussed earlier, a complex mixture of societal, political, economic and other factors 
influences terrorist financing exchanges. In other words, terrorist financing is intersubjective, 
and as such is influenced by social, cultural, and moral as much as political and economic 
dynamics, any of which may or may not bear any relation to terrorism, and therefore must 
involve interdisciplinary analysis.  This may seem to some readers therefore that these 
reformulated assumptions about terrorist financing simply mean that it is necessary to know 
everything about everything, given the complexity and intersubjectivity of the topic.  This is 
a problem, in that one can forever increase the scope and the depth of analysis in order to 
capture more and more empirical detail.  Therefore it is vital that analysis of terrorist 
financing is grounded in a central epistemological logic.  I argue that terrorist financing is 
governed by an intersubjective political logic.  The primary implication of this is 
methodological, in that it enables the incorporation of three potent analytic devices that are 
ideally suited to the complex, intersubjective realities of terrorist finance.   
Specificity of Politics 
The first device is a solution to a problem inherent to intersubjective, cross disciplinary 
research, in which the researcher must choose between ‘cherry picking’ ideas and insights 
from other disciplines, or alternatively engage fully in both disciplines, which may be 
practically impossible.   I argue that terrorist financing requires the analyst to engage fully in 
the diverse disciplines that speak to its complex reality, but this can be done by simply 
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engaging with the fundamentals of the disciplines in question.  This serves the purpose of 
embedding the research in the core of the disciplines without the need for comprehensive 
expertise in the whole subject area.  This is a viable methodological solution to the thorny 
problem of interdisciplinary research.  But how does one go about this regarding terrorist 
finance?  I argue that it is possible by applying the classical Realist conception of the 
‘specificity of politics.’ 
 
Classical Realism views politics an autonomous sphere of thought and action, distinct yet 
related to other spheres.  According to Morgenthau, this concept of politics: 
“provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the 
facts to be understood.  It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and 
understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of 
interest defines as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion.  Without such a concept a 
theory of politics, domestic or international, would be altogether impossible, for 
without it we could not distinguish between political and non-political facts, nor 
could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political spheres.”
533
 
 
For example, Morgenthau distinguishes extradition and trade policy as non-political because 
these interactions occur within set boundaries, i.e. the underlying norms and values are not 
contested.  Non-political social spheres have defined objects of interests, forms of power 
available to achieve those interests, and limits on behavior that politics lack, e.g. the object of 
interest in economic behavior is material gain and the dominant form of power is control over 
material resources, both of which set certain limits on economic behavior, such as the pursuit 
of material self-interest.534  Political activity however has no set boundaries; in fact it is the 
competition for domination of one set of underlying values over another.   
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To give context, Max Weber heavily influenced Morgenthau in his conception of the 
specificity of politics.535  Weber saw the distinctiveness of the political sphere as both an 
analytic device and a liberal political choice.  Analytically, the specificity of politics allows 
for the separate assessment of different spheres of human life according to their own specific 
rationalities, rather than be forced to adopt universalized analytic standard across 
fundamentally different spheres of human behavior.  As Warren notes, this is why “one does 
not judge art by logical consistency, love by utility, or righteousness by efficiency.”536   
Politically, Weber expanded on Kant’s differentiation of spheres of knowledge (empirical / 
aesthetic / moral) and argued that such differentiation between spheres of human behavior is 
a legitimate device because it promotes the realization of human freedom by liberating 
thought from the bounds of dogma (e.g. by being forced to adopt religious rationalities for 
economic decisions, or vice versa) and, through politics, provides an arena for people to 
propose and compete their values and rationalities.537   To emphasize, this is raised simply in 
order to underline the need to and benefit of engaging more deeply with the full spectrum of 
political theory in analyzing terrorist financing (even though comprehensive engagement is 
outside the scope of this particular thesis). 
 
This brings up an important criticism of the specificity of politics, namely that the 
differentiation of social spheres implies that each has a single “logic.”  On the surface, this 
can easily be mistaken for a mechanistic analytic approach that emphasizes the 
instrumentality of each social sphere in its relationships with the others.  However, a closer 
reading of this concept reveals that the specificity of politics should be seen as simply an 
analytical device to highlight the competing interests and struggles at play within a single 
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situation, and that that political decisions should not be reduced to one or another.  In fact, it 
is clear that Morgenthau differentiated the spheres of human action around the limitless scope 
of political judgment precisely in order to avoid a concept of politics that relied on a 
Schmittian friend/enemy dichotomy of endless conflict.538 
 
Morgenthau answers this critique by using the specificity of politics to focus on the 
evaluations of human judgment, because by doing so one can analytically challenge the use 
of “the other” to make a decision:  
“Morgenthau’s narrowing of the political sphere is neither an oversight nor a result 
of a lack of analytic sophistication.  Rather than ignoring the obvious breadth of 
political life or the complexity of the concept of the political, the limited conception of 
politics is part of a sophisticated intellectual strategy seeking to address the 
centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to an undifferentiated sphere 
of violence, to distinguish legitimate forms of political power, to insulate the political 
sphere form physical violence, and to discern the social structures which such a 
strategy requires to be successful.”
539
 
This represents a much fuller approach to the construction of action than either a 
constructivist or Schmittian method.  In the first instance, constructivism would stop simply 
at concluding that these two constructions are intrinsically in conflict (given a particular 
context, or for everyone if not).540  
 
This is relevant because terrorist financing exchanges are governed by and can be analyzed 
according to a specifically political logic, largely because local dynamics about competition 
for power, i.e. what forms of power take precedence over what others, by what and what 
means are these forms of power limited, and in which contexts does this occur, determines 
which societal, cultural, economic, or other ‘structural’ factor conditions which act of 
‘agency’ in a given political-economic context.  In other words, terrorist financing activities 
mirror the relationship terrorists have with wider societies, and understanding terrorist 
                                                           
538 Michael C. Williams, 2005. 
539 Ibid., 108. 
540 Ibid. 
  
 
239 
finance means understanding this relationship.  For example Hezbollah’s financing mirror its 
role as a state proxy within the greater Middle East, HAMAS and IRA financing mirrors their 
role as a religiously based national liberation movement, and al Qaeda mirrors its role as a 
radical grassroots socio-religious movement.541  This assumption embeds terrorist financing 
in to societal and historical realities rather than the personal or political agendas of analysts.  
In other words, this acts as a hedge against bias, and forces a deeper understanding of the 
externalities influencing terrorist financing activity. 
 
Differentiating political activity thus provides the capacity to distinguish activity related to 
the financing of terrorism from that which is not, when the actual behaviors involved may be 
similar or identical.  In other words, it is a device to arrive at meaning, rather than simply 
description, about this intrinsically political issue.  As discussed above, humans are spared 
endlessly destructive conflict not by any natural interest or structure but only by the near 
infinite capacity for people to imagine and make real alternative visions of how the world 
should be.542  Ultimately, this implies that analysis of terrorist financing should revolve 
around analysis of not only the politics of the individual political economic decisions 
involved (e.g. intent, ideology, links with terrorist groups, etc), but also and in many cases 
more importantly how terrorism-related politics are limited (or not) by economic exchange 
within given contexts (e.g. the actual consequences of agency – which may lead to 
uncomfortable conclusions or more difficult sociological analysis). 
 
Narrowing the concept of politics to the process of this existential contest therefore reveals a 
‘logic’ of political conflict in which political actors seek out ways to strategically limit the 
                                                           
541 See Jeroen Gunning, "Terrorism, charities, and diasporas," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. 
Thomas J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
542 This is reflected in the diverse and ever-changing nature of the political spaces in which terrorist financing 
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destructive capacity and maximize the positive possibilities of politics.  Recognition of this 
logic provides an epistemological device to evaluate these strategic choices separate both 
separate from and in context of the various factors influencing that choice.  Because terrorism 
is a political act – i.e. a (small scale) conflict over fundamental values – each terrorist 
financing transaction will have a particular ‘logic of political conflict’ comprised of a series 
of individual strategic choices.  Analysis of the dynamics of how these choices were 
formulated and exercised can lead to otherwise difficult to obtain insights into the social, 
political, economic, and operational contexts in which these political decisions took place. 
For example, knowledge of the political logic of a specific bank transfer may yield further 
knowledge of the operations, support networks, and other aspects of terrorist groups.  In 
addition, the specificity of the political sphere has certain political implications in an of itself, 
which match well with the political ends of terrorist financing analysis, specifically the goal 
to aid liberal democratic societies in both hindering the financing of terrorism and exploiting 
knowledge of it to confront terrorist actors.  In this context, differentiating political activity 
allows consumers of the analysis to assess the political implications of terrorist financing 
activity, upon which their own political judgments and actions can be based.  In short, the 
conceptual specificity of politics forces transparency of political goals of analysis and 
therefore helps inform political analysis and helps shield political judgments from undue or 
hidden influence from economic, bureaucratic, or other objects of interest. 
A Logic of Limited Politics 
Another device is what Morgenthau described as the “Strategy of Limits” for political action, 
which is centrally relevant as limited government is one of the foundations of liberal 
democracies.  This strategy defines political power as distinct from other forms of power, 
including those stemming from physical force, legitimacy, economic, social, ideological, and 
institutional influence.  This separates the pursuit of power from the pursuit of other interests, 
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such as wealth or social acceptance.  Distinguishing political power also provides a way to 
limit the legitimacy of violence by separating the power of force from true political power 
(which may be achieved through a variety of means).543   In short, the strategy of limits is a 
way in which analysis can be directed towards ‘winning,’ i.e. the victory of one vision of 
political structure (e.g. liberal democracy) against another (e.g. that for which terrorist fight).   
 
A strategy of limits also calls for actions that help develop other social spheres in which the 
pursuit of interests using other forms of power is possible and encouraged.  This allows 
humans the freedom to pursue the full range of possible interests – i.e. to do whatever it is 
they want to do and achieve.  This strategy also insulates the spheres from each other, 
analytically and institutionally.  As discussed above, politics is the process by which ideas 
and values are created and destroyed.  Given this, a strategy of limits, specifically the 
separation of spheres that it requires, acts as a counterbalance against the most destructive 
consequences of political conflict, just as political conflict checks the ability of these other 
realms to dominate the realm of values and thought (e.g. by subsuming values and ethics to 
material consumption, or to moral dogma).  This helps to establish a system in which the 
pursuit of any one or group of interests does not cannibalize the pursuit of others, e.g. that the 
pursuit of wealth eliminates the pursuit of morality, or that the pursuit of moral living does 
not rule out the pursuit of innovation, etc.544   
 
This powerful analytical device allows for direct application of critical analysis to action, for 
example by asking “Has political power been separately defined?” “Have other social spheres 
been allowed to develop?” “Are these separate social spheres insulated from one another, and 
if so, by what measure?”  For example, when analyzing a tribal culture, this allows for 
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political power to not be defined as separate from social bonds, particularly those of kinship.  
Therefore, in order to compete politically, i.e. by promoting alternative values and 
rationalities in such a society one must address that condition, either by using power to 
separate the spheres, or by creating a system in which their interests in the political or non-
political spheres can be achieved without the separation. In this example, it might call for 
action such as promoting Pahstunwali to accept the power of the state government of 
Afghanistan. 
 
One hypothesis to which this leads is that political actors and actions can be analyzed in 
terms of this ‘strategy of limits,’ – not because it is either universal (as many or most actors 
are neither aware of it nor follow its prescriptions) or comprehensive (as the separation of the 
spheres will always be partial) – but because it enables action to be based on systematic 
analytical assessment of all the components of political behavior, as well as the elements of 
non-political behavior that impact political decisions.  This is exactly what the analysis of 
terrorist financing requires.  
The Balance of Power 
In Realist thought, many strategies for action revolve around the concept of the balance of 
power.  Although for many this concept is intrinsically related to the state, the balance of 
power is an important strategy for action related to terrorist finance.  As Williams 
describes,545 the Realist conception of the balance of power originates in beliefs and 
assumptions about the relationship between ideas and action.  Morgenthau argued that ideas 
are not powerful enough to triumph in social life (no matter their clarity, effectiveness, or 
even wide acceptance), and that they thus must be both supported by viable social 
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foundations and perceived as supporting competing interests.546  The mechanism by which 
this occurs, i.e. the device by which politics is narrowed, its destructive capacity limited, and 
its creative possibilities protected, is the “balance of power.”   
 
This concept however goes far beyond the constricted interstate conceptions dominant in 
International Relations discourse.  As noted before, different social spheres (e.g. economic, 
legal, moral, cultural) act as a limiting force on the unbounded pursuit of power that is 
politics, and politics does the same in reverse.   As Williams states, 
“While actors in these spheres may be tempted to further their interest and power by 
dominating the political field, they will also resist attempts by the political sphere to 
encroach upon their autonomy, and vice versa.”
547
   
This leads therefore to a “social balance of power”548 in which competing spheres of human 
activity, rather than competing actors, balance one another out.  Analytically, this is 
extremely useful for the analysis of terrorist finance, because it provides a clear 
epistemological framework revolving around that knowledge which shows how power is 
exercised in the pursuit of a particular interest (and that which explains that interest, the 
forms of power used, etc).  In other words, the social balance of power is potentially an 
important concept for understanding the political dimensions of terrorist financing because it 
provides an analytic device for systematically understanding how in fact the ‘competing 
spheres of human activity’ mentioned by Williams interact, and it is within these interactions 
and competitions that terrorist financing occurs to an important extent. 
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It is helpful to place this concept of the social balance of power within the context of 
modernity.549   According to many authors, modernity intentionally breaks down the social 
balances of power of premodern societies, e.g. belief in the divine/the lord/the leader/the 
tribe/etc.  On one hand, this liberates people and allows them to find their own individual 
balance among the different powers to which they are subject (e.g. economic well being over 
belief in God, or belief in the democratic system over the power of economic wealth).  On the 
other hand, it leads to atomization and alienation, if individuals are not able to balance 
competing interests. This leads to vulnerability to an unbalanced acceptance of one sphere of 
interest, e.g. international jihad, criminal gangs, or soulless consumerism.550  As Morgenthau 
wrote,  
“The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, especially in the lower 
strata, and the atomization of Western society in general have magnified enormously 
the frustration of individual power drives.  This, in turn, has given rise to an 
increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national 
aspiration for power.”
551
   
It must be remembered that Morgenthau wrote this within his own historical context.  Given 
the nature of contemporary international society and the realities of terrorist finance, this can 
be expanded to now read “ This, in turn, has given rise to an increased desire for any 
compensatory identification of any collective aspiration for power with potential,” such as the 
international jihad, a local gang, or any other socio-political movement. This is a better 
explanation than rationalist perspectives by bank officials which claim they can take no 
action because the rules prevent them, or politicians that claim that ancient hatreds are 
responsible for a contemporary conflict. 
 
In short, the Realist balance of power argues that solving problems is not just about amassing 
power. Realists do not assume rational actors, reasoned behavior, or strategic rational 
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competition, but they do seeks to create such things, as a solution to the problems of 
destructiveness of politics.552  In this way, Realism doesn’t assume that actors are self 
interested, they just assume that they are interested.  In fact, Morgenthau rebels against 
Schmitt with his strategy of limits precisely to avoid the Schmittian logic of enmity and the 
realpolitik that could result in a view of politics as a realm of limitless struggle for 
domination.553 The social balance of power is thus potentially an important concept for 
understanding the political dimensions of terrorist financing because it provides an analytic 
device for understanding how in fact the ‘competing spheres of human activity’ mentioned by 
Williams interact (many of which exist in societies not structured according to modern 
norms, mores, and structures) and it is within these interactions and competitions that terrorist 
financing occurs to an important extent. 
Knowledge of Terrorist Finance is Necessarily Subjective 
Although this dissertation provides a epistemological model for improving the analysis of 
terrorist finance, it is necessary to recognize that there will always be limits to knowledge and 
language hindering fuller understanding of the issue. The final epistemic premise therefore is 
that knowledge of terrorist financing will always be imperfect and that analysis of it will 
always be subject to political and social pressures. This is because the analysis of terrorist 
financing itself is a political activity directed towards specific goals and objectives and thus 
policies and politics,554 which in turn implies that the analysis of terrorist financing is, like 
politics, the ‘art of the possible.’  A crucial part of this is the control and use of knowledge.  
This is just as true for a bank teller, a warlord, or a state government.  There is a close 
relationship between power and knowledge in the individual and collective relationships 
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along which individual exchanges occur, i.e. who has the power and who is controlling the 
knowledge, i.e. who is in the position to make value flow.   
 
Terrorist financing is often the product of the material expression of political support for a 
terrorist actor or a terrorist cause.  Much of this is dependent on the benefactor’s knowledge 
of the terrorist actor or cause, and thus also about the terrorist’s ability to propagate 
knowledge about himself that leads to material support.  Thus terrorist financing, and the 
powers by which it is governed, are centrally a function of knowledge.  It is through 
knowledge, specifically through the competition and victory of one knowledge against 
another that governs the mechanism, pathways, and outcome of terrorist financing activity.  
Related to this, Foucault remarked: 
“Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any 
more than silences are. We must make allowance for the concept’s complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting 
point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it (Foucault 1980, emphasis added).” 
 
An important part of Foucault’s power/knowledge is the belief that those who are in power 
have specialist knowledge. In cases such as these, “the production of knowledge and the 
exercise of administrative power intertwine, and each begins to enhance the other.”555 This is 
the reciprocal nature of these two words that Foucault titled “power/knowledge.” For 
Foucault, this is a reciprocal, mutually reinforcing relation between the circulation of 
knowledge and subsiquently the control of conduct.  What is new is the recognition that the 
specialist knowledge required in terrorist financing is often knowledge of people, how to 
manipulate them and relate to them, not necessarily knowledge of a technical sort.  More 
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simply, it is social knowledge, rather than technical, political (ideology, normative, etc), or 
economic (product, profit, etc) knowledge.  
 
Since it serves state and societal interests, analysis of terrorist financing is a political project 
in itself, and thus issues of language carry and transmit real power. The term ‘threat finance’ 
has already replaced ‘terrorist financing’ within the U.S. military because it captures the 
contingent nature of the problem and more closely aligns analysis to particular objectives and 
norms, and thus is a more potent term.556  However – to borrow a term from sociology – in 
order to be ‘legible’557 to the diverse community that consumes such analysis, it is necessary 
to continue to use the term “terrorist financing” for the foreseeable future.  Nevertheless, 
even though we are stuck with the inferior term, it is crucial to recognize the importance of 
aligning analysis with the interests of both its producers and consumers.   
 
Therefore, we must consider the process by which knowledge of terrorist financing is 
produced, as well as the actual output.  The necessary corollary is that it is impossible to ever 
fully “stop’ terrorist finance, any more than it is possible to achieve absolute ‘security.’  This 
implies a contingent nature of terrorist financing analysis – not only on the societal, 
operational, and other vagaries of terrorist financing activity, but also the contingent nature of 
our knowledge about it.  In other words, assuming there are limitations to our knowledge 
implies that terrorist financing analysis must not only account for the agency of those being 
studied, but also the agency of the analyst.  After all, analysts of terrorist financing are people 
and they will choose to produce knowledge in certain way, based on their own or their 
                                                           
556 Thomas W. O’Connell, "Defense Perspectives: The War on Terrorism," 17th Annual NDIA Special 
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community’s interests.  This therefore adds significant normative and political elements to 
terrorist financing analysis.   
 
Examples of discourses as sites of power in themselves are evident throughout the global 
political economy.  There is for example, no fundamental difference between Enron’s 
strategic creation of various fake yet bureaucratically effective bank accounts, shell 
companies, et al so as to avoid taxation and to enable false reporting of profits and losses, and 
the creation by Hezbollah, the IRA, or other terrorist actors of misleading yet rhetorically 
powerful historical and political narratives about ‘their’ people’s victimhood that form the 
basis of their fundraising appeals.  Both simply are uses of knowledge for a specific end.  As 
we have seen, however, the current discourse on terrorist financing has trouble observing and 
analyzing these dynamics of knowledge and power because it is largely blinded by adherence 
to various ideological postures and empirically unsupported assumptions that while may be 
rhetorically powerful do not form the basis for knowledge for truly serving liberal democratic 
ends. This best this dissertation therefore can hope for is to build an improved discursive 
basis of terrorist financing, distinct from the discourses on terrorism, neoliberal economics 
and law, and various critical approaches in their hyper-rationalist and unsystematic forms, 
that is firmly aligned with both the observed empirical realities of terrorist finance and the 
interests of liberal democracy. In other words, I seek a discourse that represents terrorism-
related financial activity in ways that such activity can be researched systematically, but not 
‘objectively.’  Given that knowledge of terrorist finance is inherently politicized and 
securitized, and thus tied to specific practices and systems of power, it is only by 
systematically analyzing its intersubjective realities within these contexts that more accurate, 
coherent, and practically useful knowledge of terrorist finance can be produce.   
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Relocating Terrorist Finance within International Relations 
The chapter so far has demonstrated that it is more profitable to orient conceptualizations of 
terrorist financing away from agents’ characteristics (people and their attributes, like profile 
or intent), away from structure (the social, political, economic, legal, and normative contexts 
of behavior), away from the state (failed states, weak states, and non-states), and thus also 
away from approaches that have proven so unsuccessful in explaining terrorist financing.  
Instead, it appears that analysis of terrorist financing would be much improved if it were to be 
reoriented towards a more systematic – but, importantly, not ‘objective’ – analysis of the 
dynamics and consequences of political-economic decision-making and its consequences. In 
other words, this thesis is ready to argue for a shift in the focus of terrorist financing analysis 
towards the dynamics of terrorists’ participation in and interaction with larger political 
economic communities, and the subjective meaning – for analysts – of such participation and 
interactions.  
 
This section thus reframes terrorist financing as an issue of international security that is 
governed by individual level political economic interactions, because to summarize the above 
discussions, at core terrorist financing related to the dynamics of power and the everyday 
individual exchange of value within given political economies contexts.  To reiterate, the 
‘right’ questions asked above reflect that the core concepts of terrorist financing related to the 
dynamics and meaning of terrorists’ participation in larger political economies.  This section 
fleshes this out a bit, and given that international security discourses generally are separated 
from political economic discourse, this section more explicitly explores the most relevant 
concepts of political economy, including those specifically within International Political 
Economy (IPE) discourse.   
 
  
 
250 
In part, this requires locating terrorist financing into an appropriate disciplinary home, from 
which further conceptual and theoretical development can proceed.  As discussed above, 
debates on terrorism, conflict, criminology, and other sub-sets of international relations are 
not sufficient disciplinary bases for a holistic and systematic understanding of terrorist 
finance.  In fact, International Relations as a discipline seems ill suited to the task in its 
present form. Cox remarked, “We cannot define a problem in global politics without 
presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the significant kinds of entities involved 
and the form of significant relationships among them.”558  Since analysis of terrorist 
financing necessarily involves understanding several different ‘basic structures,’ ‘ontologies,’ 
or, in Bourdieu’s words, “universe[s] of possible discourse,”559 it would seem International 
Relations, marketed as a ‘discipline of disciplines,’ would be well suited to integrate not just 
one field of knowledge but several.  However, International Relations discourse lacks any 
such agreed upon epistemological or ontological structure to govern intersubjective thinking.  
Therefore, while one can study complex, intersubjective issues within the IR discipline (and 
publish in IR journals), limiting oneself to its discursive boundaries would be insufficient in 
the extreme to understand the complex human experiences that govern terrorist finance.  For 
these reasons, I propose ‘relocating’ terrorist financing to within international security 
discourse, but explicitly focused on – and engaging with - concepts of political economy.   
 
Reframing terrorist financing a security issue that centers on political economic interaction 
brings a larger measure of conceptual order and coherence to an issue that as we have seen 
can cross virtually every social scientific discipline and theoretical boundaries.  In particular, 
including political economic concepts so centrally illuminates the central concepts around 
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which terrorist financing revolve.  Surprisingly, these are not terrorism or finance, or even 
security, globalization, risk, or other similar issues.  Instead, framing the topic as such shows 
that at the conceptual core of terrorist finance are the concepts of power, value, and the 
dynamics of everyday, individual-level exchanges that produce change in the capabilities and 
behaviors of ‘terrorist’ actors.  In other words, terrorist financing can be distilled to the 
interplay of power practices and dynamics, which flow through all aspects of terrorist 
financing; conditioning, determining, and being determined by its complex realities, and 
economic competition and inequality, in that the issue relates directly to how the economic 
success or failure of terrorist actors impact securitized views of political and social change, 
within given contextual parameters. 
The International Security Dimensions of Terrorist Finance: Addressing the Liberal 
Problematic of Security 
To review and as discussed in Chapter One, this dissertation fundamentally conceives 
terrorist financing to be, again quoting de Goede, “a cultural imaginary and political problem 
in need of (security) intervention,”560 which, because it is “mediated” as a security concern, is 
at core a topic of securitized socio-political representation.561  From this starting point, the 
dissertation in Chapters Two, Three, and the preceding parts of Four has developed the idea 
that terrorism-related financial activity is not in itself a threat to international security (as the 
‘orthodox’ perspectives claim), but rather is a set of political-economic interactions that both 
impact the nature of and reflect information about threats to international security (as this 
dissertation’s argues).  This subtle but profound difference in how one should conceptualize 
terrorist finance has equally significant impact on understanding the security dimensions of 
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terrorist finance, and thus also the place terrorist financing most appropriately occupies 
within international security thinking and discourse.   
 
Terrorist financing, as mentioned in Chapter One, is embedded within a “liberal problematic 
of security,” which, to review, means that even successfully securitizing terrorism-related 
financial activity does not produce ‘more’ security, but instead simply changes the conditions 
in which certain (desirable) actors and actions achieve gains relative to their undesirable 
counterparts.562  For example, as discussed above, just because a terrorist group has more (or 
less) money, does not necessarily mean that it will commit more (or less) terrorism.  
Conceptually, the reason for this is that the impact the acquisition and exchange of value has 
on the capabilities and behaviors of terrorist actors depends on a host of other factors that, 
depending on the actor in question, could include anything from moral considerations to 
cultural traditions to social practices to the psychology or strategic calculations of group 
leaders.  This is exactly why, as argued above, the ‘right’ questions to ask about terrorist 
finance relate to how the exchange of value impacts terrorist actions, and what such 
exchanges reflect about terrorist actors’ wider relationships.  Thus, the reframed 
conceptualization of terrorist finance presented here remains an issue of international 
security, but one in which a complex of other factors determine exactly how political 
economic activity is securitized.   
 
It should be noted that reframing terrorist finance in this way matches closely with similar 
turns in thinking on both terrorism and conflict debates, both of which have evolved more 
socially embedded and contextualized thinking about their respective topics.  For example, 
understandings of conflict have evolved well beyond approaches that view security and 
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violence only in state-vs-state or military-centric terms,563 and terrorism debates have also 
undergone a similar development to now include much work that not only encompasses 
wider and more ‘critical’ perspectives, but also just as importantly more research on the 
social, cultural, psychological, historical, political, and other contingent contexts of 
terrorism.564  
 
Returning to the liberal problematic of security, the eponymous ‘problem’ arises in that 
whether these changed conditions are sufficiently beneficial – and to whom they are 
beneficial – are highly contestable and by no means objective.  This matches closely with de 
Goede’s existing conceptualization of terrorist financing as a problem of politicized 
representation of certain securitized (i.e. terrorism-related) financial activity.565   
 
The liberal problematic of security construct also provides a specific conceptual point at 
which terrorist finance can relate to works on the problems of understanding and governing 
illicit and extra-legal economies, such as those by Nordstrom,566 Naim567, and Palan;568 an 
important development because such research has to date largely been wholly separated from 
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that on terrorist finance.569   For instance, much of terrorist financing appears to involve 
small-level, localized political economic transactions, and as the framework presented in this 
thesis could be applied to systematically answer this question, it could also be used to more 
definitively assess the impact of regulatory frameworks relating to ‘offshore’ jurisdictions 
and ‘tax havens’ on terrorist finance.  Furthermore, placing this dissertation’s conceptual 
representation of terrorism-related financial activity explicitly within the ‘liberal problematic 
of security,’ it is possible to also compare and contrast how ideas about other ‘bad’ – but, 
importantly unlike terrorist financing, not securitized – political economic activity (e.g. tax 
havens or money laundering) have transformed over time, why, and what the implications 
have been for liberal societies.  For example, Sharman has argued that such a politicized 
transformation of ideas was attempted regarding tax havens, specifically towards a 
representation of the issue promoted by rich and powerful OECD governments570 of these 
activities as illicit (and thus anti-liberal). 571  Interestingly, however, in this case, this view of 
tax havens was successfully challenged by a group of small, comparatively weak states572 
that offered an alternative representation of their actions as (liberal) ‘tax competition.’573 In 
particular, Sharman describes how the weaker ‘tax haven’ jurisdictions used OECD’s own 
symbols and values against it to promote a representation of this contested issue that was 
more advantageous to them.  This “critique within hegemony”574 succeeded, Sharman argues, 
because since the powerful OECD viewed itself as both a supporter of free market principles 
and also an objective, “scientific” authority on economic regulation, the subordinated tax 
haven states were able to present alternative ideas about international tax regulation in ways 
                                                           
569 Marieke de Goede, "Money, Media, and the Anti-Politics of Terrorist Finance," European Journal of 
Cultural Studies 11, no. 3 (2008). 
570 Such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. 
571 J.C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
572 Such as Lichtenstein, Aruba, the Cayman Islands, and Nauru.   
573 J.C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
574 J.C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), 145. 
  
 
255 
that challenged anti-tax haven policies on those grounds.  This worked because by 
challenging even powerful and ingrained orthodoxies in its own terms, the ‘tax haven’ states 
were able to “appeal to sincere members of the elite in a way that an attack from outside their 
values could not.” 575  
 
It would be interesting to systematically compare this and similar representational 
transformations to how terrorist finance is understood, as it may provide insight into ways 
that alternative representations of terrorist financing – like the one presented here – could 
challenge the ingrained yet analytically deficient orthodoxies that currently dominate counter 
terrorist financing practice.  As discussed earlier, de Goede argued that many efforts to 
combat the financing of terrorism have been presented as unproblematic, when their efficacy 
and indeed their analytic and empirical bases are highly debatable.576 For instance, the 
typology described in the next chapter offers a framework, grounded in the two ‘right 
questions’ posed above, upon which a systematic comparison of how terrorist groups access 
and actually benefit from various value chains.  This representation of terrorism-related 
financial activity could potentially provide a potent mechanism for assessing more precisely 
the actual threat represented by terrorism-related financial activity, especially if, as a ‘critique 
within hegemony,’ it was presented in ways that demonstrated that specific counter terrorist 
financing practices were unsuccessful or poorly formulated.  However, since the above would 
require in depth analysis of the particular counter terrorist financing practices and systems of 
power to be assessed, such an analysis would need to occur outside the bounds of this 
particular thesis. 
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Regardless, given that both research into and efforts to combat terrorist finance relate closely 
to this liberal problematic of security, the conceptual representation of terrorist finance 
presented in this thesis implies a shift in how terrorist financing is imagined and mediated as 
a threat, and ultimately used as a justification for action against security threats.  As such, it 
also offers an approach that can be used to develop more nuanced outcomes within this 
liberal problematic of security, and thus also outcomes of counter terrorist financing actions 
more in line with liberal principles, in three particular ways.    
 
Briefly, this is because the conceptualization of terrorist finance presented herein indicates 
that the ‘anti-politics’ that currently mediate terrorist finance discourse and action could be 
replaced by an approach grounded in ‘biopolitics.’  De Goede has observed that underlying 
both discourse and action relating to terrorist finance is what Foucault conceived of as “anti-
politics,” that is an affirmative form of power that “fashions, observes, knows and multiplies 
itself on the basis of its own effects,” in order to undermine and forbid undesirable actors and 
actions.577   In terms of terrorist financing, de Goede observes that the anti-politics of terrorist 
financing is evident in how the issue is presented as unproblematic, uncontested, and indeed 
uncontestable, which ultimately results in, 
 “marginalizing and repressing particular financial practices, but always with the 
effect of allowing and securing the circulation of what are coined as normal financial 
spaces of western markets and registered money transfers…[in order to] produc[e] 
governable spaces and secur[e] continued circulation.”
578
   
 
 
However, the representation of terrorist financing presented in this thesis undermines such 
anti-politics.  To replaces it, this thesis hypothesizes here that terrorist finance, as 
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reconceptualized by this thesis, likely rests more on a foundation of ‘bio-politics.’  This term, 
also from Foucault, is a form of politics that deals with “how groups, communities and 
people are acted upon in order to support and promote collective life,”579 and is characterized 
by a form of regulatory power “to foster life or disallow it.”580  In terms of the liberal 
problematic of security, Duffield observes that biopolitics is the mechanism by which liberal 
societies obtain knowledge about and rationalize what processes are ‘best’ for a given group, 
community, or population,581 and, echoing Dean,582 states that biopolitics is distinct from but 
a necessary condition of liberal systems of governance.583  As such – and again given that 
terrorist financing is intrinsically a politicized topic – the representation of terrorist finance 
presented in this thesis is much more attuned to being grounded in biopolitics than anti-
politics, which in turn makes it more amendable to being used to support actions in response 
to terrorism-related financial activity that are more aligned with liberal principles of 
governance than counter terrorist financing have been to date.  
 
The conceptual representation presented in this dissertation rejects an anti-political and is 
aligned with a biopolitical approach to the liberal problematic of security, in three primary 
ways.  First, by beginning with an assumption that terrorist finance is intrinsically contested 
and problematic, it undermines any attempt to represent the issue as anything other than this.  
This locates research into terrorist financing squarely as similar to those international security 
discourses that while employing post-structural and constructivist perspectives to understand 
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how the contested and problematic realities of conflict and security are both understood by 
researchers and governed by those in power.584  
 
Second, by tightly focusing analysis on those political-economic interactions that either 
impact the behavior or capabilities of terrorist actors, or tell us about terrorist actors 
relationships with wider communities (i.e. the ‘right questions), this thesis explicitly rejects 
the need to marginalize or repress any particular financial or economic practice, as is done in 
an ‘anti-political’ discourse.  This is simply because any such practice or activity – including 
legitimate, legal, or otherwise ‘desirable’ ones – may be relevant to understanding terrorism-
related economic activity.  This enables future terrorist financing research to engage more 
fully with many contemporary IR debates, such as with a growing terrorism discourse that 
applies a diversity of disciplinary approaches (such as anthropology, psychology, social 
movement theory, and peace studies, among others) to understand the behaviors and socio-
political contexts of terrorism,585  and with relevant area studies (especially those that focus 
on political economic issue of the Middle East and South Asia), which in turn produces more 
comprehensive and contextually sensitive depictions of these communities.   
 
Third, by explicitly framing terrorist finance as an issue of concern of the ‘community of 
terrorist financing analysts’ and that how the issue is represented will change according to the 
objectives and purposes of the analysis, it encourages research that engages with both 
specific relevant communities of power (e.g. official/governmental, private sector/financial 
industry, charitable sector, the citizen public) as well as communities impacted by how 
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terrorist financing is mediated and represented (e.g. ethnic and religious groups considered to 
be ‘involved’ in terrorist financing).  This helps ensure that these often competing 
perspectives are represented in how terrorist financing is mediated and conceptualized.  This 
enables future research on terrorist financing to be more than simply ‘useful’ to these 
communities, but to equate to nuanced knowledge that can contribute to how the liberal 
problematic of security, in terms of this issue, is addressed and resolved.   
The Political Economic Dimensions of Terrorist Finance: Conceptualizing ‘Everyday’ 
Terrorist Financing 
Although terrorist financing is at core a security issue, the representation of terrorist finance 
presented in this thesis emphasizes a central place of political economic interaction. This 
section therefore seeks to identify the key relevant themes within academic political-
economic discourse.  This both helps further locate this improved conceptualization of 
terrorist financing into the International Relations discipline, and provides direction to future 
research on terrorist finance. 
 
By political economy, I refer to neither the narrow sub-discipline of International Political 
Economy (IPE) (in either its statist or ‘critical’ varieties), nor the hyperrationalist Marxist 
Political-Economy to which IPE was a response, but rather the socially incisive, 
philosophically sound, and morally conscious tradition begun by Adam Smith.  This once 
great, but now somewhat lost, discipline of political economy, on the other hand, revolves 
simply around the study of how power and wealth influence one another.  Such a socially and 
cognitively oriented conception of political economy provides a powerful 
rhetorical/intellectual device for ordering thought.  This brings conceptual and rhetorical 
order to the complex empirical realities of terrorist financial activity.  It allows for different 
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types of activity to be systematically differentiated and analyzed according to different logics, 
something necessary for such a complex and multivariate topic as terrorist finance.  
 
In some ways, however, this is difficult to accomplish given the space limitations of this 
thesis.  Political-economic discourse consists of a variety of often competing ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological approaches, including not only nationalist, liberal, and 
critical-constructivist perspectives,586 but also various formulations of each, such as 
“International Political Economy,” “Regulatory International Political Economy,” “Global 
Political Economy,” “Classical Political Economy,” et al.  Choosing one or another approach 
thus requires due attention to the various debates and sub-debates within the chosen 
discourse, and rigorous assessment of the relevance of these debates to this dissertation’s 
representation of terrorist finance, as well as examination of any relevant discursive gaps that 
may exist.   More simply, although fully engaging with IPE and other political economic 
discourse is important for long term understanding of terrorist financing – and thus also of 
full  development and application of the representation of terrorist finance presented herein –
doing so to this extent would simply be impossible within this thesis, let alone this section of 
this chapter.   
 
Therefore, the discussion below will focus on two elements.  First, it will explore what key 
conceptual issues and themes are most relevant to and can be best applied to the improved 
conceptualization of terrorist financing presented in this dissertation.  This will provide a 
‘meta’ perspective of political economic discourse to provide general conceptual context to 
the aspects of this representation of terrorist financing that relate to political economy, and 
also provide an outline of areas important for further research.  Second, it will introduce a 
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specific theoretical framework of international political economy – ‘Everyday Political 
Economy’ – that provides a needed starting point for the fuller engagement with political 
economic theory that will take place outside of this dissertation.   
 
These two contemporary discourses of political economy, ‘eclectic global political economy’ 
and ‘everyday political economy,’ come close to this. These discourses provide a systematic, 
methodologically sound template for analysis of the diverse everyday social, political, 
economic, institutional, ideational, and moral elements at play within terrorist finance, many 
of which are obscured, ignored, or even intentionally suppressed in existing discourse.  
Described below, they in particular offer promising conceptual grounding for the complex 
dynamics of political-economic choice and its consequences, which, as this dissertation has 
shown, lies at the center of the reality of terrorist finance. 
Meta Perspectives: Eclectic Global Political Economy 
As such, it is worthwhile to organize the following discussion according to a broad, 
ecumenical, ‘meta’ perspective of political economy that focuses in particular on the 
interplay between political power and inequalities in wealth.  Therefore, the following is 
structured according to O’Brien and Williams’ ‘eclectic’ discourse of global political 
economy which provides a useful framework with which to outline and explore the political 
economic dimensions of terrorist financing.587  Most generally, Eclectic Global Political 
Economy (eGPE) focuses in particular on issues of power and inequality of wealth rejects 
one-dimensional views of political and economic orders as either basically conflictual or 
basically harmonious, arguing that political economy can be both, depending on factors such 
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as institutions, actors, and structures.588  More specifically, eclectic global political economy 
consists of six analytic pillars, described below, and through which ultimately, it is possible 
to explain how the compendiums of individual choices and interactions that are the reality of 
terrorist finance become global systems; and how analytically it is possible to simultaneously 
separate distinct yet related political and economic factors within analysis yet also integrate 
them.  
Integrating Economics and Politics 
The first claim of an ‘eclectic’ discourse of global political economy is the assumption that 
politics and economics should be taken as conceptually and analytically inseparable.  O’Brien 
and Williams observe that approaches that separate economics from politics lead to the 
reification and freezing of economic or political structures and processes within political 
economic discourse.589  An open question, however, is how precisely to integrate the various 
‘logics’ of vastly different spheres of thought and action, e.g. cultural obligation vs. self 
interest vs. political mobilization vs. social expectation vs. cognitive agency, etc.  Therefore, 
by assuming that there is no ontological separation between politics and economics, this 
approach welcomes my findings that analytic devices and tools, such as the Classical Realist 
‘specificity of politics’ discussed earlier, can help structure analyses of terrorist financing and 
related issues without freezing them.   
Historical Change 
Secondly, O’Brien and Williams claim that analysis of political-economic issues such as 
terrorist finance should also be sensitive to historical change. In other words, political 
economic discourse should not be ahistorical and should describe how and from where 
contemporary political economic circumstances arose.  It rests on the assumption that the 
                                                           
588 Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics, 2nd (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 418. 
589 Ibid., 410. 
  
 
263 
issues and concepts in the global political economy, as well as our interpretation of them, 
arise within specific historical contexts and thus do not have necessarily consistent meanings 
throughout history.  As discussed, terrorist financing and our understanding of it has arisen 
specifically within specific historical contexts such as the Global War on Terror, the 
emergence of viable alternatives to the global neoliberal economy, the wide adoption of 
myths about and anti-rational analysis of international society, a global Islamic revival, 
globalization, and financial sector standardization, among others.  This tenet provides a clear 
discursive home for the in-depth, empirically sound, context-specific research that ‘virtuous’ 
analysis of terrorist financing requires, and for which methods from the fields of history, 
anthropology, and area studies can be employed.  
Agents and Structures 
The third aspect of an ‘eclectic’ approach to global political economy relates to its 
structurationist approach, in which agents and structures are co-determined in complex ways, 
but the relative causation of which can be determined through empirical analysis more than 
abstract theorization.  This offers to expand the conceptual horizons of terrorist financing 
research beyond the safe confines of both the traditional approaches of terrorism studies and 
their strong positivist and neorealist undertones, and the unsystematic, self-referential 
‘critical’ approaches.  Because actor behavior in terrorist financing (both at the core and the 
periphery) is determined by complex sets of causes and effects, the epistemological outlook 
is potentially opened up to data on the full range of actor characteristics, including not only 
political and operational factors such as ideology and transaction activity, but also societal, 
economic, institutional, cultural, and psychological factors like kinship, cost-benefit, and 
social norms.  This enables more systematic, empirically grounded analysis by changing the 
central unit of analysis of this form of terrorist financing towards the two questions posited in 
Chapter Four, and away from agents (people and their attributes, like profile or intent), away 
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from structure (the social, political, economic, legal, and normative contexts of behavior), 
and away from definitions of states (failed states, weak states, and non-states).  This 
conclusion fits well with O’Brien and Williams:   
“While the assumption of rational human behavior underlying rational choice models 
has something important to tell us about the events in the global economy, and makes 
for parsimonious theory, it is nevertheless deficient in failing to take account of 
diverse cultural practices, and variations in historical experience.  Similarly, while 
structuralist approaches are useful in delineating the determinate social structure 
within which human action takes place they too often neglect or subsume the role of 
agency.”
590
 
 
Significantly, this in turn enables a thorough discussion of political-economic choice.  The 
existing literature at times describes the outcomes of these choices or the context in which 
they occur, but there is little understanding of the dynamics by which individual actors 
engage with one another, and the consequences of these interactions.  Secondly, it allows 
systematic evaluation of the ‘why’ of terrorist finance, specifically why do some terrorist 
actors succeed economically and others fail.  This requires systematic, methodologically 
sound analysis of various social, political, economic, institutional, ideational, and moral 
elements, many of which are politically off-limits in the current discursive climate, such as 
the extent to which terrorist financing is a function of legitimate political support or apolitical 
social interaction.  
The Role of Ideas 
Fourthly, O’Brien and Williams argue that it is crucial also to incorporate thorough analysis 
of the ideas and cognitive elements of political economy, which are “significant elements in 
structures outcomes in the global political economy.”591 This directly addresses the 
‘contested’ nature of terrorist finance, and provides the tools to satisfy the crucial need for 
theoretical understandings of the social, political, and economic factors that constitute these 
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realities, systematic collection of evidence relating to these factors, and mechanisms to solve 
specific problems within those realities. It also helps understand terrorist financing’s role in 
the global political-economic system because they illuminate ways in which phenomena like 
terrorist financing can challenge, manipulate, and undermine the ideas that undergird that 
system.  For example, the very language that is used to describe economic activity can impact 
political outcomes.  As Tooze remarks,  
“The concepts and languages we use to describe and interpret what is going on in the 
world political economy are not neutral – in their origin, use, or purpose.  Nor are 
they merely instruments through which we can discover an autonomous preexisting 
reality of political economy.  Economic theory, concepts, and language are 
constitutive of reality.”
592
   
As demonstrated in the dissertation, terrorists (as well of course those who observe, analyze, 
and ‘counter’ them) exploit this, because they know that if only they use the right language, 
and fit into the right theory, i.e. if they “constitute” themselves to fit the constitutive reality 
that the neoliberal world has built, they will likely escape unnoticed.  Theoretically speaking, 
this is the mechanism that they use to move among ‘criminal,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘legitimate’ 
political economies.  This is a crucial point because those that are involved in terrorist 
financing typically fit into their multiple constitutive realities, whether through manipulation 
or design.  This is a central element to the reformulation of terrorist financing, because it 
shows the crucial need for theoretical understandings of the social, political, and economic 
factors that constitute these realities, as well as mechanisms to solve specific problems within 
those realities.  
Institutions and Institutional Change 
The fifth aspect of the eclectic approach is that institutions and institutional change are 
important elements to understanding political economies, primarily because institutions affect 
behaviors and outcomes.  This means that any formulation of terrorist financing must 
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recognize that legal, state, and other institutions are being replaced by other less well 
understood but no less powerful institutions, such as global jihad movements, or global 
charities, or warlords, or global corporations, or social networks, or identity networks, etc, all 
of which can qualify as institutions or at least function similar to them.   Again, this would 
enable further theoretical and methodological development related to increasing our 
understanding of these dynamics.  
From the Individual to the Global 
The final claim is that there is a close relationship between domestic social orders and 
trend/occurrences in global political economy and international orders, or in other words that 
the individual affects the global and vice versa.  This issue is of great interest to me and in 
many ways it is a core issue of international relations.  An interesting insight that comes from 
orienting analysis of political economy towards the individual is that it challenges some 
common conclusions about the relationship between terrorism and power.  Many argue, on 
one hand, that terrorism is a ‘weapon of the weak,’ while others argue that it represents more 
a (usually unsuccessful) attempt to use violence as a shortcut to power.  However, this 
dichotomy is really untrue, as Carolyn Nordstrom writes:   
“If analysts cannot see the full compendium of economic, political, and social forces 
defining the emergent twenty-first century, yet the war orphan and [warlord] can, 
then who has the power?”
593
   
Terrorism, like conflict, does not simply involve powerful warlords oppressing weak war 
orphans, and thus its analysis should not be a pointless debate about who should count as a 
warlord (terrorist) and who is a war orphan (their victims).   Instead, if one views terrorism as 
simply an extension of the universal struggle for political power and economic wealth, this 
implies that terrorism involves the continual transformation of the weak into the strong – and 
back again – depending on the particular political economic circumstances.  More simply, 
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warlords, terrorists, orphans, and victims all have power of different form within different 
context, and this concept provides a basis for systematically analyzing the ‘full compendium’ 
of these dynamics.  
Everyday Political Economy 
Although the ‘eclectic’ approach described above provides a solid, albeit general, basis for 
identifying certain key issues and themes for future research of terrorist financing into the 
discourse of political economy, Hobson and Seabrooke’s conception of “Everyday Political 
Economy” is useful as a single discursive starting point for more in depth exploration of the 
political economic dynamics of terrorist finance, in its alternative conceptualization presented 
in this thesis.   Everyday Political Economy (EPE) relates to how ‘everyday’ actors act and 
react, resist and comply, and create and prevent change in an infinite number of subtle and 
nuanced ways.  According to them: 
Everyday actions are defined as acts by those who are subordinate within a broader 
power relationship but, whether through negotiation, resistance or non-resistance – 
either incrementally or suddenly – shape, constitute, and transform the political and 
economic environment around and beyond them.
594
  
This also, as the similarity in terminology suggests, that ‘everyday political economy,’ 
reflects well de Certeau’s ‘everyday’ approach.  In fact, this sub-discourse awakens the new 
and powerful realization that terrorist financing is at core about change, and thus the analysis 
of it is the analysis of (subtle, nuanced, yet potentially world-altering) change.   
 
Hobson and Seabrooke propose that such ‘bottom-up’ change occurs in three varieties.  The 
first, ‘defiance,’ refers to overt resistance, which in terms of terrorist finance could refer to 
the direct sponsorship activity described in the typology in the next chapter.  The second 
form of change occurs because of ‘mimetic challenge,’ which is essentially covert resistance, 
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in which change “is generated when everyday actors adopt the discourse and/or 
characteristics of the dominant to cloak their resistance-challenges to the legitimacy of the 
dominant.”  Agents, they argue, “appeal to the normative discourse of the dominant in order 
to push through their own subversive agenda.”595 Third, everyday change can take the form 
of ‘axiorational’ conduct, defined as “habit-informed, reason-guided behavior within which 
an actor still retains a concept of interest.” Axiorational behavior, they write,  
“Is neither aimed at purely instrumental goals nor purely value-oriented goals.  
Rather [it] is where an actor uses reason to reflect upon conventions and norms, as 
well as the interests they inform, and then chooses to act in ways which are in 
accordance with broader intersubjective understandings of what is socially 
legitimate…actors often behave in economically rational ways, but that this is in part 
defined by norms and identities that prevail at any one point in time and which 
prescribe that which is rational in the first place.”   
One can easily see the relevance of this conception of change.  For example, it can uncover 
how actions such as providing financial support to the IRA for a vague, yet unassailably 
noble cause like ‘Irish freedom’ or al Qaeda for ‘the solidarity of the ummah,’ even though 
both discourses are demonstrably subversive to those causes.  The result, analytically, is that 
such strategies can be systematically revealed and assessed, and then if necessary, countered.  
Systematic application of this conception would greatly help to integrate many of the still 
disparate conceptual strands brought forth in this dissertation.   
 
Everyday political economy emphasizes that change occurs according to “dialogic” and 
“negotiative” relationships, rather than via any kind of mechanistic or self-serving/self-
referential conception of human behavior.  This implies first that rather than simply a 
situation in which elites oppress and the marginal resist, all actors involved are 
simultaneously resisting one another.  This echoes some of the points above, but further 
illuminates power dynamics across the whole spectrum of political and economic behavior, 
and provides Cox’s ‘basic structure’ within which improved analysis of political economic 
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realities can arise.  More simply, it shows that the key to analysis of terrorist finance is to 
uncover which forms of resistance are used in what context, and which forms produce what 
outcome.  From this foundation of knowledge, analysis of political economic phenomena – 
including terrorist finance – could become much more useful.  
 
The benefits of this are immediately evident.  For example, it overcomes completely the 
‘terrorist vs. freedom fighter’ dichotomy by repositioning the problem as ‘No matter if they 
are terrorist or freedom fighters, one must ‘negotiate’ a relationship with them in a way that 
makes oneself successful.’596  In other words, it reorients both analysis and action towards a 
systematic understanding of relationships among actors and the consequences of those 
relations.  This appears to have potential as the foundation for significant improvement in 
understanding not only terrorist finance but also the contemporary global political economy, 
especially if combined with systematic empirical work.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an epistemic revision that better reflects the inherent 
intersubjectivity, complexity, and cross-cultural variations in terrorist financing activity.  To 
review, I demonstrated that the ‘right questions’ to ask about terrorist financing concern the 
instrumentality of economic activity for terrorist actors and what such activity tells one about 
the relationship terrorist actors have with wider societies, because these questions get to the 
heart of the objectives of analysis, which are how to better understand terrorism and terrorists 
and how to respond to terrorism and terrorists in a way that protects and defends both liberal 
democratic society but also its principles.  This instrumentality of economic activity as a 
conditioning – rather than determining – factor of terrorist behavior, recognition of which 
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creates a foundation for developing a framework for systematically analyzing and specifying 
the actual impact various behaviors have in given contexts.  The same can be said for 
systematically analyzing and specifying the precise dynamics of these interactions and 
relationships that are illuminated by financial and economic support.   
 
The chapter also discussed how terrorist financing can be reframed according to several new 
assumptions, which together focus on analyses of human agency, norms, socio-historical 
context, and the processes of power competition, value exchange, and knowledge creation, as 
well as recognition that the analysis of terrorist finance is itself a political project meant to 
serve specific interests of liberal democratic society.   This reframes analysis of terrorist 
financing away from agents’ characteristics (people and their attributes, like profile or intent), 
away from structure (the social, political, economic, legal, and normative contexts of 
behavior), away from the state (failed states, weak states, and non-states), and thus also away 
from approaches that have proven so unsuccessful in explaining terrorist financing.  Instead, 
it orients analysis of terrorist financing towards the dynamics and consequences of political-
economic decision-making and its consequences.   Although this may appear to create an 
awkwardness of fit between structural dynamics of terrorist financing (like those raised in the 
case study of Chapter 2) and a conceptual emphasis on agency and reasoning, this 
awkwardness is only superficial since the next chapter demonstrates that it is possible to 
construct a conceptualization of terrorist finance that links the structural dynamics and 
reasoning in a way that that the former depends on the latter.  Specifically, the structural 
dynamics of terrorist financing (most importantly which value chains are accessed, how they 
are accessed, and what changes result from this access) depends on human choices (agency) 
about terrorist group values, objectives, and goals, which are themselves a product of 
rationality & freedom and the place of the individual in global society.  This subtle but 
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important epistemological shift subordinates normative debates about ‘bad’ (i.e. terrorist) 
versus ‘good’ financing, and replaces it with a foundation of analysis that is not only closer to 
the specific (liberal democratic) interests and objectives it is supposed to serve, but also 
enables access to more analytic tools required to meet those objectives.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Application:  
A New Typology of Terrorist Finance 
This chapter introduces a practical analytic application of the reformulated epistemology 
presented in the previous chapter in the form of a typology of terrorist financing activity that 
enables a coherent and nuanced representation of such activity and thus also ultimately a 
systematic analysis of its empirical realities at both macro and individual transaction levels. 
Typologies are a familiar concept within the counter terrorist financing community, and are 
often used by governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and charities to 
tell them ‘what to look for’.597  By definition, they are a way to categorize activity, or in other 
words are essentially an epistemic theory of classification.  The typology presented here 
splits terrorist financing activity into two distinct modalities, value chain exchanges and 
material expressions of support for terrorism, each of which has a distinct analytic logic.  
This essentially offers two definitions for terrorist financing.  In other words, this chapter 
argues that terrorist financing can be more precisely redefined as either the value chain of 
terrorist actors or material expressions of support for terrorism.  
 
Typologies – in character if not by name – appear throughout the International Relations 
discipline, often in association with hyper-rationalist or structural approaches,598 although the 
ubiquitous ‘levels of analysis’ epistemic formulation is in essence a typology.  Even though 
terrorist finance is a phenomenon inherently contestable along politicized lines, a typology is 
nevertheless an appropriate device with which to apply the previous chapters’ research 
primarily because it will be legible to those in governments, the financial industry, and others 
in the community of terrorist financing analysts whom use analysis of terrorist finance to 
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inform action.  Because this dissertation is in some ways inherently a political project by 
virtue of its subject matter, this legibility is important.  
 
It is important to recognize here that often such a typology would be outlined and then tested 
against empirical evidence.   This thesis, in this respect, may appear to put the proverbial 
‘cart before the horse’ by proposing this typology in its final full chapter. This has been done 
because, simply put, the deficiencies in both the orthodox and critical literature on terrorist 
financing mean that it has taken the previous four chapters to even get to the stage where a 
new typology could be outlined. Fully testing it is thus outside what would be possible within 
the three years of a PhD dissertation.  Therefore, in terms of the above metaphor, the thesis is 
focused on identifying what is in fact a horse and cart, where each can be found, how they 
could be brought together, and an outline of a plan to decide on the correct positioning of the 
horse relative to the cart.  The actual placement of the horse and the cart in relation to one 
another thus lies beyond the confines of this dissertation. 
 
More specifically, this typology provides a coherent, concise framework within which 
terrorism-related financial and economic activity can be represented, and thus ultimately 
serves as the epistemic foundation for an improved conceptualization of terrorist finance.  
This improved conceptualization is intended to provide ‘terrorist financing studies’ with an 
analytical framework upon which future, better, research on terrorist finance can proceed.  In 
other words – specifically those of Canada’s main intelligence agency – there is a need for “a 
generally accepted model of terrorist financing,” which “would provide a clear and common 
strategic understanding of how terrorist financing operates and a sound basis for deciding 
how to respond to it.”599  As currently no such model currently exists, this typology is not 
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only a conceptually sound application of this dissertation’s reformulated epistemology, but 
also a viable analytic alternative to the deficient ‘orthodox’ analytic frameworks. 
The Terrorism Value Chain 
This section argues that analyzing terrorist financing in terms of the value chains accessed by 
terrorist actors provides a way to representing and give meaning to those activities now 
encompassed by the term ‘terrorist finance.’  I argue that, in a fundamental way, ‘terrorist 
financing’ is similar epistemologically to a commercial value chain, which has been defined 
as, “the sequential set of primary and support activities that an enterprise performs to turn 
inputs into value-added outputs for its external customers.”600  In this conception, terrorist 
‘enterprises’ turn ‘inputs’ (e.g. volunteer labor, training, ideological or religious radicalism, 
weapons, donated money) into ‘value-added outputs’ (e.g. attacks, political power, social 
welfare, territorial governance, advantageous changes in state policy) for their ‘external 
customers’ (e.g. social, religious, ethnic, ideological, or other constituencies), via a ‘set of 
primary and support activities’ (e.g. the various financing and logistical methods often 
referred to in existing literature as ‘terrorist financing techniques,’ such as money laundering, 
hawala, or engagement in crime).  Therefore part of what is now referred to as ‘terrorist 
financing’ can be more precisely defined as the compendium of individual transactions in 
which various items of material and non-material value are exchanged that result in terrorist 
actors acquiring something of value.    
 
To illustrate this, compare for example HAMAS and General Electric (GE).  The latter has a 
vast network of associated independent businesses and individuals that provide it with goods 
and services that range from the glass for its light bulbs to contracted advice for its 
                                                           
600 Interoperability Clearinghouse, Glossary of Terms, http://www.ichnet.org/glossary.htm. The term ‘value 
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government lobbying, each of whom interacts with GE according to various objective-, 
relationship-, context-, time-, and place- specific dynamics.  The same can be said of 
HAMAS, although of course the goods, services and forms of value will be different, as will 
the dynamics of exchange.  Regardless of the variations, although its suppliers are accurately 
included as part of GE’s ‘value chain,’ it would be nonsense to conclude that such interaction 
either makes them part of GE itself or necessarily beholden to GE. Similarly, just because 
someone interacts with HAMAS economically does not necessarily imply they ‘are’ HAMAS 
or part of the movement’s ‘infrastructure.’  
 
Conceptually, reframing ‘terrorist finance’ as the above is a logical consequence of the 
arguments of the previous chapters. As discussed earlier, the term ‘terrorist financing’ is a 
misnomer in that much of the activity encompassed by that term involves neither terrorism 
nor money.  Instead, terrorist financing more accurately refers to the flow of economic and 
material value to ‘terrorist’ actors, however that contested term is defined and represented.  
This helps distance understandings of ‘terrorist finance’ from the narrow normative, legal, 
and political contexts that dominate ‘orthodox’ thinking on terrorism and terrorist finance, 
and places the issue more in context of the everyday realities of how global and local political 
economies impact and are impacted by contemporary issues of international security.  
Although further research is necessary to fully understand the implications of doing so, 
understanding terrorist financing in terms more aware of and sensitive to both local and 
global socio-political realities is likely to significantly impact perceptions and actions related 
to terrorist finance.  As discussed earlier, Nordstrom observes that a Marlboro-selling 
Angolan war orphan is often more aware than Western political officials or economists of the 
local and even global political economic realities that govern her society, a situation that 
implies that Western governments, academics, and societies are poorly positioned to not only 
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understand and research such realities, but also – and more importantly – act on and change 
them.  The previous chapters clearly demonstrated that the same problem existed regarding 
terrorist finance, and this typology offers a coherent framework to address this situation.   
 
In particular, re-conceptualizing terrorist finance as an issue of how certain political actors – 
‘terrorists’ – access, influence, and are impacted by economic exchanges of value carries the 
implication that better approaches to understanding and responding to terrorist finance lie in 
understanding how terrorists interact with and influence particular local and global political 
economies.  Specifically – given, as described in the previous chapter, that one of the two 
‘right’ questions one should ask of terrorist financing activity concerns the extent to which 
such so-called ‘financial’ activity is instrumental to terrorist operations – the significance of 
terrorist financing lies not in the ‘financial’ activity itself, but in the activity that is benefited 
by that financial activity. Conceptualizing terrorist finance in terms of terrorist access to 
value chains implies that for analysis of terrorist finance to measure and assess this 
instrumentality, it must understand and engage with the local and global political economic 
realities with which terrorists themselves are interacting as part of these value chains.  
 
It is important to emphasize here that this epistemic reformulation is an analytic claim, not a 
normative one.  Naturally, it is reasonable for a politician for example to try to dissuade 
economic interaction with terrorist actors with these terms, or for legislators to pass laws to 
outlaw certain interactions with HAMAS that would be legal with GE, for instance.  I argue 
simply that it is unreasonable for systematic analysts of terrorism and terrorist financing to 
base their epistemic frameworks on such normative claims. Analysis of how both 
organizations are ‘financed’ would thus focus on understanding the dynamics of its 
relationships with its value chain.  GE for instance typically engages in formal written 
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contracts to govern its relationships with its suppliers, while HAMAS relies more on shared 
religious or ideological commitment, and both value strong personal relationships.  Analysis 
of their ‘financing’ would thus focus, in part, on how these relationships and interactions 
affect the instrumentality of these organizations.  For GE, this means shareholder value,601 
but for HAMAS it means its various social and political goals such as revenge and resistance 
against Israel, consolidation of power over the Palestinian territories, international 
recognition.  
 
In general terms, the analytic implications of this redefinition are significant.  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, focusing on instrumentality shifts the analysis of terrorist financing away from 
static descriptions of actors and methods and towards evaluation of more context-dependent 
flows, processes, and outcomes.  For example, a hypothetical car manufacturer would 
prioritize maximizing the efficiency (a process) of its assembly line (a flow) in order to 
increase profit (an outcome) over sticking to any individual machine, laborer, or customer.   
Analogously, one could hypothesize that HAMAS (or any terrorist actor) is likely to place a 
higher priority on context-dependent processes such as recruitment or flows such as income 
generation than on any specific person to be recruited or method of generating income.  To 
emphasize, both static descriptions of actors and actions and analysis of their instrumentality 
within given specific contexts are important.  Mossad, for example, is likely to want to not 
only identify what is being smuggled to HAMAS and by what means, but also understand the 
various relationships that make such smuggling possible and significant for HAMAS 
operations.  Existing literature on terrorist financing, however, typically privileges the former 
over the latter, as was discussed in Chapter Three.  Characterizing terrorist finance (in part) 
as a value chain thus reverses the epistemological polarity of analysis of it.  
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Hypotheses about Terrorist Financing Value Chains 
The central hypothesis rising from a focus on ‘value chain’ activity is that terrorist actors 
likely access existing market flows for things of value (such as weapons, people, materiel, 
cash, and other goods and services) rather than create and manage their own closed 
‘infrastructures’ or ‘networks’ to produce, move, or use these things.  One can hypothesize 
that terrorist actors, like any actor, therefore seek out market flows that help them meet their 
objectives.  In order to explain how this likely occurs – and thus where future research could 
best be focused – we must, as discussed in the previous chapter, start at a individual level of 
analysis, examining the individual exchanges that provide terrorist actors access to such 
market flows.  
 
By reframing the discussion of Chapter Four, these individual exchanges can be represented 
as being governed by essentially two variables.  The first variable is, using plain English, the 
desire of terrorist actors to access a particular market flow, which is essentially a function of 
the perception that such access will meet certain pre-existing objectives.  This refers to the 
extent to which a terrorist actor would like to obtain the forms of value available within a 
given market, and is primarily a function of the terrorist actor’s rational assessment (in Sen’s 
conception of rationality) about how instrumental a particular form of value would be in 
assisting his objectives.  More simply, one could hypothesize with reasonable surety that 
terrorist actors access pre-existing markets for reasons tied to their own objectives.   
 
Given that many subsidiary factors influence a terrorist’s assessment of both his own 
objectives (including, as discussed in Chapter Four, ideology, tactical assessments, political, 
social, or cultural values, or perceptions about ones capabilities), as well as how a particular 
item of value would instrumentally serve them (such as, one could estimate, perceived 
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quality, reliability, worth, or other information available about the desired item of value),    
this places terrorism-related financial activity in a richer conceptual context, for example by 
helping highlight, nuance, and specify important differences among different terrorist actors.  
 
A useful example relates to how differences in how terrorist actors’ interactions with charities 
are represented.  Using al Qaeda and HAMAS as examples, orthodox conceptualizations of 
terrorist finance tend to represent the differences between these groups use of charities to 
fund their activities as at core a difference in technique, with al Qaeda using a vast charitable 
“infrastructure” to fund its activities602 and HAMAS instead using a more sophisticated 
network of charitable “front organizations.”603  However, by applying this dissertation’s 
alternative conceptualization of terrorist finance, such differences can be re-represented in 
terms of these groups’ desire to access a particular value chain; in this case the flow of 
Islamist-oriented charitable donations.  Representing this activity in these terms immediately 
highlights important nuance and specificity. For instance, although they both receive 
financial support from charitable organizations, available evidence indicates that whereas al 
Qaeda appears to regularly misappropriate funds towards militant operations meant for 
humanitarian purposes (as illustrated in Chapter 2), HAMAS makes concerted efforts to 
ensure all such donations are accounted for transparently and go towards the group’s 
political, social welfare, and other non-military activities.604   In other words, although both 
groups access this particular value chain (albeit likely different parts of it), nevertheless, as 
Gunning observes, HAMAS desires to do so in order to maintain and strengthen its non-
military activities and cement its reputation with its Palestinian constituency as a benevolent 
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and incorruptible social movement, while al Qaeda appears to do so only to gain the ability to 
carry out violent terrorist attacks.605  This begins to illustrate how this alternative 
representation of terrorist finance  provides a more systematic and coherent approach to that 
available in existing discourse. 
 
To continue, one can also hypothesize, especially based on the discussions of Chapter Four, 
that terrorist actor assessments of value, objective, and instrumentality are completely 
context-specific.  In other words, something that may be of value in one time or place may be 
less ‘desirable’ in another, even for the same terrorist actor.  This is because goals change, 
situations change, and particular forms of value become relatively more or less valuable 
accordingly.  Taking the example from Chapter 2, it seems that the Chechen separatists were 
likely seeking access to markets for drugs, arms, food, clothing, personnel, or services 
according to particular political-economic needs at particular times.  
 
The second variable governing terrorist financing ‘value chains’ is the ability of terrorist 
actors to access these pre-existing market flows of value.  This refers simply to the actual 
capability of the terrorist actor to not only access a market but to do so in a way that he is 
able to engage in an exchange that he finds ‘desirable.’  Drawing from the discussions of the 
previous chapter, the ability of a terrorist actor to access a given value chain can be 
characterized in terms of the power the actor is able to exercise within the individual 
interactions that would lead to such access, therefore in turn also a function of how and how 
well terrorist actors are able to interact with the societal environment that contextualizes 
those interactions.  
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To illustrate, let us briefly explore how by examining the ability of the Taliban to access the 
market flows for opium and heroin one can arrive at important and highly useful conclusions 
about a terrorist actor.  Prior to the 2001-2002 invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. and NATO 
forces, the ruling Taliban movement had – to generalize a complex relationship – a mutually 
advantageous partnership with the global drug trafficking networks that bought, processed, 
and sold Afghan poppy, in which the these networks were able to operate in exchange for 
providing the Taliban significant revenue from the production and export of Afghanistan 
primary export.606  However, the invasion saw Taliban deposed from power, its leadership 
displaced, and most of its military and political capabilities destroyed, a change that 
unsurprisingly ended the group’s previous arrangements with drug trafficking organizations.  
Nevertheless, by 2004, the Taliban began to reconstitute itself as a military and political force 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, primarily because it regained the ability to access the lucrative 
flows of value related to the opium trade.  This was accomplished, as Peters documents, 
because Taliban leaders were able to use their strong kinship bonds and historical 
relationships with the Pashtun tribes that governed much of the Afghan-Pakistani border 
areas to facilitate both the smuggling of opium out of the region, as well as the importation of 
cash and its laundering.607  Since then, this relationship has evolved so that by 2008, the 
Taliban was staging large-scale military operations against NATO forces only in order to 
divert attention away from convoys conducting many tons of opium into Pakistan.608 
 
Orthodox approaches to terrorist finance typically describe the above situation in terms of the 
growth of a so-called “crime-terror nexus,”609 a representation that, as Williams has noted,610 
                                                           
606 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin in Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2009), 67-101. 
607 Peters (2009), 102-144. 
608 Peters (2009), 102-144. 
609 Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised 
Crime and Terrorism ," Global Crime ( ) 6, no. 1 (February 2004). See discussion in Chapter Three. 
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depicts the phenomenon far too unproblematically, and which does not necessarily require 
any exploration and specification of, or nuance about the centrally important historical, 
political, economic, cultural, social and other contexts that constitute the individual level 
realities of such a ‘nexus.’  By representing terrorist finance instead as in part a function of 
the ability of a terrorist group to access value chains, typology presented here forces analysis 
of terrorist finance to engage with these contexts and realities from the outset.  In the above 
case, for instance, there occurred in essence a change in what was required of the Taliban to 
access its primary source of economic value – from mutually beneficial tolerance (when it 
was in a position of strength relative to the regions drug trafficking organizations) to active 
participation and support (when it was in position of relative weakness).  Examining this 
change in terms of the dynamics by which individual political economic interactions both 
impact the capabilities and behaviors of terrorist actors and reflect relationships with wider 
communities, as Chapter Four proposes, then, for one, it is possible to place detailed 
empirical field research, such as by Peters,611 into a coherent conceptual and praxial 
framework and thus better and more systematically assess and utilize her information.  More 
pithily, this indicates that by simply ‘asking the right questions’ about terrorist finance, one 
can arrive at answers that are more coherent, more precise, and ultimately more useful.    
 
Engaging with the complex individual contexts of realities of terrorist finance via an 
examination of the ability of terrorist actors to access value chains naturally involves other 
factors, which will need to be explicated with further research.  These factors may include, 
one could hypothesize, relationships with key players in a particular market (as above),, 
                                                           
610 Phil Williams, “Terrorist financing and organized crime: nexus, appropriation, or transformation?” in 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. Thomas J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
611 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin in Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2009).  
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institutional knowledge of the market (e.g. of regulations – such as KYC612 requirements – 
that must be met to access services), or simply logistical dynamics (e.g. that would impact the 
ability to acquire certain types of weapons in certain locations).  
 
Overall, it is thus logical to assume that how and to what extent terrorist actors are able to 
access markets such as these will depend on their capabilities for interacting with these 
various market dynamics.  More simply, a key assumption one can make about terrorist 
financing is that terrorist access to a given market will be dependent on their knowledge of 
the market and their abilities to access it in order to use it.  The diversity of potential factors 
that could possibly influence the desire and ability of terrorist actors to access value chains, 
many of which are illicit and extra-legal, is implicit in the following from Nordstrom’s is 
implicit in anthropological research: 
The profit trail [of extra legal economies] is extensive and equally nontransparent. 
Cars, trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes must transport nonlegal goods from the 
point of production to the final destination.  Each is produced by industrial centers, 
fueled by petroleum products, and piloted by professionals.  Each transverses 
controls and international borders, where complicit personnel assist nonlegal as well 
as legal transfers.  Handlers transport the commodities, experts test them, 
accommodating financial institutions lend and launder money, and less-than-
legitimate security forces take a cut to ignore the law.  Each step in the considerable 
set of transfers that moves any commodity across time, space, international borders, 
and the boundaries of the law carries these nontransparent earning into the markets 
of everyday life.
613
   
 
Although further research is required to document and analyze precisely how these factors 
interact with one another for specific terrorist groups and their access to particular value 
chains, it is possible to arrive at some general preliminary conceptual insights that would 
guide this further research by placing this typology in context of existing research on 
commercial value chains.  Given that on a conceptual level, as Chapter Four outlined, 
                                                           
612 Know Your Customer 
613 Carolyn Nodstrom, "Extrastate Globalization of the Illicit," in Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong: 
Anthropologists Talk Back, ed. Catherine Lowe Besteman and Hugh Gusterson (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 151. 
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terrorist financing relates centrally to how individual level political economic interactions 
govern and are governed by various contextual factors, the work of Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon on commercial value chain governance is especially relevant.614  They build a 
theoretical framework that argues that the key determinates of how value chains are governed 
are: 
A. the complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a 
particular transaction, particularly with respect to product and process 
specifications;  
B. the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, 
therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific investment 
between the parties to the transaction; and   
C. the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements 
of the transaction.
615
   
 
When placed in context of terrorist financing, their argument supports the hypothesis that 
how and whether terrorist actors access any given value chain will depend greatly on the 
knowledge and power dynamics that impact their desire and ability to seek out and achieve 
this access.  This implies that the exact nature of how the particular factors that impact 
terrorist access to value chains interrelate is likely governed by how terrorist actors are 
willing and able to impact these power/knowledge dynamics in ways advantageous to them.  
Overall, the desire/ability explanation of the basic political economic decision-making 
process involved in the individual exchanges of the ‘value chain’ of terrorist financing thus is 
very similar in substance to both Amartya Sen’s rationality/freedom dichotomy discussed 
earlier as well as Atwood, Glatz, and Muggah’s motive/means explanation of the demand for 
small arms.617  
 
                                                           
614 Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, "The Governance of Global Value Chains," Review of 
International Political Economy 12, no. 1 (February 2005): 78-104. 
615 Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005): 85. 
617 Anne-Kathrin Glatz and Robert Muggah, "The Other Side of the Coin: Demand," in Small Arms Survey 
2006: Unfinished Business (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006). 
  
 
285 
One very possible – and important, if born out in further research – implication therefore is 
that the same decision making process occurs whether buying small arms, remittance 
services, plutonium, transportation, or tomatoes, since, as indicated below, the processes by 
which terrorist actors access markets for everything from weapons to money to tires appears 
to be at core a function of managing information and relationships within governance 
structures particular to specific times and places, regardless of the item of value or the value 
chain accessed.  The same naturally might be said of any actor interacting with contemporary 
political economies.  .  
 
Epistemically, this element of the typology requires a method centered on analysis of the 
market flows in which value is exchanged and the dynamics of exchange within them. In 
other words, it means a permanent shift in terrorist financing research away from the 
inherently deficient ‘orthodox’ descriptions of simply ‘who finances terrorism and how they 
do it,’ and towards research focused on collecting and evaluating evidence to understand the 
dynamics by which terrorist actors interact with, impact, and are impacted by local and global 
political economies. In general terms, therefore around the various forms and practices of 
power and value exchange evident within both the specific value chains accessed by terrorist 
actors and the activities taken in order for the terrorist actor to access those markets; as well 
as, most significantly, observation of the dynamics of how relationships, interactions, and 
movements within the global system produce these forms and practices of power and value, 
both individually and in aggregate. More specifically, this would in actual research practice 
likely entail at least the following: 
" Identification and cataloging of the material and non-material resources (i.e. forms of 
value) used by terrorist actors. 
  
 
286 
" Identification of the existing markets flows and value exchange systems used by these 
actors to acquire these resources. 
" Assessment of how and by whom these markets, value flows, and value transfer 
systems are governed and controlled, for example by collecting and analyzing data on 
structural factors, e.g. is the flow of value open and competitive, or is cartel-type 
behavior evident, or is it controlled tightly by one (e.g. a warlord) or many elites. 
" Assessment of how access to these markets, value flows, and value transfer systems is 
or could be gained, both in general and specifically by the given terrorist actor, 
including identification and contextualization of the criteria for and methods of access 
and entry to these particular markets, e.g. kinship bonds, ideological credibility, 
economic wealth. 
" Assessment of relevant local practices, traditions, and structures relating to politics 
and power (including ideology), society & culture (including religion), economics and 
business, and institutions and law. 
" Identification of relevant geographies, for example any known trafficking or 
smuggling routes, or locations of regulated or unregulated marketplaces, etc. 
" Research into how relevant terrorist actors have accessed these value chains in the 
past.  
" Evaluation of how this access impacted threat actors’ capabilities, operations, and 
other activities; what this access indicated or currently indicates about the terrorist 
actors’ specific operational, social, political, and other relationships and behaviors; 
and  what access to a particular market and/or acquisition of a particular resource 
indicates about these factors. 
 
  
 
287 
Although this alternative approach provides the foundation for an improved way to represent, 
research, and ultimately understand terrorist finance, it nevertheless also raises new analytic 
challenges.  One is that naturally it is often difficult to collect data on the abovemention 
areas, especially at the individual or transactional level of detail.  However, as discussed in 
the previous chapter and as proven by researchers like Nordstrom, Peters, Horgan, and 
Kupatadze, among many others, this is hardly impossible, especially if one employs 
ethnographic or historical research methods like interviewing and observation.  Another 
significant challenge is that, because much of terrorist financing occurs outside the highly 
formalized and regulated political economies of the Europe and North America, applying this 
typology requires deep understanding of non-Western, informal, extra-legal, and ‘shadow’ 
political economies, which are often hard to comprehend without local knowledge.  Using 
these methods, it would be possible to build both a comprehensive data set about ‘terrorist 
financing’ behavior as well as a set of evidence-based of analytic judgments about the 
significance (i.e. instrumentality) of this behavior to given actors, times, and places.  Both of 
these would be applicable to governments, financial institutions, and other relevant actors 
within liberal democratic societies.  
 
In summary, the concept of the ‘value chain’ of terrorist actors represents one half of the new 
typology of terrorist financing presented in this dissertation.  A basic irony of such ‘value 
chain activity’ is that it involves interactions that are mostly apolitical (i.e. not intentionally 
supportive of a terrorist cause) but which often directly lead to terrorist violence.  This 
section introduced the general theory of how terrorist actors access existing markets for what 
they need.  The following section discusses these processes in more detail and examines the 
advantages of this (re)formulation of terrorist finance relative to frameworks currently 
available in the literature.   
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Terrorist Access to Value Chains: Examples 
This section provides an examples of some of the global and local value chains accessed by 
terrorist actors, and, as much possible with the evidence available, describes the processes by 
which terrorists achieve this access.  Further research is required to provide greater empirical 
and analytical depth to these discussions, particularly in terms of the individual-level 
dynamics of political economic decision making evident in these activities, as well as the 
various consequences and meanings these findings would have for different audiences.   
Accessing Value Chains Related to Money 
Common sense would tell us that it is likely that much – but, as emphasized earlier, by no 
means all – activity usually termed ‘terrorist financing’ relates to how terrorist actors acquire 
and use money and its equivalents.  As discussed in Chapter Two, orthodox approaches to 
terrorist finance promote a notion that terrorists squirrel away money in some sort of vast and 
secret infrastructure of bank accounts, hidden stores of cash, and various sophisticated 
financial vehicles.  Applying the typology of a value chain to these activities puts this 
mistaken conception of terrorist financing to rest.   
Cash 
Terrorist actors, like anyone else, need cash to purchase goods and services.  This means 
therefore that terrorist actors simply access existing market flows for cash, and engage in 
various individual exchanges of value in order to acquire the monetary instruments that they 
require to purchase other items of value, such as weapons, transport, labor, or long-term 
capability.  In other words, the flow and the market for money, cash, currency, and their 
equivalents are epistemologically no differently than flows and markets for any other form of 
value.  
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In existing, orthodox, discourse on terrorist finance, the dynamics of how terrorist actors’ 
access to flows of global or local market flows in the supply of cash and its equivalents – or 
in other words their acquisition of money – is described as in terms of how terrorist actors 
‘generate’ money, e.g. through crime or charitable or business ‘fronts.’  In most cases, this is 
a misnomer, as terrorist groups, strictly speaking, rarely ‘generate’ money (unless of course 
they are printing counterfeit currency).  More accurately – and in line with the 
conceptualization and representation of terrorism-related financial activity presented in this 
dissertation – money is simply the form of value for which value-added products are 
exchanged, and terrorist actors engage in various actions and interactions to access market 
flow for this particular form of value.  For example, in the case mentioned above, the Taliban 
appears to be in large part ‘funded’ by huge amounts of cash related to the heroin trade.  
However, this belies the more complicated reality of the exchange of various forms of value 
– one of which is cash – in which the Taliban is engaged with local and global drug 
trafficking organizations.  To grossly simplify a very complex phenomenon for the sake of 
space, if one were to trace the exact path of the cash received by the Taliban, it often would 
be something along the lines of the following.618  The Taliban receives cash from a locally 
based drug trafficker (who may also be a warlord, tribal leader, or even government official) 
in exchange for opium made from poppy farmed from Taliban controlled lands.  The 
trafficker provides the opium to other traffickers who smuggle the drug to its ultimate market 
in Europe, but also receives payment for this opium provided in cash from local business 
elites.  These local business elites, who often are also involved in legitimate commerce 
throughout South Asia and the Middle East, receive their cash by intentionally over-invoicing 
exports to colleagues in the United Arab Emirates, employing a technique that has been 
                                                           
618 For documentation and specific examples of this type of value exchange involving the Taliban and South 
Asian drug trafficking organization, see especially Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin in 
Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009); and John Cassara, Hide & 
Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and the Stalled War on Terrorist Finance (Washington DC: Potomac 
Books, 2006). 
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termed as “trade based money laundering.”619  Completing the chain, these UAE-based 
businesspeople receive cash from other similar business colleagues, some of whom will 
eventually received money directly from drug trafficking organizations that has been 
generated by the sale of drugs in Europe.   It is clear to see, therefore, that ‘terrorist finance’ 
is superiorly represented in terms of the exchange of value, rather than an unproblematized 
issue of ‘terrorist money.’ 
 
In another example, from the case described in Chapter 2, foreign jihadist fighters were able 
to access flows of donated cash that flowed from donors in the Middle East through various 
branch offices of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) or Al Haramein 
Foundation (AHF) and ultimately to the militants themselves (and of course onto corrupt 
Georgian officials and others beyond this).  Representing this activity in terms of how 
‘terrorists’ (in this case the foreign jihadists going to Chechnya) access ‘value chains’ (in this 
case the flow of cash described in the previous sentence) is likely to yield far richer analysis 
than ‘orthodox’ depictions of BIF and AHF as terrorist ‘fronts’ that “funnel” money to 
terrorists or more generally “underwrite” terrorism.620  This is because the former 
immediately raises important issues about the dynamics of this value chain and the realities 
and implications of access to it by specific terrorist actors.  The following indicates just some 
of the significant areas of knowledge that could be illuminated by reframing this activity as 
value chain access: 
                                                           
619 In brief, trade based money laundering can be described as: Bob wants to secretly pay Jim.  Bob and Jim 
both also have legitimate import-export businesses.  Bob overpays for goods Jim imports.  According to law 
enforcement sources in the United States, this basic technique is used more often to avoid taxes than for any 
reason associate with organized crime, drugs, or terrorism. For a complete description, see Financial Action 
Task Force, "Trade Based Money Laundering" (Paris, June 23, 2006); and John Cassara, Hide & Seek: 
Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and the Stalled War on Terrorist Finance (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 
2006). 
620 Stuart Levey, "Address of Under Secretary Stuart Levey," to The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
Policy Conference 2005 (U.S. Treasury, May 25, 2005). 
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! The identity and background of all participants in each element of the value chain, 
from, for instance, the donors and organizers of the fundraising events that led to their 
donations to the corrupt Georgian officials who ultimately received payment for 
transporting the ‘terrorists’ to the Chechen border. 
! The motives, social, cultural, and moral beliefs and practices, and other individual 
contexts that informed individual decisions about interacting with either this value 
chain, the charitable foundations, or the terrorist actors (e.g. how exactly did 
theological factors, such as inclusion of jihad within the justifiable bases for zakat 
donations, impact the decision making of the donors). 
! The acts and practices of power that influenced the outcomes of these interactions, 
including, physical (e.g. armed force or threat thereof), social (e.g. kinship bonds), 
cultural (e.g. communication traditions), economic (e.g. command or control of 
resources), political (e.g. formal or institutional authority), or cognitive (e.g. influence 
over the production or acceptance of ideas or norms), among others.   
! The local business, social, and cultural practices and customs that influenced the 
context, conduct, and outcomes of these interactions, as well as the meaning one 
might attach to them (e.g. do any cultural factors, such as Kist hospitality traditions, 
alter judgments about the legality or morality of certain decisions). 
! The general criteria for entry and exit of this flow of value, and how readily other 
terrorist actors might meet these criteria (e.g. what criteria was considered – and 
considered by whom – to be sufficient for a recipient to receive funds donated to 
support jihad in Chechnya). 
! The specific ways in which access to this value chain has in fact served (or not) the 
interests of particular terrorist or other actors (e.g. how exactly did this money impact 
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the behaviors and capabilities of Chechen separatists, or any other relevant given 
actor).  
Money Services 
Another flow of value that has been regularly accessed by terrorist actors is the market for 
what is commonly termed ‘money services,’ i.e. services for moving money around the globe 
and storing it securely when it is neither in motion nor in use.   These services are clearly a 
form of value to terrorists, as they are to every other person and organization in the world, as 
without them both the accumulation and expenditure of wealth would be impossible outwith 
one’s immediate sphere.   
 
Money is circulated around the world in a wide variety of ways, always dependent on the 
local political economic context.  One way of course is through the global regulated banking 
system, which in recent years has become an incredibly cheap, efficient, and secure means to 
store and transfer monetary forms of value. Information technology and the global 
liberalization and standardization of banking regulation has meant that, in theory, one can not 
only securely store virtually any amount of money anywhere in the world, but also nearly 
instantaneously transfer or access that money across the world at the touch of a button.  This 
system can of course benefit terrorist actors just as much as it can anyone else, as evidenced 
by the relatively open use of wire transfers, bank accounts, and ATM cards to circulate 
money between al Qaeda leaders and the 9/11 hijackers.621   Using the above construct, the 
choice to use banks was both desirable in 2000 and 2001 for al Qaeda in that it both 
instrumentally served their objectives to fund a dispersed group of operatives from across the 
globe, and was (at the time) considered to be a relatively low-risk method of accessing 
                                                           
621 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the 
Commission, (Washington DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 
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banking services, even for those committing illegal acts.622  As discussed earlier, this has 
largely – although not entirely – forced terrorist and other illegitimate actors to seek other 
circulation markets.  Before discussing them, however, it is worth emphasizing that banks are 
simply the most ‘modern’ element of the global market for money circulation services, and is 
no different on an epistemic level any other in that use of them is a function of one’s desire 
and ability to do so; which only emphasizes that market accessed by terrorist may function 
according to political-economic dynamics very different to those familiar in the West. 
 
For example, the cases of Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company mentioned in Chapter Four 
illustrate the depth of information that can be gained if one approaches analysis of these 
designated ‘financiers of terrorism’ from the value chain perspective posited here, rather than 
with current orthodox approaches.  In its press release announcing the designation as 
Specially Designated Global Terrorists, the U.S. Treasury stated that Bayt al-Mal and the 
Yousser Company, “function as Hizballah's unofficial treasury, holding and investing its 
assets and serving as intermediaries between the terrorist group and mainstream banks.”623  
Orthodox approaches, as discussed in previous chapters, would – and in fact do624 – 
emphasize the importance of defining terrorist actor-linked providers of money services like 
Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company as part of the “network” or “infrastructure” of 
terrorist groups, in this case Hezbollah.  But again, the perspective presented here offers a 
much richer analytic approach to representing and ultimately analyzing and responding to 
terrorist financing.  For example, it provokes questions such as: 
                                                           
622 It must be noted however that none of the 9/11 hijackers financial activities would have been ‘red flagged’ 
under present regulations.  In this way, therefore, the regulations may be more of a factor in affecting the 
desirability of banking for terrorists in that they view it as higher risk, rather than them actually be less able to 
use.   
623 United States Treasury, "Treasury Designation Targets Hizballah’s Bank," Press Release, September 7, 
2006, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp83.htm (accessed April 10, 2008). 
624 Matthew Levitt, "Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List," Testimony to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, United States House of Representatives, June 20, 2007, 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lev062007.htm (accessed April 20, 2008). 
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! What interactions do Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company have with legitimate 
Lebanese social, political, and economic actors?   
! What do these intersections tell us about the place of Hezbollah in Lebanese society? 
! Are these interactions structured along any particular social, cultural, political, or 
economic lines, such as sectarian, religious, ideological, or geographic? 
! How easily can Hezbollah access the services provided by Bayt al-Mal and the 
Yousser Company through another provider?  What alterative services or service 
providers are available, and how would changing providers impact the behavior and 
capabilities of Hezbollah? 
! What impact did these services have on Hezbollah’s military vs. political vs. social 
capabilities, in the short, medium, and long term?  
 
More generally speaking, money is also circulated in cash form by couriers, remittance 
systems, and through non-cash instruments.  This can be done legally in many countries, as 
long as a customs declaration is made.  Often however, cash is simply shipped out of the 
country, which is actually very easy as only a fraction of shipments are ever inspected, 
meaning that with the right relationships and right monitoring one could ship cash anywhere.  
The other factor is that cash is not actually that bulky.  One million dollars in $100 bills 
weighs about 22 pounds / 10kg and could be made into 6 stacks of 20cm high, meaning that it 
could easily fit inside an average briefcase.625  Given current exchange rates, one could also 
use sterling or Euros for even more value by weight.  Terrorist actors have been known to 
circulate monetary value by physically carrying currency.  For example, HAMAS, Hezbollah, 
al Qaeda, and Jemahh Islamyiaa are all known to use cash couriers to transport sometimes 
                                                           
625 Calculated from official U.S. Treasury statistics.  
  
 
295 
millions of dollars.626  Large amounts of cash like this are often difficult to hide in western 
countries, but in much of the world “cash is king.”  For example, in Iran, people regularly 
buy houses in cash. In the Middle East, exchanges of this size are also normal business 
operations.  In corrupt countries large bribes are paid to the ruling elites usually in cash, 
which then must be moved and circulated.  The bottom line is that movement of cash by 
courier is neither unusual nor very difficult in most of the world.  Aside from banks, 
numerous systems move huge amounts of money around the world, ranging from the highly 
regulated money services businesses like Western Union and bureaux de change, to the so-
called “informal value transfer systems” of hawala, chit, chi’en, and hundi, to the black 
market peso exchange, a Mexico-based illicit currency market.  Each of these systems is run 
differently, but each has an organizational logic and abides by certain rules, often set by 
social or cultural norms within specific community contexts more than economic 
maximization.  For example, hawala is based on social and kinship bonds and while a profit 
making enterprise is often conducted as a complement to other businesses (e.g. a convenience 
store) as a service to the operator’s community.627  Since 2006, Western Union has a similar 
focus, when as a corporation it made a business decision to drop their transfer rates, hire staff 
from the communities they serve, and even openly champion political causes important to 
immigrants.628  All this means that remittance systems are highly dependent on the political-
economic contexts in which they operate.  For scale, in 2006 worldwide 150 million migrants 
remitted more than $300 billion through an estimated 1.5 billion distinct transactions.629  
                                                           
626 See for example Peter Slevin, "Cash Flow to Hamas Is More Restricted, Deeper Underground," The 
Washington Post, February 19, 2006: A23; Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of 
State, Hezbollah "an Octopus" with Tentacles Around World, Officials Say, September 28, 2006, 
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/September/20060928183525adynned0.8449823.html 
(accessed May 30, 2008); and Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: the Financial Network of 
Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaida," NBR Analysis, December 2003; respectively. 
627 See Passas, Regulatory Frameworks for Hawala, 2005. 
628 Jason Deparle, "Global migration is cornerstone of Western Union growth," International Herald Tribune, 
November 21, 2007. 
629 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Sending money home: Worldwide remittance flows 
to developing countries, http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/ (accessed May 30, 2008). 
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Money can also be circulated through non-cash instruments, such as false trade invoicing, 
gold, commodities, stolen cars, and pirated goods, among others; the exchange of each of 
which is governed by particular systems.  
Accessing Other Value Chains 
Weapons 
Terrorist actors use a variety of weapons, including AK-47 assault rifle and RPG-7 rocket 
propelled grenade launcher, as well as the common FIM92A “Stinger” and the SA-7 "Grail" 
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles),630 but also arms intended for hunting or target 
shooting, such as shotguns and full-bore rifles.631  Terrorist groups also have possessed and 
used medium and heavy sized infantry weapons, such as small and large caliber machine 
guns, small and large sized mortars, wire-guided missiles, and shoulder-held anti-tank missile 
launchers.632   
 
Most explosives used by contemporary terrorist groups are improvised or at least modified 
from their manufactured form (e.g. a modification of found landmines or unexploded military 
ordnance).633  Explosives actually consist of three distinct components, the explosive charge, 
the fuse, and the triggering device, each of which may be procured separately or together 
with others.  Explosive charges historically used by terrorist actors include Semtex, RDX,634 
PETN,635 C4, Tri Nitro Toluene (TNT), common fertilizer, and dynamite.  Fuses such as 
blackmatch, quickmatch, plastic igniter cord (PIC), stickymatch/tapematch, Chinese cracker, 
time fuse, cannon, flying fish, and visco are both commercially available and can be 
                                                           
630 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence – Threats, Handbook: 
A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, 2003). 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Also known as Cyclonite or Hexogen, depending on the form. 
635 The raw form of RDX. 
  
 
297 
improvised with readily available materials such as black powder, clear tape, cotton string.636  
Triggering mechanisms vary widely in form and sophistication.  They include pressure 
activated (physical, water or atmospheric) switches, electronic signal (remote control, radio 
frequency), electronic pulse, photo electric cell (i.e. "when dawn breaks"), motion detector, 
heat detector, radiation trigger, circuit connection (anti-handling device), time switch 
(electronic), time switch (acid activated), and fuse wire.637  By combining these components 
in various ways and adding items such as nail or bolts to increase the lethality, the terrorist 
actor can create a variety of different types of bombs, ranging from basic pipe bombs, to 
backpack, car, and truck bombs, to sophisticated barometric bombs that explode once 
reaching a certain altitude.   
 
Terrorists actors have also used and been known to possess unconventional weapons such as 
nerve agents, biological agents, and radioactive materials, together commonly referred to as 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) material.  Terrorist use of CBRN 
weaponry has been a great concern for Western governments, sparked in part by Aum 
Shinrikyo’s attack on the Tokyo subway using the sarin nerve agent, the unsolved anthrax 
attacks in the United States in 2001-2002, and the seeking and suspected possession of 
chemical and biological agents by people associated with the al Qaeda movement.  The A.Q. 
Khan network was also suspected of exploring the possibility of selling nuclear material to 
terrorist actors.   
 
Very generally, and assuming a desire to acquire such goods, the processes by which terrorist 
actors access markets for small arms, heavy weapons, and explosives varies depending on the 
ability of the terrorist actor to identify and access the value chain for the weapon in question.  
                                                           
636 Pyrotechnics, http://www.chemlab.org.uk/Pyrotechnics/fuse.htm (accessed November 11, 2007). 
637 Handbook: A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2003). 
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As explained above, this is largely a function of managing information and relationships 
within governance structures particular to specific times and places.  Indeed, all of the 
weapons mentioned above can be obtained commercially and legally in some way, given of 
course that the correct information is provided in the correct form via the correct 
relationships to complete an exchange.  For example, in the tribally governed provinces of 
Pakistan (and elsewhere) accessing a value chain for automatic AK-47s typically involves 
nothing more than locating and visiting one of many well-known establish open arms 
bazaars, thus requiring knowledge and relationships of this value chain possessed by most of 
the population there.638 However, purchasing the same weapon in most parts of Western 
Europe would entail either documenting that the buyer was a legitimate government user (e.g. 
a military), or accessing underground, criminal arms dealing networks, each of which would 
require a very different set of information and relationships.  The same essential dynamic is 
present concerning other weaponry value chains, which terrorist and other actors can access 
by managing – in ways specific to the social, political, cultural, and other contexts present – 
both information (e.g. by forging end user certificates) and relationships (e.g. by interacting 
with traffickers).639   
 
Naturally, however, precisely what weapon is sought out is largely a function of the strategic 
and tactical objectives of the terrorist actor within a particular time and place.  For example, 
al-Qaeda has tended towards small and spectacular attacks, while Hezbollah favors more 
militarily significant operations.  The corollary is that one could predict or at least make best 
guesses as to the type of weapons being sought out by a terrorist actor by analyzing their 
                                                           
638 For a discussion regarding weapons markets in Pakistan and Afghanistan, see Aamer Ahmed Khan, " 
Pakistan's flourishing arms bazaar ," BBC News, June 21, 2006, and Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How 
Heroin in Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009). 
639 For a general description of the processes involved in arms trafficking, see Hugh Griffiths and Adrian 
Wilkinson, Guns, Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine Arms Transfers (Belgrade: 
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), 
August 2007). 
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objectives.  For example, al Qaeda is likely to seek nuclear capability, but Hezbollah is not 
because doing so would likely actually hinder its more regional political objectives.   
Other Value Chains 
Terrorist actors also require goods, services, and other items of value for logistical, 
administrative, recruitment, communication, intelligence / surveillance, and other purposes 
related to enabling terrorist operations or generally maintaining or expanding the group.  For 
example, terrorist actors expend resources on the movement of their own personnel, 
including commercial transport, such as the cost to travel to and from the United States 
during the planning phase of the 9/11 attacks, as well as unrecorded or informal 
transportation services such as in the Georgia case described earlier in which corrupt 
Georgian officials charged $10,000 per person for a foreign fighter to be transported to the 
Chechen border.   These travel expenses also include costs for forged travel documents, such 
as visas or passports, all of which are available easily on black markets. Terrorist actors also 
expend resources on shipping services, such as for the delivery of weapons, or other supplies, 
or for the delivery of propaganda materials to the outside world, as well as communication 
needs, such as those associated with communication by phone, internet, courier, and other 
means.  Personnel costs include recruitment and training cost, creating materials for them, 
and other costs. Intelligence costs involve surveillance equipment, vehicles, and other costs 
normally incurred in selecting and surveilling potential targets.  Other expenses include food 
and shelter associated with operations.  
 
One can safely assume that accessing the value chains for these items of value is often 
straightforward, at least in somewhat developed societies, involving primarily simply 
walking into a store or visiting the appropriate internet site.  However, in other societies, 
especially those torn by war or poverty, acquiring weapons or illicit narcotics can be much 
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easier and cheaper than acquiring certain foods or professional services.640  Regardless, such 
access still must be gained by a combination of knowing where and from whom to purchase 
what good and also acquiring the correct type and amount of value to pay for it. The 
implication naturally is that, in many places in the world where terrorist actors operate, there 
is nothing fundamentally different in the individual interactions by which they procure 
weapons, satellite phones, or light bulbs.  You just have to know the guy who sells them, and 
have enough to pay for it.  This is true everywhere, although the ‘who,’ the ‘how,’ and the 
‘how much’ will change over time, place, and circumstance. 
Advantages over Existing Frameworks 
Representing terrorist financing through a value chain paradigm brings many advantages to 
the analyst of terrorist finance.  By focusing on instrumentality, it provides a ‘North Star’ to 
guide analysts and scholars as they wade through complex and often voluminous sets of data 
and seek to explain actions and events that can seem to have no or almost infinite possible 
explanation.  In the slang of counterterrorism it helps ‘connect the dots’ and see at the same 
time ‘the big picture’ and ‘what to look for.’  More precisely, it provides an epistemological 
framework for systematically analyzing the interplay of power, value, and human agency 
within given political economic contexts at both transaction and system levels. 
 
A secondary advantage is that shifting to a ‘value chain’ representation of terrorist finance is 
that it provides a viable alternative to replace once and for all the inaccurate, misleading, and 
easily abused idea of terrorist ‘financial infrastructure,’ which mistakenly implies that 
economic interaction with a terrorist actor – even if done so illegally, willingly, and 
knowingly – necessarily implies being a part of some wider terrorist financial ‘infrastructure’ 
or ‘network.’  It shows this to be no more accurate than concluding that the various 
                                                           
640 See for example Moises Naim, Illicit (London: William Heinemann, 2005). 
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interactions within a businesses value chain are actually part of that business.  General 
Electric (GE), to return to the above comparison, has a vast network of associated 
independent businesses and individuals that provide it with goods and services that range 
from the glass from for its light bulbs to contracted advice for its government lobbying, each 
of whom interacts with GE according to various objective-, relationship-, context-, time-, and 
place- specific dynamics.  Although these relationships are accurately included as part of 
GE’s ‘value chain,’ it would be nonsense to conclude that such interaction either makes them 
part of GE itself or beholden to GE. Similarly, just because someone interacts with al Qaeda 
economically does not necessarily imply they ‘are’ al Qaeda or part of the movement’s 
‘infrastructure.’  It is useful to emphasize that this epistemic reformulation is an analytic, not 
a normative claim.  Naturally, it is reasonable for a politician for example to try to dissuade 
economic interaction with terrorist actors with these terms.  I argue simply that it is 
unreasonable for serious analysts of terrorism and terrorist financing to do so.  This thus is 
another secondary benefit to this part of the typology, in that it draws a bright line between 
those that seek to analyze terrorist financing systematically and rationally, and that seek to do 
so to serve some narrow political, personal, or institutional interest.   
 
The primary analytic outcome for liberal democratic society is that a value chain modality 
more accurately and comprehensively rates the importance of terrorist financing activity to 
terrorist actors than any other method currently available, who got what where when and 
why, and what does it mean. This re-orients analysis of ‘terrorist financing’ towards 
assessment of the instrumentality of ‘financial’ activity as it directly relates to terrorist 
operations.  In other words, the significance of terrorist financing lies not in the ‘financial’ 
activity itself, but in the actions that are benefited by that financial activity.  This insight is 
only possible by viewing terrorist financing in terms of a value chain.   
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Ironically perhaps, value chain transactions are likely to most directly lead to specific acts of 
terrorist violence, even though the dynamics of them are typically apolitical.  For example, by 
providing efficient financial services (e.g. bank accounts, ATM access, and international wire 
transfer services) to al Qaeda operatives in the United States, Sun Trust Bank was a critical 
component in the value chain for the 9/11 attacks, even though the bank broke no law and 
there has never been any implication that employees of the bank were in any way aware in 
advance of the attacks or sympathetic to al Qaeda’s objectives.641  Nevertheless, by 
representing Sun Trust’s terrorism-related financial activities in terms such as “a component 
of al Qaeda’s value chain,” it is possible to simultaneously research and assess the bank’s 
role in the attacks, without also requiring a corresponding political, ethical, or legal judgment.  
Of course these latter judgments are likely to be important to various members of the 
community of terrorist financing analysts (e.g. law enforcement or intelligence agencies, or 
simply academic researchers), the point is that the ‘value chain’ based representation of 
terrorist finance presented here allows these judgments to be distinct from analysis of the 
actual activities.  More briefly, the approach allows analysis of terrorism-related financial 
activity that is separate from (while still informing) the constructed and contingent meaning 
various audiences necessarily will attach to such activity.  This enables a more systematic 
approach to researching terrorist finance that is not only coherent, but also ultimately useful 
to a multiplicity of audiences (even ones that hold opposing political or moral perspectives). 
Material Support for Terrorism 
In one sense, terrorist financing is more accurately the ‘material support’ of terrorists, their 
violent and non-violent activities, and the causes for which they supposedly fight.  However, 
                                                           
641 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the 
Commission, (Washington DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 
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as has been noted in the literature, understanding of this support, its dynamics, and when and 
how exactly it translates into material or financial support is unsystematic and theoretically 
weak.  In other words, terrorist financing is often seen as “material support of terrorism,” but 
the dynamics of this support are underspecified.  This section develops an epistemic theory of 
the material support for terrorism.  I argue that the material support for terrorism is a four-
part continuum, each of which exhibits different behavioral dynamics, analytic logics, and 
response options.  The first two parts of the continuum, “sponsorship” and “sympathy,” 
describe material support to actual terrorist operations.  The second two parts, “subsidy” and 
“ambient support,” describe other forms of material support not to actual acts of terrorist 
violence, but to the non-violent organizational and socio-political aspects of terrorist actors.   
This chapter represents a significant contribution to understanding terrorist financing as it 
actually exists, and is the first step in moving beyond the critiques of the previous five 
chapters.   
Hypotheses about Terrorist Finance as Material Support 
The second typological mode of terrorist financing I present is that of material support for 
terrorism.  As discussed previously, terrorism is at core a socio-political phenomenon and as 
such reflects certain norms, values, beliefs, and interpretations regarding global and local 
societies.  ‘Support’ for terrorism thus seems clearly to be a reasoned choice grounded in 
these beliefs that ranges in form from agreement with broad principles like ‘self-
determination’ or ‘Islamic unity’ to donating money directly to a terrorist organization in 
order finance specific acts of violence against an enemy.   Currently, however, such dynamics 
of support are grossly underspecified.  The following typology of terrorist financing thus 
presents a taxonomical continuum of activity by which people provide value that supports 
terrorists and the causes for which they fight.  More precisely, I hypothesize that terrorist 
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financing in the form of material support consists of freely and rationally chosen action, 
which are grounded in particular social and political ideas, that result in the provision of 
material goods, services, or other forms of value that are instrumental to the objectives of 
terrorist actors.   
 
This raises three important conceptual issues that need explanation.  The first is that it 
conceives material support as an action produced by certain ideas that are related to certain 
terrorist actors.  For some this may be problematic as many ideas ‘linked’ to terrorists are 
widely held and seen to be legitimate.  For example, the cause of Palestinian statehood – or 
even violent Palestinian resistance against violent Israeli occupation – is a belief held by 
many who do not agree with the terrorist tactics of HAMAS.  Similarly, many in the Irish-
American community believed in the idea of a united Ireland but were disgusted by the 
terrorism of the IRA.  Nevertheless, conceptually it appears both more accurate and more 
useful to in some way analytically connect terrorists with the causes for which they claim to 
fight, and thus necessarily also with those that support those causes whether or not they 
themselves support the associated terrorist actors.   
 
The implication, therefore, is that understanding material support of terrorism requires 
specifying and understanding the epistemic nature of that connection.  For this reason, I have 
developed a preliminary taxonomy of such connections, in the form of continuum of activity 
consisting of ‘sponsorship support’ and ‘sympathy support’ at the end involving material 
support for the operations of terrorist actors, and ‘subsidy support’ and ‘peripheral support’ at 
the continuum’s other end in which people materially support the socio-political objectives of 
terrorist actors rather than their operations themselves. This continuum represents a 
typological reconceptualization of terrorist financing that enables one to accomplish this 
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much more systematically than is possible with either orthodox or critical approaches to 
analyzing terrorist finance, and is explained in detail in the following section. 
 
Secondly, this formulation of material support grounds analysis of terrorist financing into 
analysis of the choices that go into supporting terrorist objectives, and thus of the values, 
beliefs, and ideas that inform and drive those choices.  This takes human agency seriously, 
and further research based on this approach would contribute to the ongoing debates 
regarding the role economic poverty and inequality play in provoking and sustaining 
terrorism.642  Instead, using Sen’s conception of rationality as a basis, ‘material support’ can 
thus be seen to be governed by the content of the rationales driving support, the extent that 
those choosing to engage in material support of terrorism were (culturally, politically, 
cognitively, morally) free to do so, and the factors that strengthen or diminish the power of 
those rationales. This implies clearly that individuals bring local concerns into even global 
social movements.  This is not new.  In fact, it is the basis of any large scale political 
movement, from the Roman empire, to Christianity, to Islam, to Communism.  Burke 
describes very well how much of al Qaeda’s success is due to its ability to co opt local 
concerns into a global struggle, much as Communism or even Americanism did before.643  
Therefore, by representing terrorist finance as individual level material expressions of 
support for certain socio-political causes avoids the pitfalls of conceiving terrorism as a 
global political movement or organization forces terrorist groups into a political space that 
they do not occupy.  Further research based around this approach could thus contribute to 
understandings of how and why individuals come to support terrorism (the critical factor of 
                                                           
642 See for example Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic 
Papers 56 (2004): 563-595 who argue that socio-economic factors play a greater role in determining 
participation in political violence than political factors; and Alan Kreuger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, 
Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives 
17, no. 4 (2003): 119-144, who argue that there is no generalizable causal connection between economic 
deprivation and participation in terrorism.  
643 Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin, 2003). 
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terrorist financing),644 and provide a way to analyze the rationality of terrorist actors and their 
supproters, something that many have had difficulty doing out of fear that doing so somehow 
‘legitimizes’ terrorists and their causes. 
 
Third, this part of the typology focuses on the consequences of such material support by 
focusing the outcome of analysis, like above, not simply on descriptions of actions and ideas, 
but on what they mean for terrorist actors’ ability to achieve their objectives. One irony of 
this activity is that even though it by definition involves a will to support terrorism, the 
economic actions seem to typically result in supporting non-violent activities, such as social-
welfare and propaganda.  Given that terrorists often fight for vague or broad objectives it is 
entirely reasonable to hypothesize that materially supporting actions that empower the ideas 
on which these objectives are based is tantamount to ‘supporting terrorism.’ In fact, 
analytically this appears to be logical.  The point therefore is that when states are seeking 
ways to respond to terrorism it is likely impractical or unfair to outlaw all ‘material support’ 
for terrorism, if not outright anti-liberal.   That said, one can also hypothesize that it is still 
desirable for states learn from such material support, as it will give unique insight into the 
social and political power of both terrorists and the causes linked to them.  This is largely 
because that measuring material support in this way can provide a window into how 
seriously various individuals and groups take which causes and objectives, for the same 
reason that prices contain much information about the various factors that go into economic 
choice.   
 
Under United States law, terrorist financing is generally synonymous with ‘material support.’  
This is an accurate conflation.  The plain English definitions of ‘support’ are sufficient for 
                                                           
644 Especially the literature on ‘radicalization’ 
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our purposes here, and in fact hint at some of the ways in which individuals support terrorism 
and its related objectives. 
A Continuum of Material Support for Terrorist Objectives 
In summary, the below continuum of material support for terrorist objectives provides an 
approach for systematically analyzing how the ideas and actions of individual people 
combine to provide instrumental support to the objectives of terrorist actors.  Ultimately, this 
offers a preliminary template for accurately and comprehensively rating the relative 
importance of much ‘terrorist financing’ activity.   
Sponsorship 
The first part of the continuum of material support of terrorist financing is what can be 
referred to as ‘sponsorship,’ defined here as the direct and active material support for violent 
terrorist operations that mean to serve certain shared objectives.  More precisely, 
‘sponsorship’ thus encompasses those activities in which an actor exercises agency 
intentionally and with at least some foreknowledge of their ultimate use to provide material 
forms of value directly to actors without meaningful intermediaries or intervening processes 
who immediately and unambiguously are, or are intending to be, involved in the planning, 
execution, or exploitation of a terrorist act of violence.  
 
For illustration, Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be categorized as a 
‘sympathetic’ supporter of terrorism for his explicit, direct, and active material support of 
Chechen militant and terrorist groups and likely also of al Qaeda.  Very briefly, Hekmatyar 
was one of the most well known and powerful mujahedeen during the Afghan-Soviet war of 
the 1980s, but unlike many of his compatriots  he actively and publicly expressed both a 
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takfiri interpretation of Islam as well as a deep hatred of the United States,645 and on February 
19 2003 was designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the United States 
Department of State.646  Currently, Hekmatyar is leader of a militant group known as Hizb-i-
Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) that not only controls large amounts of territory in Afghanistan’s 
Kunar and Nuristan provinces along the country’s border with Pakistan, but also is heavily 
invested in the illicit trade of timber, gemstones, and heroin out of these provinces.647       
 
This implies several things. First is that this conception of ‘sponsorship’ is at the same time 
both more precise and more broad than traditional views that focus on state support of 
terrorism.  I argue that any actor can “sponsor” terrorism, state and non-state alike.  This 
requires the state sponsorship model, most thoroughly elucidated by Byman,648 to be 
expanded to include for example activities such as fundraising or individual donations to 
terrorist actors as well as direct transfers from state governments.  Whether a state or not, 
sponsors of terrorism exercise a free and rational choice to mobilize material resources not 
only on behalf and in support of a terrorist actor but also in service of the specific objective 
of carrying out terrorist violence.  Second is that sponsorship necessarily entails belief in 
terroristic conflict to achieve one’s own political objectives.  In other words, the analytic 
‘unit’ of sponsorship is political support for the (primarily tactical) objective of terroristic 
conflict. Sponsorship behavior is fundamentally a form of warfare, either in its active or 
‘symbolic’ forms, and thus must be addressed as such. Third is that sponsorship implies a 
‘straight line’ from the sponsor to violent terrorist objectives, which distinguishes them for 
example from those sympathizers who fund an amorphous terrorist ‘cause’ rather than an 
                                                           
645 Omid Marzban, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: From Holy Warrior to Wanted Terrorist," The Jamestown 
Foundation, September 2006. 
646 "Designation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a Terrorist," Press Statement (U.S. Department of State, February 
19, 2003). 
647 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin in Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2009), p127. 
648 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
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actual terrorist actor. This is only possible with this nuanced distinction which enables 
systematic assessment of the actual, tangible importance of a material supporter to a terrorist 
actor.649 
Sympathy 
The second part of the continuum of material support of terrorist financing is what I refer to 
as ‘sympathy.’  “Sympathy” is of course a familiar term, but I argue that it is an important 
element in material and financial support of terrorist activity.  ’Sympathetic support’ is 
defined here as indirect, passive, and/or ad hoc support for violent terrorist operations that 
mean to serve certain shared objectives.   By this I mean activities that are not strategic but 
either opportunistic or passive and contingent on a particular time and place, and thus rely on 
more emotional, normative, or cognitive factors rather than rational calculation.  Thus it can 
include forms of non-material support as well, such looking the other way at a border 
crossing or lowering the price of a weapon, but only if such action was undertaken out of 
sympathy for the violent activities of a terrorist actor.  This distinguishes similar actions in 
support for either the non-violent activities of terrorist actors or support for broader, non-
actor or group specific causes, which may or may not have a violent component.  This is the 
reverse of the above example in which a sympathizer supports the cause, but not the actor.  
 
For illustration, Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be categorized as a 
‘sympathetic’ supporter of terrorism for his opportunistic – albeit ongoing – material support 
of al Qaeda.  Very briefly, Hekmatyar was one of the most well-known and powerful 
mujahedeen during the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, and served as prime minister of 
Afghanistan from 1993 to 1994 and again in 1996.  However, unlike many of his compatriots  
he actively and publicly expressed both a takfiri interpretation of Islam as well as a deep 
                                                           
649 Richmond, 2003. 
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hatred of the United States,650 and on February 19 2003 was designated a “Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist” by the United States Department of State.651  Currently, 
Hekmatyar is leader of a militant group known as Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) that not 
only controls large amounts of territory in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces along 
the country’s border with Pakistan, but also is heavily invested in the illicit trade of timber, 
gemstones, and heroin out of these provinces.652  Journalist Gretchen Peters reports that HIG 
works closely with al Qaeda members present in the neighboring Pakistani districts of Bajaur 
and Dir.  Although few specifics are given, she implies that Hekmatyar, via his HIG 
subordinates, enables al Qaeda operatives to participate and profit from these illicit trades, 
most likely by either providing heroin, timber, or gemstones directly to al Qaeda (which it 
can then sell on using its own networks) or by allowing al Qaeda operatives to participate in 
HIG’s own trafficking networks.653    
 
Although Hekmatyar provided direct material support to a terrorist actor (i.e. either 
marketable goods or at least access to his trafficking network), this case is best categorized as 
sympathetic support because Hekmatyar has at various times sought to distance himself 
ideologically from al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden,654 and the support he likely has provided 
to the group is much more ad hoc and opportunistic, rather than active and direct.  Most 
likely, this is because while Hekmatyar is sympathetic and supports al Qaeda’s objectives, he 
is also known to be aware that too active and overt material or rhetorical support of al Qaeda 
may provoke actions by the United States or Pakistan that could not only disrupt his 
trafficking networks but also jeopardize his well-known ambitions to return to national 
                                                           
650 Omid Marzban, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: From Holy Warrior to Wanted Terrorist," The Jamestown 
Foundation, September 2006. 
651 "Designation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a Terrorist," Press Statement (U.S. Department of State, February 
19, 2003). 
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653 Peters (2009), 128. 
654 Candace Rondeaux, "Afghan Rebel Positioned for Key Role," The Washington Post, November 04, 2008. 
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leadership in Afghanistan.655  This case thus illustrates the various individual-level social, 
political, economic dimensions of terrorist financing, and generally that material support of 
terrorism is very profitably represented in these terms.   
Subsidy 
The third part of the continuum of material support of terrorist financing is what I refer to as 
‘subsidy.’ Because terrorist actors are political actors, we must distinguish material and 
political support of violent and non-violent activities.  This is a normal thing to do, and 
explains how Americans can be opposed to their government’s foreign policy but still love 
their country and pay their taxes, and how Europeans can fund charities associated with 
HAMAS but not, in their mind, fund HAMAS suicide bombers.  ‘Subsidy support’ is defined 
here as active material support for those non-violent activities of terrorist actors that mean to 
serve certain shared objectives. ‘Subsidy’ involves material support as an expression of 
support for terrorist actors, but only of their non-violent, non-terroristic activities.  
 
The case of the Holy Land Foundation, the directors of which were convicted of providing 
‘material support’ to HAMAS, provides a useful illustration of ‘subsidy’ support of terrorist 
groups.  The presentation slides shown in Figure 5.1 below are taken from a U.S. 
Government Exhibit in the terrorist financing trial of the HLF directors.  As one can see in 
the slide, HLF was accused of helping provide media, money, and men to Hamas.  This is 
true, although it is not the best way to describe the situation. This way looks at the HLF as an 
entity that has to be determined to be either involved or not involved in financing terrorism.  
This is a legalistic viewpoint.  A political viewpoint would require examining the individual 
exchanges involved.  One would then see that certain members of HLF were had social bonds 
with members of Hamas, and supported their political cause.  They then used their position as 
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leaders of a charity to support this cause, in several material ways.  This type of behavior 
happens all the time for a variety of political causes, for example a prime minister of a 
country making policy on the advice of business people who then benefit from that policy 
change is, if done legally, simply ‘serving one’s constituency,’ and it is the core of political 
behavior.  And that terrorist actors are specifically political animals, as previously discussed, 
then serving and being served by one’s constituency is at its core.   
 
Figure 5.1: Holy Land Foundation Trial Material Support Chart 
  
 
The analytic implications are twofold.  First, it implies that terrorist financing is sometimes a 
form of political expression, and thus that terrorist groups must be analyzed as political 
entities, i.e. actors with political objectives that compete against and with analogous 
objectives of other political actors, including states.   When put into this context terrorist 
financing is often an expression, and as such is often a non-violent activity, i.e. it is an 
exchange of value in order to express some thought or belief.  Analytically, therefore, the 
important question is what precisely is being expressed and how does it change over time and 
place.  
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Second, subsidizing a terrorist actor, one can hypothesize in this conception, often actually 
constrains their violent terrorist activities, because the terrorist actor feels pressure to 
maintain their subsidies even at the expense of changing their operations or objectives. For 
example, Gunning points out that HAMAS is much more constrained in its behavior because 
it is financially bound to its constituents, whereas al Qaeda is not.656  This interesting side 
effect of subsidy support, while valuable in that it supports other core political-economic 
missions of the group, also ties terrorist groups to constituencies who may conflict with their 
other or broader missions. In this way, it would logical to hypothesize, subsidizing terrorist 
actors binds them to certain constituencies, but often not the ones for whom they supposedly 
act.  For example, Gunning argues that Hezbollah, even though it is a Shi’a group within 
Lebanese sectarian based political community, receives funding support from Lebanese 
Christian groups, which in turn influences Hezbollah to act in certain ways as representing all 
of Lebanese society’s interests, especially in opposition to Israel.657  In other words, 
donations from subsidizing actors within Lebanese Christian communities appear to broaden 
Hezbollah’s desired public identity into an ‘all-Lebanon’ group, in certain contexts.  The 
point of this is not to assume any cause-and-effect relationship, but simply to point out 
certain the important implication that financial dynamics, it can be hypothesized, will 
generally follow preexisting social or political dynamics.  And of course the reverse is true, 
one can know the financial dynamics by examining social and political contexts. Al Qaeda 
does not have this problem because they do not engage in subsidy support because they have 
no non-violent social or political program. Analytically, this is a good indicator of how 
socially embedded a terrorist actor is.  In addition, it is both reflects and a reflection of local 
political economic contexts.  
                                                           
656 Gunning, 2008. 
657 Jeroen Gunning, "Terrorism, charities, and diasporas," in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, ed. 
Thomas J Bierstecker and Sue E Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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Peripheral 
The fourth part of the continuum of material support of terrorist financing is what can be 
referred to as ‘peripheral support.’  “Peripheral support” is a new term, but I argue that it is 
an important element in material and financial support of terrorist activity. I define 
‘peripheral support’ as material & non-material support for broad socio-political objectives 
shared by terrorist actors.  The central dynamic of such activity is the material expressions of 
support for the ‘politics of terrorism.’   In other words, this means material assistance meant 
to further goals of terrorist actors.  For example, this would include both Arab benefactors of 
Al Qaeda in Iraq, Boston cops for Irish freedom, and any supporter of a Hamas government.   
 
For illustration, much – but by no means all – of the financial support provided by Irish 
Americans to the Irish Republican movement could be considered ‘peripheral support.’ 
Throughout its existence, the IRA received significant financial support from the Irish-
American community; for example, in the early 1970s the IRA received approximately half 
its annual operational budget (at the time about £4 million658) from U.S. sources.659  These 
funds originated primarily from fundraising organizations,660 the largest of which was 
NORAID.  From its founding in 1969 until 1991 NORAID raised approximately $3.6 million 
for Irish republican causes through a combination of testimonial fundraising dinners and an 
extensive campaign to solicit donations through direct mail, dinner-dance benefits, and 
‘passing the hat’ in Irish bars and businesses in major U.S. cities.661 This money was 
ostensibly to provide support for any number of causes related to Ireland and Irish 
republicanism, ranging from political activities to support to the families of imprisoned IRA 
                                                           
658 Adams, 1986, 131.  
659 Adams, 1986, 137. 
660 Comprised of both Irish citizens living in America, and American citizens of Irish descent – See Adams, 
1986, 137; and Andrew Mumford, "Intelligence Wars: Ireland and Afghanistan – The American Experience," 
Civil Wars 7, no. 4 (2005), 382. 
661 Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 (July 1996), 524. 
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members,662 but much of it actually went to purchase weapons for the IRA, a fact essentially 
admitted to by several NORAID leaders in their 1982 arms smuggling trial.663  The key 
difference separating this activity from ‘sympathetic’ support is that, generally, donors of this 
funding were intending to provide support to Irish republicanism generally, but not 
necessarily the IRA itself.   
 
This case, specifically the way in which the U.S. Government dealt with NORAID, raises 
some interesting points regarding the regulation of such ‘peripheral’ support groups.  For 
example, despite such clear and well-established links between NORAID and the IRA, the 
U.S. Government’s response was ambiguous.  In some ways, U.S. officials were indifferent 
or even sympathetic to NORAID’s activities. Under the American Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938 all organization raising money to be remitted overseas are required 
to name the primary ‘foreign principal’ to which the money is directed.  Although it tried to 
register a different recipient, the official ‘foreign principal’ of record for NORAID in fact has 
been the Irish Republican Army since a U.S. district judge ruled in 1981 that NORAID was 
“an agent of the IRA providing money and services for other than relief purposes.”664  
Despite this, NORAID has always been allowed to operate openly and freely in the United 
States, even to such an extent that members of Congress, high-level state officials, and 
various other prominent people with ties to the Irish American community regularly attended 
NORAID’s fundraising dinners.665  Guelke makes an important observation about these 
fundraising efforts which sets such participation firmly in a domestic political context:  
                                                           
662 Ibid.  
663 The defendants were NORAID founder Michael Flannery and four others.  They did not deny smuggling 
arms to the IRA, but they did claim that the CIA paid them to do it. See Adams, 1986, 137-142; Mumford, 
2005, 382; and Guelke, 1996, 523-525.   
664 Quoted in Warren Richey, "The Noraid connection," Christian Science Monitor (international edition), 
January 19-25, 1985. 
665 Adams, 1986, and Guelke, 1996. 
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“By no means all of the politicians who went to such dinners could be counted as 
supporters of the Provisional IRA; NORAID was the beneficiary of the American 
political elite's disposition to be joiners.”
666
  
Conversely, the British government applied great diplomatic pressure to the U.S. 
Government to investigate and prosecute those involved in financing IRA terrorism.  This 
became politically easier after the 1979 IRA murder of Lord Mountbatten undermined the 
moral legitimacy of the IRA for many in the Irish American community.  In addition, the 
close relationship between U.S. President Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher led to 
increased efforts of U.S. authorities against IRA fundraising in the United States, including 
the arrest and 1982 prosecution of NORAID founder Michael Flannery for arms smuggling.  
In fact, these efforts were successful in permanently diminishing the share of funds the IRA 
received from the U.S. from almost half in the 1970s to perhaps one-tenth of that by the late 
1980s.667  Interestingly, both the IRA and the British government largely ignored this 
development.  The IRA and its political arm Sinn Fein for example continued to exploit the 
increasingly fictional foundation of financial support in the U.S. to bolster its claims that it 
was a legitimate military organization involved in a legitimate armed struggle.  This 
ambiguity led to a contradictory U.S. approach towards terrorist financing in the Northern 
Irish case.  On one hand, the U.S. allowed an avowed terrorist financing organization to 
operate within its territory, but on the other hand it used existing laws to take increasingly 
robust – and ultimately successful – actions against it.  When put in context of the domestic 
and international politics of the day, however, the reasons for these contradictions are 
perfectly clear and comprehensible.  This illustrates that how prior to the formalization of the 
regime counter terrorist financing actions were undertaken largely to explicitly serve the 
national interests of the states executing the actions. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not always 
the case in the current regime.   
                                                           
666 Guelke, 1996. 
667 Adams, 1986, 137. 
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Advantages over Existing Frameworks 
This typological formulation contributes a potentially powerful framework of analysis that 
will enable accurate and comprehensive assessments of the meaning and importance of 
terrorist financing activity to global and local societies, illuminating which financial activity 
is relevant to which actors, communities, and analytic outcomes.  This would allow, for 
example, conclusions about future trends in terrorist finance by researching evident trends in 
the various types of support in a given time and place, or relevant to a particular terrorist 
actor or socio-political cause.  A second is that risk and associated response can be 
systematically evaluated together along this ‘continuum’ of behaviors. 
 
In general terms, this typology serves the liberal democratic objective of promoting the rule 
of law, specifically by more rationally establishing the norms of business ethics upon which 
laws that regulate how actors in the private and charitable sector interact economically with 
terrorist actors.  Currently, laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act proscribe some economic 
interactions with terrorists but allow others, a situation that has led to confusion and 
unintended social consequences.  For example it is illegal to sell – often even unknowingly – 
value transfer services to a terrorist actor, but legal to sell groceries to that same actor.  While 
this may seem a silly example, it highlights the need for clear laws based on transparent and 
consensus norms, something difficult regarding terrorist finance given that often-legitimate 
societal variations (such as in informal value transfer systems) are mistaken for ‘red flags.’668 
This typology serves this function, as it provides an epistemology for nuanced analysis of 
how different societal variations impact both terrorist financing and liberal democratic 
society. For example, existing terrorist financing regulations emphasize the relevance of 
verifiable identification and traceable financial transactions to determine whether an activity 
                                                           
668 That is, indicating a higher likelihood of interaction with terrorists. 
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is likely involved in terrorist financing, even though most poor people in the world lack any 
form of identification, and in many middle eastern societies cash transactions with minimal 
or different forms of tracking (i.e. without names attached) are common.  By tying such 
societal variation to the political economic decision making of terrorist actors, however, the 
above typology provides a framework for constructing more nuanced and more effective 
counter terrorist financing legislation, particularly relating to informal value transfer systems.  
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that for the purposes of analysis, the epistemological foundations of 
terrorist finance laid out in Chapter Four can be formulated into an applicable ‘typology’ of 
terrorist financing behavior.  This typology posited that terrorist financing actually consists of 
two analytically distinct forms of conduct.  To review, they are: 
• the compendium of individual transactions in which various items of material and 
non-material value are exchanged that result in terrorist actors acquiring something of 
value; and  
• freely and rationally chosen actions, which are grounded in particular social and 
political ideas, that result in the provision of material goods, services, or other forms 
of value that are instrumental to the objectives of terrorist actors.   
 
The previous chapters mentioned that a popular conception of terrorism-related financial 
activity, upon which much counter terrorist financing action is based (as discussed above), is 
that it ‘exploits’ ‘legitimate’ economic systems, and must be therefore pushed ‘out’ of those 
systems.  These normative-based frameworks I argue however are inferior to the epistemic 
view presented here in this typology.  The above typology is based on the different 
assumption that the financial networks of HAMAS is the system, just as General Electric is.  
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In other words, both simply represent how different actors produce, acquire, and use forms of 
value in order to increase their power within their global environment.  From this foundation, 
one can then proceed to systematically analyze, for instance, their interests and objectives, 
the nature and extent of their power, in what forms of value and value exchange they engage, 
and the consequences of all of the above for various subjects, such as liberal democratic 
society.  
 
Ultimately, therefore, this typology represents a teleological theory of human behavior, in 
that it is concerned with the actual conduct of people at the individual level, within given 
contexts and tied closely to explicit analytic goals.  This represents a significant advancement 
in the analysis of terrorist finance, for the reasons explained in the next chapter.   
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CONCLUSION  
Applying this Dissertation to Future Research on Terrorist Finance 
This dissertation aimed to improve how terrorist financing is conceptualized, specifically by 
engaging with relevant critiques to build an original, alternative way of representing terrorist 
finance based around a typological understanding of the complex, intersubjective everyday 
realities of the individual political-economic decisions that govern terrorist financing activity.  
The improved conceptualization presented here achieves this goal by offering a frameworks 
that is capable of producing knowledge that both more accurately reflects the realities of 
terrorist financing, and is more useful and applicable to the ‘community of terrorist financing 
analysts’ both within and outside International Security debates.  To emphasize the 
contribution this research represents to spheres of both academic discourse and practice, the 
dissertation concludes by discussing how the conceptualization presented herein contributes 
to the International Relations discipline, specifically by outlining a program of future 
research that could be based upon the findings of this dissertation.   
 
This dissertation, given the conceptual nature of terrorist financing, was necessarily and 
simultaneously bedded in critique and focused on problem solving within a particular 
subjective and political context.  As such, it waded into much more philosophically important 
– and turbulent – waters where ideas and action, philosophy and politics, knowledge and 
power intermix   In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche captures the essence of this turbulence 
and our intellectual ‘duty’ in relation to it, writing:  
"This world with which WE are concerned, in which we have to fear and love, this 
almost invisible, inaudible world of delicate command and delicate obedience, a 
world of "almost" in every respect, captious, insidious, sharp, and tender--yes, it is 
well protected from clumsy spectators and familiar curiosity! We are woven into a 
strong net and garment of duties, and CANNOT disengage ourselves--precisely here, 
we are "men of duty," even we! Occasionally, it is true, we dance in our "chains" and 
betwixt our "swords"; it is none the less true that more often we gnash our teeth 
under the circumstances, and are impatient at the secret hardship of our lot. But do 
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what we will, fools and appearances say of us: "These are men WITHOUT duty,"-- 
we have always fools and appearances against us!"
669
 
 
As we have seen, much of the ‘orthodox’ literature on terrorist finance is written to imply that 
understanding terrorist finance requires one to uncover dark secrets about the global 
‘infrastructures’ and “mysterious”670 networks that supposedly finance terrorism.  However, 
has been discussed, while the world of terrorist finance is indeed often ‘invisible’ and 
‘inaudible,’ it is very much knowable and comprehensible.  This is because what is referred 
to as ‘terrorist finance’ is most basically simply a certain sub-set of political economic 
activity about which liberal democratic societies are currently concerned.  It can thus be 
observed, analyzed, interpreted, and acted upon, just like any other manifestation of human 
behavior.  In other words, this dissertation demonstrates throughout that terrorist financing is 
very much an ‘everyday’ activity in which certain individuals make certain decisions that 
lead to particular outcomes that in different ways and for a variety of reasons results in 
enabling certain opponents of liberal democratic societies.   
 
Within this context, especially given that full testing of the conceptualization presented 
herein was not possible within the time and space constraints of a PhD dissertation, it seems 
logical to conclude with an exploration of how exactly how this dissertation could be applied 
to making the financial dimensions of those deemed to be ‘terrorists’ – more ‘visible’ and 
‘audible.’   To do so, this conclusion first will discuss potential – and in a few cases actual – 
applications of the representation of terrorist finance presented in this thesis, as well as the 
typology proposed in Chapter Five, to the specific systems of actions and power of the 
various components of the community of terrorist financing analysts. 
                                                           
669 Frederich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter VII. 
670 Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," Strategic Insights (Center for 
Contemporary Conflict) IV, no. 1 (January 2005). 
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Applications to the Community of Terrorist Financing Analysts 
As discussed in Chapter One, the ‘community of terrorist financing analysts’ refers both to 
the audience of this thesis, as well as those who mediate representations of terrorist finance.  
In other words, it is they who are the ‘powerful’ who use and are impacted by the ways 
knowledge about terrorism-related financial activity is created and structured.  To review, the 
this audience consists of the following communities: 
" Researchers of terrorist finance, and academics publishing works relating to the issue.   
" Financial intelligence or compliance sections of financial institutions.  
" Military or intelligence community analysts who specialize in collecting, analyzing, 
and exploiting data about the financing of terrorist actors. 
" Law enforcement agents and attorneys who investigate and prosecute terrorist 
financing cases, as well as those who provide legal defenses for those accused of 
terrorist financing related offenses. 
" National government regulators who formulate and enforce regulations regarding 
terrorist financing. 
" Legislators and executive administrators who make and implement laws against 
terrorist financing, including elected political leaders as well as appointed cabinet 
ministers and their deputies. 
" International standard setting bodies and regulatory forums.   
" Other professions or the general public, as long as they are interested in terrorist 
financing or attempts to regulate and ‘fight’ it.   
" Members of so-called ‘high risk’ social, political, or cultural communities that are 
perceived to be more likely to be involved in or supportive of terrorist financing. 
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The following sections outline how this thesis can contribute to both the academic and 
praxial components of the community of terrorist financing analysts. 
Contributions to Communities of Practice  
Regarding spheres of practice, although systematically determining how this thesis could 
contribute and be applied to various relevant systems of power and practice would indeed be 
a worthwhile project, it would require research beyond what is possible for this concluding 
chapter.  With this caveat, it is nonetheless possible to briefly outline the potential 
contribution across different and even competing spheres of practice in order to illustrate that 
the re-conceptualization of terrorist finance within this thesis has accomplished its goal of 
providing a foundation for understanding terrorist finance that can produce coherent and 
systematic knowledge about terrorism-related financial activity how ever this knowledge is 
ultimately mediated or used.   
 
In the first instance, the alternative conceptualization of terrorist finance presented in this 
thesis allows governments to re-represent terrorism-related financial activity not as a problem 
of ‘bad’ or ‘threatening’ money, but of either an instrumental element of the capabilities and 
behaviors of terrorists, or something that reflects – and therefore an important vehicle to learn 
about – the relationships terrorists have with the communities and political economies within 
which they interact.  This reconceptualization could thus be the foundation of potent 
intelligence and analytic tools, such as, for example, a comprehensive taxonomy or ‘risk 
map’ of terrorist financing activity based largely on deductions from knowledge of local 
political-economic and socio-cultural dynamics, without necessarily penetrating actual 
terrorist groups; based on estimates of the likelihood a suspected actor or activity is both 
active in a particular ‘high risk market’ and has a relationship with terrorist actors within 
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these markets. In other words, this typology provides a viable framework to, in effect, make 
relatively accurate ‘best guesses’ about terrorist financing in given times and places.671  
 
Second, this thesis enables the financial industry to systematically re-imagine terrorist 
finance as the politicized and securitized problem that it has always been, a recognition that 
would help counter the deleterious impact of orthodox perceptions of the issue as 
unproblematic and uncontested.  This recognition would likely lead to more systematic 
reevaluations of regulations meant combat the financing of terrorism (CFT), especially in 
terms that compared the considerable costs such regulations impose on the financial industry 
with the actual benefits provided to governments.  In particular, one could predict that – 
given that terrorist finance appears to often involve the exchange of non-monetary forms of 
value outside of the regulated, ‘Western’ financial system – this would lead to the conclusion 
that the financial industry is much less of a central component of CFT efforts than currently 
perceived.  If this prediction was proven to be accurate, this would in turn indicate that the 
financial industry’s primary contribution relates to financial intelligence, rather than financial 
warfare, and therefore regulations, to be cost-effective, should focus more on financial 
reporting and analysis requirements, rather than those related to account blocking and 
designations. 
 
Third, the alterative representation of terrorist finance presented herein empowers the public, 
charities, and ‘high risk’ communities to comprehend the changes in society driven and 
justified by this issue and to provide input about which of these changes are just of not.  For 
example, members of communities that are portrayed as supportive of terrorism can better 
understand why this is the case and can more successfully delineate differences among who 
                                                           
671 That is, by the markets various terrorist actors could and likely would access Information technology is 
probably needed to support this viably, as much of this data is available from anthropological, sociological, 
economic, historical, or area studies research. 
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and what they support so as to support political and social objectives without necessarily 
supporting violent groups that share those goals.  
 
More specifically, the table below summarizes the potential contributions to each segment of 
the community of terrorist financing analysts specifically by the improved conceptualization 
presented in this thesis.    
 
Table C1: Predicted and Actual Contributions of this Thesis to the 
Spheres of Practice within the ‘Community of Terrorist Financing 
Analysts’ 
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Case study of terrorist financing along the Chechnya-Georgia Border, 1999-2002              
Deficiencies in ‘orthodox’ representations of terrorist finance         A     
The ‘Right Questions:’ Impact on terrorist actor behavior and capabilities    C      D    
The ‘Right Questions:’ Reflection of terrorist actor relationships with wider communities B   C      D    
Reframed bases of conceptualizing terrorism-related financial activity     C      D    
Typology: terrorist finance as interaction with value chains    C      D    
Typology: continuum of material support for terrorist actors or terrorism related causes    C      D    
 
 
As illustrated, the alternative representation of terrorism-related financial activity presented 
in this thesis has wide potential application across communities of practice, not only among 
state organs involved in identifying, prosecuting, or otherwise ‘fighting’ terrorist actors, but 
also to communities who have been negatively impacted by counter terrorist financing 
practices in the past, such as defendants in terrorist financing / material support criminal 
cases, as well members of religious, social, or political communities that are perceived to be 
sympathetic to terrorist groups.  In the boxes denoted with a letter, the findings of this thesis 
  
 
326 
have already contributed to the community of practice identified.  In particular, this thesis has 
already been applied to: to help the U.S. Congress identify problems in existing terrorist 
financing legislation (A); the formulation of investigative frameworks and questionnaires 
related to terrorist financing at one of the five largest global banking groups (B); the training 
of special operations soldiers in the collection and exploitation of intelligence on terrorism-
related financial activity (C); and the preparation of formal advice about how to restructure 
counter terrorist financing practices to a senior appointed government official with executive 
policy and budgetary authority (D).673 
 
Regarding contributions to academic discourse, researchers of terrorist financing and those 
academics that produce works within what is termed here as terrorist financing studies will 
benefit from the representation of terrorism-related financial activity in primarily three ways.  
First, the reframed conceptual foundation of the issue presented in Chapter Four (i.e. the 
‘right questions’) provides a cogent point of reference from which both empirical and 
theoretical investigation of terrorist finance can proceed.  Second, by relocating terrorist 
finance within International Relations as an issue of individual-level securitized political 
economic interaction, the thesis helps deepen theoretical understanding of not only terrorist 
finance, but also of extra-legal political economies in general, and provides a theoretical 
construct within which future investigation of these complex, intrinsically politicized and 
contingent, and largely under-researched issues can advance.  Third, the typology presented 
in Chapter Five presents both a coherent framework for structuring positivist, empirical 
research on terrorism-related financial activity (regardless of one’s perspectives on or 
definitions of terrorism, money, globalization, or other contested and problematic issues of 
contemporary international relations), as well as even a series of hypotheses that can be tested 
                                                           
673 Details of these contributions are sensitive, but available as required. 
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and refined as necessary.  The below section explains in more detail how these advances 
could form the basis for a more formalized and systematic research program about terrorist 
finance.    
A Program for More Formalized Research on Terrorist Finance 
This section explains in more detail how this dissertation forms the foundation for a program 
of research that could produce a formalized analysis of the financing activities and contexts 
of those deemed to be ‘terrorists’ that more empirically comprehensive, analytically 
systematic, and methodologically repeatable than anything available in either the orthodox or 
the critical literatures.   This not only outlines how future research could proceed in this 
emerging area of interest, but also illustrates more specifically the contribution and 
significance to International Security discourse this dissertation’s improved conceptualization 
of terrorist financing represents.   It is important to note that because it seeks to formalize 
many of the conceptual findings of this dissertation, the proposed research program must for 
the sake of repeatability consolidate some complex themes into singular variables.   
 
 
The proposed research program comprises six (6) distinct but related elements of 
documentation and analysis.  The elements complement each other, and together they are 
intended to provide needed conceptual order to measuring and documenting the complex and 
intrinsically politicized dynamics of terrorist finance. The proposed program centers on 
documenting what makes change within the flows of value accessed by terrorist actors.  In 
other words, it holds that terrorist financing can be understood by documenting political 
economic change-making, and that in turn political economic change-making can be 
understood by documenting what value ‘flows’ each actor in a conflict accesses, and what 
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political-economic changes result from accessing these flows.  This allows analysis of a 
complex subject that is systematic, comprehensive, and repeatable.   
 
First, it is helpful to describe the ontological, epistemological, and typological components of 
this method, which combined allow for documentation of the interrelated dynamics of power 
and value exchange relevant to terrorist actors.  Epistemologically, the research program 
proposes to narrow analytic focus to power.  In other words, this means that power – 
specially to influence interactions with value chains – is the central ontological feature of 
terrorist financing, and therefore that it is fruitful to focus explicitly on data that tells us about 
the forms, practices, and exercise of power.  By power, I simply mean the ability to influence 
the actions of others, a vague definition, based, as discussed in Chapter Four, in Classic 
Realism, that allows for consideration of all forms and practices of power, including physical, 
cultural, economic, political, psychological, etc.  To simplify again, this means that terrorist 
financing is essentially about the ability to make change.  However, this alone is not a 
sufficient guide to collecting data on terrorist financing, namely because it begs the 
foundational question, ‘what is terrorist financing?’ 
 
This question is addressed by assuming that, ontologically, terrorist financing relates 
essentially to the aggregation of various flows of value, each constantly shifting and each in 
truth an aggregation of many individual exchanges. Again, I adopt an intentionally vague 
definition of value.  I take value to mean anything of value, including cultural value, 
economic or material value, political value, including flows of material and non-material 
forms of value, e.g. goods, services, norms, ideas, etc.  Therefore, I propose, terrorist 
financing activity – i.e. the change-making behavior with which we are concerned – is 
focused on making change to these flows.  In other words, the proposed epistemology first 
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narrows the epistemic focus of research on terrorist finance to the role and dynamics of 
power (change-making), and second simplifies the financial underpinnings of terrorist actors 
to a compendium of individual interactions with individual flows of value.  All of this of 
course is based on the baseline assumptions above, which hold, it is worth emphasizing 
again, that this occurs in context of certain analytic objectives.  The outcome is that terrorist 
financing activity can in theory be measured in terms of how such action ‘makes change’ in 
local value chains accessed by terrorist actors in ways that are specifically relevant to pre-
specified analytic outcomes desired by the analyst. But in practice, how to structure a 
methodology to actually document this change making?  The next section proposes a 
program to do so.   
Element 1: Defining and Bounding Terrorist Conflicts 
The first element is a method for identifying, defining, and describing terrorism.  As 
discussed in the dissertation, ‘terrorism’ is an inherently contested issue and therefore it 
seems fruitless to attempt to provide one single universally applicable definition.  Therefore 
the research program proposed here intentionally goes without one.  Instead, the research 
program proposed here simply calls for an explicit and systematic specification of variables 
that define and separate, and bound a specific ‘terrorist conflict.’   These defining, limiting, 
and bounding variables could include particular determinations of time, place, group, 
ideology, or some combination thereof.   
 
For example, the case study in Chapter 2 could be so defined, limited, and bounded in several 
different ways, depending on some combination of the following variables, or others.  The 
following table illustrates only a small few of the variations possible to define, limit, and 
bound the conflict mentioned. 
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Table 1 
Time Place Group Ideology 
Second Chechen War Russia Chechen boeviks Chechen Separatism 
1992-2002 Chechnya al Qaeda Violent Takfiri Salafist Islamism 
 Pankisi Gorge Chechen Jihadists Jihad in the ‘Way of Allah’ 
 
Various combinations of these variables are possible, and thus each different combination 
represents a different way of defining, limiting, and bounding a terrorist conflict.  For 
example, the above case could be part of a conflict bounded as “violent takfiri salafist 
Islamist terrorism in Chechnya during the Second Chechen War” or “militant Chechen 
separatism from 1992-2002.”  Naturally, the particular combination used depends in large 
part on the a priori objectives and perspectives of the analyst.  For example, a 
counterterrorism analyst in a Russian government intelligence agency might find the former 
the more useful combination of variables with which to define, bound, and limit the conflict 
he seeks to analyze, while an academic historian of the Caucuses might find the latter a more 
helpful formulation.   
 
The significance lies in neither which combination of variables are used nor which 
boundaries are set for a particular terrorist conflict, but simply that they are set, and set 
explicitly.  This naturally raises all sorts of political, moral, legal, and other issues and 
complexities, and requires the analyst to wade into these murky waters. However, since 
terrorism is inherently politicized already, then the analyst has already done so, and this is 
simply a call for these inherent – but often unstated – normative and political biases, beliefs, 
views, and objectives that mediate any given view of terrorism and terrorist actors to simply 
be made explicit to the extent that is necessary to make decisions on which combination of 
variables should define, limit, and bound how the terrorist conflict under analysis is 
represented.  Therefore, it is also useful to explicitly identify which normative and political 
beliefs – such as liberal democracy, support for a particular country’s foreign policy, etc – 
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underlie the chosen set of variables.   This last step however is not necessary because many 
of these beliefs are implicit in which variables are chosen.  For example, bounding a conflict 
by a set of variables such as “Radical Islamist Terrorism in Chechnya” likely – albeit not 
certainly – carries certain identifiable – or at least possible – political beliefs about terrorism 
and ‘radical Islamism,’ as well as about those who seek to counter them.  Naturally, since 
these fundamental beliefs are also contested and likely contentious, it does behoove the 
analyst to make them explicit as much as possible. 
Element 2: Defining and Documenting Terrorists 
The second element of the research program is a method for defining the combatants in 
terroristic conflicts; otherwise known as ‘terrorists.’  One often-commented upon feature of 
terrorism is that the term is intrinsically contested and political, and based on one’s own 
norms and political ideas, which leaves a definitive approach to identifying who exactly is a 
terrorist uncertain.  However, even though many simply assert that a terrorist is one who is 
designated as such by liberal democratic governments, the processes and objectives that 
inform these designations are often arbitrary and contradictory, and always political and 
contestable. For example, while Hezbollah’s ‘military wing’ could and is defined as a 
terrorist group by both the United States and the European Union, only the former classifies  
the group’s political leaders who sit in the Lebanese parliament as the same.  This is 
important obviously because if these parliamentarians are indeed considered to be ‘terrorists’, 
then a host of analytic and practical implications are likely to flow from this determination, 
such as the propriety, legality, and prudence of economic and financial support for these 
political leaders.   
 
Given this complexity, the research program proposed here proposes to limit the definition of 
terrorism to those individual or collective actors who either commit (i.e. one’s own actions) 
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or commission (i.e. the exercise of power to influence others to commit the action) acts of 
war with boundaries specified in Element 1.  Acts of war are defined as acts of deliberate 
violence for social or political goals, as opposed to violence committed solely for economic 
gain (e.g. criminal violence) or for some internal psychological motive (e.g. ‘everyday’ 
murder).  The war/violence distinction is to keep analytic focus on the defining actors of a 
conflict.  In other words, given that there can be no conflict without acts of war, it is not only 
logical to focus on these actors, but also useful as seen below.   
 
The research program proposed here also proposes that combatants can be documented by 
collecting data on what can be referred to as ‘Terrorist Attributes.”  There are likely almost as 
many ways to document terrorists as there are parties interested in doing so.  The following 
however is a coherent, comprehensive, and useful schematic for representing and 
documenting the activities, nature, and defining characteristics of terrorists.    
! Composition  
o Structure 
o Organizational Dynamics 
o Geographic Location 
o Strength 
o Recruitment 
! Personalities / Specific Individual Participants 
! Ideology 
! Radicalization  
! Objectives & strategy 
! Operations 
o Targets 
o Tactics 
o Training 
o Communications 
o Weapons 
o Operations Table 
! Logistics 
o Finance 
o Weapons Acquisition 
! External relationships 
! Culture 
! Miscellaneous Information 
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! Threats to the Interests/Beliefs/Ideas of the Analyst674 
Element 3: Documenting the Economic Contexts of Terrorist Actors 
The third element of the research program proposed here is a method for modeling the 
economics of a terrorist conflict.  As discussed above, this is often seen as a difficult, if not 
impossible, analytic task, as it necessarily must incorporate the full compendium of complex 
individual level exchanges of value, much of which is not monetary or even material, and 
which often involves seemingly opposed actors (e.g. combatant economically interacting 
with opposing combatants, or combatants economically interacting with non combatants such 
as civilians, businesses, NGOs, and foreign governments).  However, I posit that this 
complexity can be documented to a sufficient level of accuracy by collecting data on three 
significant aspects of economic interactions within a terrorist conflict, collectively referred to 
here as ‘Economic Context Attributes”.   
 
The first set of Economic Context Attributes is a record of the economic resources used by 
terrorist actors.  The specific variables include: 
! Item of Value  
! Number / Amount of Item  
! Associated tactics of Terrorist  
! When Acquired?  
! Who acquired?  
! Acquired from whom?  
! Where Acquired?  
! Acquired for what? (description)  
! Where Item is in Use? 
! End User  
! Miscellaneous  (motives, etc)  
! Monetized Price (amount)  
! Monetized Price (currency) 
! Exchange Rate (to USD) 
! Dollarized Price (or some other common currency for cross-comparisons)675 
                                                           
674 This set of variables originates from the Dynamic Threat Assessments of the Universal Adversary Program 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  This particular framework for analysis of conflict actors was 
designed by Helios Global Inc, a consultancy, and represents a modification of the schematic contained in U.S. 
Army Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22 – Counterinsurgency Operations. 
675 Thank you to Charlotte Bullen for her assistance in refining these variables. 
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The second set of Economic Context Attributes relate to the value chains for each of these 
resources within or via the conflict zone, and specifically two variables that together allow 
one to document the individual exchanges of which economic activity within conflicts is 
comprised.  The first variable is, using plain English, the desire of terrorists to access a 
particular market flow, which is essentially a function of the perception that such access will 
meet certain pre-existing objectives.  This refers to the extent to which a terrorist would like 
to obtain the forms of value available within a given market, and is primarily a function of 
the terrorist’s rational assessment (here using Sen’s conception of rationality676) about how 
instrumental a particular form of value would be in assisting his objectives.  More simply, the 
research program holds that terrorists access pre-existing markets for reasons tied to their 
own objectives.  Of course, many subsidiary factors influence a terrorist’s assessment of both 
his own objectives and how a particular item of value would instrumentally serve them, 
including information available about the desired item of value (e.g. quality, reliability, 
value), and agreement on strategic and tactical objectives.  In addition, it must be emphasized 
that these assessments of value, objective, and instrumentality are completely context-
specific.  In other words, something that may be of value in one time or place may be less 
‘desirable’ in another, even for the same terrorist.  This is because goals change, situations 
change, and particular forms of value become relatively more or less valuable accordingly.  
For example, the terrorists in virtually any conflict would seek access to markets for drugs, 
arms, food, clothing, personnel, or services according to particular political-economic needs 
at particular times.  Similarly, in some places it’s easier or cheaper to get AK-47s than 
tomatoes; but one must know the market and how to access it in order to use it.  
 
                                                           
676 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002 
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The second variable governing the role of ‘value chains’ in conflicts is the ability of terrorists 
to access these pre-existing market flows of value.  This refers simply to the actual capability 
of the terrorist to not only access a market but to do so in a way that he is able to engage in an 
exchange that he finds ‘desirable.’  This is governed, generally, by the amount of power the 
terrorist is able to exercise within that market flow. In other words, individual economic 
transactions within conflicts are therefore a function of how and how well terrorists are able 
to interact with their societal environment.  Power, especially political economic power, is 
complex, but it is possible here to make some initial determinations of how to measure and 
analyze the factors that govern the form, nature, and amount of power terrorists can exercise 
over and within a market flow.  The subsidiary factors influencing the ‘capability’ to access 
value flows thus include such things as prior relationships with key players in the market (e.g. 
Taliban can easily access arms markets in tribal areas of Pakistan because many of them are 
members of these tribes), or institutional knowledge of the market (e.g. of external 
intermediary markets for natural resources).    
Element 4: Documenting Governance of Value Chains Accessed by Terrorist Actors 
The fourth element of the research program proposed here is a method for modeling 
governance within a terrorist conflict.  Given the complexity of contemporary conflicts, 
governance structures and practices are often complex, ever-varying, and perhaps surprising 
or unexpected to the analyst.  For example, while conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Pakistan are often termed ‘civil wars’ 
(implying a war between a government and an opposition force), recent conflict research 
indicates that they are really societal complexes in which competing actors vie for and 
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compete over governance of flows of value, knowledge, and socio-political power and 
control, often using violence and warfare as simply tools of this competition.677 
 
Within this context, the research program proposed here posits that governance of economic 
value within a terrorist conflict can be documented by collecting and analyzing data in three 
primary areas, only one of which relates directly to economics.  First, the research program 
proposed here proposes to collect data to determine who influences and controls the markets 
and by what acts and practices of power do they do so.  This would include data on such 
attributes such as local business practices and customs, the identities and biographies of the 
individual economic players active in buying and selling of a particular good or service, and 
the profit margins of each of those players, among other variables still to be determined.  
Second, the research program proposed here proposes to collect data to determine who 
controls territory and by what acts and practices of power do they do so.  This would include 
data primarily on identifying first who enforces entry, exit, use of, and claims to land, and the 
methods, techniques, and practices these individuals or groups utilize for such enforcement. 
Third, the research program proposed here proposes to collect data to determine who 
produces knowledge and by what acts and practices of power do they do so? A vulgar 
measurement of this data would be to identify all indigenous researchers, non-indigenous 
specialists in the variables bounding the conflict determined in Element 1, the 
periodicals/newspapers that cover or are published in the terrorist conflict, the consultancies, 
think tanks, and other private research organizations that cover or are based in the terrorist 
conflict, and the government (including intelligence) agencies that produce knowledge about 
the terrorist conflict.   
 
                                                           
677 See for example, Christopher Cramer, Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing (London: Hurst & Company, 2006); 
and Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001). 
  
 
337 
Although naturally all this information about a terrorist conflict would be useful, nevertheless 
how does one validate that these three proposed datasets represent a useful mechanism for 
understanding the governance of economic value within conflicts.  I posit that to assess this, 
one can evaluate these datasets according to three different criteria.  The first criterion is how 
this control and influence over value flows, territory, and information influence value chains 
in ways that serve the interests of any violent conflict actors.  This will illuminate the extent 
by which each actor in a terrorist conflict zone contributes to the economic success of each 
terrorist and therefore the continuation of the conflict.  The second criterion is how this 
control and influence over value flows, territory, and information influences changes in 
political or social orders in ways that serve the interests of any violent conflict actors (note: 
intention is not considered here, only consequence).  This will illuminate the extent by which 
each actor in a terrorist conflict zone contributes to the welfare of the population, or doesn’t. 
The third criterion is how this control and influence over value flows, territory, and 
information produce knowledge that serves any of the violent conflict actors (information 
threats).  This will illuminate the extent to which actors active in a terrorist conflict zone 
control the narrative and therefore ideas about the conflict, and to what interests this serves.   
 
The combination of governance of value flows, territory, and information is in essence 
governance of political economic change.  Therefore, the first four elements of the research 
program proposed here constitute a method to document and model political economic 
change making within conflicts.  The remaining three elements of the research program 
proposed here serve to document and model how such political economic change making 
impacts and reflects terrorists in conflict, and how knowledge produced by the research 
program proposed here can be applied to efforts to influence the outcomes of conflicts.   
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Element 5: Documenting the Meaning of Economic Activity to Terrorists 
The fifth element of the research program proposed here is a method for documenting what 
political economic change-making tells us about terrorists within a terrorist conflict.  The 
purpose of this element of the methodology is to begin to overcome and manage the high 
levels of complexity and subjectivity surrounding efforts to document and give proper 
meaning to observations about political economic activity in conflict.  For example, what if 
money intended for humanitarian aid is being used to support terrorists?  Is the meaning we 
give to this behavior that humanitarian organizations are ‘fueling conflict?’  Or what if 
corrupt businesses are serving the same function?   
 
To resolve questions such as these, this element of the research program proposed here 
integrates the knowledge collected in the previous four elements of the research program 
proposed here by asking the question: “What does the political economic change making 
documented in the research program proposed here element 4 reflect about the variables 
identified in the research program proposed here element 1 or 2.”   This can be restated less 
briefly, as “What do the governance structures and practices that produce changes in value 
flows, socio-political orders, territorial control, and/or information within a terrorist conflict 
reflect about the defining, limiting, and bounding factors of that conflict and/or the 
identifying attributes of that conflict’s terrorists.”     
 
This allows one to assess the relative importance of political economic changes.  This could 
be done in particular by documenting how the political economic change making documented 
in the research program proposed here element 4 impacts the outcome(s) produced by the 
variables identified in the research program proposed here element 2.  This can be restated 
less briefly, as the question, “How do the governance structures and practices that produce 
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changes in value flows, socio-political orders, territorial control, and/or information within a 
terrorist conflict impact the behaviors produced by the attributes a terrorist conflict’s 
terrorists.”    Measuring this is in essence a method of giving meaning to political economic 
activity within a terrorist conflict, as illustrated in the graph below.  
 
This graph illustrates that governance of value flows can impact the attributes and behaviors 
of terrorists – and therefore impact the outcomes and dynamics of the conflict – in four 
primary ways.   First, economic activity in conflicts can be given meaning as Economic 
Contexts that Exacerbate Conflict.  These are existing flows of economic value over which 
terrorists have little control and influence, but which nevertheless magnify and enhance the 
attributes of terrorists.  For example, poverty can magnify and enhance the appeal of extreme 
ideologies and facilitate recruitment to terrorist groups, or an unregulated small arms market 
can ease access to weaponry and thus amplify the military capabilities of terrorists.  Second, 
economic activity in conflicts can be given meaning as Economic Contexts that Mitigate 
Conflict. This is the reverse of contexts that exacerbate conflict, in that in this case existing 
flows of economic value diminish the attributes of terrorists, for example when a decrease in 
socio-political inequality leads to less attraction to extremist and violent groups; or, in a case 
in which governance of value flows in one area can influence that in another, when an 
increase in the power of state to enforce land rights, collect taxation, distribute government 
spending diminishes the ability of terrorist groups to generate wealth through the exploitation 
of natural resources.  
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Third, economic activity in conflicts can be given meaning as Economic Drivers of Conflict.  
This refers to when terrorists have high levels of control over flows of economic value that 
directly and positively impact their specific attributes.  An natural example is that control 
over natural resources – such as the control of the poppy trade by the Taliban in Afghanistan 
– can each generate massive amounts of material wealth for terrorist groups, which in turn 
can strengthen not only their military capabilities but also their ability to make political, 
social, and cultural change that is to their advantage.  Finally, economic activity in conflicts 
can be given meaning as Economic Obstacles to Conflict.  The opposite of Economic 
Drivers, this refers to when terrorists attributes are diminished despite or because of the fact 
that they have high levels of control and influence over a particular flow of value.  For 
example, although Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland largely governed the flow of 
illegal drugs in the province, this control – despite being very profitable and a primary 
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funding mechanism for their military capabilities – also greatly discredited them in the views 
of their intended political and social constituencies.   
Element 6: Applying this Knowledge to Influence the Behavior and Capabilities of Terrorists 
The final element of the research program proposed here is a method for integrating and 
applying the knowledge produced in the previous elements of the research program proposed 
here to practices and exercise of power meant to influence the outcomes of a particular 
conflict.  Outcomes of conflicts can be influenced in many different ways and for many 
different ends.  The research program proposed here offers a way to make attempts at 
influencing conflict outcomes more transparent.  This element is included because it not only 
offers a way to stop, resolve, mitigate the effects of – or even win – a terrorist conflict, but 
also allows one to place the political economics of conflict into wider political, normative, 
and practical contexts.  In other words, if one can understand how a terrorist conflict can be 
impacted by influencing political economic activity within it, then one can also comprehend 
or at least examine who might benefit and seek such outcomes.   
 
The research program proposed here accomplishes this via a comparison of the variables 
from Elements 5 and 1 in order to determine their precise or estimated relationship.  Once 
this relationship is determined, then an appropriate set of structures, practices, and ultimately 
actions can also be determined.  This can be stated less briefly as a graph that assesses what 
structures, practices, and actions will impact, in ways that serve the normative and political 
beliefs of the analyst, existing governance structures and practices within a terrorist conflict, 
which themselves produce changes in value flows, socio-political orders, territorial control, 
and/or information that in turn impact terrorist behaviors that run counter to the normative 
and political beliefs of the analyst.   An example of such a graph is below: 
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This graph shows that using the research program proposed here it is possible to represent 
and schematize the relationship between the meaning one attaches to economic activity 
within a terrorist conflict and one’s practical and analytic objectives vis a vis the same 
conflict.  In particular, the graph shows that responses to conflict (i.e. actions meant to 
influence the outcomes and dynamics of a terrorist conflict one way or another) can be 
assessed as a function of whether the impact on the governance of political economic activity 
in ways that the analysts views as favorable or not favorable to the terrorists of a terrorist 
conflict, and whether this action is in line with the underlying normative, political, analytic, 
or other beliefs of the analyst.  In particular, it demonstrates that by analyzing their impact on 
the governance of relevant political economies, responses to terroristic conflict can be 
represented in four general categories.   
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First, Successful Responses are those actions that change political economic reality in ways 
that are not only antagonistic to terrorists but also fit closely with the aims and beliefs of the 
analyst.  This helps explain how, for example, the growth of the middle class in Northern 
Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland served to lessen the ongoing conflict there.  Second, 
Unmitigated Failures are those responses that both impact the governance of political 
economies within conflicts in ways that favor terrorists and violate the principles, beliefs, or 
objectives of the analyst.  For example, many critics of covert American support to the 
regime of Augusto Pinochet are in essence arguing that such policy represented an 
unmitigated failure in that in not only strengthened the political economic control of certain 
terrorists (e.g. Pinochet and his fellow coup plotters) but also undermined American 
principles such as support for rule of law and human rights.  Third, Well Intentioned Failures 
are those responses that serve the interests of the analyst but also benefit terrorists.  Examples 
of such failures would include increases in humanitarian aid that are simply stolen and used 
by terrorist groups in a terrorist conflict, or programs to develop a country’s natural 
resources, but which ultimately only serve to increase the wealth and power of terrorist 
groups. It should be noted that Well Intentioned Failures can be politically useful to those 
engaging in them, especially when there is a lack of knowledge, information, or simply 
concern about whether the responses are achieving their intended effects.  Fourth, Pyrrhic 
Successes are those actions that do negatively impact terrorists – and thus serve to undermine 
if not mitigate conflicts – but do so at the cost of violating the normative, political or other 
beliefs and objectives of those conducting the response.  This could include for example 
increased surveillance of financial activity by the United States and EU governments in the 
name of fighting terrorist financing, which appear to have diminished the ability of terrorist 
groups to use the global commercial financial system, but at the price of lessened protections 
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for civil liberties and some high profile cases of individuals wrongly identified and punished 
as financiers of terrorism.  
Summary 
This concluding section set out to outline an analytic methodology with which the complex 
and often difficult to research realities of terrorist financing can be documented, represented, 
and schematized.  I argue that the research program proposed here represents a promising – 
and, more significantly, a systematically testable – approach for documenting and modeling 
terrorist financing because, even though the results may be a vulgar representation of reality, 
the research program proposed here is systematic about not only the attributes of conflict, but 
also in its explicit engagement with the subjectivity of terrorism and contemporary conflict.  
It would naturally require and benefit from further empirical testing and analytic refinement, 
both of which are beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Conclusion 
This thesis began with an exploration of how orthodox understandings of terrorist finance 
generally ‘ask the wrong questions’ about terrorist financing, and presented an analysis of 
what, epistemically, the ‘right questions’ are, upon which this thesis ultimately built an 
alternative conceptualization of terrorism-related financial activity that represents such 
activity in terms centered around the contextualized dynamics of individual-level political-
economic interaction.  In particular, this thesis found that the term ‘terrorist financing’ is a 
misnomer in that much of the activity encompassed by the term involves neither terrorism 
nor finance, and thus can be more successfully analyzed in terms not counterproductively 
governed by both these intrinsically problematic and contested concepts.  Instead, terrorist 
financing can be alternatively represented typologically as either the exchanges of economic 
and material value that empower ‘terrorist’ actors, or specific material expressions of support 
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to either ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorism’-related socio-political movements (however this contested 
term is defined).  This typology and the improved conceptualization presented in the thesis, it 
is argued, constitute a framework for representing terrorism-related financial activity within 
which, compared to existing discourse, more accurate and precise knowledge of the political 
economic dimensions of terrorist actors can be produced and mediated in terms that are more 
useful to all members of the community of terrorist financing analysts. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the academy by directly confronting a topic that despite being 
subject of a vast and powerful regime that costs billions and affects the behavior of millions 
remains grossly and destructively misunderstood.  While further research remains to further 
explicate and apply the findings, conclusions, and hypotheses raised in this thesis, its 
contribution rests in its successful presentation of an empirical field study of terrorist finance, 
an extended critique of existing analysis, a systematic reformulation of the epistemological 
foundations of the issue, an application of this new epistemology to the topic, and a blueprint 
for a viable research program to continue to improve understanding of this complex and 
difficult topic.   
 
Most significantly, this dissertation simply acts on acceptance of the full epistemological 
consequences of recognizing that the analysis of terrorist finance is itself a political project 
meant to serve specific interests of liberal democratic society.  More precisely, it provides a 
conceptual framework that helps address the liberal problematic of security as it related to 
terrorist finance, and also is viable alternative to dominant analytic approaches that require 
one to uncover dark secrets about the global ‘infrastructures’ and “mysterious” networks that 
supposedly finance terrorism.  However, while the world of terrorist finance is indeed often 
invisible and inaudible to the casual observer, it is very much knowable and comprehensible 
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– if one asks the right questions and has frameworks to represent the issue in ways that 
support systematic, repeatable research that is both empirically grounded and conceptually 
sound.  This dissertation fundamentally argues that what is referred to as ‘terrorist finance’ is 
at core simply a certain sub-set of political economic activity about which liberal democratic 
societies are currently concerned.  It can thus be observed, analyzed, interpreted, and acted 
upon, just like any other manifestation of human behavior. This subtle but important 
epistemological shift subordinates normative debates about ‘bad’ (i.e. terrorist) versus ‘good’ 
financing, and replaces them with a foundation of analysis that is not only closer to the 
specific (liberal democratic) interests and objectives it is supposed to serve, but also enables 
access to more analytic tools required to meet those objectives. 
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